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THE MARSHALL PLAN: A CASE STUDY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPIRMENTATION
CHAPTER I 
FROM YALTA TO THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 
Introduction
On May 8, 19̂ 5> President Harry S. Truman announced to a 
thankful nation the unconditional surrender of Germany. Although 
the actual capitulation had occurred the previous day at Rheims,
France,it was ratified formally at Berlin on May 9; 19̂ 5- On August 
l4, 194$, the President announced the surrender of Japan. Officially 
the surrender was made on September 1, with the following day being 
proclaimed as "V-J Day".
Thus was brought to its close the most destructive and costly 
war in the world's history and the first conflict actually spanning 
the entire globe. Stemming directly from this century's other and 
first "world" war, out of the devastation and fury of the war years 
1939-19^5 was spawned a new era, the age of the super-states. Although 
the fact was not clearly discernible in 19^5, the war and its after- 
math heralded the end of traditional international relationships. De­
parted from the center of the world power structure were Great Britain, 
France, Germany and Japan. Enfeebled by a half-century of preparing
for and fighting debilitating wars, these once dominant actors on the
1
world stage now found themselves in roles of secondary and even lesser 
importance, their places having been preempted by the new super-states, 
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Although infinitely exhausted by the savagery of the blood-let­
ting so recently ended and conscious only of a desire to erase the 
memory of the holocaust through a return to the business of peace as 
expeditiously as possible, the peoples of the war-torn areas were to 
be given no surcease. Instead, they were to be catapulted into an even
more intense, if less sanguine, struggle for power between the new
super-states. Out of the seeds of the victorious war-time alliance
were to arise the bitter fruits of hate, suspicion, mistrust and, pos­
sibly, the war to end all wars--perhaps the world itself.^
The casting of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet 
Union into the role of allies in the second World War was an apt illus­
tration of the incongruities and vagaries that fate often deals its 
mortal subjects. Sometimes termed the "Grand Alliance", a more ap­
propriate term might have been the "Grand Misalliance". Including, as 
it did, the archetypes of capitalism and communism, the "Grand Alliance" 
contained the seeds of its own disintegration. Cooperation among the 
three allies was never easy during the war. Indeed,, the path to allied 
harmony \often seemed to be obstructed by elements of discord strewn 
deliberately by the Soviet Union. At the same time, suspicion of the 
motives of its Western allies was not lacking on the part of the Russians.
^"If the nineteenth century, politically speaking, was the era of 
multiple opportunities, the twentieth century by stark contrast is the 
day of the single chance . . . ." Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign 
Policy (New York: The Norton Library, W. W. Norton and'Co., Inc., 196̂ ),
p. 8 8.
Concessions were made frequently by the Anglo-Americans to their Soviet
2partners. Each concession was made in the hope that it would be part 
of the cement of a cooperative postwar relationship in the interest of 
enduring world peace.3
The United States had been forced into the war--so it thoqght; 
it was fighting to destroy the evils of Fascism, Naziism, and militarism, 
as exemplified by Germany, Japan, and Italy; and after the war had been 
won it would much prefer a return to more prosaic enterprises. The war 
was a nightmarish interlude in the affairs of a people dedicated to less 
sanguinary pursuits. The sooner it was ended, the better. Therefore, 
American policy during the war most frequently was dictated by military 
rather than political ends. There was concern, of course, for the con­
figuration of the postwar world. Great efforts were expended on the 
planning of a postwar international organization to guarantee the
^An American official of that period asserted, however, that the 
record of Yalta, " . . .  shows clearly that the Soviet Union made greater 
concessions ... to the United States and Great Britain than were made 
to the Soviets . . . ." The Yalta Agreements were termed a "diplomatic 
triumph" for the Western partners in the alliance. Edward R. Stettinius, 
Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians; The Yalta Conference, ed. Walter John­
son (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 19̂ 9); PP* 295-307*
•3It was only at Yalta, late in the war, that Big Three military 
plans were coordinated for the first time. Ibid., pp. 110-111. One 
author argues that "Russia was as eager as the West to co-operate. Not 
until victory seemed certain did Stalin show anxiety to keep the eastern 
front as his exclusive theatre of military operations . . . ." Stephen 
Borsodj’-, The Triumph of Tyranny: The Nazi and Soviet Conquest of Central
Europe (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 155* Herman Finer, on the
other hand, itemizes the concessions made by the West in the interest of 
cooperation with Soviet Russia. He points out that Roosevelt consistently 
attempted to conciliate Russo-British differences and that Britain, under 
Roosevelt's lead, made serious efforts to get along with the Russians. How­
ever, Finer adds that hardly any of the conciliatory actions made to still 
Russian suspicions "was accepted with clear good grace . . . ." America * s 
Destiny (New York: The Macmillan Co., 19 7̂), p. 26$.
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peacefully-inclined peoples of the world against would-be aggressors 
of the future. As during World War I and during the planning for the 
abortive League of Nations, the United States aspired to an idealistic 
state of affairs in which the specter of power politics could not rear 
its ugly head. There were, to be sure, realists among America’s policy- 
and opinion-makers. But those who saw clearly the war-time objectives 
of the Soviet Union frequently had to yield to the primary aim of win- 
ning the war. The peace would take care of itself in due time.
That the peace would not "take care of itself" began to become 
evident before the war’s end. And in only a few short months after the 
sounds of battle had ebbed, it became apparent that a new struggle, with 
even higher stakes, was under ŵ gr.
Although the discordant sounds of World War II have retreated 
into time, they have not been replaced by notes of harmony. The years 
since the Axis surrender hardly have been years of tranquil international 
relations. Hardly at any time since 19 5̂ has the world felt safe from 
a final and cataclysmic eruption between the two giants of the postwar
kUnited States Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman 
told President Truman on April 20, 19̂ 5 that the Russians simultaneously 
were pursuing policies of cooperation with the United States and Great 
Britain and extension of control over neighboring states. Some of 
Stalin’s advisers, he said, had interpreted the generosity and desire to 
cooperate of the United States as "softness" and that the Soviet Union 
could continue its policies with little risk of being challenged by the 
United States. Harriman advocated a "reconsideration of our policy and 
the abandonment of any illusion that the Soviet government was likely 
soon to act in accordance with the principles to which the rest of the 
world held in international affairs . . . ." Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: 
Year of Decisions, .1 (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1955)> 71* 
Columnist Walter Lippmann, speaking unofficially, visualized Russia, up­
on the defeat of Germany and Japan, as the " . . .  greatest power in the 
rear of our indispensable friends . . . ." He saw the great danger posed 
to future international peace in the problem of Soviet Russia’s security
5
era. The dream of Roosevelt and others for a future society of 
nations so ordered that world war would he impossible, if not unthinkr 
able, had been converted into the reality of bipolarity, the division 
of the world literally into two armed and antagonistic camps.
In retrospect, only during a hhort respite after the end of 
World War II have the people of the United States (and the world) been 
at "peace". This was so, however, only because their immediate post­
war domestic concerns made them blissfully unaware of the power struggle 
that was gathering force rapidly for an open and convùisive confrontation.
interests on its western frontiers. If the states of Eastern Europe would 
adopt policies of neutrality, and if the Soviet Union would respect such 
policies, this would prevent a conflict from arising over this matter be­
tween the United States and the Soviet Union, Furthermore, it would give 
these states the " . . .  only form of security we are able to offer them." 
U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and
Co., 19^3 )>PP* 1^5-152. Presented with an accomplished fact at the Yalta 
Conference, all the United States could do in regard to Eastern Europe 
was to assure the Russians that it agreed with them on the necessity of 
having friendly governments on its western borders. The United States be­
lieved, however, that this need could be fulfilled through guarantees that 
Nazi and Fascist elements would not be represented in such freely-estab­
lished governments. As events were to prove, however, the Soviet security 
interests could not be met by leaving to chance the composition of s.ùch 
governments, particularly to the risks involved in holding Western-style 
elections.
5Western hopes for postwar cooperation had been buoyed during the 
war when the Communist International was disbanded. Restrictions on 
religion within Soviet Russia were lifted and emphasis placed on patriot­
ism to Mother Russia. Immediately after the war, however, a marked re­
action occurred. Success in the war was attributed largely to the 
exemplary characteristics of the Soviet system and to the ideology and 
orthodoxy of Communism. In August, 19̂ 5, Mikhail Kalinin, President of 
the Supreme Soviet, warned that only the "most immediate" danger to 
Soviet Russia had disappeared with the defeat of Hitler’s Germany.
Foreign Minister Molotov, on November 6, 19̂ 5; warned against possible 
"new violators of the peace". Stalin, on February 9; 19^, called for 
the strengthening of the Soviet industrial base in order to guarantee 
the country against any "accidents". This speech was termed by United 
States Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas as the "Declaration of 
World War III." In Soviet Russia, in 19^5  ̂the Commmist Party undertook
6
The main concern of this dissertation lies in examining one 
particular aspect of the continuing world struggle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. It may be precipitate to characterize 
this situation, at the outset, as a contest between the United States 
and the Soviet Union; however, at war's end only these two states could 
be assessed correctly as great powers. All others by the obvious fact 
of their relative poverty would fall into one of the orbits of the two 
giants. Once the United States came to the full realization of its 
leading worhd role in the postwar period, the struggle then clearly 
became one between the two great super-powers and their satellites.
It shall be the primary purpose in the following sections of 
this chapter to present in outline form the rapid deterioration of the 
wartime coalition and the accelerating asperity in the relations be­
tween two members of that alliance, the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The end of the wartime cooperation, such as it was,, and the 
division of the world into two antagonistic blocs, can best be seen 
in the progress of events in Eastern Europe immediately preceding and 
subsequent to the war's end; in the occupation and resultant division 
of Germany; in the failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers to
a thorough purge of all elements of cultural and intellectual "cosmo­
politanism", i. e., admiration for or recognition of Western achieve­
ments. Attacks upon Western culture became increasingly vehement. As 
before the war, emphasis again was placed on the dangers of "capitalist
encirclement". Subjected to a widespread purge also was the Soviet
Communist Party. To lessen the potential competition of the Red Army, 
recent military heroes were downgraded, relegated to obscurity, or
worse. William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co­
operation and Conflict, 19yl-I9^6, sd. Arnold Toynbee ("Survey of Inter 
national Affairs, 1939-19̂ 5"; London: by Oxford University Press for
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953)̂  pp.
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resolve basic issues; in Soviet obstructionism in the United Nations; 
in the economic and political deterioration of Europe following the 
war; and, finally, in the Greek-Turkish crises leading to the adoption 
of the Truman Doctrine.
With the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, a line finally was 
established between the Soviet Union and the United States--between 
East and West. But even with this disheartening decline of relations, 
the United States was to make one further attempt to include the Soviet 
Union in a venture to build a viable postwar world. This was the Mar­
shall Plan, and on this revolutionary aspect of the postwar foreign 
policy of the United States shall be placed the primary focus of this 
dissertation. By the time of its pronouncement, the responsibility of 
the United States in the postwar world had been brought into clear re­
lief. How the President, the Congress, and the American people responded 
to the new international challenge shall be the major concern of this 
dissertation.
The Deterioration of Relations Between the United 
States and the Soviet Union after World War II
Eastern Europe-After Yalta 
During the period December 7, 19̂ 1 to December 31; 19̂ 6, there 
were some 32 major allied conferences and meetings.^ Among the more 
important of these were those involving the heads of state or govern­
ment of the Big Two or Big Three Allied Powers, such as Casablanca
^Ibid., pp. 769-771.
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(19̂ 3); Cairo (l9%8), Tehran (19̂ 8), Quebec (1944), Moscow (1944),
Yalta (1945), and Potsdam (1945).
Because of its implications for the postwar political struc­
ture of Europe and the relations between the United States, Britain, 
and the Soviet Union, the Crimea (Yalta) Conference of February 4-11, 
1945, participated in by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, 
and Marshal Stalin, must be regarded as the most significant and far- 
reaching. At the Yalta Conference, the Big Three dealt with the terms 
for Russia's entry into the war against Japan; the voting formula in the 
Security Council of the proposed United Nations Organization; the Polish 
problem; Allied policy toward Germany; and Allied policy in the areas of 
Europe liberated from Nazi rule.
Roosevelt was hopeful that at Yalta had been laid the foun­
dation for a stable world order, to be guaranteed through the co­
operation of the major powers functioning through the United Nations.
It is difficult to attribute any such motives to Stalin. It is pos­
sible that even he looked forward to a period of international stability, 
during which the Soviet Union would recoup its terrible losses of the 
war years and renew its mission of world Communism. It is also pos= 
sible that Stalin departed from the ill-starred Crimea Conference con­
fident that he had been dealing with men who envisioned relationships 
in the postwar world much as he did, i. e., a world in which power
politics would continue to be the order of the day, despite the window-
7dressing afforded by the United Nations Organization.
^Stalin, at Yalta, was bluntly explicit in his view that the 
peace should be maintained by Russia, Britain, and the United States.
9
Regardless of speculations as to Stalin's motives at the 
time, the post-Yalta record indicates clearly that the Conference 
meant one thing to the Anglo-American participants and another to 
the Russians. The hard truth of the matter was that the Russian 
Army was in control of much of Eastern Europe at the time of the 
Crimea Conference and its westward drive continued until the German 
capital of Berlin was reached. This fact dictated not only the 
outcome of the Yalta deliberations with respect to Eastern Europe,
g
but the future course of events in all of Europe.
The "Declaration on Liberated Europe", drawn up and subscribed 
to by the Big Three at Yalta, looked hopefully toward a period of post­
war cooperation between the Three Powers "in meeting the political and
economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic .
9
principles". Also, it looked forward to the " . . .  restoration of 
sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been 
forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.This was viewed 
not just as a desirable end but as a responsibility jointly assumed by
It was "ridiculous", he said, that a small country "like Albania" should 
have a voice equal to one of the Big Three Powers. As late as February 
k, 194^, Secretary of State Stettinius felt that no progress had been 
made "toward building a world organization based on recognition of the 
sovereign rights of all nations." Stettinius, pp. 112-114, II6.
Q
At the time of the Yalta Conference, American and British 
armies had just repulsed the German counter-offensive in Belgium; the 
Rhine had not yet been bridged; and the Allied advance in Italy had 
bogged down. With the exception of most of Czechoslovakia, all of 
Eastern Europe was in the hands of the Red Army. Ibid., pp. 300-301».
^Ibid., p. 335, 
lOlbid., p. 343.
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the Big Three Powers. In addition, the hope was expressed that France
would associate itself with the Three Powers in this effort. Joint
assistance of the Big Three was anticipated for any European-liberated
state or former Axis satellite in Europe where, in the judgment of the
Three Powers, conditions require
(a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to 
carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed 
peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities 
broadly representative of all democratic elements in 
the population and pledged to the earliest possible es­
tablishment through free elections of governments respon­
sive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate
where necessary the holding of such elections.
A "Declaration on Poland", agreed upon by the Conference, called 
for reorganization of the Provisional Government then functioning in 
Poland " . . . on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of demo­
cratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad . . . . " Soviet 
Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, United States Ambassador to Russia 
Averell Harriman, and British Ambassador to Russia Sir A. Clark Kerr
were constituted a commission to consult in Moscow with democratic
Polish leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view toward 
reorganizing the Polish Provisional Government. The reorganized govern­
ment, to be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, 
would be " . . . pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections 
as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret 
ballot . . . ." The Three Powers pledged to establish diplomatic 
relations with the new government, as soon as it had been reorganized 
lines described in the Declaration. Further, the Three Powers
^^Ibid., pp. 343-344.
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recognized the Gurzon Line, with digressions in Poland's favor, as the 
eastern boundary of Poland. Although the necessity for "substantial 
accessions of territory in the North and West" was recognized, the 
final delimitation of the western Polish boundary was left to the Peace 
Conference.
Finally, the Three Powers recommended, in regard to Yugoslavia,
that the Tito-Subasitch Agreement should be put into effect immediately
and that a new government should be formed on the basis of this Agree- 
13ment.
The underlying assumption of the Yalta agreements regarding 
Eastern Europe, in so far as the United States was concerned, was that 
the war-time cooperation of the Big Three, and particularly as this co­
operation appeared to be manifested at Yalta, would continue into the 
postwar period. Although the United States recognized and supported 
the Soviet desire for security of its western frontiers against future 
aggressors, it believed that this security could be obtained through 
measures designed to insure that Nazi and Fascist governments did not 
again rise to power in Germany or in any of the states of Eastern Europe. 
Thus, in the view of the United States, both the security requirements 
of,the Soviet Union for its western frontiers and the aspirations for
^^Ibid., pp. 34Ô-347.
^^Ibid., p. 347. Dr. Ivan Subasitch, of the London Yugoslav 
Government-in-Exile, and Mar-shal Tito, leader of the Yugoslav Partisans, 
had been brought together by the British and Russians and had agreed 
to join in the formation of an interim government, with Tito as Premier 
and Subasitch as Foreign Minister. The agreement called also for the 
holding of free and unfettered elections and the establishment of a truly 
representative government. Tito further agreed to the establishment of 
a regency in place of King Peter. Ibid., p. 217*
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freedom among the peoples of Eastern Europe would he met through the
establishment of democratic regimes in those states and through the
subjugation and ultimate democratization of Germany.
Although a signatory to the same Yalta Agreements to which
the United States and Great Britain had acceded, the Soviet Union had
a radically different interpretation of those agreements and of its
security requirements. No longer were its western frontiers to be
dependent upon "buffer zones", "balance-of-pcwer" arrangements, or
other devices beyond its control to manipulate in accordance with its
. 1 1̂-own considered neeas.
Long before the Yalta Conference convened, events had been
set in motion which had as their design the ultimate stabilization of
the western Soviet frontiers. During the period of the Molotov-Ribben-
trop Pact, this objective seemed assured, if any faith could be put in
15the Nazi partners of this nefarious scheme. When this rapprochement
^^Herman Finer, in 194?, contended that the primary concern of 
the Soviet Union was with the " . . .  security of the land of the Soviet 
revolution. If they can acquire influence and domination abroad, well 
and good--but not to pursue this at an exhorbitant cost, such as a tan­
gible risk of war." Finer, pp. 280-28l. Another-author, however, 
doubted that Soviet expansionist moves were motivated by desire for 
security or by fear and suspicion of the outside world. " . . .  It would 
place a considerable strain on a sympathetic imagination to believe that 
the security of the Soviet Union, which included within its 1939 frontiers 
almost one-sixth of the land surface of the globe, was seriously imperiled 
by the independent existence of such small neighbor states as Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia . . . ." William Henry Chamberlin, The European 
Cockpit (New York: The Macmillan Co., 19^7)  ̂pp. 6O-6I.
^^Signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939- In a secret protocol, 
the two parties agreed to a delineation of Soviet and German spheres of 
interest in the Baltic states, Poland, and Southeastern Europe. Germany 
declared its complete disinterest in Southeastern Europe. U. S., Depart­
ment of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-194^, Publication 
6462 (Washington! U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 245-247.
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had served its purpose and the Nazis had turned upon their erstwhile 
ally, the Soviets sought assurances from their new Western allies that 
they would not be denied the fruits gained during the period of Nazi- 
Soviet agreement. Such assurances were not forthcoming, although the 
British were not as optimistic as their American partners in regard to 
entering a new era free of "power politics" and "spheres of influence".
The United States insisted, however, that territorial settlements must 
await the postwar peace negotiations.^^
By the time the Big Three met at Yalta, however, at least some 
responsible officials of the United States State Department were becom­
ing concerned with the realities of the situation in Eastern Europe.
They recognized Soviet aspirations in this area and that now, with the 
rejuvenated and victorious Red Army rolling ominously westward, there 
was little that could be done to prevent the complete realization of 
these ambitions. Thus, the "Declaration on Liberated Europe" was
During the negotiations for the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance, 
which was signed on May 25, 19̂ 2, the Soviets asked Great Britain to 
recognize their claims to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and portions of 
Finland, Poland and Rumania. Britain would not grant the Soviet request. 
The United States threatened to denounce any treaty containing any 
such recognition. However, in August, 19̂ 2, Churchill, meeting with 
Stalin in Moscow, conceded the "predominant interest" of the Soviet 
Union in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bul­
garia. The "predominant interest" of Great Britain in Greece was recog­
nized by Stalin. In the summer of 1944, an agreement was reached be­
tween the British and the Russians whereby Rumanian and Bulgarian affairs 
temporarily would be "mainly" the concern of the Russians and Greek af­
fairs would be a British concern. Roosevelt reluctantly agreed to a 
three-months' trial of this arrangement, again cautioning against the 
creation of spheres of interest. In October 1944, at Moscow, Churchill 
and Eden agreed that Russia should have 90 percent predominance in 
Rumania, 75 percent in Bulgaria; Britain should have 90 percent pre­
dominance in Greece, while they should have equal influence in Yugo­
slavia and Hungary. Borsody, pp. 158-160, 17O-I7I, 174.
14
17prepared and expectantly presented to the Big Three at Yalta.
As events were to prove, mere words were no effective de­
terrent to Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe. While its Western
partners were concentrating on the war effort, the Soviet Union had
been looking to the future.
The actual Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe occurred as the 
Red Army sped through the area in the final months of the war. As
the Nazi yoke was lifted, another was put in its place.
Before his death, President Roosevelt became alarmed at re­
ports reaching him about Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. He did not 
relinquish hope, however, that Russia would continue to cooperate with
^7one of those officials was Philip E. Mosely. He writes that 
by mid-1943, among those experts and diplomats of the State Department 
" . . .  who had more time for reflection and prognostication in a 
period of 'technological unemployment' imposed on them in time of war 
[there was] no wish to escape into rosy dreams of a conflictless world. 
The studies prepared by the Country and Area Committees within the 
Department of State during 1943 and 1944 will show, when published, 
that there was a keen awareness of the menace of Soviet domination over 
East Central Europe and an equally keen desire to ward off this menace. 
And both this awareness and this desire were fully shared by the De­
partment's Committee on Post-war Programs." Mosely also reports, how­
ever, that "serious cleavages" existed among President Roosevelt's 
various military and political advisers. There was an especially 
serious cleavage between the State and War Departments. Roosevelt's 
military advisers believed that the United States should accept no 
responsibilities in spheres outside its own theaters of military com­
mand. This resulted in the Mediterranean and East Central European 
areas being treated as primarily British concerns. As late as April 
23, 1945, Secretary of War Stimson argued that the Balkans were not in 
the sphere of United States action. The United States, therefore, 
should exercise caution in opposing Soviet violations of the Yalta 
Agreements in this area. Philip E. Mosely, "Hopes and Failures: Ameri­
can Policy Toward East Central Europe, 1941-1947." The Ph,te of East 
Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy, ed»
Stenhen D. Kertesz fNotre Dame. Ind.: Universitv of Notre Dame Press.
1956), pp. 57,60, 62-63.
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l8America and Britain in the postwar world. President Truman was 
advised, upon assuming office, that the Soviet representatives were
acting unilaterally in the liberated and former Axis satellite states
19of Eastern Europe. Prime Minister Churchill sought unsuccessfully
to get agreement from Truman for the Western armies to push as far
to the east as possible before the ultimate Nazi surrender, in order
that the West might have more bargaining power against the Russians
after the end of hostilities. President Truman, however, believed
that if Britain and the United States did not adhere to the letter
of prior commitments, they could not expect the Russians to do like- 
20wise. It was not to become obvious to the Americans for many 
months yet that their view of solemn undertakings and that of the, 
Soviets were diametrically and unalterably opposed.
The complete consolidation of the Soviet control of Eastern 
Europe did not occur simultaneously with "liberation" by the Red Army, 
The pattern, however, was similar in each country. In some cases, 
take-over was accomplished by native Communists who had gone under­
ground during the war years to harass their Nazi oppressors, This
loBorsody, p. 206.
^̂ Ibld,. pp. 197-198.
^^After fighting had ceased in Europe, Churchill, on June h}
19^5 ill a message to Truman, said he viewed " . . .  with profound mic- 
givings the retreat of the American army to our line of occupation in 
the Central Sector, thus bringing Soviet power into the heart of Western 
Europe and the descent of an iron curtain between us and everything to 
the eastward." Truman, I, 243-246, 298, 301-302. President Truman was 
quoted as saying in early 1946 that " . . .  if I had known then I1945J 
what I know now, I would have ordered the troops to go to the western 
boundaries of Russia." Herbert Agar, The Unquiet Years (London; Rupert 
Hart-Bavis, 1957)> PP. 6O-61,
l6
21was true in Albania and Yugoslavia. In other countries, Moscow- 
trained Communists returned to their homelands with the liberating 
Red Army to establish governments, ostensibly for the purpose of 
maintaining order in the rear of the advancing Red Army.
During the immediate postwar period, an effort was made to
give the Eastern European governments the appearance, at least, of
the "respectability" required by the Yalta Agreements, although ap-.
pearances did not equate with actuality. This was the era of the
coalition regimes, in which were found representatives of all parties,
with the exception, of course, of the Nazis and Fascists, In these
governments, the Communists were not always in the majority. They
did, however, gain control quickly and deliberately of such vital
22ministries as police, army, communications, and information. At 
the opportune time, it was but a short step from dominance of these 
crucial posts to complete control.
Non-Communists in the Eastern European coalition regimes were 
not long in learning that their participation in governmental affairs 
was to be at the sufferance of the Soviets and bheir local vassals. 
Gradually, all actual non-Communists were forced out of such govern­
ments, although the fiction of separate parties was continued for 
varying periods in the different countries. Non-Communist politicians 
who actively opposed Soviet policies were removed through intimidation, 
threats, and actual violence. In their places came those who were
^^Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1951), p. lêÔ.
--Ibid., pp. 169-170.
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willing to sacrifice principle for position. The independent agrarian 
parties j who provided the Communists with their primarj'' and most per= 
sistent opposition, were systematically suppressed and eliminated, 
usually amid charges of "Fascist reaction". When the Communist take­
over was complete, the fiction of separate parties was eliminated. 
Paradoxically, this was termed by the Communists as a further step
23along the road to greater democracy.
The "iron curtain" between East and West descended with seem­
ingly utter finality upon the Communist seizure of power in Czecho­
slovakia in February, 19^» Events preceding the Czechoslovak coup, 
of course, did not proceed mechanically, yet the Communist plan -ms 
apparent from an early date.
President Truman was advised on April 13, 19̂ 5 that the Rus­
sians were using their dominant position on the Allied Control Councils 
in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to interfere unilaterally in the 
political activities of these countries. At the same time, he was 
informed that Ambassador Harriman's efforts in Moscow to implement the 
Yalta decisions relative to Poland were being sabotaged by the Russians 
Only ten days later, the Polish situation had deteriorated to such an 
extent that President Truman and his principal advisers were forced to
consider the possibility of an imminent break in relations with the
25Soviet Union. On May 2, 19̂ 5, Truman was advised that the Communists
^3ibid., pp. 170-171. 
2^ruman, I, 15-17- 
^^Ibid., pp. 85-86.
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were dominating the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, despite the 
wishes of the people, and were initiating measures to tie these coun­
tries economically and politically to the Soviet Union,Only as a 
consequence of the efforts of Harry Hopkins, dispatched to Moscow to 
consult personally with Marslial Stalin, was the Polish stalemate ended. 
Even then, the resulting Provisional Government was dominated by Poles 
favored by Moscow, Mikolajczyk, the London Pole whose inclusion in 
the Provisional Government was insisted upon by the United States and 
Great Britain, was forced out of that Government in the summer of 19^»
and by the autumn of 19̂ 7 the facade of multi-party representation in
28the Government was ended.
In Albania and Yugoslavia, complete domination of the govern­
ments by the Communists was effected almost upon the cessation of 
hostilities. The Tito-Subasitch Agreement was carried out ostensibly, 
with Tito becoming Premier and Subasitch Foreign Minister. It soon
became obvious, however, that opposition to the Communists would not 
29be tolerated. In Bulgaria and Rumania, the fiction of broadly
S^lbid., p. 2$4.
07 _-'On commenting to President Truman on the results of the Hopkins 
visit with Stalin during May 26-June 7> 19̂ 5> Ambassador Harriman said 
he was ” . . .  afraid that Stalin does not and never will fully under­
stand our interest in a free Poland as a matter of principle. The Russian 
Premier is a realist in all his actions, and it is hard for him to ap­
preciate our faith in abstract principles. It is difficult for him to 
understand why we should want to Interfere with Soviet policy in a coun­
try like Poland which he considers so important to Russia’s security un­
less we have some ulterior motive. He does, however, appreciate that he 
must deal with the position we have taken . . , Ibid., p. 263.
-"Seton-Watson, pp. 109-171»
^^ Ib id . , p. 168; Borsody, pp. 204-20$.
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representative multi-party governments was maintained until the fall
of 19^7- In Hungary, the step to final Communist dictatorship was
taken in the spring of 19^8. After February, 19^8, the Communists
70tolerated no opposition in Czechoslovakia.
During the period in which Communist political control of 
Eastern Europe was being implemented, it was being supplemented by a 
network of political and economic treaties between the Soviet Union 
and the various Eastern European states and between these countries 
and each other. During the period from December 12, 19^3^ to April 
6, 19^8, the Soviet Union concluded "treaties of friendship, cooper­
ation and mutual assistance" with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Finlaiid. Each of these was a 
treaty of military alliance, defining the terms under which it would 
become operative and prohibiting the signatory from joining in coali­
tions directed against the Soviet Union.3^
As political control was cemented by the Communists in Eastern
Europe, constitutional forms based on the Soviet model were adopted.
32Sovietization of the national life then was undertaken in earnest.
The model here, again, was the Soviet Union, with the emphasis on 
nationalization of big industry, mining and banking, rapid industriali­
zation, agrarian reforms and mechanization of agriculture. As in Soviet
30-Seton-Watson, pp. I7O-I7I.
^^Jacob B. Hoptner, "The Structure of the Soviet Orbit," 
Challenge in Eastern Europe, ed. C. E. Black (Hew Brunswick, H. J.: 
Princeton University Press, IS^k), pp. 201-202.
S^Seton-Watson, p. I7I.
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Russia, no aspect of life escaped its role in the total Communist 
design.33
. Economically, the Eastern European satellites became more and 
more a complementary part of the vast Soviet economy as they were tied 
to the Soviet Union in a series of trade and barter arrangements. In 
addition, the Soviets encouraged the satellites to trade among them­
selves and to avoid wasteful competition.
Obviously, the Communist take-over of Eastern Europe did not 
go unnoticed in the West. Initially, although protests were offered 
to the turn of events, the hope was maintained that the Soviet desire 
for security against future aggression would not extend to actual con­
quest of its weak western neighbors, especially if guarantees could be 
given to the Russians that never again would they be required to face 
a Germn onslaught alone. By 19̂ 7; however, it became apparent that 
the Soviet Union did not entrust others with its own defense. Some 
observers, as has been pointed out, attributed less charitable and 
more sinister motives to Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere; 
With the Western awakening to the realities of the Soviet threat came 
the gruaan Doctrine and the )^rshall Plan for European reconstruction. 
There came, also, increasingly abrasive criticisms of the Yalta Agree­
ments and malignment of the responsible United States officials. There 
was little criticism at the time of the Conference, however* In the 
United States there existed a vast reservoir of good will toward the
33Ibid., pp. 265-go8, 277, 297, 307,
3^Ibid., pp. 259-262.
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Soviet Union, After all, it was accomplishing magnificently its part 
of the Allied war aim— the total destruction of Nazi Germany,
At Yalta, both Roosevelt and Churchill had been aware of the 
changed power structure in Europe and the world. Roosevelt perhaps 
was more optimistic than the latter regarding the implications of this 
change for postwar peace and stability. However, at Yalta, the two 
Western leaders had these major objectives: first, to èhd the war as 
quickly as possible, utilizing all possible Soviet aid to this end; 
second, to insure the success of the projected United Nations Organi­
zation through measures necessary to guarantee continued Soviet partici­
pation in the victorious war-time alliance. The cooperation of Soviet 
Russia was deemed indispensable, by the most trusted advisers of the 
two leaders, to both a rapid conclusion of the war and to a successful 
organization of the peace. The Russians were fully cognizant of their 
bargaining position and were prepared to realize its maximum advantage.
The Western leaders did not "give away" anything at Yalta that 
was within their power to withhold. President Roosevelt, upon the al­
most unanimous advice of his highest and most trusted advisers, mili­
tary and political, was convinced that many months of costly warfare 
lay ahead for the United States even after victory over Germany, Ha 
was advised that the Soviet Union had to be brought into the war against 
Japan, in order to minimize United States losses. Even with Russian 
support, and even with the knowledge that soon the United States would 
have completed its first atomic bomb, it was assumed that victory over 
Japan could not be achieved for some eighteen months beyond the end of 
the European war.
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The Yalta Agreements have been denomced as morally indefen­
sible. Yet. at Yalta; Roosevelt and Churchill were presented with a 
fait accompli in Poland, Central and Southeastern Europe, and the Far 
East. It may be argued that the two Western leaders should have stood 
firmly on principle and resisted all Soviet demands. Neither of the 
two refused to argue his convictions with Stalin. Yet the Red Army 
was in actual physical control of territory long considered vital to 
the security of the Soviet Union. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill was 
prepared to deny that the Soviet Union had legitimate security interests 
in this area. In the end, all they could hope for was that the Russians 
would honor their formal agreements. It was a calculated risk which 
was taken--and lost. Nothing short of armed conflict could have re­
versed the tide of events which was set in motion by the victorious 
Red Army as it swiftly forged westward during the waning months of 
the war. The people of the Western world were in no mood to commence 
war with the Russians in 19^5*^^
'̂•'̂For a scholarly and thoroughly documented interpretation of the 
decisions'at the Yalta Conference, see John L. Snell (ed.) et, al., The 
Meaning of Yalta: Big Three Diplomacy and The New Balance of Power (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956). The swift demobilization
of American armed forces after the end of hostilities probably encouraged 
the Russians to proceed less cautiously than they otherwise might have 
been inclined. At any rate, this could only serve to weaken the voice 
with which the United States spoke in international affairs. Both Roose­
velt and his adviser, James F. Byrnes, had let it be known at Yalta 
that the American public would not countenance a direct and prolonged 
involvement of the United States in European affairs. Churchill was dis­
mayed and alarmed. Stalin was non-committal. Stettinius, pp. 88-89,
121, 127, 139. On October 29, 19^5, General Marshall stated: "For the
moment, in a widespread emotional crisis of the American people, de­
mobilization has become, in effect, disintegration, not only of the 
armed forces, but apparently of all conception of world responsibility 
and what it demands of us." Quoted in Finer, p. 29*
23
The Division of Germany Between East and West 
Nowhere he.s the split between East and West been more vividly 
dramatized than in Germany. Beaten to its knees by the vengeful forces 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, Germany 
became the focal point as well as the main prize in the struggle which 
erupted between the recent allies.
In 1945, prostrate Germany was the scourge of the earth. There 
was unanimous agreement that future security.in Europe depended upon ut­
ter and complete destruction of Naziism and the slime from which it was 
spawned. By 1948, however, Germans were being told that their destiny 
lay, on the one hand, with the West, and on the other, with the East.
The Germans themselves had little voice in the struggle, since they 
still were an occupied country. With the East-West schism becoming even 
more pronounced, it was à likely conclusion that the areas under occu­
pation by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France would develop 
along lines favored by those powers and that the area occupied by the 
Soviet Union would become an outpost of Soviet Communism in the heart of 
Central Europe. By 1948, sporadic pleas for German reunification could 
be discarded largely as propaganda--from whatever the source.
Germany divided between East and West was as little foreseen 
as was the rapid Soviet conquest of Eastern Europe. Here, as elsewhere, 
postwar cooperation of the war-time allies was assumed. Divergences of 
interest there were sure to be, yet these would be composed within the 
pacific framework afforded by the new United Nations Organization.
At the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in October, 1943, 
Secretary of State Hull, British Foreign Secretary Eden, and Soviet
2k
Foreign Minister Molotov established the European Advisory Commission, 
with headquarters in London, to work out common postwar policies to­
ward Germany. The Commission did adopt a plan for establishing zones 
of occupation but ’-tus unsuccessful in reaching agreement on a coordi­
nated policy for the post-war treatment of Germany. Certain prominent 
Americans advocated severe punishment for the defeated Germany.
At Yalta, in February, 19̂ 5, the Big Three secretly agreed that 
Germany should be dismembered following final Allied victory and that 
knowledge of this fate should be imparted to the Germans in the terms 
of surrender. In addition, the Yalta conferees agreed that Germany 
should be disarmed and demilitarized. To guarantee observance of the 
terms of surrender, Germany would be divided into occupation zones. In 
addition to zones for the Big Three Powers, an occupation zone for France 
would be formed out of the British and American zones. Coordinated ad­
ministration and control was to be provided by a Central Control Com­
mission, composed of the top military commanders of the occupying powers. 
France would be given a seat on the Control Commission if it accepted 
a zone of occupation.
3^Sumner Welles favored splitting Germany into several states. 
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. advocated the "pastorialization" of Germany by re­
moving all industrial plants from the Huhr and flooding the Ruhr mines. 
These ideas were resisted vigorously by the State and War Departments. 
John C. Campbell et al., The United States in World Affairs, 19^5-19^7 
(New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and 
Brothers, 19̂ 7), p. l66; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany Is Our Problem 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 19̂ 5); PP» 1-̂ ; Philip E. Mosely, Dis­
memberment of Germany," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (April, 1950), 488-14-98; 
Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany," Ibid., XXVIII (July, 1950), 
590-594.
""̂ Stettinius, pp. 121-126. 
®̂Ibid., p. 334.
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Although no definite amount was stipulated in the agreement, 
the Big Three decided that Germany would be required to pay in kind for 
the losses caused by her to the Allies during the war. The exact amount 
of reparations and a detailed plan for exaction thereof was to be worked 
out by an Allied Reparation Commission, consisting of one member each
•30from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.
Punishment of war criminals and extirpation of all Nazi influences from
it-0German life were other declared aims of the Big Three at Yalta.
The policies to be followed by the victorious allies in the post­
war treatment of Germany were delineated further at the Potsdam Conference, 
during July 17-August 2, 19̂ 5* As stipulated in the Protocol to the Con­
ference, the Allied Control Council was to be guided by certain political 
and economic principles in the occupation of Germany. These included:
(l) The complete disarmament and demilitarization 
of Germany and the elimination or control of all 
German industry that could be used for military 
production
(11) To convince the German people that they have 
suffered a total military defeat and that they can­
not escape responsibility for what they have brought 
upon them«elves .
(ill) To destroy the National Socialist party and 
its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dis­
solve all Nazi institutions, to insure that they are 
not revived in any form and to prevent all Nazi and 
militarist activity or propaganda.
(IV) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of
39u. S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 19^57




German political life on a democratic basis and for
eventual peaceful cooperation in international life
by Germany,
Nazi lavs were to be abolished; war ciminals, Nazi leaders and 
other influential Nazis were to be punished; Nazis were to be removed 
from office in public and private agencies; German education was to be 
controlled so as to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines; the judi­
cial system was to be reorganized in accordance with democratic principles; 
the political structure was to be decentralized and local responsibility 
developed. Although no central German Government was to be established 
immediately, the Potsdam Agreements did call for the creation of central 
German administrative departments, particularly in the fields of finance, 
transport, communications, foreign trade, and industry. These were to
lipfunction under the direction and control of the Allied Control Council.
In the sphere of economics, the Control Council was directed to 
eliminate Germany's war potential. Germany was not to be permitted to 
produce arras, ammunition and implements of war, aircraft or sea-going 
ships. Production of items directly necessary to a war economy were 
to be rigidly controlled. Productive capacity not needed for permitted 
production was to be removed for reparations or destroyed. The German 
economy was to be decentralized, with primary emphasis to be placed on 
the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. The
^^Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner (eds.). Documents on 
American Foreign Relations, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1946, VIII (Prince- 
ton: Published for The World Peace Foundation by Princeton University 




nation, however, was to he treated as an economic unit. Production of
goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupation forces
and displaced persons and to maintain in Germany average living standards
honot exceeding the average for all European countries v,3.s t ■ he assured.
The payment of reparations was not to he so excessive as to re­
quire external assistance for Germany. The proceeds from exports from 
current production and stocks was to he made available in the first place 
for payment of approved imports. The Soviet Union's reparations claims 
were to he met hy removals from its occupation zone and from German ex­
ternal assets. Reparations claims of Poland were to he met from the 
Russian share, and the claims of the United States, United Kingdom, 
and other countries were to he met from the Western zones' and from Ger­
man external assets. In addition, the Soviet Union was to receive from 
the Western zones 15 percent of the usable industrial capital equipment 
not necessary for the peace economy, in exchange for an equivalent value 
of specified commodities. It also was to receive another 10 percent of
such industrial capital equipment not necessary for a peace economy,
kkwithout payment or exchange of any kind in return.
The success of the Potsdam accords, and Germany's eventual re­
entry into the family of nations, depended completely upon the coopera­
tion achieved hy the occupying powers. Events in Eastern Europe indi­
cated, however, that the Soviet Union was bent upon a unilateral course 
of action throughout Europe. In Germany, the inner contradictions among
^3ibid., pp. 928-929. 
^Ibid., pp. 930-931.
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the Four Powers revealed their irreconcilable nature soon after the 
beginning of the occupation. Only upon matters of the most perfunctory 
nature could accord be reached. Ironically, not the Russians, but the 
French provided the initial obstructions to the achievement of the ob­
jectives of Potsdam. Although assigned a zone of occupation and given 
a seat on the Allied Control Council as a result of the Yalta decisions, 
France was not a signatory to the Potsdam Agreements. It could, as a 
consequence, pursue a unilateral course when it so desired. In view of 
the French fear of German military and economic strength, France of­
fered repeated opposition to measures by which centralized authority
I15would be placed in German hands.
At the beginning of the occupation, the Soviet Union expressed
a desire for a unified Germany.This, of course, could enhance the
possibilities for eventual communization of all Germany. The frequently
expressed desire of the United States to disengage itself from German
and European affairs at the earliest possible opportunity could only
have encouraged Soviet hopes for the attainment of its ultimate ob- 
i+7jactives. The Western powers were opposed to the creation of a highly 
centralized administration as Germany's future government. The United 
States and Great Britain persistently advocated the creation of a central­
ized economic administration for Germany, as had been directed by the
liftPotsdam Agreements. In regard to Germany's future political organi-
^5Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, N. Y.: Double- 
day and Co., 1950), pp. 157, I6O-I6I, 350-353*
^̂ McWeill, p. 167.
^Tstettinius, pp. 88-89, 121, 127, 139; McNeill, p. 532.
^Clay, pp. 40-4l, 163-185.
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zation, however, they agreed upon a federal system, with Great 
Britain advocating a higher degree of centralization than was con­
sidered wise by the United States. A federal system was believed 
best suited to prevent the re-establishment of a highly centralized,
ilQmilitaristic German state. France obstinately opposed any but the 
most decentralized type of administrative structure for post-oc­
cupation Germany, 50
Although advocating a centralized political administration 
for Germany, the Russians consistently obstructed British and American 
efforts to effect the unified economic administration directed at Pots­
dam. This obstructionism in pursuit of immediate objectives ultimately 
thwarted a long-term Soviet objective. Short-term Soviet policy had 
as its objective the securing of German reparations in amounts which would 
both deplete the German war potential and also contribute toward re­
construction of war devastation in the Soviet U n i o n . N o  agreement 
could be reached among the Allied Powers as to the final amount of 
reparations to be assessed against the Germans.^ In view of the 
stalemate, the Russians were to be permitted to exact and withdraw 
reparations in advance of the anticipated settlement. These advance 
reparations were to be credited against the final sum allotted to the 
Soviet Union.53 It had been agreed at Potsdam that no reparations 
^̂ Ibid., p. 396.
^°Ibid., pp. 39, 396.
5^Peter Nettl, "German Reparations in the Soviet Empire," Foreign 
Affairs, XXIX (Januarjs 1951), 300-308,
52stettinius, pp. 266-207; Clay, p. 319'
53McNeill, p, 623,
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would be taken from current German production. In order to minimize 
occupation costs upon the occupying powers, each zone was to provide 
for the whole the goods and services for which it was best equipped,̂ "' 
In this vital function, however, both the French and the Russians re­
fused to cooperate. In addition, the Soviet authorities continued to 
exact reparations from current German production. This policy had 
been adopted upon the realization of the wastefulness of the earlier 
policy of removing plants and equipment to the Soviet Union. By leav­
ing the plants in operation in the Soviet zone t-n produce for repara­
tions, jobs were created for German laborers. This gave the Russians 
a political advantage, at least temporarily, due to employment problems 
in the Western zones which had been exacerbated by the great Influx 
of expellees and refugees fron the former German territories and Eastern 
Europe, and also by the Russian refusal to provide the Western zones 
with needed raw materials. Soviet authorities refused to make an ac­
counting of the withdrawals of equipment from their zone, in addition
55to the open abrogation of the understanding reached at Potsdam,
As a result of the Soviet intransigence, the American and 
British zones were merged for economic administration in January, 19̂ 7> 
However, they retained their separate identities for military adminis­




5 ^ Ib id . , p . 163.
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During 19̂ 7? the Allied Control Council increasingly "became 
a forum for Soviet proï«gandistic harangues against the Western Foyers, 
Efforts at Four Pbwer cooperation ended with the Soviet walkout from 
the Council in March, 19U8. In defense of their actions, the Russians 
charged the Western Powers with attempting to create a separate German 
state, Soviet opposition was expressed also to the currency reform 
which was to he undertaken in the Western zones,
The actual division of Germany had begun prior to the Soviet 
walkout fpom the Control Council, From the outset of the occupation, 
Soviet policy in its zone was directed toward the creation of a replica 
of the Eastern European satellites. The Soviets were the first of 
the occupying powers to permit the formation of political parties,^® 
Although the parties initially were allowed a certain freedom from 
interference, election results soon proved that such liberalism was 
not conducive to the attainment of Soviet o b j e c t i v e s ,A fusion of 
the Social Democratic Party (SPD) with the Communist Party (KPD) was 
directed in April, 1946, prior to zonal elections. The resulting party 
was a "united ̂ rker’s party" or, as it was known officially, the 
Socialist Unity Party (SlD). This party was to become the instrument 
for the fulfillment of Soviet policy in the Soviet zone, Beth the
'̂̂ Ibld,, pp, 349-357.
^®Beate Ruhn von Oppen (ed, ), Documents on Germany Under 
Occupation, 1945-1954 (London; by Oxford University Press for the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955)> PP* 37-39*
^^Joachim Joesten, Germany; What Now? (Chicago: Ziff-Davis 
Publishing Co,, 1948), pp. 63-72,"
^°Ibld,, pp. 136-144.
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SED and the nominal opposition parties gradually were purged of all
61elements opposed to Soviet policyJ
The soviétisation of the Russian zone was pursued further in 
the socialization measures taken in agriculture and industry.These 
measures included divesting the Junker landowners of their large hold­
ings and dividing them among small farmers, agricultural workers and 
refugees, and nationalization of major industries in the name of the
63wDhking population.
In their refusal to participate in a unified economic admin­
istration of Germany, both the French and the Russians erected zonal 
barriers to trade and communications. These barriers became increas­
ingly difficult to surmount,The French gradually were induced to 
lower their zonal barriers and to cooperate with the Anglo-American 
bizone for economic purposes. This cooperation was extended further 
when, at a conference in London during February and March, lg48, it 
was agreed that the three Western zones should be merged and that the 
German population would be permitted to establish la Government for the 
merged area. The Germans were to be permitted to call a constituent 
assembly in September, I9U8. Simultaneously, the three oeeuwing powers 
would draw up an Occupation Statute which would transfer the functions
P. Nettl, The Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany, 
19^5-50 (London; Oxford University Press, 1951), PP* 99-11̂ *
Ibid,, pp, 151-184; Ruhm von Oppen, pp, 59-64,
^3peter Nettl, "Economic Checks on German Unity," Foreign 
Affairs. XXX (July, 1952), 559-560.
^^Clay, pp. 111-112.
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of military government to a civilian High Commission.
The Western Powers were charged by the Soviets with perpetuating
ééthe division of Germany. However; the Soviet authorities had laid the
foundation for an East German Government prior to the action of the 
Western Powers, An embryonic central government Imd been created in the 
Soviet zone in 194$, Its scope gradually was extended to the degree that 
the transfomation to a governmental status was but a change in name,
A "People's Congress" was sumnoned in December, 194?, and met at various 
times during 19W, It had embryonic governmental organs in the forms 
of a "People's Council" and a Presidium, This Congress approved a con­
stitution, ostensibly drafted for all of Germany, which envisaged the 
formation of a "People's Republic" similar to the satellite states of 
Eastern Europe. This constitution became the fundamental law for the 
German Democratic Republic, which was proclaimed dm October 1, 1949» 
following the establishment of the first Government of the West German 
Federal Republic,^?
The threat of territorial dismemberment ultimately was abandoned 
by the occupying powers as one side and then the other vied for the favor 
of the German people. Dismemberment did occur, in fact, as the division 
of Germany between East and West became more concrete. The Russians by 
unilateral action prior to the Potsdam Conference had transferred to
Ibid., ppo 404-406. 
^Ibia.» pp. 355=357.
^?Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1947- 
1948 (London; by Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1952), pp, 2$7=260,
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Polish "administration" that part of Germany under Soviet control 
to the east of the Oder-Western Naisse Line, with the exception of 
the Baltic port of Koenigsberg and its immediate environs. This area 
contained Germany's second-largest coal deposits, its second most con­
centrated industrial area, and its most important food producing re­
gions. One-fourth of Germany's pre-war food supply had come from 
this area. Since Germany was required to import from 20 percent to 
25 percent of its foodstuffs, the loss of this area to the indus­
trialized western zones was a serious handicap to their economic 
68revival.
This Soviet action was protested vigorously at Potsdam. Mar­
shal Stalin argued that the advancing Red Army had required an ef­
fective administration of the liberated areas in order that subversive 
activities did not hinder its forward movement. It had been necessary, 
therefore, to turn this area over to the Poles since the German popu-
69lation had fled. In the hope that concessions might be gained from 
the Russians elsewhere,] Ta^uman and Churchill reluctantly agreed to 
postpone the final solution of this problem until the peace conference, 
Since there had not been established a central German Govern­
ment with which a peace treaty could be negotiated, the severance of 
this territory from Germany assumed the characteristics of permanency. 
Not only did this action deprive Germany of valuable territory and
^James P. Warburg, Germany-Bridge or Battleground (New York; 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946, 1947), PP* 30-31*
^%ruman, I, 3̂ 6-3 7̂>
ĵ r̂oid., pp. 367-370.
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force millions of people into an already over-crowded rump-Germany,
but also it resulted in the di'ssdlüÿion of the feudalistic Prussia#
state, the symbol of German arrogance and militarism. It placed Poland
in perpetual dependence upon the Soviet Union because of the fear of 
71German revanchism.
A common level of industry for the German economy was agreed 
upon by the Allied Control Council in December, 19̂ 5* This was an ab­
solute minimum for subsistence, and for it to be attained, the co­
operation of each zone was essential. The Russians, realizing the 
relative wastefulness of their dismantling and removal policies, be­
gan extracting reparations from the current production in their zone. 
This openly violated the Potsdam directives. When they would neither 
cease this practice nor account for the equipment previously removed, 
the Americans halted deliveries of advance reparations from their 
zone in the spring of 19k6, Soon the British acted similarly. They 
Justified their actions on the ground that the Soviet policies were 
forcing them to subsidize their zones. Until the Russians agreed to
treat Germany as an economic whole, they would receive no further
72reparations from the Western zones.'
In the suimer of 1946, the Russians expropriated over two 
hundred of the largest industrial works in their zone. Thenceforth 
they were termed "Soviet Corporations". This action also was a con­




zation of German industry. Three-fourths of the production of the 
expropriated industries vent direct to the Soviet Union or vas ex­
ported on Soviet account; one-fourth went to the East German economy, 
which was required to contribute a disproportionate share of the raw 
materials,'^
Early in the occupation of Germany it became more and more 
apparent that the independent courses of action being pursued in the 
four occupation zones were not only preventing German recovery but 
also the recovery of all Europe. Its geographic location in the heart 
of Europe, its physical and economic resources, the energy and skills 
of its people, long had made Germany a vital factor in the economic 
well-being of all Europe. Acceptance of this fact lay behind the 
American and British zonal merger in 19^7 and the 1948 merger of the 
three Western zones in order to facilitate the economic and political 
rehabilitation of the truncated West Germany. Conscientious efforts 
had been made by the Americans and British to apply the Potsdam prin­
ciples to the occupation of Germany; yet, in the end, Germany had 
ceased to be the enemy on the day its defeated armies laid down their 
arms. This fact did not become apparent until the division of Germany 
between East and West had become a reality.
The Council of Foreign Ministers: Failure to 
Resolve Basic Issues 
The Council of Foreign Ministers was established by the heads 
of government of the United States, Great Britain, end the Soviet Union,
^^Nettl, Foreign Affairs, XXIX (January, 1951), 300,
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at the Potsdam Conference. It was to be composed of the Foreign 
Ministers of those three states, France, and China.
The immediate task of the Council was to prepare peace 
treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. It 
was also to propose settlements of territorial questions outstand­
ing at the end of the European war. In addition, the Council was 
to be utilized in preparing the peace settlement for Germany. That 
settlement, however, would have to await the establishment of a 
German Government empowered to accept a treaty. In preparing the 
peace treaties, the Council was to be composed of members represent­
ing those states which signed the terms of surrender imposed on the 
state concerned. For the purpose of the Italian treaty, France was 
to be regarded as a signatory to the Italian surrender. In addition 
to the preparation of the peace treaties, the Council could consider 
other matters by agreement.
Behind the creation of the Council of Foreign Ministers was 
an awareness that agreement among the great powers was indispensable 
in preparing peace temis for the defeated enemy states. Although the 
smaller nations who participated in the struggle against the Axis 
would be given some voice in the peace settlements, it would be recom­
mendatory, largely, and could not be expressed until basic issues had 
been settled among the great powers,
^Document8 on American Foreign Relations, VIII, 925* Churchill 
had proposed at Yalta that the Big Three Foreign Ministers meet every 
three months. Both Stalin and Roosevelt agreed. Stettinius, p. 2l6.
'̂ D̂ocuments on American Foreign Relations, VIII, 925.
38
When the Council was created the war still was in progress. 
Cooperation among the members of the Grand Alliance still was the 
rule rather than the exception. Danger signals had appeared on the 
horizon, particularly in Eastern Europe; yet hopes were strong ab 
Potsdam that the postwar period would be witness to a new era of 
international cooperation.
The Council held its first meeting in London, beginning on 
September 11, 19̂ 5* The war was over and, when the Council terminated 
its fruitless deliberations on October 2, it appeared that the era of 
war-time cooperation had ended as well. It quickly became apparent 
that the primary task confronting the Foreign Ministers was to re­
solve the differences between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers 
which had now been brought into the open. At stake were the power 
relationships in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Already dominant 
in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union now challenged the Western Powers 
in the Mediterranean area.^^
Following the initial meeting in London, further sessions were 
held in Moscow, Paris, and New York. It was not until December, 1946, 
in New York, that final agreement was reached on the terms of the peace 
settlements to be imposed on Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Finland. During the course of the several meetings, relations between 
East and West had deteriorated progressively. Each meeting was marked 
by increasing bitterness, rancor, and by an obviously widening diver­
gence of purposes, in that precious little agreement emerged from the
^^Campbell, pp. 64-69.
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series of meetings. The insignificant role in drafting the peace 
settlements given to the smaller states vho had heen associated vith 
the Great Powers in the struggle against the Axis only emphasized the 
emerging bipolar structure of international politics. Increasingly, 
the least consequential occurrence on the world political scene 
would serve as a powerful magnet in attracting the contending forces.
The peace settlements which emerged ultimately from the dis­
cordant proceedings of the Council of Foreign Ministers were Regarded 
as unsatisfactory to the interests of the United States. Although 
concessions were made by the Soviet Union during the bargaining, it 
did not relinquish its tenacious grip on its predominant position in 
Eastern Europe, The United States had hoped to preserve at least a 
modicum of influence in this area, yet it found itself confronted with 
the same situation with which it had to contend at Yalta; the ominous 
presence of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, Thus, the United States 
had to take what it could get, under the circumstances. It may have 
had little significance for the outcome of the negotiations, yet 
during this period American postwar foreign policy had not crystallized 
flmly, A "get tough with the Russian.s" attitude was developing, yet 
American policy often seemed to vacillate and to be at cross-purposes.
The United States was striving for influence in Eastern Europe at the 
same time it was allowing its once awesome military power to disinte­
grate. Its leaders spoke of early withdrawal from further active partic­
ipation in European affairs simultaneously as they competed for influence 
in areas vital to the security of the Soviet Union, Great reliance was 
put in the new United Nations Organization as the ultimate hope of
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mankind although the limitations of that body were readily apparent.
The peace settlements served only as technical mechanisms to 
end the state of war existing between the former enemies and the victor­
ious Allies and also to allow the vanquished states to resume their 
places in the family of nations, Germany, so vital a prize in the 
developing East-West struggle, could not expect a peace treaty or 
reunification until the larger issue of East-West relations was set­
tled, This proved obvious during the course of further futile negotia­
tions during 19*<-7. For the former enemy states of Eastern Europe, 
ratification of the peace treaties restored only nominal sovereignty 
since, in reality, they already were safely ensconced within the con­
fines of the vast Soviet empire.
In another setting, the rising antipathy between Eastern and 
Western components of the victorious war-time alliance had produced 
stalemate in the Incipient United Nations Organization,
Soviet Obstructionism in the United Nations 
In contrast to its role in the years after World War I when 
it quickly retreated into its shell of Isolationism, the United States 
very early during World War II took the lead in activities designed to 
establish a more effective successor to the defunct League of Nations,
As plans for the projected United Nations Organization crystallized, 
it was recognized by American planners that only through cooperation 
among the great powers could the new organisation realistically func­
tion in a world of conflicting interests, This realization, and their 
great hopes for the future, led those responsible for the direction of
4l
American foreign policy to demonstrate at every opportunity their 
good will toward their Soviet ally. As the war progressed, American 
policy-makers realistically assayed the changed status of the Soviet 
Union as a world power of r.he first magnitude. Her cooperation would 
be as indispensable pc .cs as it ?̂as in the war.^^
At the- Yalta Conference, final plans were laid for establish-
/ing the United Nations Organisation, A conference on the proposed 
organization was scheduled to begin in San Francisco on April 2$, 194$,
Because it was recognized that the proposed organization could 
not preserve the peace effectively without unanimity among the great 
powers, the Big Three agreed at Yalta to support at the San Francisco 
conference a proposal that all matters before the Security Council, 
other than procedural, must be decided by the affirmative votes of the 
five permanent members (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, 
France, and China), Thus, any of the five could block effective action 
by the Security Council when it so chose. This provision was adopted 
at San Francisco, over the objections of the smaller participating 
states. It was this provision which was the rock upon which the United
T7por the war-time planning on the United Nations Organization, 
see Cordell Hull, Memoirs (2 vols,; New York: The Macmillan Co,, 1948), 
particularly Vol. II, Because President Roosevelt largely was his own 
Secretary of State, Hull had much time during the war to devote to this 
project, Hull, who had served as Secretary of State since 1933> did 
not participate actively in any of the frequent war-time conferences 
between Roosevelt and Churchill nor did he attend any of the Big Three 
heads of government conferences. He dismissed these meetings as being 
"primarily military". Ibid., I, 95* Secretary Hull did venture to Mos­
cow in 1943 for a meeting of the Big Three Foreign Ministers, Here he 
met Stalin and departed with the conviction that Russia would be a willing 
paz'ticipant in postwar cooperation for peace. Ibid,, II, I3II; 1464- 
146$.
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Nations floundered from its inception. Without such a "veto", how­
ever, it is unlikely that the Senate would have accepted the Charter 
and United States participation in the organization. Isolationism 
may have been in its death throes, but it was by no means dead. Its 
complement, nationalism, was in no mortal danger. Ironically, the most 
frequent, and the most irresponsible, use of the "veto" has been by the 
Soviet Union, Frequent use of the "veto" during the formative years of 
the world organization changed from exuberance to dismay the attitudes 
of those who had looked to the United Nations as a "new beginning" in 
international relations.
Conceived in an atmosphere of cooperation, the United Nations 
has been nurtured on conflict. Rather than cure the ills of the world. 
World War II exposed its survivors to newer end more perplexing maladies. 
From its organizational meeting onward, the United Nations has been the 
focal point of the continuing world crisis.
The steady erosion in relations between the United States and 
the Soviet Union was reflected in the deadlock which gripped the United 
Nations during 1946 and 194-7. One of the few proposals to which the 
Russians offered no objections was that to establish the permanent 
headquarters of the new organization in the United States.?® The areas 
of dispute were many, These included the selection of the first Secre­
tary-General, the crisis over removal of Soviet troops from Iran, in­
ternational control of atomic energy, the care and treatment of dis­
placed persons and refugees, British troops in Greece, the Greek civil
'Campbell, p, 84.
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war, American assistance to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine, 
conventional disarmament, implementation of Article 43 of the Charter 
(placing armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council) the 
Corfu Channel incidents between Albanie end treat Britain, selection 
of a Governor for the Free Territory of Trieste, admission of new members 
to the United Nations, voting in the Security Council, and European re­
construction.
From the outset, the Soviet Union apparently had assumed no 
genuine community of interests with the other members of the United 
Nations, with the possible exception of those members over which it 
exercised political or economic dominance. It appeared to use the 
United Nations as another mechanism to serve the interests of Soviet 
foreign policy. As the months passed, it became brutally evident that 
the war-time community of interests between Russia and its Western 
partners had evaporated or, possibly, had never existed. Instead of
"one world" there were two, and the points at which the two met were
79as seething volcanoes waiting to erupt.
"̂ Ĉharles 0. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People 
(2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 212. 
Another author argued that the Soviet Union was " . . .  just as genuinely 
interested as other nations in the success of the United Nations . . . 
Constant vilification of the Western powers by the Soviet press and radio 
is a measure of defense rather than attack . . . ." Russia could not "re­
lax" its "vigilance" because it was " . . .  convinced that the struggle 
against Naziism and Fascism is not over . . . ." Vera Micheles Dean,
The United States and Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 
pp. 134, 137-138" On the other hand, responsible American officials and, 
gradually, the American public adopted the interpretation offered in 
1947 by George F. Kennan. In Kennan's analysis, the unswerving Soviet 
faith in the Marxist-Leninist ideology should be the guidepost to Western 
policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The accepted Soviet ideology warned 
of an "innate antagonism" between capitalism and socialism. " . . .There
The reasons for the obstructionism of the Soviet Union in the 
United Nations, indeed, the motives underlying its actions in general:, 
are locked deeply in the many mysteries of the Kremlin. Generally,
Soviet actions have been interpreted as being motivated by deliberate 
aggressiveness or by concerns for security. The two are not entirely 
unrelated, although no attempt to separate them will be made here. How­
ever, an undue concern for security could lead to aggression, and suc­
cessful agression could lead to security.
After Eastern Europe had been engulfed and swallowed into the 
Soviet domain, most Americans tended to treat Soviet belligerence as a 
reflection of its aggressive tendencies. They tended to forget that the 
newly-found concern of the United States in matters far outside its pre­
vious span of interest may have given the Soviets pause in regard to
can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of 
aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capital­
ism . . Kennan warned against being misled by "tactical maneuvers" 
which might seem to indicate a "mellowing" of the Soviet antagonism 
toward the West. He predicted a long period in which Western relations 
with the Soviet Union would be difficult and frustrating in the extreme. 
The Soviets were in no hurry since the Marxian dialectic tells them 
history is on their aide. With such faith in inevitable victory, there 
cannot possibly be any meeting of minds between Soviet and Western 
policy-makers, Therefore, said Kennan, we can speak to them only with 
facts--" facts of unchallengeable validity." Because they have learned 
caution and flexibility, both as Russians and as Communists, retreat 
is not defeat nor is it a cause for panic. Both Russian'history and 
Communist ideology teach of the hostility of the outside world, Soviet 
intransigence ultimately provoked a reaction which seemed to justify 
the original suspicion, hostility, and aggressiveness. Therefore, Kennan 
concludes, " . . .  the main element of any United States policy toward 
the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but fim and vigi­
lant containment of Russian expansive tendencies , , . American Diplo° 
macy; 1900-1950 (New York: A Mentor Book, Published by the New American
Library, 1952), pp. 105-113" Kennan's thesis originally_̂ was published 
under the pseudonym "X", "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, 
XXV (July, 1947), 566-582,
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their security interests. Being constantly out-voted in the United 
Nations probably gave them little assurance that their security could 
best be entrusted to the operations of this ostensibly Western-controlled 
organization.
Although the United States increasingly found itself embroiled 
in matters of varied scope and description, it consistently tried to 
assure the suspicious Russians that its only aspiration for the postwar 
world was that of peace. Only when the Soviet take-over in Eastern 
Europe was complete, and only then, did the United States conclude 
that the Soviets respected force more than evidences of good intentions. 
As long as no objections were made, political vacuums the world over 
would be filled by the avid Russians. Belatedly, the United States 
concluded that, in the future, its verbal protests must be supported 
by displays of the strength and will necessary to carry them through.
The growing competition between the two super-powers had been reflected 
in the rapid degeneration of the United Nations into an arena where the 
major protagonists of the East-West struggle played their deadly game.
The Economic and Political Deterioration of Europe:
Failure To Re-establish a Viable Economy 
The mr  that ended in 19̂ 5 had wrought untold destruction and 
damage to the nations of Europe in terms of both human and physical re­
sources, Joined to the miseries of war were the natural disasters fol­
lowing its conclusion--the droughts of the iimediate postwar summers and 
the severe cold of the record-shattering winters which, in a seeming 
conspiracy of fate, paralyzed efforts toward European reconstruction.
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The deliberate efforts of Indigenous Communists to contribute to, and 
ultimately to capitalize upon, the chaos, led responsible American of­
ficials to the formulation of a plan of assistance which was to révolu-
80tionize American foreign policy.
Europe’s most critical problem, in the summer of 1945, vas to 
repair the physical devastation caused by the war. No amount of ef­
fort could repair the destruction of human lives and spirits. Recon­
struction efforts were handicapped seriously bÿ the Potsdam decisions 
not to re-establish immediately a German Government and to place severe 
limitations on the German economy. The Allied administration of Germany 
as four separate states contributed heavily to the eventual failure to
81reconstruct the European economy without massive external assistance,
®^One postwar visitor to Europe left Great Britain with " , , . 
an impression of grim austerity, of hard though plucky struggle with 
economic obstacles so serious as to be almost unmanageable. One finds 
in France and Italy deep lines of internal division, governments so 
divided as to be almost impotent, much hatred and disgust% among classes 
and political parties, and a creeping inflation that threatens to undo 
the beneficial results of the economic progress which has been achieved 
since the end of the war, Germany in 1946 seemed to have touched almost 
the lowest conceivable level of hopeless desolation." Chamberlin, p. 225, 
Another visitor commented: "A striking fact to visitors accustomed to 
the intense political acuteness of the Old Europe is that'the passions 
of this Europe which scrimps, stands in queues, does without, are not 
closely related to intellectual programs or ideological objectives. Hopes 
and disappointments . . . are measured in buckets of coal, ounces of. 
bread, packets of cigarettes, and a vote goes wherever it seems most 
likely at the moment to increase the supply of these and other life es­
sentials." Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Europe Revieted," Foreign Affairs, 
XXV (July, 1947), 538.
81The November, 1947 meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, 
in Moscow, had faltered due to inability to reach agreement on a German 
policy and peace settlement. By that time, however, German unity had 
become of secondary importance in Western thinking as compared to Euro­
pean economic reconstruction. In their view, Germany was to have a vital 
role in European economic rehabilitation. If German unity could be 
achieved only on Soviet terms, it would be best to integrate Western
kl
In the pre-war period, Germany was the primary market for and supplier 
of the nations of Western Europe, Unless it was returned to its normal 
role in Europe*s economy, the adjustments necessary to compensate for 
its loss appeared insurmountable. The dislocations of pre-war trade 
and commercial patterns caused by the almost total severance of Eastern 
from Western Europe and its subsequent political and economic reorien­
tation toward the Soviet Union contributed significantly to the problems 
of reconstruction.
Allied leaders recognized early in the war that the fighting 
would leave in its wake problems of vast scope. Generous assitance would 
be required in order to prevent utter chaos and the loss of untold mil­
lions of innocent victims to plague, pestilence, disease, and starvation. 
Thus, during the war, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad­
ministration (UNRRA) was created to provide food, clothing and shelter 
to needy persons in war-devastated areas of Europe and Asia. In regard 
to rehabilitation it was to provide "assistance in the resumption of 
urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and restoration 
of essential services." Member states agreed to contribute 1 percent 
of their respective national incomes to the agency’s efforts, These 
contributions eventually produced a grand total of approximately $4 
billion.Of this total, the United States Government provided $2»7 
billion, or 72 percent of UNRRA's operating budget.Of the American
Germany into the program for reconstruction of Europe and shelve, at 
least temporarily, hopes for German reunification.
“^Campbell, pp. 316-320.
s, . Congressional Record, 80th Cong,, 1st Sess,, 1947, XCIII,
Part 1; 38,
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contribution, recipient nations included Austria, Belgium, China, 
Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, the U. S. S. R., Turkey, and Yugoslavia. UNRRA as- 
siàtance was of inestimable value not only in preventing widespread 
starvation and disease in Europe but also in contributing to the 
restoration of essential services, such as in transportation and com­
munications , The agency became embroiled in the general East-West 
controversy, however, and the United States declined to make any 
further contributions after December 31, 19̂ 6. Dependent almost 
entirely upon the United States for its resources, the agency therefore 
ceased its activities. President Truman warned Congress on January 3, 
19 7̂, however, that further assistance would be required by some of 
the war-devastated countries during 19̂ 7* The President, and the State 
Department, recommended that such relief needs be met through bilateral
arrangements between the supplying and recipient nations. The United
84Nations would be used as an information center in the enterprise.
During the period from the end of the war to July 1, 1947, the 
United States Government provided a total of $l6«3 billion in assistance
Q^Ibid., pp. 38-39. There were many complaints heard in Congress 
that the United States was carrying too great a share of the UNRRA bur­
den while receiving too little credit for its contributions from the 
recipient nations and that those in charge of UNRRA's administration 
had shown "gross incompetence" and had voted themselves "exhorbitant" 
salaries. There were also complaints that over 80 percent of the organi­
zation's personnel was comprised of citizens of countries other than the 
United States. Its officials were charged with spreading anti-American 
propaganda. Demands were made for supervision of American relief by 
Americans. See Ibid., Part 2, pp. l473-l475, for criticisms expressed 
by Representative Vursell (R., 111.).
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to var-devastated areas throughout the world. Of this total, some 
$12.1 billion were provided to European countries. The assistance 
took two forms: repayable loans and credits, and relief and special
grants not requiring specific repayment. Of the $12.1 billion Euro­
pean total, $7,977,000,000 was in the form of repayable loans and 
credits, while $î, 183,000,000 was in grants and other relief.Un­
til early in 19̂ 7, responsible American officials had assumed that 
the European economy could be restored to normal through temporary 
"stop-gap" assistance, on a country-by-country basis. The need for 
a long-term, comprehensive reconstruction effort had not been con­
templated seriously. Ironically, on February 21, 1947, President 
Truman, in a request that Congress authorize the appropriation of 
$350 million in post-UMRRA relief for liberated countries, suggested 
that this sum should be used only for the "basic essentials of life".
He envisaged the task of providing relief to war-devastated areas as 
"nearly finished".
The countries of Western Europe have many features in common. 
They are largely industrial nations and must import large amounts of 
food for their peoples, raw materials for their factories, and must 
have secure markets for their industrial products. Of the Western
Û C
U. s. ,  Congress, Senate, The European Recovery Program; Basic 
Documents and Background Information, 00th Cong., 1st Sess., 19̂ 7, 
Document No. 11, pp. 30-32. Cited hereafter as U. S. Senate, The 
European Recovery Program; Basic Documents and Background Information.
^^Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 1, I3OI. The United States 
promoted the establishment and the work, not only of UNRRA but also 
of the Emergency Economic Commission for Europe, the Emergency Inland 
Transport Organization, the Emergency Coal Organization, the Bretton 
Woods agreements, the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture, and
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European nations, only Denmark is a net exporter of food. After the 
war, the severe summer droughts and winter freezes, the spring floods 
in England, the shortages of agricultural machinery, farm animals, 
fertilizers, and farm labor, further reduced the ability of these
87nations to feed themselves. '
Before the war, Western Europe possessed sufficient coal and 
iron resources for/its needs. It had to import other important in­
dustrial raw materials, especially nonferrous metals, cotton,wool, 
lumber, pulp and paper, rubber, petroleum, and tropical products. Be­
cause existing stockpiles of these materials, as well as slender 
natural resources of some of them, were exhausted during the war,
88these nations were even more dependent on imports after the war's end.
Foreign trade is indispensable to the progress and well-being 
of the nations of Western Europe. They must import food and industrial 
raw materials and must export to obtain the necessary foreign exchange 
to pay for their imports. In the pre-war period their imports ordinar­
ily were greater than their exports. Western Europe paid for this
the Food and Agriculture Organization. Mosely, The Fate of East Central 
Europe, p. 56. To supervise postwar United States lending, the Adminis­
tration created in 19̂ 5 the National Advisory Council on International 
Financial and Monetary Problems, consisting of Henry A. Wallace, Secre­
tary of Commerce; Marriner S. Eccles, Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board; William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Export-Import 
Bank; John Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury; and William L. Clayton, 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Although America's post­
war relief and lending was viewed as a means of preventing economic and 
social disorder, it was not conceived initially as being "anti-Russian" 
or "anti-Oommunist". Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, A149-150'-
^̂ U. S. Senate, The European Recovery Program: Basic Documents
and Background-Information, pp. 11-12.
^^Ibid. , p. 12.
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excess of imports over exports through "invisible" items, in the 
balance of trade, i.e., earnings from shipping, insurance, overseas 
investments, remittances from emigrants, and money spent by tourists
89in Europe,
Mines, factories, machinery, equipment, and transportation 
facilities suffered enormous destruction during the war. Over two 
years after the war's end, Europe had made only a start in recon­
struction. Even those countries which may have had the necessary 
foreign exchange found difficulties in obtaining vitally-needed raw 
materials and industrial and transportation equipment. Another im­
portant factor in Western Europe's inability to reconstruct a viable 
postwar economy was the dislocation of the pre-war commercial, finan­
cial and business relationships in each country. Labor was neither 
as productive nor as plentiful as in pre-war Europe. Millions of 
laborers were killed or displaced by the war. The postwar labor 
force possessed inadequate food, shelter, and clothing. The laborer 
was paid in inflated currency and paid high prices for the few goods 
available for purchase. In consequence of the low output of the 
factories, farmers had few incentives for delivering their products 
to the towns and cities.
In the pre-war period Eastern Europe provided much of Western 
Europe's raw materials, particularly food. Because of the droughts and 




91production vas curtailed seriously. In many instances only UNKEIA 
and other relief prevented widespread starvation. Even though some 
states in Eastern Europe produced good crops in 19̂ 7/ Western Europe 
was confronted with a shortage of the necessary foreign exchange to 
purchase the available exports. By 19^7  ̂iïi addition, the nations of 
Eastern Europe had been drawn more tightly into the economic and poli­
tical orbit of the Soviet Union. Western trade with these countries 
had become increasingly difficult.
Western Europe had to look elsewhere for its needed food, 
industrial raw materials and equipment which previously had come 
from Eastern Europe br colonial areas. These could be found, largely, 
only in the United States, Canada, and Latin America, where dollars 
were required in payment. Unfortunately, Western Europe was able to 
re-establish only 60 percent of its exports to the dollar areas. This 
dollar gap was much greater than in the pre-war period, since at that 
time Western Europe did not make so many purchases from dollar areas. 
Because of the war's destruction of her shipping resources, her forced 
liquidation of overseas Investments, and the severely reduced earnings 
from tourists, Western Europe lacked the necessary dollars to pay for 
the excess of its imports over its exports. Much of the assistance
provided by the United States immediately following the war was used
92to finance the trade deficit with the dollar areas. Because of world­





Efforts to exjand exports and restrict imports, and thereby
achieve a balance of trade, led to the increased use of such devices
as import and export quotas, barter and compensation agreements, blocked
currency funds, and thus to even more greatly curtailed foreign trade 
93activities.
On its own, and through loans, credits, and other temporary 
assistance from outside, Europe by 19^7 had made gratifying strides 
toward economic recovery, despite its extreme difficulties in foreign 
trade. Using 1937 as the index year (lOO), by June, 19̂ 7; the in­
dustrial production of Belgium was 85, Denmark 100, Prance 97, Italy 
52 (March), the Netherlands 91, Norway 122 (May), and Sweden IO8, The 
United Kingdom's industrial production was at 102 in 1946 and, in the 
same year, Austrian industrial production was 4l. Using 193̂  as the 
index year, industrial production in the United States zone of occu­
pation in Germany was 48 in June, 1947, and in the British zone in-
94dustrial production was 34. It should be stressed that these pro­
duction levels represent a concentration on reconstruction and capital 
replacement, not on expansion of plant and increased production of 
consumer items.
Despite recovery in some areas, production of coal end steel 
was still far below pre-war production in 1947, Agricultural production 
for Europe as a whole was not quite 80 percent of pre-war production, 
Consumption lagged far behind recovery in production. Thus even though
^3ibid., pp. 15-16, 
94ibid.. p. 19.
Europe's progress in reconstruction was encouraging, its existing 
resources and the fruits of production were severely over-taxed.
For example, out of production had to come consumption, maintenance 
and depreciation of existing capital equipment, normal capital expan­
sion and, in addition, production had to compensate for war destruc­
tion. Populations were greater, due to normal population growth and 
to mass movements of people to Western Europe. Food was available 
only to the extent necessary to sustain life. The margin was ex­
tremely precarious in some countries. Rationing was necessary, in 
accordance with the type of work being performed, age, sex, general 
state of health, etc. The housing situation was desperate, and the
OSsituation in clothing and shoes was critical. Exports did Increase 
with the war’s end and the attempted return to normal patterns of 
economic life. However, domestic requirements severely limited the 
amounts available for export while import needs were expanded greatly 
above pre-war requirements.
Except for Germany, the European countries in the pre-war period 
generally had "priee-profit” economies. During the war, of course, these 
mechanisms were disrupted. Postwar efforts to return to "free" economies 
however, were unsuccessful initially, due to scarcities of good, mone­
tary disturbances, etc. Therefore, price controls, rationing, allocations, 
priorities, and other controls were retained in varying degrees in the
d5"̂Ibid., pp. 21-25. A world-wide famine was viewed as a distinct 
possibility in the winter of 1945-1946. Truman, I, 467. A series of 
emergency measures was announced by President Truman on February 6, 1946, 
designed to render greater United States assistance in meeting the food 
crisis. American efforts were hampered by transportation strikes in 
late 1945 and early 1946. Campbell, pp. 326-328.
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several countries. However, price controls could not hold and
rationing and allocations systeias proved inadequate. Inflation and
black markets existed in Austria, Germany, France, Greece, and Italy,
In Germany a barter market developed and, to a certain extent, barter
markets existed in Austria, France, and Italy, International trade
carried on by the European countries was largely on a barter or bi­
gglateral basis.
Because they lacked the means of securing essential imports, 
the situation had become critical in mid-19it-7, particularly in Austria, 
France, and Italy, By that time the latter countries had exhausted 
nearly all their means of securing needed Imports of food, clothing, 
and industrial raw materials. Unemployment and increased internal 
instability appeared to be the next steps in the general deterioration. 
Austrian needs currently were being supplied through the foreign re­
lief program of the United States. France and Italy, in the summer of 
1947, took steps to eliminate all but absolutely essential imports.
It was expected that without assistance France would be unable by Decem­
ber to purchase food or fuel. By January Italy was expected to be in 
as desperate a plight,
S, Senate, The European Hecovesy Program; Baaie Docimente 
and Background Information, pp, 24-25,
^^Ibld,, pp, 65-66, The world-wide "dollar crisis" was magni­
fied by the fact that prices increased by one-third in a nine-months' 
period during 19W  and 19^7 in the United States, the leading "supply­
ing" nation. In addition to the critical situations in Austria, France, 
and Italy, which were considered the most serious, Denmark, Holland, and 
Sweden were forced to reduce their imports. Australia and New Zealand, 
which were regarded as "supplying" countries, even had to lock for ways 
to reduce dollar imports. Canada and Argentina, also "supplying" nations, 
faced this expediency in the simmer of 19̂ 7* Barbara Ward, The West at 
Bay (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc,, 1948), pp, 14-15,
$0
Accompanying the inability of Europe to reconstruct a viable 
economy in the postwar period were highly unstable political con­
ditions in some of its countries, France and Italy, especially. These 
conditions made the portent for economic recovery even more ominous. 
Governments resting on unsteady popular bases could not be expected to 
undertake and pursue vigorously the programs of economic austerity 
required to effect rapid and complete recovery. The situation in 
Greece had deteriorated to such an extent by early 19^7 that both ecoa 
nomic and military assistance was required from the United States to 
prevent a complete breakdown of authority and possible Communist take­
over.
By early 19^7, serious doubts had arisen as to the ability of 
France to continue as a democratic nation,in the growing dichotomy 
between East and West, its retention among the democratic Western 
nations was considered of vital importance. During this period the 
largest of the French labor forces, the General Confederation of 
Labor (CGT), was Communist-dominated. In îfey, 19^; the Communists 
still formed the largest party in the National Assembly, although 
they had had no ministers in the Government since May, lh9J, Through­
out the year 19̂ 6, no Government had been able to remain in power for 
any extended period. By mid-19^7 a coalition under Robert Schuman 
had made some progress in stabilizing the financial situation, yet 
both the right and left opposition were capitalizing on the discontent
S., Congress, House, Select Committee on Foreign Aid, Final 
Report on Foreign Aid, 80th Cong., 1st Sess,, 19̂ 7; H, Kept. l84$ Pur- 
suant to H, Res. 29^ (May 1, 1948), p. 154. Cited hereafter as House 
Select Committee on Foreign Aid, Final Report on Foreign Aid.
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of the people» It was feared that if Schuaan should he overturned 
the choice of a Governisent would he hetveen DeGaul 1 e on the ri^ht
and the Communists on the left. The likelihood of civil war gave
99no reason for optimism,
Italy had been beset by crisis since it had left the war in 
19̂ 3* During the period 19^3-19^5 it suffered an administrative 
breakdown, Until June, 19̂ 7, its governments, characterized by their 
administrative inefficiency, largely had been based on a coalition of 
the Christian Democrats and Communist#,the two largest parties. Poli­
tical unrest had increased among the Italian people, due to the delays 
among the war-time Allied Powers in reaching agreement on the Italian 
peace treaty. When the treaty was completed, the Italians considered 
its provisions too severe. Accompanying the political unrest was a 
steady deterioration in economic conditions. Italy, of course, had 
suffered the devastations of war and in the postwar period ws con­
fronted with inflation, scarcities, and unemployment. The Italian Com­
munists attempted to capitalize on the dissatisfaction with the peace 
treaty by directing the malcontent against the Western powers. The 
Coî^unists accused the Goveri®ent of being responsible for the serious 
©eonoasie situation, They called for increased wages despite the un- 
E.vailability of many consumers’ goods, Strikes were used to gain 
political concessions, Hints of civil war were made by the head of 
the party. An armed Communist underground was known to exist, in ad­
dition to a complex of "People's Action Committees ", In June, 19 7̂, 
the Christian Democrats withdrew from the governing coalition end formed
^Xbld., pp. 15U-168.
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a new Gtoverniasnt composed of Christian Democrats and Independents,
The Communists were charged with deliberately obstructing the effoirts
of the previous Government to achieve economic recovery. The new
Government began a program designed to bolster the domestic economy.
It included credit restrictions, increased tax collections, and a
reduction in Government expenditures. It was feared, however, that
the exclusion of the Communists from the Government would widen the
cleavage between them and the rest of the country, resulting in in*
100creased Communist efforts to secure control.
The economic and political deterioration of Western Europe, 
the economic and political severance of Eastern from Western Europe, 
the increasing intransigence of the Soviet Union and its refusal to 
cooperate with the Western powers, convinced more and more Americans 
that the United States must assume greater international responsibilities 
if the world were to be saved from disaster. In the United States the 
primary threat to peace increasingly was viewed as emanating from the 
Soviet Union and world Communism. The policy of cooperation having 
failed, next came the Truman Ibotrine.
Greek-Turkish Crisis
In March, 19̂ 7; in an apparently sudden denouement, the gradual 
changes which had been occurring in poster American foreign policy vis- 
a-vis the Soviet Union crystallized in the historic and revolutionary
^^Ibid., pp. 169-180, During the autumn of 1946, stores of arms 
were found in northern Italy. Since British and American troops were 
scheduled to withdraw from Italy in 1947 in accordance with the peace 
treaty, it was presumed that the Communists were preparing for a violent 
take-over after the departure. McNeill, p. 734.
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pronouncement of the Truman Doctrine. Vanished were the remaining 
hopes that the United States might retur"̂  to the state of affairs 
existing prior to the outbreak of the second World War and the cata­
clysmic chain of events activated by that conflict. With the announce­
ment by Great Britain that it no longer would be able to act as the 
stabilizing factor in Greece, the United States quickly reached the 
decision that only it could provide an effective counterweight to 
Soviet power aspirations in this as well as other parts of the world.
Only the presence of British troops in Greece since its libera­
tion from the Nazis in 19W*-, and a liberal measure of British and 
American economic assistance, had kept that country from falling into 
complete chaos and, ultimately, into the avid Communist hands which 
sought to gain control. Only through American economic assistance 
could embattled Turkey continue to maintain the armed forces necessary 
to withstand Soviet threats to its eastern provinces and to its doml>f. 
nation of the Black Sea Straits.
Greece was the sole nation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
which, by 19̂ 7? was not Communist-dominatsd or subject to predominant 
Soviet influence. Without the assistance promised under the Truman 
Doctrine, however, it was doubtful that poverty-stricken Greece could 
remain much longer outside the Communist orbit. The strategic geo­
graphic location of Greece was an important factor in the United States 
decision to take decisive action. The Ëlastem islands of Greece face 
Turkey and dominate the entrance to the vital Dardanelles. Crete, on 
the south, controls Mediterranean lines of conanunication to the Middle 
East and India, If Greece were to fall into Communist hands, increased
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pressure could be applied to Turkey, Italy, ahd the Middle East.
Liberated from Geztsan rule in IQhL. Greece had proceeded im­
mediately into civil var between opposing political factions of the 
left and rights Even before the ^ r  among Eastern Europe's poorest 
nations, Greece's meager resources suffered heavy damage during the 
war^^^ and subsequent intermittent civil wars. Economic recovery 
was Impossible, under the circumstances.
The crisis of 19^7 had its beginning in the Metaxas dictator­
ship of 1936, which was followed by Nazi occupation in 19kl, Political 
parties were suppressed during both periods, The Coimnunists, who were 
trained to operate clandestinely, continued to function and during the 
war led the lewgest resistance movement. Their efforts to gain con­
trol of the government after the liberation were resisted by the rightists 
and by British troops. Internationally-supervised elections in March, 
191̂ 6 produced a clear victory for the rightist elements, although the 
Communists did not participate in the elections, A plebiscite in Sep­
tember, 1946, also internationally supervised, led to the restoration 
of the Greek monarchy. Coalition gcver%uents, under the control of 
the Populist (Royalist) Party, were unsuccessful in effecting any ap­
preciable degree of economic recovery.
^OlAccording to an UNRRA survey, one-third of Greece's villages 
were destroyed. The Corinth canal was blocked and the Peiraeus and 
Salonica harbors were wrecked, All the main bridges on the Athens- 
Salonica line were down, 80 percent of its rolling stock and 90 percent 
of its locomotives lost, large stretches of track wrecked, and many 
stations and rei^ir shops destroyed. One-half of its draught animals, 
one-third of its cattle, and 80 percent of its pigs were lost. Two mil­
lion olive trees, three million fruit trees, and sixty thousand acres of 
vineyards were destroyed, Cited in Seton-Watson, p. 329•
^^House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, Final Report on Foreign
Aid, p, 19U,
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Greece was plagued with a multiplicity of political parties, 
in which factionalism was most intense. More often than not, loyalty 
to the party was placed above loyalty to the nation. The nation suf­
fered from overcentralization of governmental activities in the capital. 
When communications were disrupted by guerrilla activities, operations 
at subordinate levels of government were paralyzed.
The Greek people for long had been accustomed to a low standard 
of living, due to the nation's infertile, unproductive soil and to over­
population. Most of the 7,500,000 Creeks were farmers. Less than a 
million depended on industry, transportation, communications, and bank­
ing for their livelihoods. Even though most of its people are farmers, 
Greece must import food in order to live. In 19̂ 7; thé United States 
supplied over one-third of the food consumed in Greece. Greek exports, 
never sufficient to cover its import requirements, primarily are agri­
cultural products. Because of the war's destruction, the disruption of 
international trade, a continuing deficit in the balance of payments,
over-population, and the intermittent civil wars, Greece was unsuccess-
IQkful in re-establishing even its extremely poor pre=war seonomj'. Greece 
underwent ruinous inflation at least twice prior to the offer of assistance
lOSlbid,
^^^Ibid.. p. 196. Agricultural output had risen to 85 percent 
of pre-war by 19&7; Industrial production, 70 percent; communications,
50 percent; internal rail transportation, Ç0 percent of its pre-war 
load capacity. The merchant fleet had 60 percent of its pre-war ton­
nage. Electric power output exceeded by 20 percent the pre-war pro­
duction. Exports were at approximately one-half of the pre-war level 
and imports (excluding relief aid) were only at approximately 35 per­
cent of pre-war.
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under the Truman Doctrine,
During the period July 1, 1940-Decemher 31; 19̂ 6, Great Britain 
and the United States contributed a total of $1,039,861,063 in assist­
ance to Greece (G.B,: $632,380,000; U, S,; $407,48l,063). Most of this 
aid vas given in the period after liberation. Of aid supplied by UNRRA, 
$2%3;l80,331 was from the United States during the period July 1, 19̂ 5- 
December 31; 19̂ 6, During the same period, Greece received a property 
credit in the amount of $U5,000,000 from the Office of the Foreign 
Liquidation Commission. From the Maritime Commission, Greece received 
a property credit of $23;708,903. From the Export-Import Bank, Greece 
received a credit for $25,000,000. With the $300,000,000 it vas to re­
ceive under the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill (Truman Doctrine), the grand 
total of postvar aid by the United States to Greece would be $876,500,
000,loG
During the period, and certainly during the debates on the 
Greek-Turkish Aid Bill, Greece did not remain free of criticism from 
its benefactors. Its government vas censured for failure to take ef­
fective action toward achieving a balanced budget, toward instituting 
tax reforms, toward reducing government and relief payrolls, and toward
105 new currency was introduced after the German departure in 
19^k in an attempt to curb wild inflation. Expenditures were far greater 
than normal, hovrever, and revenues dwindled to practically nothing. In 
November, I9kk, one dollar (U, S.) was worth I50 new drachmae, 500 In 
June, 1945, and 5,000 in January, 1946, In June, 1945, the Government 
attempted to reduce prices and cut bureaucratic expenses, it refused to 
grant an increase in armed forces’ pay, and it levied an "extraordinary 
contribution" on industrialists and merchants. The success of these 
endeavors lasted only into the summer, Seton-Watson, pp. 399-331,
*̂̂ Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 3, 3151-3153»
63
controlling speculation and hoarding of vital commodities. Some 
of its citizens drev criticism for exploiting the economic crisis 
to further their ovn selfish interests. The Greeks were criticized 
for developing an attitude that they could continue existing indefi­
nitely through foreign subsidies. Although it was to be assisted 
under the Truman Doctrine in in^roving its governmental administration, 
Greece was cautioned that leadership could come only from within Greece 
and until the Greeks developed a greater sense of leadership and self- 
reliance " , , , Greece will remain an open invitation to imperialist 
totalitarian powers seeking to exploit its tragedy for their own un- - 
scrupulous ends,"^^
At London, in January, 19̂ 6, the Soviet Union asked the 
Security Council to consider the situation of the presence of British
108troops in Greece, British troops had landed in Greece in October,
19W*', in the role of liberators, although German troops already had 
begun an evacuation. In order to prevent a possible coup d‘ etat by 
ELAS (National People's Liberation Army), the Communist-led guerrilla 
army, the British ordered that all such forces be disbanded, ELAS, 
the most numerous armed force in the country, and SAM (National Liber­
ation Front), its political counterpart, resorted to force rather than 
surrender their arms and their predominant position, Terroristic acts 
by ELAS in Athens during the short civil war cost the Communists much
^House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, Final Report on Foreign 
Aid, p, 19k, In connection with a request for American assistance prior 
to the March, IQL? crisis, Trvnasn had warned the Greeks "to get their 
house in order," Truman, I, 522,
lofiCampbell, pp, 85-86,
6k
of their public support» Efforts to negotiate a settlement proved 
futile and; finally; British force prevailed after more than a month 
of fighting» A peace was then concluded, with BIAS agreeing to dis­
band, Parties associated with EAM could not be represented in the 
Government *
Nothing came of the Soviet demand that the Security Council 
investigate the matter of British troops in Greece, after the Greek 
representative declared that the troops were in Greece at the request 
of the Government,However, the Greek Government began to be sub­
jected to a barrage of propaganda from Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bul­
garian Communist sources, and in the spring of 19k6 fighting erupted 
again in the n o r t h , L e d  by the Communists, the guerrillas in­
cluded many who were motivated not by ideology but by a desire to 
escape the repressive policies of the right-wing Greek governments.
The economic chaos led many to take up arms. Others required little 
or no motivation to resort to violence.
Supporting the guerrillas were the Communist governments of 
Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria,who accused the Greek Government 
of persecuting its national minorities. In August, 19^, Greece was 




^l^House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, Final Report on Foreign 
Aid, pp, 192-193,
llSlbld.; pp. 190, 192-193.
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frontiers, A United States proposal to have the Security Council 
investigate the matter was defeated, by Soviet veto,^^^
vSien the peace treaties for the former enemy states were 
under consideration at Paris in the summer of 1946, both Yugoslavia and 
Bulgaria had pressed unsuccessful claims to Greek territory,There 
may have been some validity in their claims, as with other süch claims 
in fragmented Eastern and Southeastern Europe, However, as after World 
War If there was no easy solution to the tangled national minorities 
problems of this area. The Albanian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian propa­
ganda offensive against Greece, and their support of the Greek guer­
rillas generally coincided with the deterioration of relations between 
the Soviet Union and the West and appeared to be calculated to capitalize 
upon the disability of the Greek Government to maintain order to the 
degree necessary to effect a modicum of economic reconstruction.
Britain would have preferred to place its support behind a 
more moderate government for Greece, but the moderates were unable to 
organize. The rightists were able to cossasnd majority support on the 
ground of defending Greece against the threats of Communism, Even 
fervent anti-Communlsts recognized the inconsistencies apparent in 
rushing to the support of the existing Greek Government as a "bastion 
of democracy". As before the war, there were extreme contrasts in 
wealth, with most Greeks falling into the poverty-stricken category.




The wealthy few concentrated upon preserving their wealth, regardless 
of the consequences for Greece, In addition, a corrupt bureaucracy 
and a police force noted for its brutality and for excesses under the 
mantle of fighting Communism did nothing to endear the Government to 
many of the people and to those who were called upon to provide as­
sistance to Greece, Many recruits were supplied to the rebels because
of loose denunciations as "Communists" by personal enemies, business
117rivals, or the police.
In December, 1946, the Greek Government charged in the Security 
Council that Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were lending support to 
the Greek guerrillas. An American resolution to create a Commission 
to investigate the disturbances on both sides of the Greek frontier 
was adopted. The Ccxmniosion, upon which all members of the Security 
Council were represented, assembled in Athens in January, 194?* After 
on-the-spot investigations there was general agreement on the existence 
of a threat to the peace but no agreement as to the cause, A majority 
report, in which eight members concurred, concluded that "Yugoslavia, 
and to a lesser extent Albania and Bulgaria have supported the guerrilla 
warfare in Greece," The Russian and Polish representatives attributed 
blame to the Greeks. The Prench representative did not reach a con­
clusion, The majority report noted the unstable conditions in Greece 
and criticized the Greek Government for permitting excesses against 
opposition political groups and against Slav and Albanian minorities,
llJgeton-Wataon, p, 336, 
llGcempbell, pp. 474-47$.
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On the other hand) it noted Cossnunist propaganda and the training 
and organisation of Greek refugees in Yugoslavia, It noted Yugo­
slav and Bulgarian territorial ambitions in Greece and their efforts
119to promote separatist movements in Greece.
At the time the Security Council Commission vas in Greece, an . 
American economic mission vas on the scene endeavoring to determine 
vhat measures could be taken to restore the Greek economy. The mission 
had been undertaken in response to an urgent request of the Greek Gov­
ernment for assistance,Late in February, 19̂ 7, vord vas received 
by the United States Government that Great Britain, because of its ovn 
economic crisis, vas being foz'ced to reduce its foreign commitments, 
After the end of March, it vould no longer be able to continue its
support of Greece and Turkey. The l6,000 remaining British troops
121vould be removed from Greece shortly thereafter.
While Greece struggled to prevent utter chaos and possible
122absorption into the Communist vorld, its eastern neighbor Turkey 
also vas being confronted vith problems having serious import in the 
grovlng East-West struggle. Since the war's end, Turkey had bean sub­
jected to an increasingly vituperative barrage of Soviet propaganda, 
blandishments, and threats in regard to the control of the Black Sea
^^^Ibld., 1947-1948, pp. 387-390.
^̂ Îbid.. 1945-1947, p. 476,
^^^Ibid.. pp, 476-477; Truman, I, 99-100.
Cki February 18, 1947, Mark Ethridge, of the United States In­
vestigating Commission in Greece, vamed of an "impending move by the 
Communlèts to seize the country . . . ."'Harry S. Truman, Memoirs ; Years 
of Trial and Hope, II (Nev York; Doubleday and Co., Inc,, 1956), 99*
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Straitsf Controversy regarding the Straits vas not new in Russian- 
Turkish relations. However, the insistent Soviet denands for a joint 
voice in the control of the Straits convinced the Turkish Government 
that war over the issue was quite possible. The efforts to maintain 
an arroy capable of resisting Soviet aggression were more than the 
backward Turkish economy could support,
The Soviet Government believed that it had legitimate griev­
ances against Turkey. It objected to the German-Turkish treaty signed 
in June, 19̂ 1, It was incensed at a pro-German pan-Turk group in 
Turkey who agitated for the separation from Russia of Turkish-populated 
regions in the Caucasus and Central Asia and called for their in­
dependence or their incorporation into Turkey, The Soviets charged 
also that the Turkish Government had permitted German warships to pass 
through the Straits during the war. In March, 194$, the Soviet Govern­
ment renounced the 1925 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey, It said a 
new treaty would be signed only if Turkey ceded to the Soviet Union 
its eastern provinces of Kars, Artvin, and Ardahan, allowed the Soviets 
to establish a base in the Straits, and agreed to the revision of the 
Montreux Convention of I936, regarding governance of the Straits. Tur­
key rejected these demands but did indicate a willingness to consider 
a revision of the Montreux Convention. The United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union had agreed at the Potsdam Conference, in 




125Union's changed situation» '
Violent Soviet propaganda attacks vere directed against the
Turkish Government, with the Turks replying in kind. In July, 19̂ 6,
the Soviet Government proposed that a new regime for the Straits he
established by the Black Sea Powers and that defense of the Straits
be made a joint underteUcing of Turkey and the Soviet Union. This
was unacceptable to T u r k e y . T h e  United States, on August 19,
declared that the defense of the Straits would best be entrusted to
Turkey alone. If Soviet Black Sea positions should ever be threatened
by a non-Black Sea Power, the matter would best be handled in the 
127United Nations, This was the situation existing in early 19^7 
when the United States found itself confronted with the crisis in 
Greece.
^^^Documahts on Merican Foreign Relations, VIII, 93̂ »
^^^Neill, pp. 713-714, Truman called this an "open bid" by 
the Russians "to obtain control of Turkey , . , Truman, II, 96-97»
^Sston-Watson, pp» 35I“353»
CHAPTER II
ÂMEHICAÎ9 m@8TIC POLITICAL DEVELORSBNTS, 19k$-19W3
When Harry S. Truman succeeded to the Presidency on April 12,
19%$, he vas an unknown quantity to the American public, Except for
the favorable publicity attached to his role as chairman of a Senate
committee investigating the war effort on the home front,^ Truman's
public background was unspectacular and colorless. His brief tenure
in the Vice Presidency, overshadowed by the aura surrounding the almost
legendary figure in the White House, contributed virtually nothing in
equipping him for the responsibilities that were to become his upon the
sudden death of the controversial leader who had been at the nation's
2helm through twelve of its most critical years.
Genuinely humble as the mantle of leadership was placed on his
shoulders,- President Truman sought the nation's support In continuing
^Special C«mnittee Investigating the National Defense Program,
%r. T n m m  served as Vice President eighty-tw© dsys, % e  late
President Roosevelt was in Washington on fewer than thirty of those 
eighty-two days. Truman said he saw the President only eight times in 
the year before Roosevelt's death, Louis W, Koenig (ed,), The Truman 
Administration; Its Principles and Practice (Washington Square, N, Y.; 
New York University Press, 19$6), P, 2,
30n the morning of April 13, 19%$, Mr, Truman's first full day 
in the Presidency, he told an Associated Press correspondent that " , , « 
few men in history equaled the one into whose shoes I was stepping end
, , , X silently prayed to God that I oould measure up to the task." It
was accepted generally that Mr, Truman's humility in regard to his
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the policies of the fallen Roosevelt toward a successful conclusion 
of the war effort. By this time, the W8,r in Europe WB,s proceeding 
to a rapid conclusion under the momentum of the mighty array of forces 
assembled by the Grand Alliance. Unknown to President Truman on the 
day he assumed his awesome responsibilities, an as yet untried secret 
weapon in the possession of the United States would bring the Pacific 
war to a close many months ahead of its most optimistically anticipated 
conclusion.
With the war's end, the American people ̂ in the summer of 19̂ 5 
were eager to resume a way of life approximating "normal". The war had 
contributed to significant changes in the American style of living.
Even though the war had. brought sacrifices, a majority of those Amer­
icans who had maintained the home front had come to enjoy a vastly 
improved standard of living during the war years. Their expectations 
now were much higher and they would not willingly return to the austere 
existence of the depressed 1930's. The new way of life had been made 
possible by the tremendous sums of money poured into the economy by the 
Federal government in the war effort. The expenditures of the Roose­
velt Administration toward effecting recovery from the Great Depression 
were infinitesimal in comparison to the wartime expenditures. Despite 
the obvious reason for the comparative prosperity enjoyed by America
ability to carry out the tasks of the Presidency, although initially 
causing a surge of popular sympathy and support, ultimately led to 
some difficulties in asserting his authority.
1|.
Mr. Truman told members of the Cabinet on April 12, 19̂ 5, 
that he intended to carry on with the late President Roosevelt’s poli­
cies. In his first message to Congress, delivered in person on April 
lé, 1945, Mr. Truman gave reassurances that he would continue the poli­
cies of the New Deal. Truman, I, 9i Congressional Quarterly, Vol. I 
No. 2 (Apr.-June, 19̂ 5), 415-432.
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as it prepared to re-enter a period of international peace, the role 
of the government in the economy was to constitute the prime issue 
dividing the nation politically in the postwar years.
During his first months in office, President Truman enjoyed 
the enthusiastic support of the nation. His excellent relations with 
Congress were attributed to the friendships he had built and to the 
knowledge he had acquired of the functioning of that body during his 
years in the United States Senate. Those first months in the Presi­
dency, however, were months during which the nation remained united 
in the great cause of winning the war.^
With peace would come new problems requiring vigorous leader­
ship, if the reconversion to peaceful pursuits were to mean the con­
tinuation of a virtually full employment economy. Possibly the fore­
most question during the immediate postwar years was whether the United 
States would sink into disastrous economic depression. If it did, it 
would be accompanied on its descent by the rest of the world. The eyes 
of the world, therefore, watched expectantly as the United States con­
verted from I'jar to peace.^
The transition to a peacetime economy did not proceed smoothly 
or uneventfully. As a matter of fact, the transition never was made
5a Roper poll in August, 19̂ 5 indicated that 72 percent of those 
polled rated President Truman's conduct of foreign affairs "good" to 
"excellent"; 70 percent rated his handling of Congress "good" to "ex­
cellent"; and 6h percent rated his handling of domestic problems "good" 
to "excellent". Elmo Roper, You and Your Leaders: Their Actions and





in actuality, because of the inception of the "cold war" and the 
resultant programs of massive foreign aid and rearmament. However, 
the public itself did not become seriously alarmed about the status 
of United States-Soviet relations for nearly two years after the end 
of World War II. Its immediate concern was with resuming the way of
g
life which had been interrupted in 19̂ 1.
Due perhaps to the unanticipated early ending of the Pacific 
war, adequate plans were lacking for an orderly transition from war 
to peace. President Truman found it necessary to call Congress back 
from a recess in September, 19̂ 5» in order to present a reconversion 
program. Mr. Truman called for demobilization of all armed forces no 
longer needed; settlement of war contracts; clearance of war plants 
so that peacetime production could be resumed; holding the line on 
prices, wages, and rents; removing all possible wartime controls, 
keeping only those necessary to aid reconversion and expansion; and
^The origin of the term "cold war" is attributed to Herbert 
Bayward Swope, a veteran newspaperman, in a speech he helped Bernard 
Baruch prepare for delivery at Columbia, South Carolina, on April l6,
19̂ 7' Columnist Walter Lippmann then popularized the term. Eric P. 
Goldman, The Crucial Decade--And After (N. Y.; Vintage Books, A Division 
of Random House, 1961), p. 60.
g
Gallup polls taken in October, 19̂ 5? February, June, September., 
and December, 1946, indicated that less than 25 percent of the respond­
ents in each poll considered foreign policy issues as the most impor­
tant problems facing the American people. Gabriel A. Almond, The 
American People and Foreign Policy (N. Y.: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 
Publishers, I960), p. 73» A Fortune poll, released in September, 19̂ 5, 
indicated that only 25 percent of the respondents considered Soviet 
Russia's moves in Eastern Europe as aggressive. By July, 1946, when the 
Council of Foreign Ministers was stalemated at Paris, 50 percent in a 
Fortune poll believed that Soviet Russia was intent on world domination. 
However, 34 percent thought Russian moves were dictated by security 
interests. By October, 1947, 66 percent in a Fortune poll thought Russia 
capable of starting a war to gain its ends. Ibid., pp. 94-95»
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measures to prevent rapid decreases of wage Incomes or purchasing 
power* He also called for expansion of the coverage and benefits 
of the unemployment compensation laws; increase of the minimum hourly 
wage and coverage of agricultural workers; extension of price stabili­
zation authority; full employment legislation; and a permanent Pair 
Employment Practices Committee. The President further called for 
cooperation between labor and industry to keep strikes and lockouts 
at a minimum. He announced plans for strengthening the Department of 
Labor and asked that the United States Employment Service be continued 
temporarily under Federal control in order to assist returning veterans 
and displaced war-workers. He asked for machinery to safeguard farm 
prices. The President also requested a continuation of Selective 
Service; a broad Federal housing program; Federal aid for re-develop­
ment of urban slum areas; establishment of a single Federal Research 
Agency; limited tax reductions in 1946; development of the Columbia, 
Missouri and other river basins; and Federal aid to small business.
He asked for the creation of an agency to inventory the nation's natural 
resources and to undertake a program of "useful public works" which
9would provide employment in the event private industry could not do so.
President Truman's message was not solely a reconversion pro­
gram. It marked the beginning of the Fair Deal as well as the end of 
his "honeymoon" with Congress and the public. It isolated him from 
those who believed he would assume a more conservative position than 
the late President Roosevelt. It led to bitter struggles with Congress, 
both when that body was controlled by Democrats as well as when the
^Truman, I, 481-485; Koenig, pp. 148-176.
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Republicans gained control after the 19^6 elections.The Republican- 
dominated Eightieth Congress> elected in 1946  ̂was later excoriated by 
Truman and the Democrats as the "do-nothing" Congress. Yet it is 
debatable whether the President's program achieved a much greater de­
gree of success with the Democratic-controlled Seventy-ninth Congress 
than with the Republican Eightieth.
In addition to his comprehensive program of September 6, 19̂ 5, 
President Truman subsequently submitted to the Seventy-ninth Congress 
proposals relating to; reorganization of Executive branch agencies; 
Presidential succession; adoption of the United Nations Charter; con­
trol of atomic energy; additional funds for the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA); a National Health Program; 
further extension of price and rent controls; Universal Military Train­
ing (UMT); labor fact-finding boards and thirty-day cooling-off periods; 
drafting strikers into the armed forces and authorizing injunctive pro­
ceedings against labor leaders who called or encouraged strikes against 
the government; veterans' housing; and participation in the new Inter­
national Court of Justice.
^Ojonathan Daniels writes that President Truman told him " . . .  
that September the sixth speech was made to let the Hearsts and the Mc­
Cormicks know that they were not going to take me into camp." Daniels 
concludes that the speech "cost" the Democrats the 1946 Congressional 
elections but that Truman " . . .  became President, not on April 12, but 
on September 6 . . . ," The Man of Independence (Philadelphia: Lippin- 
cott, 1950), pp. 297v 299' Other observers concluded, however, that 
President Truman did not gain full confidence in his role until after 
the Democratic Congressional defeat in 1946. By this time, most of the 
Roosevelt followers had left the Administration and Truman was following 
his own counsel and that of advisers whom he had personally selected. 
Goldman, pp. 62-64; Tris Coffin, Missouri Compromise (Boston; Little, 
Brown and Co., 1947), pp. 306-3OY; Roper, pp. 13O-13I; Columnist Gould 
Lincoln, Washington (D.Ç.) Evening Star, January I8, 194?, quoted in 
Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, AI98.
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Very little of Truman's program vas enacted by the First Session 
of the Seventy-ninth Congress. Hovevsr, Congress passed and the Presi= 
dent signed a government reorganization bill, an appropriation of $l60 
million for veterans' housing, a new UNRRA participation act, a bill 
implementing United States membership in the United Nations, a tax re­
duction measure, an extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Acts, a 
sàlary adjustment for Federal employees, a surplus property bill, an 
extension of the Price Control act, and a measure providing more liberal 
credit and benefits to veterans. The United Nations Charter was adopted 
overwhelmingly by the Senate. During this session, opposition mounted 
against continuation of wartime emergency controls over prices and rents. 
This was to become one of the primary obstacles to cooperation between 
President Truman and Congress.
Several important measures of the President's program were re­
jected or left pending for the Second Session. During the Second Session, 
the President signed into law: additional veterans' housing legislation; 
Federal aid for school lunches; the Employment Act of 19^6 (full employ­
ment); a national Mental Health Act; extension of Selective Service; 
Federal Aid for airports: a pay increase for Federal employees; Federal 
aid for hospitals; increased Federal contributions to Social Security; 
the British loan; adherence to the United Nations Educational and 
Scientific Organization; the Atomic Energy Act; the Congressional Re­
organization Act; another extension of price controls; and the Adminis­
trative Procedures Act. Most of the Truman recommendations which became
llpioyd M. Riddick, "The First Session of the Seventy-ninth 
Congress (Jan. 3-Dec. 21, 19 5̂)/' American Political Science Review,
XL (April, 1946), 256-271.
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law were modified in varying degrees by Congress. Still pending at
the end of the Seventy=ninth Congress were these major portions of
Truman's program; self-government for the District of Columbia;
Federal aid to education; labor fact-finding boards; permanent Fair
Employment Practices Committee; health and medical care; increase in
the minimum wage; national housing program; Presidential succession;
extension of Social Security; aid to small business; St. Lawrence
Seaway; expansion of unemployment compensation; single Federal Research
Agency; armed forces' unification; expansion of crop insurance; crea-
12tion of a Missouri Valley Authority; and UMT.
Rather than criticizing Congress as a whole for the failure of 
much of his program to become law, the President placed the blame on 
its committees.However, Congress during this period appeared con­
sciously to be striving to break the spell of Presidential domination 
which had become so customary during the earlier Roosevelt Adminis­
trations. Pleas that Congress recapture its status as a co-equal 
branch of the Federal government were voiced frequently during hear­
ings on the Congressional Reorganization Act of 19̂ 6. The disappear­
ance of Roosevelt, the inexperience of the new President, occasional 
displays of Executive ambiguity and vacillation, as well as occasional 
blurrings of responsibility within the Administration, probably con­
tributed to the growing independence of Congress in relation to the 
Executive branch. In addition. Congress continued to be dominated
^^Floyd M. Riddick, "The Second Session of the Seventy-ninth 
Congress (Janv ll|-Aug. 2, 1946)," Ibid., XL I (February, 194-7 ), 12-28.
^^Koenig, p. 252.
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by a conservative coalition of Southern Democrats and Northern Re­
publicans. to whom much of the New Deal and Fair Deal programs spelled
ihanathema.
The reconversion period bordered often on chaos. Consumer 
goods were in many cases in extremely short supply whereas a great 
backlog of consumer wants, demands, and purchasing power had ac­
cumulated during the -war. With the great accumulation of wartime 
savings seeking out a limited quantity of consumer goods inflation 
posed a serious problem throughout the early postwar years. There 
were constant and simultaneous pressures on President and Congress 
both for the end of all wartime emergency controls over the economy and 
for the continuation of such controls until the supply-demand situation
^^There was less party regularity among Senate and House Demo­
crats in the Seventy-ninth Congress than among the minority Republicans, 
although considerable crossing of party lines occurred in both parties.
This is shown in tables on distribution of party regularity in Congres­
sional Quarterly, Vol. II, No. !+ (Oct.-Dec., 19̂ 6), 783. Only those
votes on which a majority of both parties voted differently are included 
in the analysis. Evidence of the cross-purposes within the Truman Ad­
ministration was demonstrated by the confusion surrounding the speech 
by Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace in September, 1946, in which 
he argued for a "softer" American foreign policy relative to the Soviet 
Union, ostensibly with the approval of the President and contrary to the
policy line being followed by Secretary of State Byrnes. The American
public and friends abroad were at a loss as to the Administration's in­
tent. Herbert Agar, The Price of Power: America since 1945, in The Chicago 
History of American Civilization, ed. Daniel J. Boorstin (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 60-64. In the early days of his 
Administration, President Truman was criticized for delegating too much 
responsibility to his subordinates. According to one source, the Presi­
dent believed in selecting the "right" men to head the departments and 
then leaving departmental operations to such appointees. " . . .  It took 
him some time to discover that while he could delegate every duty he 
could escape no responsibility . . . ." Daniels, p. 302. Also see Coffin, 
p. 23. The Administration also was criticized on the grounds that while 
it urgently pressed for UMT it meekly capitulated to the "popular clamor 
for demobilization"; while supporting large loans to European and other 
countries it allowed desperately-needed food shipments to lag far behind
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could become stabilized, Labor generally sought the elimination of 
controls on wage increases whereas business and industry' sought the 
elimination of controls over prices. Farmers sought the continuation 
of high price support levels won during the war. As controls gradually 
were eliminated, the consuming public was subjected to severe inflation. 
President and Congress constantly were at loggerheads over the issue 
of controls. Although generally favoring only a gradual relaxation 
of controls, the President was not entirely unambiguous regarding his 
position on this subject. However, the dominant sentiment in Congress 
was for an accelerated end to controls and, despite the efforts of the 
President, this was reflected in legislation enacted on the subject.
That this was à serious problem and one for which a solution was not 
readily attainable was evidenced by its injection as the major issue-- 
the "high cost of living"--ln the 19tô Presidential campaign.
schedule; and that while assuming a "tough" posture toward the Soviet 
Union it permitted American armed forces to disintegrate and did nothing 
else concrete to convince the ambitious Russians of American determi­
nation. Goldman, pp. 36-37. Mr. Truman also was criticized at various 
times for alleged ineffectual leadership of Congress, for splitting 
organized labor and the nation’s liberals. Max Lerner, Actions and 
Passions; Notes on the Multiple Revolution of Qur Time (N. Y.: Simon
and Schuster, 19^9); PP» 205-207; Coffin, p. 29. ”
15Before the war's end and generally throughout the early post­
war period President Truman strongly urged the retention of those con­
trols necessary to prevent runaway inflation and its consequences. Yet 
on the eve of the 19̂ ^̂  elections the Administration lifted controls on 
meat, which was in critically short supply. In October, 1946, living 
costs were 20 percent above those of 1944. After the elections nearly 
all price controls were removed and housing controls were reduced. Prices 
immediately moved upward. At the time the President viewed the major 
problem as one of goods being deliberately withheld from the market and 
placed the onus for the situation on the "unworkable price-control law 
which Congress had passed" in July. Truman, I, 223, 488-491, $12-915; 
Truman, II, 26; Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, A7-8; Louis H.
Bean, How to Predict Elections (n . Y.; Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. $2.
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Following the end of the war and throughout 1$46 the country 
was swept by waves of paralyzing strikes as labor sought to consolidate 
its gains made during the war while working a reduced number of hours 
per week. Labor's demands were resisted bitterly by business which, 
simultaneously, was seeking an end of price controls. Strikes were
of such intensity and frequency that demands soon were heard for severe
16limitations on the rights of organized labor. As relations between
However, Truman again warned Congress of the continuing dangers of ruin­
ous inflation in his January 6, 19^7 State of the Union message and 
called on labor and industry to hold the line on wages and prices. By 
this time, living costs were an estimated 33 percent above the level 
on December J, 19̂ 1. Truman, II, 26-27; Goldman, p. 2$. Actually, 
President Truman appeared to be in a hopeless predicament in regard 
to peacetime economic controls. He was criticized for his attempts to 
maintain effective controls and again when he removed most of the re­
maining, ineffectual, controls. One writer bitterly commented: " . . .  
Taft's present indictment against the President is that after the 
Republicans had killed the CPA ninety per cent, Truman proceeded to 
wipe out the remaining ten per cent." Lerner, p. I80. Another author 
implies that President Truman's real position on peacetime controls was 
that such controls were "Police state methods". Goldman, p. 21.
^̂ Mr. Truman described the labor unrest as "one of the most 
difficult and persistent of all the domestic problems" he faced as 
President, In the fall of 19̂ 5 there were strikes in the coal mining, 
oil, lumber, automobile, and meat-packing industries. Strikes were 
threatening in the steel and railroad industries. By the first week 
in December, 26$,000 workers were on strike. Truman, I, 495-500. On 
April 1, 1946, John L. Lewis ordered 400,000 coal miners to walk out 
of the bituminous coal fields. On May 23, 1946, twenty railroad unions 
called out on strike 300,000 members from most of the major lines across 
the nation. The railroad strike was settled only after the President 
had asked Congress for authority to draft the strikers into the armed 
forces. The coal strike resulted in the Federal government taking over 
operation of the coal mines. Lewis called another strike in November 
and he and the union were fined a total of $3,510,000. The November 
strike is credited with assisting the Republicans in regaining control 
of Congress. Ibid., pp. 500-505. Also in 1946 there were strikes by 
the maritime and telephone workers' unions. It was estimated that the 
1946 strikes resulted in a loss of 107,475,000 man-days of work. Gold­
man, p, 25. When the Eightieth Congress convened in January, 1947, 
another coal strike was pending and union contracts in steel and other 
key industries were due to expire in a few months.
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the Soviet Union and the United States deteriorated, the demands of
labor frequently came to be viewed as a part of the overall world
Communist conspiracy. Friends of labor were painted with the same 
17brush. The climate of opinion was ripe for the adoption in 19^7
of the Taft-Hartley Act, which was described as a measure designed to
readjust the balance between labor and management. To organized labor,
18however, it was a return to the "dark ages" of labor. President 
Truman's ringing denunciation of this legislation, which effectively 
eclipsed his earlier espousal of a measure under which striking workers 
could be drafted into the armed forces, contributed significantly to 
his victory in
The Congressional elections of 1946 witnessed the return of
the Republican Party to national power for the first time since the
20Hoover Administration. The stage appeared to be set for certain
Quarterly, Vol. Ill, No. 2 (April-June, 194?)> 282. A Roper poll in 
September, 1946 indicated that only 11 percent of the respondents 
thought un ions were doing a "fine" Job; 31 percent conceded that 
unions "make mistakes" but that they are more beneficial than harm­
ful; 39 percent conceded the need for unions but considered them harm­
ful as then operated; and 10 percent thought the country would be 
better off without unions. Roper, p. 19$.
17Bean, pp. 29, 35; Lerner, p. 205.
^̂ Congressional Quarterly, Vol. Ill, No, 2 (April-June, 1947),
284-296.
^^Ibid., p. 295; Wilfred E. Binkley, The Man in the White House; 
His Powers and Duties (Rev. ed.; N. Y.: Harper Colophon Books, Harper 
and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. l44; Truman, II, 29.
20The last time the Republicans had won control of both houses 
of Congress was in the I928 Hoover landslide. They lost the House of 
Representatives by one vote in 1930, Edward M. Sait, American Parties 
and Elections (3d ed.; N. Y.: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc,, 1942), 
p. 272.
82
Republican victory in the 1948 contest for the Presidency. During
1946 the popularity of President Truman had continued to decline,
culminating in the loss of control of both houses of Congress by the 
21Democrats. Legitimate concern arose as to the possibility of utter 
stalemate in the Federal government, divided as it was between a Demo­
cratic Executive and a Republican Congress. The reasons underlying
22the resurgence of Republican power are varied. Of great importance 
was the mood of disquietude pervading the country during this period. 
There was dissatisfaction with the direction, or lack thereof, in 
which the country seemed to be moving.^3 Factors contributing to the 
Democratic loss of Congress certainly included anxiety about the threat­
ening course along which the country appeared to be moving in inter­
national affairs; dissatisfaction with continued shortages of consumer 
items, increasingly high prices, strikes and other evidences of labor
November, 19̂ 5 Roper poll indicated that 62 percent of the 
respondents thought President Truman was doing a "good" job. However,
13 percent thought he was either incapable of handling the Presidency 
or that the country was în a dire predicament with him as President.
Only 46 percent considered him to be doing a good job in April, 1946, 
whereas 34 percent thought him incapable of handling the Presidency, and 
6 percent thought of him as bad for the country. A trial heat for the 
1948 Presidential race pitting Truman against Stassen end Dewey showed 
Stassen edging Truman 37 percent to 35 percent while Truman and Dewey 
tied, each receiving 4l percent, Roper, p. 127» According to other 
Roper polls, neither the President nor Congress was rated in high esteem 
by the American public in 1946. Ibid., p. 192.
22House Speaker Sam Rayburn is said to have remarked to a 
friend that "This is going to be a damn beefsteak election." William 
S. White, The Taft Story (N. Y.: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1954), 
p. 36. The Speaker appeared to have gauged the mood of the public 
fairly accurately.
The press referred to 1946 as the "Year of Frustration". Agar, 
The Unquiet Years, p. 65; Goldman, pp. 44-45-
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unrest; apparent confusion in the highest levels of government, 
evidenced by incessant bickering between President and Congress, 
among officials within the Executive branch, and by the seeming in­
ability of the government to solve the many perplexing issues of 
24the day. Communism was an issue in the election as attested by
one Republican campaign slogan beseeching the electorate to "End
Controls, Confusion, Corruption, Communism, Vote Republican".
Aware of the developing anti-Communist sentiment and a tendency to
equate all things "bad" with Communism or sympathy therefor, some
Democrats sought to dissociate themselves from their New Deal ante- 
26cedents. Despite the fact that the "tide" had been running against
the Democrats for several years, in that margins of victory had con­
tinued to decline from the high point of 193^-1938, it is possible 
that victory still might have been salvaged had it not been for 
voter apathy. A surprisingly large number of normally Democratic 
voters stayed at home on election day. Democratic leaders could not 
be persuaded of the possibility of defeat and thus, because they did 
not conduct a vigorous campaign, contributed to the apathy and to the 
defeat.
-^ean, pp. 7-8, 25, 29-30, 35̂  52; White, pp. 55-5&; Agar,
The Unquiet Years, pp. 65-66; Coffin, pp. 299-300; Goldman, p. 296.
Z^Another Republican slogan which seemed to capture the spirit 
of the electorate was "Had Enough? Vote Republican, November 5*" 
Goldman, p. 295.
^ B̂ean, p. 35- Being a "radical", a term used to characterize 
Democrats, was dangerously near being a Communist. Democrats joined in 
the anti-Communist chorus, some apparently trying to out-do the Repub­
licans. Coffin, pp. 297, 299.
2?Bean, pp. 23, 29-30, 34-35.
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The jubilant Republicans interpreted the electoral victory
as a repudiation of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and Harry Truman's 
oftFair Deal. It was a vindication of policies espoused during the 
long, dark years of Democratic unorthodoxy. The ultimate reprieve 
would come with the election of a Republican President in 19̂ 8. Much 
of the activity surrounding the Republican Eightieth Congress was 
focused upon insuring that outcome. That the Republicans misinter­
preted the reasons underlying their return to majority status was 
evidenced by the resurgence of President Truman's popularity during 
19̂ 7 as he frequently was vitriolic in his denunciations of Republican 
Congressional policies. Complete evidence that the nation was not 
ready for a return to pre-Rooseveltian domestic policies was seen in 
President Truman's spectacular victory in winning the Presidency in
29his own right in 19^ against ostensibly insurmountable odds.
q Q
Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.) reportedly called 
on President Truman to appoint a Republican as Secretary of State and 
then resign in his favor. President Truman's reaction to this sug­
gestion was not reported. James M. Bums, Congress on Trial; The 
Legislative Process and the Administrative State (N*. Y. : Harper and 
Brothers, Publishers, 1949), p. 1>0.
29William S. White, Senator Taft's biographer, writes that 
Taft returned to Washington after the 19^6 elections convinced that 
the New Deal had been repudiated. White said it was "inconceivable" 
to Taft that the elections had been determined on the basis of highly 
emotional issues, such as the serious shortage of meat. White, p..56. 
Another author describes the men who led the Eightieth Congress as 
"men with a mission" who " . . .  had come roaring into the Capitol 
filled with spleen and plannings." Goldman, p. p2. In the 19^6 Con­
gressional elections the Republicans received 5 .̂3 percent of the votes; 
the Democrats received 4$.7 percent; and minor party candidates re­
ceived 1.̂ . percent. In the House of Representatives, the Republicans 
made their largest gains in districts classified as "northern big city". 
American Institute of Public Opinion, The Gallup Political Almanac for 
19|<3 (Princeton, N. J. : printed by The Clarke Press, Manchester, N. H., 
194Ô), pp. 6, 53. Louis H. Bean interpreted this to mean that the
85
The Republican Eightieth Congress, which convened January 
3> 19̂ 7> «3£ from the outset characterized as "Taft's" Congress. 
Although not the formal leader of the Senate majority, Taft, from his 
strategic position as Chairman of the Majority Policy Committee, un­
doubtedly reflected the views of a majority of his Republican colleagues 
in both the Senate and the House. Taft's outspoken conservatism in 
domestic policies and isolationism in foreign affairs raised the pos­
sibility of a return of the United States to policies of domestic con­
servatism, economic nationalism and isolationism. Superficially, this 
appeared to be the destined course, as Republican leaders voiced their 
Intentions to concentrate upon reducing the role of the Federal govern-
high cost of living issue was most serious in big city districts. Voter 
resentment was directed against the Democrats because of this issue, 
not on the basis of a rejection of the New Deal or Fair Deal. Bean, 
p. 52. The results of a series of Roper polls in 19 5̂ and 1946 seem 
to discount Republican claims that the New Deal and Fair Deal were repud­
iated in the 1946 elections. A 194-5 poll showed 77 percent of the re­
spondents favoring the extension of Social Security to all working per­
sons. In February, 19^> a majority of respondents favored the idea 
of the Federal government building homes for sale or rent to the public. 
In June, 1946, 67 percent approved, and 24 percent disapproved govern­
ment price controls. Seventy-two percent of respondents in a November, 
1946 poll thought the government should provide for all persons unable 
to care for themselves. Roper, p. 193*
^^Agar, The Price of Power, p. 68. The Senate was composed of 
fifty-one Republicans end forty-five Democrats. The House included 246 
Republicans, 188 Democrats, and one American Labor Party representative. 
Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 15, D6. Officials and party leaders 
of the Senate included the following: President pro tempore, Arthur H.
Vandenberg (R., Mich.); Majority Leader, Wallace H. White, Jr. (R., Me.); 
Majority Whip, Kenneth S. Wherry (R., Neb.); Chairman, Majority Policy 
Committee, Robert A. Taft (R., Ohio); Chairman, Republican Conference, 
Eugene D. Millikin (R., Colo.); Minority Leader, Alben W. Barkley (D., 
Ken.); Minority Whip, Scott W. Lucas (D., 111.) House officials and 
party leaders included: Speaker, Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (R. , Mass.);
Majority Leader, Charles A. Halleck (R., Ind.); Majority Whip, Leslie C. 
Arends (R., 111.); Chairman, Republican Conference, Roy 0. Woodruff (R., 
Mich.); Minority Leader, Sam Rayburn (D., Tex.); Minority Whip, John W.
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ment in the lives of the American people. Most of the Republican
leaders were the possessors of isolationist voting records of long
standing, with an important exception in Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg,
the President pro tempore and Chairman of xhe Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, who was a recent convert to an internationalist philosophy.^
It was the hope of the Republican leaders, however, that foreign prob-
__
lems would not dominate the attention of this Congress.
Such,hopes were in vain, as the Eightieth Congress hardly had 
completed its organization under the new Congressional Reorganization 
Act of 19̂ 6^̂  when it was confronted with the Greek-Turkish crisis. 
Scarcely had the momentous decision been made to support President
McCormack (D., Mass.); and Chairman, Democratic Conference, Aime J.
Forand (D., R. I.) Congressional Quarterly, Vol. Ill, No. 1 (Jan.-Mar.
1947), ill.
01
Radio address of Senator Robert A. Taft on NBC January 3, 19̂ 7; 
printed in Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, A7-8, and address of 
House Speaker Joseph W. Martin, Jr., February 2$, 19̂ 7; before Pennsyl­
vania Manufacturers' Association convention at Philadelphia, printed in 
Ibid., pp. A783-784.
3^The occupants of the top seventy-six Republican positions in 
the Eightieth Congress had an average previous tenure in Congress of 
1̂ .5 years. They represented primarily agrarian constituencies. Thus, 
the "control of legislation was . . . transferred to those who generally 
represented the ideology of the 1920's and were in a sense the incar­
nation of a cultural lag . , . Binkley, p. 120.
^^Statement of Taft, quoted in Agar, The Price of Power, p. 68.
Public Law 60I, Seventy-ninth Congress. Under the act, the 
number of committees was reduced in the Senate from thirty-three to 
fifteen, and in the House from forty-eight to nineteen. In addition, 
committee jurisdictions were re-defined. The problem of making com­
mittee assignments at the beginning of the Eightieth Congress was un­
usual, with most of the entire membership of each house receiving new 
assignments. Congressional Record, XCIII, Part I>, D8.
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Truman’s reconmendation of assistance to prevent further Communist 
inroads in Southeastern Europe when the Administration announced its 
revolutionary offer of assistance in the reconstruction of Europe.
From that time onward, even though matters of serious domestic import 
required resolution, the Republican Eightieth Congress ironically was 
confronted with the issue of committing the United States to a long- 
range, intimate, and massive involvement in foreign affairs.
Throughout the stormy life of the Eightieth Congress, domestic 
problems divided that body from the President. The nation continued 
to be plagued with strife between labor and management. The cost of 
living incessantly moved upward.On November 17> 19^7  ̂the Eightieth 
Congress was called into special session by the President to meet two 
crises, one domestic and the other international, each of which was con­
sidered of equal gravity. Chaos impended in Austria, France, and Italy, 
unless effective economic assistance should be immediately forthcoming.
35in his January 6, 19^7 State of the Union Message, President 
Truman warned of the dangers of inflation and asked labor and industry 
to exercise restraint on wages and prices. A few controls continued 
in existence in 19̂ 7, mainly on certain foods in critically short supply 
and on certain materials. Rent controls continued and although the 
President signed a bill extending such controls to February 29, 19^, 
he denounced the measure vigorously and castigated real estate lobbyists. 
Trimen, II, 24-28; Congressional Quarterly, Vol. Ill, No. 2 (April-June,
1947), xvii. At hearings conducted throughout the country during Sep­
tember, October, and November, 1947, three subcommittees of the Joint 
Committee on the Economic Report heard testimony on the effects of con­
tinuing inflation. They were told that demand was far outdistancing 
supply; that speculators were getting too much of the food dollar; that 
there were too many middlemen; that excessive exports were raising 
prices; that food took more than one-third of a worker's take-home pay; 
and that many families were enduring substandard diets and as many as 
three or four meatless days per week. Labor and housewife groups urged 
a return to rationing and controls, while representatives of business and 
Industry urged greater production and lower taxes. Congressional Quarterly, 
Vol. Ill, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1947), 711.
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Unless the domestic inflation problems were resolved, any plan de­
vised by the United States for assisting Europe in meeting its eco­
nomic crisis would bo foredoomed to failure.
President Truman continued to press Congress for adoption of 
his Fair Deal legislative program. It was ironic that the Eightieth 
Congress, bitterly derided during the 1948 Presidential campaign as 
the "do-nothing" Congress, agreed to Greek-Turkish aid and the Mar­
shall Plan, which were revolutionary departures from the traditional 
American approach to foreign affairs. Paradoxically, while Senator 
Vandenberg effectively persuaded his Republican colleagues to concur 
with the President in his foreign policy proposals, this Republican
87Congress, under the leadership of Senator Taft in domestic matters,^' 
rejected the Administration's proposals for a new Department of Wel­
fare, comprehensive civil rights legislation, long-range housing, the 
Brannan Plan for the nation's agriculture, UMT, a Tennessee Valley 
Authority steam plant, a national health program. Federal aid to
3̂ Ibid., p. 746; Truman, II, 28.
^^Taft displayed little interest in matters of foreign policy.
He considered domestic questions much more significant; He and Senator 
Vandenberg had reached an agreement according to which bipartisan 
foreign policy would be Vandenberg's domain. Congressional Record, 
XCIII, Part 10, A7-8. Taft's record in foreign affairs, writes White, 
" . . .  was inconsistent almost to the point of inconceivability."
White, p. l42. In view of past Republican voting records on foreign 
policy issues, Senator Vandenberg's task of promoting bipartisan for­
eign policy in the Senate promised to require a considerable degree 
of skill in the art of persuasion. On a series of foreign policy 
proposals from 1933-1948, only a slight majority of Republicans in 
House and Senate favored such proposals while more than 80 percent 
of their Democratic colleagues supported them.; See data in Robert A. 
Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (N. Y,: Haroourt, Brace and.Co., 1950),
p. 189.
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education, an extension of Social Security, and an increase in Old 
Age and Survivor's Insurance. At the same time. Republicans and 
Rebellious Democrats in both houses combined to pass, over the op­
position of the President, the Taft-Hartley Act, the Portal-to?Portal 
Pay Act, and a tax reduction benefitting upper-level taxi«,yers more 
than the far greater number paying lesser but not insignificant 
amounts. The "Taft" Congress modified, but did not kill, other Ad­
ministration proposals. Rather than Universal Military Training the 
President received an extension of Selective Service. Congress gave 
him a modified extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement acts, 
modified inflation control, modified rent control, and a modified 
secondary market for "G. I." housing loans. Democrats charged the 
Republicans with going only so far in inflation and rent controls as 
to protect themselves while attempting to put the President in an 
unfavorable political position.3̂
At no time during the two sessions of the Eightieth Congress 
was the Presidential campaign of 1948 far beneath the surface of events. 39
^̂ Congressional Quarterly, Vol. Ill, No. 1 (Jan.-March, 194?), 
xv-xvii; Ibid7, Vol. Ill, No. 2 (April-June- 1947); xviii-xix: Koenig,
p. 253; Goldman, p. 5̂ .
^ T̂he Eightieth Congress commenced its deliberations on 
rather dreary notes. Long and acrimonious debates erupted over the 
seating of Senator Theodore G. Bilbo (D., Miss.) and the confirmation, 
of the President's appointment of David E. Lilienthal as Chairman of 
the Atomic Energy Commission. With regard to the Lilienthal contro­
versy, the New York Times, on February 12, 194?, warned Senate Repub­
licans against attempting to capitalize upon the issue "at the expense 
of the Administration." The Washington Post considered the Republican 
part Ih the attempt to prevent Lilienthal's confirmation a bad omen in 
view of the need for cooperation between President and Congress in 
"this critical year." Editorials printed in Congressional Record, 
XCIII, Part 10, A543-544. On February 8, 194%, Senator Arthur H.
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Early during the First Session, the leadership of the Democratic 
Party selected Senator Taft as its most formidable prospective op­
ponent in the campaign and proceeded to attack him on all positions 
in which there conceivably might be some vulnerability.^^ The at­
mosphere was filled with Democratic and Republican charges and counter­
charges regarding the responsibility for the high cost of living-- 
and for all the other obvious faults in the American social fabric. 
During 19^7 the stock of the Democratic Party and President Truman
tended to appreciate vis-a-vis the Republican opposition led by such
klstalwarts as Taft, Vandenberg, Stassen, Dewey, and Bricker. As 
though it found prosperity distasteful the Democratic Party began 
to disintegrate into warring factions as 1948 arrived and election­
time neared. President Truman's strong and uncompromising stand for
Vandenberg was imploring his fellow Michigan Republicans to "forget 
1948 for the time being" in view of the "critical tasks at hand."
Ibid., A452.
^Pjack Redding, Inside The Democratic Party (Indianapolis:
The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Incl Publishers, 1955)> PP» 57> 62. Redding
was Director of Public Relations for the Democratic National Committee
during this period.
^^The low-point in President Truman's popularity was reached 
in January, 1947. A Roper poll indicated that, at the time, Repub­
licans Dewey, Vandenberg, Stassen, Bricker, and Taft were preferred 
over Truman for the Presidency in 1948. However, in another 1948 
Presidential trial heat conducted in August, 1947, the President out­
paced Taft, Vandenberg, and Stassen, and trailed Dewey only by two 
points. Roper, p. I30. High prices remained a great problem and, 
according to the polls, the Republicans were receiving most of the 
censure for high prices and high living costs. Production, employ­
ment, and profits were high in 1947, yet the voters complained of dif­
ficulty in making ends meet. Labor was bitter over the Taft-Hartley
Act and planned an intensive campaign against Congressmen who supported 
the measure. Special Congressional elections, as well as state and 
local elections in 1947, indicated a return of the Democrats to popular 
favor. Bean, pp. 162-I63.
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effective civil rights legislation cost him dearly in his own party,
h-2producing a rebellion in the Southern ranks of the Democrats.
Throughout 19̂ 7? unrest had been stirring in the liberal ranks of 
the Democratic Party around the figure of Henry A. Wallace, former 
Vice President and Secretary of Commerce and titular successor to
43the leadership of the Roosevelt New Dealers. Wallace, unceremoH 
niously deposed from the Cabinet by Truman in September, 19^, for 
openly and outspokenly opposing the Administration's Soviet policy, 
continued throughout 19^7 his attacks against the Administration’s 
programs of assistance to Greece and Turkey and to European recon­
struction. Early in 19W  Wallace announced his candidacy for the 
Presidency as the standard-bearer of the newly-created Progressive
koThe Southern rebellion cost the Democratic Party a large 
source of its financial contributions as well as its place on the 
ballot in some Southern states. Republican members of the Republican- 
Southern Democrat conservative coalition in Congress were accused of 
offering to help kill the civil rights legislation if the Southern­
ers would agree to bolt the Democratic ticket in November, 19^» Red­
ding, pp. 132-lkO, Truman proceeded with his fight for a permanent 
F. E. P. C. and civil rights legislation despite the advice of Cabinet 
members and others. Truman, II, 182.
^^Liberals were unhappy for a variety of reasons. Some, per­
haps, disapproved of Truman simply because he lacked the glamor and 
sophistication of Roosevelt. Mr. Truman had alienated labor with his 
request for strikebreaking legislation, although this grievance was 
at least partially redressed by his veto and denunciation of Taft- 
Hartley. Gradually, Mr. Truman had eliminated most of the Roosevelt 
coterie from the inner councils of the Administration and this alien­
ated some liberals. Liberals of the Wallace school largely were fear­
ful that the Administration was courting war through its "hard" Soviet 
foreign policy line and that the Administration was dooming the United 
Nations to a premature and unwarranted demise. Other liberals thought 
President Truman succumbed too readily to the "anti-Communist hysteria", 
in view of the stringent loyalty program developed pursuant to a Presi­
dential Executive Order. Lerner, pp. IO5-IO6, IO7-IO9, 110-111, 223- 
22k; Redding, pp. 40-4l; Goldman, pp. 5-9, l4.
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Party, At the same time, many influential figures within the 
Democratic Party had become convinced that the Party could not con­
ceivably win the Presidency that year with President Truman as its 
candidate. Plans thus were laid to secure an alternate candidate. 
These plans centered largely upon efforts to persuade General Dwight
D. Eisenhower, probably the least controversial figure in America,
I4.5to enter the political wars as a Democrat.
As has been mentioned previously, the charge of "soft on 
Communism" was used liberally in the 1946 Congressional elections.
As relations between the United States and Soviet Russia grew pro­
gressively worse during the ensuing months, a development reminiscent 
of the "Red Scare" of the post-World War I era began to arise in Amer­
ican This anti-Communist attitude was not unimportant in the enact­
ment of both the Greek-Turkish Aid Bill and the Marshall Plan. The 
latter, of course, was predicated upon its positive offer of economic 
assistance to all European nations, regardless of their political and 
ideological orientations, whereas the decision to intervene in Greece 
and Turkey with economic and military assistance was openly anti= 
Communist in its orientation. The "anti-Communist hysteria", as it 
was called by some, also had its serious implications for Merican 
society, giving rise to an era in which one's Americanism had almost
^^Agar, The Price of Power, pp. 60-64; Redding, p. 5̂ .
lj.C
Jack Arvey, Chairman of the Cook County (Chicago) Democratic 
Committee, Mayor William O'Dwyer of New York City, Leon Henderson, for­
mer 0. P. A. Administrator, and James Roosevelt, son of the late Presi­
dent, attempted to persuade General Eisenhower to reconsider his de­
cision to forego politics. Redding, pp. l47-l49.
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to be proved by the fervor of his anti-Communism and his willingness 
to sign loyalty oaths. Throughout the period under studĵ . Communism 
on the domestic scene occupied a significantly increasing amouAt of the 
time of Congress and the Administration. It was an important factor 
in the eventual enactment of the Marshall Plan.
The purpose in this chapter has been to present the domestic 
political background for the decision in 19^7 by the Truman Adminis­
tration to embark upon a revolutionary role in foreign affairs. That 
background becomes Important in view of the necessity of the Adminis­
tration to have the firm support of Congress and the public in the under­
taking.
The period surrounding the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine 
for Greece and Turkey and the offer of massive economic assistance to 
Europe through the Marshall Plan was one of instability on the domestic 
scene and searching in the area of international affairs. Relations 
between President and Congress, apparently at an all-time low and 
fraught with the possibility of stalemate, were paralleled on the
^^One author attributes the post-World War II "Red scare" in 
America to the feelings of frustration which arose after "winning" the 
war and then being unable to live in peace. Agar, The Price of Power, 
p. 5- An atmosphere of "conspiracy" arose after our efforts to reach 
agreement with the Soviet Union over control of atomic energy had 
failed. America then proceeded to draw the ring of secrecy even 
tighter about the atom and to develop even further its frightful de­
structiveness. The resulting competition with the Russians only ac­
centuated the necessity for preserving inviolate the secrets of the 
atom. In such an environment, deviations from the ordinary become the 
subject of much searching, investigating, and suspicion. Ibid., p. 57» 
Senator Capeliart (R., Ind. ) announced that he would vote for the Greek- 
Turkish Aid Bill (s. 938) " . . .  because of my abhorrence of communism 
. . , . " He vTas grateful that the Administration finally had recognized 
what the Republican Party had known for a long time: " . . .  that the 
threat of communism within and without this Nation is our greatest dan­
ger. " Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 3; 3787'
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domestic front by continuing strife between labor and management, 
shortages of products to satisfy the increasing wants of a relatively 
prosperous public, continuing inflation which seriously curtailed the 
real incomes of the relatively less well-to-do, and heightening public 
controversy about the direction in which the' nation should move. In 
addition, there were the attitudes of doubt, distrust, and suspicion, 
engendered by such haunting questions as the atomic bomb and how to 
prevent it ultimately from returning to destroy the nation responsi­
ble for its development. It was difficult for the average citizen 
to comprehend how the Grand Alliance of the recent war could have 
deteriorated so rapidly and ominously to a point of constant American- 
Soviet rivalry on a score of complex and seemingly unrelated issues 
world-wide in scope. It was a period of frustration, in short, both 
for the people and the policy-makers.
The Truman Administration, in the spring of 19̂ 7> faced a 
decision which would shape the course of American and world affairs 
for years to come. An obvious power vacuum existed in world leader­
ship. World War II had decimated the ranks of the former world 
powers, leaving only two nations capable of assuming world power 
status. Unfortunately for the world, those two states represented 
totally antithetic guiding philosophies: democracy and totalitarian 
Communism. Agreement between America and the Soviet Union appeared 
increasingly to be a receding hope as events throughout the world 
came more and more to be viewed in terms of an "East-West" struggle 
for power. The United States had a history of reluctant participation 
in affairs outside its own hemisphere, preferring to leave to others
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the role ôf maintaining the equilibrium of the world power balance. 
With the British announcement that it could no longer carry the 
burden of assistance to tiny Greece, stark reality confronted the 
decision-makers in Washington. If it were a valid premise that 
further advances of international Communism constituted a threat to 
the security of nations professing to be and actually democratic 
in character, then immediate action was required to stem the apparent 
tide in Europe and elsewhere. Southeastern and Western Europe ap­
peared to be approaching chaos— fertile ground for extremist solutions 
to unwieldy problems, Only one nation possessed the resources ade­
quate to prevent European economic disintegration and the ultimate 
political consequences, none of which bode well for democracy and 
for world peace. That nation was the United States.
The task before the Truman Administration, beset with the 
necessity to provide solutions for persistent and serious domestic 
problems and confronted with a Congress dominated by an opposition 
party straining for the opportunity to re-establish its contrary 
philosophies of economics and government, was formidable indeed.
The possibilities for uniting Congress and the nation behind a revolu­
tionary departure in international relations, entailing the whole­
hearted acceptance of internationalism and its attendant burdens, 
were the subject of a continuing and great debate throughout the re­
mainder of 19̂ 7 and well into the spring of 19H8,
CHAPTER III
THE GREEK-TURKISH CRISIS: THE U. S, RESPONSE^
Recognition and Delineation of the Problem
On February 3, 1947, United States Ambassador Lincoln Mac- 
Veagh reported from Athens rumors that Great Britain vjas going to 
withdraw its troops from Greece. On February 12, he urged that the 
United States supplant Britain in furnishing assistance to Greece. 
The American Embassy in London, on February 20, reported that the 
British Treasury was opposed to providing any,further assistance 
to Greece. On February 21, the British Ambassador in Washington in­
formed American officials that Britain would have to withdraw from 
Greece by April 1. Over the weekend of February 22-23* Acting Secre­
tary of State Dean Acheson and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Com-
p
mittee (SWîîCC) prepared a memorandum regarding United States policy 
in the situation. The recommendations formulated by this group were 
supported by General Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. SWNCC 
submitted that both Greece and Turkey were in danger of being lost
iFor background on the political and economic situations in 
Greece and Turkey at the time, see supra. Chapter I, pp. 5̂ -69.
^Created during the war when the Secretaries of State, War, 
and Navy agreed to meet informally once each week to discuss mutual 
problems, Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks; February 21-June 3, 
1947 (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), p. 62.
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to Coinmunism. If either was so lost, the position of the other would 
he untenable. If the United States failed to provide assistance to 
Greece and Turkey, other free countries in Europe, especially Italy and 
France, and the Middle Eastern countries would be convinced that no 
reliance could be placed upon the United States in defense of their 
freedom. It was mandatory, therefore, that American aid be furnished 
Greece and Turkey without delay. On February 27, President Truman 
consulted in. his office with Senators Bridges, Vandenberg, Barkley, 
and Connally, Speaker Martin, and Representatives Eaton, Bloom, and 
Rayburn, to explain the Greek-Turkish situation and its implications 
for the United States. The British decision to withdraw had not yet 
been made public and even none of this select groupé knew the serious­
ness of the situation. During the following days State Department
kexperts, under the direction of Acting Secretary Acheson, drafted 
proposed legislation and occupied themselves with other aspects of the 
matter. The President placed the situation before the Cabinet on March 
7, where the proposed United States policy received general agreement.
A Cabinet committee, headed by Treasury Secretary John Snyder, was
■5By inadvertence, or otherwise. Senator Robert A. Taft was not 
invited to this meeting with the President. Senator Vandenberg called 
this to the President's attention and asked, in view of Taft's position 
as Chairman of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, that he be in­
vited to future bipartisan consultations of this nature. Jones, p. I38.
ItSecretary of State George C. Marshall was briefed on the Greek- 
Turkish crisis in late February, as he prepared to depart for the Moscow 
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, at which the problems of 
Germany and Austria were to be considered. He participated in the deciw 
Sion to aid Greece and Turkey and, before leaving, instructed the staff 
through Acheson that they were to draft the Greek-Turkish aid program 
and the President's message to Congress without any thought as to the 
effect this might have on his position at Moscow. Ibid., pp. IO9-IIO.
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appointed to advise the President on how best to apprise the public 
of the crisis. The committee recommended that the President appear 
before a joint session of Congress.^ On March 10, a group of Con­
gressional leaders, including Senators Barkley, Connally, Taft, Van­
denberg, and White, Speaker Martin, and Representatives Bloom, Cannon, 
Eaton, Halleck, McCormack, Rayburn, Short, and Taber, met with the 
President. There was no opposition to the course of action decided 
upon, according to President Truman. On March 12, the President ap­
peared before Congress in Joint session to present his historic pro- 
6posai.
President Truman, in his address to the joint session of Con­
gress, did not include any reference to the Soviet Union. Only a 
single reference was made to Communism and that was to point out that 
the "militant minority", which was defying the authority of the Greek 
Government and making economic recovery Impossible through its terror-
^Senator Vandenberg advised President Truman to "scare hell out 
of the country." Goldman, p. 59* According to Joseph M. Jones, who 
ws in the State Department’s Office of Public Affairs and who helped 
draft the President's message to Congress, it was his [jonss'j sug­
gestion that Truman appear in person before Congress as the best way to 
dramatize the situation. Jones, p. l6?.
^This account of the activities of American leaders during 
the days preceding the enunciation of the Trvaian Doctrine was taken 
largely from Truman, II, 99-105. Former Senator Tom Connally, then 
ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote that there 
were objections to the Administration's proposed course from Speaker 
Martin and that Senator Vandenberg " . . .  refused to commit himself 
. . . ." Tom Connally (as told to Alfred Steinberg), My Name is Tom 
Connally (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 195̂ ); P* 31Ô* Jack Red- 
ding, then Director of Public Relations for the Democratic National 
Committee, wrote that as Truman pondered the decision to aid Greece 
and Turkey he wondered whether it would divide his personal support 
in the country, i.e., between those who feared this step would pre­
cipitate war and " . . . those who saw more clearly . . . ." Also,
u
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istic activities and the resultant "political chaos", vas "led hy
Communists," There vas little question, however, about whom the
President spoke in his references to " . . . totalitarian regimes
imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, .
As justification for the proposed United States action to extend
economic, technical, and military assistance to Greece and Turkey
in the amount of $400,000,000, the President pointed to the "gravity
of the situation" confronting the world in Greece and Turkey;
The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened 
by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed 
men, led by Communists, who defy the Government's au­
thority at a number of points, particularly along the 
northern boundaries . . . .
If Greece was to become a "self-supporting and self-respecting democ­
racy", it must have assistance immediately. That assistance could 
come only from the United States, since the United Nations and its 
related organizations were not equipped to meet the urgency of the 
situation or to provide the kind of help needed. The President made 
no excuses for the knovm excesses of the Greek Government, condemning 
equally " . . .  extremist measures of the right or the left . = .
He advised the Greek Government to practice tolerance. With regard 
to Turkey, the President declared that its future " . . . as an in­
dependent and economically sound state is clearly no less important 
to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece
President Truman pointed out the "leading part" of the United
wrote Redding, aid to Greece and Turkey was opposed by some within the 
Administration who feared what it might do to their own positions within 
the government. According to Redding, National Chairman (and Postmaster 
General) Robert E. Hannegan criticized certain Cabinet members who did 
not seem to recognize that "they held their offices at the pleasure of 
the President, . . . ." Redding, pp. 35-36,47.
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States in establishing the United Nations, but added
... We shall not realize our objectives, however, 
unless we are willing to help free peoples to main­
tain their free institutions and their national in­
tegrity against aggressive movements that seek to 
impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no 
more than a frank recognition that totalitarian re­
gimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect 
aggression, undermine the foundations of international 
peace and hence the security of the United States.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United 
States to support free peoples who are resisting at­
tempted subjugation by armed minorities or by out­
side pressures.
United States aid, declared the President, should be "primarily" eco­
nomic and financial, " . . .  which is essential to economic stability 
and orderly political processes." The United States was not embarking 
on a policy of indiscriminate defense of the status quo, but
we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods 
as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political in­
filtration . . . .
The consequences of failure by the United States to come to the as­
sistance of Greece and Turkey would be "far reaching to the West as 
well as to the East." In closing the President reminded his listeners 
of the "serious course upon which we embark", stating "l vould not
Y
recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious."
Thus, the United States had reached a turning point in the 
conduct of its postwar foreign policy. It could overlook the crises
7U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assist­
ance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 19̂ 7; H. Rept. No. 
3l4 to accompany H. R. 26Î6, pp. 5-7; House Miscellaneous Reports, 
II (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19̂ 7)* Cited here- 
after as House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rept. No. 31̂ ; Assistance 
to Greece and Turkey.
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in Greece and Turkey and retreat into its pre-war isolationist 
shell. On the other hand, it could shelve, temporarily at least, 
its idealistic postwar reliance on the fledgling United Nations as 
the panacea for the world's ills and resolutely come to grips with 
its responsibilities as the world's foremost democratic power. A 
vacuum was about to be created in Greece, into which would step 
those with the strongest, most cohesive and dedicated forces at 
their command. Given the chaotic circumstances in Greece, there was 
little question as to whom this would be ultimately. Turkey, without 
external assistance, could not resist for long either the power or 
the threats of the Soviet Union. Its strategic location astride the 
Dardanelles made it invaluable to the forces of democracy.
To return to a policy of isolationism could lead ultimately 
only to war, reasoned some. To others, the providing of economic and 
military assistance to Greece and Turkey could be interpreted only 
as a direct provocation of the Soviet Union and similarly fraught with 
the possibility of war. To many, it meant the premature demise of the 
United Nations and a return to sordid "power politics", in view of the 
questionable democratic credentials of the two governments for which 
assistance was proposed. A majority concluded, however, that the decis­
ion made by the Truman Administration, based frankly on the necessity 
of acting to prevent further Communist aggression, was the only alter­
native after the failure of all efforts toward cooperation. In the 
final analysis, if Greece should be permitted to go by default to Com­
munism and if Turkey should be forced to capitulate to the demands of 
the Soviet Union, the national security of the United States would be
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seriously imperiled. Before this conclusion was reached, however, 
the new foreign policy proclaimed by the President had to move 
through the tortuous process of policy formulation in a democracy.
It was not enough that the President and his foreign policy ad­
visers recognized the need for a great shift in American policy.
They could formulate and enunciate, yet its effectuation depended 
ultimately upon the American public and Congress.
Dominant Personalities in the Executive Branch 
Engaged in Formulation of the Truman Doctrine 
The policy which quickly became identified as the "Truman 
Doctrine" was not developed overnight nor was it developed by one 
person. The Greek-Turkish crisis provided the context for the im­
plementation of a less conciliatory American policy in relation to 
the Soviet Union. This policy had been developing since the end of 
the war. Neither President Truman nor former Secretary of State
James F. Byrnes had the patience of the late President Roosevelt
8in dealing with the Soviets. Yet the pronouncement of the Truman 
Doctrine did not mean the United States had abandoned all hopes of 
effecting a reasonable settlement of its differences with the Soviet
^Byrnes is credited with the development of the policy of 
"patience but firmness" toward the Soviet Union. John C. Campbell, 
et al., The United States in World Affairs, 19^7-19^8 (New York: 
Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers,
1948), p. 7. However, Mr. Truman, only shortly after assuming office 
and before he had appointed Byrnes, delivered a very blunt lecture 
to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov regarding Soviet violations of the 
Yalta Agreements. Also, Mr. Truman became piqued at Secretary Byrnes 
early in the letter's tenure for being overly conciliatory toward the 
Soviet Union in an effort to conclude the peace treaty negotiations. 
Truman, I, 79-82, 546-553.
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Union. President Truman hoped that if Congress enacted the Greek-
Turkish aid program hy Majrch 31, it would strengthen the negotiating
position of Secretary of State Marshall at the Moscov Conference of
the Council of Foreign Ministers for some kind of understanding between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Truman hoped that Marshal
Stalin would be convinced by quick enactment of Greek-Turkish aid that
more was to be gained through cooperation with the United States and
9the United Nations than by defiance of them. Prolonged Congressional 
consideration of the program, however, probably nullified any psy­
chological advantages the Administration may have gained from its 
dramatic shift of policy. The lengthy debates also served to emphasize 
the negative aspect of the Truman Doctrine, which was the containing 
of Soviet power.
The figure in the Executive branch popularly associated with 
the Truman Doctrine was, of course, President Truman himself, since 
the burden for determining the future course of United States foreign 
policy was on his shoulders, and since he had publicly enunciated the 
new policy. One of Mr. Truman's outstanding characteristics was his 
courage to act decisively, once all the evidence was before him. Al­
though during the early part of his Administration Mr. Truman deferred 
to the aura of infallibility grown up around his predecessor, contri­
buting to the image fostered by his detractors that he was unfit for 
the Presidency,Mr. Truman was not completely unprepared for the
9james Heston, in New York Times, April 10, 19̂ 7; P» 10» 
^^ruraan. I, 13*
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awesome responsibilities of the Presidential office. His ten years as 
United States Senator from Missouri (193̂ -4944) had been preceded by 
several years as a county "judge"̂  ̂in Jackson County (Kansas City),
Missouri, where he gained valuable administrative experience--not com-
/
parable, of course, to the administrative and executive responsibilities 
he assumed on April 12, 19̂ 5- Although not an influential member of the 
Senate's "inner circle" during his years in that body, Mr. Truman's pro­
ductive activities during the war years as chairman of a Senate committee 
conducting a Judicious and low-key investigation of the home-front war 
effort gained for him the respect and rise in statute which led to the 
1944 Democratic Vice Presidential nomination and, ultimately, to the 
Presidency. Mr. Truman's formal education had been limited to high 
school, yet his intelligence and common sense were never questioned 
seriously. Moreover, a life-long love of history had led him to ex­
tensive reading on the subject, providing him with a solid foundation
for understanding and coping with the world problems confronting him 
12daily. Although considered by some as totally lacking in sophis­
tication and a "man of the people", in a deprecatory sense, Mr.
Truman was not invariably led by the public opinion polls. When con­
vinced of the correctness of his own position, Mr. Truman was not 
averse to leading public opinion.His stubbornness, on
^^In Missouri, an administrative rather than a Judicial posi­
tion, similar to the office of "county commissioner" in other states.
^%ones, p. 113.
^3ln the area of domestic affairs, Mr. Truman quite frequently 
during the early postwar years became incensed at various interest 
groups because he was convinced they were attempting to gain special 
privileges which would be detrimental to the welfare of the general 
public. Whether it was labor, agriculture, or business which drew his 
ire, however, î>îr. Truman had no hesitancy in expressing his interpre­
tations of the public interest. Koenig, p. 4.
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occasion, was not dissimilar to that of the fahled mule of his native 
state.
From the first days of his Administration there was a great
deal of controversy surrounding some of Mr. Truman's appointments to
high governmental positions, as well as the circle of close personal
friends who undoubtedly offered advice and suggestions pertaining to
lAimportant public matters. There was no controversy, however, re­
garding his selection of General George C. Marshall to succeed James
F. Byrnes as Secretary of State.Likewise, Under Secretary of State
l^Despite warnings that the appointment would be rejected, Tru­
man nominated Edwin W. Pauley, a Democratic Party fund-raiser, as Under 
Secretary of the Navy. Eventually, because of the extreme opposition 
to the appointment, Truman withdrew the nomination from the Senate. 
Congressional Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 1 (Jan.- March, 19̂ 6), IO6-IO7 . 
Truman's nomination of David Lilienthal as first chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission threw the Senate into serious controversy for weeks 
during the first session of the Eightieth Congress, disrupting its work 
schedule and threatening stalemate.
^^Byrnes resigned ostensibly for reasons of health. He had 
threatened to resign in the fall of 19 6̂ , however, as a result of then 
Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace's incursion into foreign policy 
matters. Even earlier, Truman, according to his own account, had had 
to "put Byrnes in his place" because Byrnes seemed to forget that Truman 
was President. Truman, in appointing Byrnes apparently was motiviated 
in part by a desire to placate Byrnes' obvious hurt at being passed 
over for the Vice Presidential nomination in 1944. Their relations were 
never uneventful afterward. Truman, I, 190-193? 546-553* General Mar­
shall's appointment as Secretary of State was endorsed by newspapers 
throughout the country. See Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, 
AI74-I7 5? for comments of the Baltimore Evening Sun, Jan. 8 , 1947? Phila­
delphia Record, Jan. 9? 1947? Philadelphia Bulletin, Jan. 8 , 1947? Los 
Angeles Times, Jan. 8 , 1947; Detroit News, Jan. 9? 1947? and the Chicago 
Daily News, Jan. 8 , 1947. In Congress, Republicans as well as Demo­
crats joined in applauding the appointment. For remarks of Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R., Mass.) and Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg 
(R., Mich.), see Ibid., Part 1, 158-159* After the announcement of Gen­
eral Meirshail's appointment on January 7? Senator Vandenberg asked on 
January 8 that the nomination be referred to the Foreign Relations Com­
mittee and that the committee be permitted to meet that day, during the 
Senate session, to consent to the nomination. This was done and, the 
same day. General Marshall's nomination confirmed unanimously by the 
Senate. Ibid., p. 17O.
10b
Dean G. Acheson commanded wide support among Influential Congressmen^ 
as did Under Secretary for Economic Affairs William L, Clayton-”  ̂Con­
troversy was not to envelop Mr. Acheson until later in the Truman Ad­
ministration.
Secretary Marshall played a relatively minor role in the initial 
development of the Truman Doctrine, except to lend to it his great 
prestige. He was engaged in preparations for the forthcoming Moscow 
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers when the Greek-Turkish 
crisis arose. Most of the initiative was taken by Under Secretary 
Acheson. Secretary Marshall did participate in the initial briefing 
of leading Congressional figures on February 27 but, according to one 
source, failed to convey to those persons the urgency of the situation 
as it related to United States security. Under Secretary Acheson saved 
the Administration's presentation by pointing out in starkly realistic 
terms what the United States stood to lose and, conversely, what the 
Soviet Union stood to gain, should the United States fail to render
^^Senate confirmation of Acheson's appointment as Under Secre­
tary of State, on September 24, 194-5, was opposed only by Senator Kenneth 
S. Wherry (R., Neb.), who objected because Acheson had disagreed with 
General MacArthur as to the number of troops needed to occupy Japan. 
Congressional Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 2 (Apr.-June, 1945), 476. Acheson 
and Senator Vandenberg developed particularly close relations. Jones, 
p. 100. The post of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs had 
been created specifically for Mr. Clayton, who had been serving as As­
sistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, to give him more prestige in 
international negotiations. Congressional Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 3 
(July-Sept., 1946), 480. Clayton had headed for many years the world's 
largest firm of cotton brokers, Anderson, Clayton Co., of Houston, and 
served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce, 1942-1945. He was a firm in­
ternationalist and was convinced of the responsibility of the United 
States, because of its productive and financial power, to help restore 
the world economic balance. His prestige was great in the business 
world and in Congress. He had had a large share of the responsibility 
for securing the .$3>75 billion postwar loan for Great Britain, Jones, 
pp, 120-121,
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aid to both Greece and Turkey.Acheson, of course, had been in the 
State Department since 1941, and had also served as Under Secretary 
to Mr. Byrnes. Because Byrnes vas out of the country much of the time 
during his tenure, occupied in the frustrating effort to negotiate the 
Axis satellite peace treaties, Acheson, as Acting Secretary, had in 
effect run the Department of State.Understandably, he vas more 
familiar vith the intricacies of the vorld political situation than 
General Marshall. The General, as Army Chief of Staff, had per­
formed admirably during the var and had von universal respect and ad­
miration not only for his abilities as an administrator, but also for
his fairness and impartiality. He vas, for all practical purposes,
19an apolitical person in a highly political atmosphere. Most sources 
"̂̂ Jones, p. 142.
4®Acheson had served six months as Under Secretary of the Treas­
ury in 1933 but resigned vhen he disagreed with President Roosevelt over 
the gold devaluation policy. He returned to the government as Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in February, 1941 and assisted 
in planning and organizing various international economic agencies such 
as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, UNRRA, and 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. Secretary of State Stettinius 
had placed Acheson in charge of Congressional liaison, at which Acheson 
was very successful. When Byrnes became Secretary, Acheson agreed to 
serve as Under Secretary» Acheson i-?as one of the first of the top-echelon 
figures in the Administration to press for a "tough" policy toward the 
Soviet Union, after efforts toward cooperation apparently had failed. 
Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon, The Trumpi Merry-Go-Round (New 
York: The Vanguard Press, Inc., 1950), pp. 399-403. Acheson continued
to serve in his Congressional liaison capacity even after being pro­
moted to Under Secretary. After he resigned, on June 30, 194?, the 
Congressional liaison duties were assumed by Charles E. Bohlen. James 
A..: Robinson,Congress and Foreign Policy-Making: A Study in Legislative
Influence and Initiative (Homewood, 111.: The Dorsey Press, Inc., The
Dorsey Series in Political Science, 1962), p. l44. After Acheson's 
resignation, liaison with Congress " . . .  was not always close or 
well handled", states one observer. Campbell, p. 20.
l̂ Daniels, p. 320; Coffin, pp. 308-309; Connally, pp. 3l6-317i 
Roper, pp. 171-172.
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appear in agreement that General Marshall's forte was not in policy
20development, hut in policy execution. His great stature, of course, 
enhanced any policy to which his name or his approval was attached. 
Although President Truman had his difficulties with some of his sub­
ordinates , he had only the greatest admiration and respect for General 
21Marshall. In this respect, some observers feared the implications
of President Truman's appointment of several former military officers
to important positions in the Administration, particularly in the top
echelons of the State Department, and the President's apparent tendency
22to rely heavily on the advice of military leaders. There was little, 
if any, evidence, however, that General Marshall, as Secretary of State, 
exhibited any of the tendencies or proclivities of the so-called "mili­
tary mind". He displayed only the firmest loyalty to President Truman 
and to his decis ions.
^^Daniels, pp. 316-31?; Allen and Shannon, p. 420; Connally,
pp. 316-317.
"Truman had . . . more confidence in Marshall than in any­
body in the government and probably anybody in the world. Sometimes, 
indeed, he acted . . .  as if Marshall were his walking equivalent of 
George Washington and Robert E. Lee . . . ." Daniels, pp. 316-317»
^^In this period, decisions having the greatest import for 
foreign policy were being made by the military in Germany end Japan. 
Former top-ranking military men were serving in ambassadorial posts 
in the Soviet Union, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Union of South Africa, 
and Panama. In October, 1946, the Foreign Policy Association ex­
pressed concern over the apparent influence of the military over the 
formulation and execution of foreign policy The Washington Post 
stated: "Some of our military men seem to think their department
is the State Department. They behave . . . like frustrated diplo­
mats." Coffin, pp. 254-255» The emphasis on the military aspects of 
aid to Greece and Turkey was connected, by opponents of such aid, 
to the influence of the military upon President Truman.
^^Jones, pp. 106-107.
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Under Secretary Acheson "was delegated great administrative 
and policy responsibilities under Mr. Marshall. The Secretary, per­
haps because of his military background, firmly believed in the staff 
and chain-of-command concepts. The details of administration were to 
be performed by the appropriate levels in the administrative hier­
archy. Matters requiring the Secretary's attention were to be pre­
sented to him in the form of problem analyses, with alternative solu­
tions proposed. He would then accept, reject, or revise. Policy formu­
lation, then, largely was a function of the staff, under "chief-of^ 
staff" Acheson. Acheson worked closely with the staff and was success­
ful in obtaining good results from its members because of his obvious 
pleasure in meeting with them and exchanging ideas of relevance to 
foreign policy. Not only did there exist an excellent personal and 
working relationship between Secretary Marshall and Under Secretary 
Acheson, the Under Secretary also enjoyed a close relationship with
President Truman, in which there were aspects of both friendship
2kand genuine mutual respect. The Under Secretary, during his tenure 
as the State Department's liaison officer to Congress, had developed 
beneficial connections with influential members of Congress.
Also intimately involved in the development of the Truman
2^Tbid., pp. 100-101. Jones comments: " . . .  When [Marshall] 
gave Dean Acheson, under his command, full authority over policy, ad­
ministration and operations, the Department of State for the first time 
in years became an integrated institution subject to the authority of 
the President, capable of conducting foreign relations in an orderly 
manner . . . . " Other observers, however, without detracting from 
Secretary Marshall's great abilities as an organizer and administrator, 
expressed concern whether his system permitted him to be as informed of 
Important details of policy as he should have been, as the President's 
chief adviser on foreign policy. Connally, pp. 3lè-317î Allen and 
Shannon, p. 420; Daniels, pp. 316-317.
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Doctrine were a number of lesser-known personages in the State De­
partment, as well as the heads of several Cabinet departments. W. 
Averell Harriman, Secretary of Commerce and former Ambassador to both 
Great Britain arid the Soviet Union, long had advocated that the United 
States, in its relations with the Soviet Union, should pursue a course 
more realistically attuned to the national interest. Mr. Harriman had 
accompanied the late President Roosevelt to most of the top-level war­
time conferences and had been with President Truman at Potsdam. He thus
was one of Mr. Truman's most informed advisers on policy relating to 
2Sthe Soviet Union. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson had served 
as Under Secretary to the wartime Secretary Henry L. Stimson, who had 
retired in 19^5* A New York Republican judge, and trained as a lawyer. 
Secretary Patterson had become an authority on military history through 
wide reading. He was widely respected for his dependability, industry, 
and wisdom. Mr. Patterson was regarded as "completely fearless" and 
not particularly subtle. Like Mr. Stimson, he believed the United 
States had inherited world-wide responsibilities with its new position 
as a world power of the first order.Consistently maintaining and 
advocating a similar position was Secretary of the Navy James V. For- 
restal. He early recognized the Soviet Union as a "menace" to United 
States Security.27
Reportedly, the Cabinet member closest to the President was




Secretary of the Treasury John L. Snyder, a long-time personal friend, 
whose fortunes had risen in direct ratio to the ascent of Harry Truman
28from the United States Senate to the Presidency. Snyder, an economic 
conservative, was chosen to head a Cabinet ̂Committee with responsibil­
ity for developing a plan for presenting the Greek-Turkish aid program
and its larger implications to leaders over the country, particularly
29in the business world.
Other Cabinet members, as well as the President, were active 
in presenting and defending the Truman Doctrine in public speeches 
throughout the country during the weeks the aid legislation was being 
debated in Congress. Most active were Secretary of Labor Lewis B. 
Schwellenbach, Attorney General Tom C. Clark, Secretary of the Navy 
Forrestal, and Secretary of War Patterson.Although he was in Mos­
cow most of this time. Secretary Marshall wired personal appeals to
Senator Vandenberg and Representative Eaton for urgent and favorable
81action on the proposed aid program. Lower-ranking State Department 
2®Allen and Shannon, p. 121.
29Truman, II, 105; Jones, p. 168.
S^New York Times, March 16, 19̂ 7; P* 9; Ibid., March 23, 19̂ 7; 
p. 12; Ibid., March 30, 19̂ 7, p. hh; Ibid., April 6 , 19̂ 7, pp. 1, 51; 
Ibid., April 16, 19̂ 7, pp. 1, 1I+, Secretary of Agriculture Clinton 
Anderson added to the difficulties of the StAte Department by testify­
ing before the Deficiencies Subcommittee of the House Appropriations 
Committee that there had been no coordination between his department 
and State on the aid program. A representative of the Agriculture De­
partment, however, testified that Mr. Anderson had been kept fully 
informed. U. S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 
19^#, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 194^, pp. II83, II9I. Cited hereafter 
as House Subcommittee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Supplemental 
Appropriation Bill for 1948.
^^Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 3̂  3̂ 91, 372̂ 1 New York 
Times, April 22, 19̂ 7, p. 20; Toid., Ivlay 7, 19̂ 7, pp. 1,4-,
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officials also apoke before select groups in support of the Truman
32program.
Under Secretary of State Acheson was responsible for presenting 
the Greek-Turkish aid program to Congress, for preparing the draft 
legislation, and for developing in detail the program to be presented 
as justification for the aid. Likewise, it was his general responsi­
bility for presenting the program to the public in such a way that 
support would be generated and reflected in Congress. Mr. Acheson 
cautioned his subordinates that the new policy must be emphasized as 
a " . . . positive policy directed toward helping free nations strengthen 
their democracy and their independence . . . ." It was not directed 
"against any country or even any movement, . . . . Under the general 
guidance of Mr. Acheson, a select group from the State Department's 
Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Office of European Affairs, 
Office of Economic Affairs, Office of Public Affairs, the Legal Division, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Occupied Areas, and the Central 
Secretariat, was given only a few days' time to draw up in detail the 
program of economic, military, and technical aid to Greece and Turkey, 
draft the necessary enabling legislation and the President's message 
to Congress, and develop a program of public information. Loy Henderson, 
of the Near Eastern and African Affairs Office, was named to coordinate 
the work of this group.
^̂ New York Times, March lé, 19̂ 7, P* Ibid., March 28, 19̂ 7,
p. 12.
Jones, pp. 145-147.
^̂ Ibid. After the Greek-Turkish aid bill became law, depart-
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A Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information of the State-War- 
Navy Coordinating Committee ms made responsible for developing the 
public presentation of the Truman Doctrine. Its chairman ms Francis 
Russell, Director of the State Department's Office of Public Affairs. 
The other principals were the information chiefs of the War and Navy 
departments. Its task was to gather background data on all aspects 
of the program, determine the main obstacles to public acceptance and 
suggest how to overcome them, define the program contemplated, draft 
the themes to be used in the public approach, anticipate Soviet propa­
ganda and try to counter it, and prepare informational programs for 
press, radio, periodicals, and group leaders over the country.
As a follow-up to President Truman's message to Congress, the 
State Department's Office of Public Affairs made a thorough study of 
the public reaction to the proposal. Press and radio commentary, 
opinion surveys, and the views of political leaders, prominent individ­
uals and organizations were analyzed. Although the message was written 
on a "pro-freedom" rather than an "anti-Soviet" plane in an attempt 
to prevent war hysteria, results of the analysis showed, in general, 
that support of the program was based on the belief that United States
mental and interdepartmental "interim Greece-Turkey Assistance Com­
mittees" were set up to prepare the budget justifications to present 
to skeptical House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The depart­
mental committee was headed by George C. McGhee, of the Office of 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. The interdepartmental 
committee, under the chairmanship of Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secre­
tary of State for Economic Affairs, consisted of representatives from 
the departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Navy, Labor, War, 
Treasury, and the Budget Bureau. House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 
Hearings on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 19^> pp. Il4#-1151.
35jones, p. 150.
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security required resistance to Soviet expansion and that the Truman 
Doctrine was designed to achieve that objective.3̂
Under Secretary Acheson, who had excellent relationships with 
the press, briefed a select group of correspondents prior to the Presi­
dent’s message to Congress. In this off-the-record "background" brief­
ing, Mr. Acheson talked of the British decision to leave Greece, the 
strategic situation of Greece, the decision to ask Congress for aid, 
and Mr. Truman’s February 27 meeting with leading Congressmen. Acheson 
held other sessions with newsmen, radio commentators, and columnists in
•57succeeding days.
In Mr. Acheson' 8 first meeting with newsmen, he did not mention 
Turkey. In Mr. Truman's message to Congress, references to Turkey were 
reserved for the latter stages of the address. This was a deliberate 
attempt of the Administration to de-emphasize assistance to Turkey, be­
cause of its wish to avoid an overly-strong Soviet reaction and to avert
38alarming the American people to the point of defeating the program. In 
the hearings and debates before Congress, aid to Turkey was explored, 
but not as thoroughly as the Greek aspect of the program. In the hear­
ings before committees of both Houses, Administration spokesmen were 
most circumspect in not bringing the Soviet Union into the discussions. 
This puzzled, and even angered, some Congressmen, who could interpret 
the situation in no light other than as the long-anticipated confron-
3^Ibid., p. 176.
3'̂ Ibid., p. 145.
38Ibid., p. 162.
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tation between America and the Soviet Union.When the President’s 
message was being drafted in the State Department, a copy was shown 
to George Kennan, the acknowledged author of the "containment" policy 
ostensibly being implemented by the Truman Doctrine. Mr. Kennan, a 
Foreign Service veteran and respected authority on Soviet Russia,
" . . .  objected strongly both to the tone of the message and the 
specific action proposed . . . He approved the proposal to provide 
Greece with economic aid but hoped that any military aid would be kept 
to a minimum. Mr. Kennan opposed any assistance at all to Turkey. 
Specifically, Mr. Kennan’s objections were based on the impression 
given in the message of two opposed ways of life (democracy v. com­
munism) and the open-end offer to aid free peoples anywhere. He felt 
that the tone of the message was so strong that Soviet Russia might be
forced to declare war. Mr. Kennan expressed his objections to Under
kOSecretary Acheson, but to no avail-
39por example, in the hearings on H. R. 26x6 before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Acting Secretary Acheson did not mention the 
Soviet Union in his opening statement and referred to Communism only
two or three times. In response to questioning by Rep. Chester E. Merrow
(R. , ÎÎ. H. ) regarding Soviet activities, Mr. Acheson said he preferred 
"not to discuss the present situation in the light of the possible activ­
ities of any foreign power." Rep. Karl E. Mundt (R., S. D.) pressed 
Acheson to be more specific as to the reason Turkey was spending so 
much money on keeping up its army. He also .wanted to know if the Truman 
proposal was "the first step in a consistent and complete American 
policy" designed to stop Communist expansion. Mr. Acheson replied that 
he did not think the President said his proposal was a "crusade against 
any ideology." Testifying on the Greek economy and events which had 
brought that economy to near collapse. Under Secretary of State Clayton 
refused to be drawn into "speculations about political questions", 
stating that his responsibility lay in the area of economic and finan­
cial matters. U. S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Hearings, on H. R. 26x6, A Bill To Provide for Assistance to Greece and . 
Turkey, 00th Cong., 1st Sess., 19̂ 7, PP. 15; 29-33, 75» Cited hereafter 




The Administration's Congressional Strategy 
and the Results 
_ It vas the Administration's strategy to present its Greek- 
Turkish aid proposal to Congress as a "crisis" measure, yet it hoped 
to unduly alarm neither the American public nor the Soviet Union. As 
it turned out, the situation, although admittedly serious, was not 
quite so critical as it had been presented. On the other hand, de­
bate on the proposal, both in Congress and elsewhere, focused on the 
growing rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and 
the mounting possibilities of a violent confrontation between the 
two. Thus Congress was under great pressure from the Administration 
to act with dispatch on the Greek-Turkish aid legislation.
Congress was not to be hurried in this matter, although the 
Senate, under Senator Vandenberg's leadership, acted much more expe­
ditiously than did the House. Top officials of the Administration 
appeared before public and closed sessions of Congressional committees 
conducting hearings on the legislation. Representative Charles A.
Eaton (R., N. J.), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in­
troduced H. R. 2616, "A Bill to Provide Assistance to Greece and Tur­
key", on Tuesday, March l8 .̂  ̂ On March 19> Senator Vandenberg, Chair­
man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced "by request"
JiO
8 .938, "a Bill to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey." The 
House Foreign Affairs Committee began hearings on H. R. 26l6 on March 
20. The committee held seventeen meetings on the measure: nine public
^̂ Congressional Record , XCIII, Part 2, 2219.
^-Ibid., p. 2223.
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sessions and eight executive sessions. Hearings were concluded on
April 9 and the measure was reported favorably to the House on April 
1 .
25- Three days of hearings were conducted by the House Rules Com­
mittee on H. R. 2616 (April 28, 2$, and May 2). On May 2, the Rules 
Committee reported H. Res. 205, providing for nine hours' general 
debate on H. R. 2616. On Tuesday^ May 6 , the House considered and 
agreed to H. Res. 205. It then began debate on H. R. 2616. Debate 
continued on the bill and amendments the next day, May 7* H. R. 2616 
was adopted on May 9- The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began 
open hearings on S.938, the companion measure to H. R. 2616, on Mon­
day, March 2k. Other public hearings were held on March 25, 26, 27, 
and 31. Executive sessions were held dm March 28 and April 1, 2, and 3. 
In addition, an executive session was held.on March I3, prior to the 
introduction of S.938, at which Acting Secretary Acheson and Secre­
taries Patterson and Forrestal appeared to present the implications 
of the President's program. The committee reported S. 938 favorably 
on April 3,̂  ̂and debate began on the measure in the Senate on April 
8 . Debate continued on April 9, 10, 11, 15, 1 6, I7 , I8 , 21, and 22.
On April 22, by a vote of 67 "yeas" to 23 "nays", the Senate passed
lj.3 ,House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rept. No. 314, Assistance
to Greece and Turkey.
^^Congressional Record. XCIII, Part 15, D126, 129, 139, l4l,
1I+9, 152, 155, 159.
U. s.. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, As­
sistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 191-7, Report 
No. 90 to accompany S.938, pp. 6-7, 21, in Senate Miscellaneous Reports, 
I (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 191-7)• Cited hereafter 
as Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report No. 90, Assistance to 
Greece and Turkey.
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5.938 with amendments, Conferees of the two Houses were appointed 
on May 12 and differences between the two measures were compromised
on May 13» On May 1$, the conference report was adopted by both Houses, 
thus clearing the measure for the President's signature. On May 22,
5 . 938 was signed by President Truman and became Public Law 75 of the 
Eightieth C o n g r e s s . Thus, more than two months had elapsed since 
President Truman's message to the joint session of Congress on the 
crisis in Greece and Turkey. Even yet, the Administration's odyssey 
was not completed. Its case had to be further justified before the 
Appropriations Committees of both Houses before the policy contained 
in 8.938 could be fully implemented. The authorization measure had 
provided that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation could advance the 
Administration $100,000,000 to begin the aid program. Yet the whole 
gamut of hearings and debates had to be traversed again, if the Ad­
ministration was to receive the full $400,000,000 authorized by S.938.
The portent was none too favorable, in view of the sentiments expressed 
by Representative John Taber (R., N. Y.), Chairman of the House Ap­
propriations Committee, on May I7, that his committee would be reluc­
tant to approve the cash appropriations to implement Greek-Turkish aid 
" . . .  until we have looked into it very carefully." Chairman Taber 
was particularly interested in learning from the Administration the 
"complete" cost of the foreign aid program under the Truman Doctrine. 
Senator Styles Bridges (R., N. H.), Chairman of the Senate Appropriations
^^Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 3, 3175, 3195 et seq.; Ibid., 
Part 15, D76, 79, IO7 , 108.
^̂ Ibid., Part I5, DI61, 168, I7 0, I7 7, 205.
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Committee, likewise had demanded such an overall aid estimate from
48the Administration. At the beginning of July, Chairman Taber stated 
that not even $100,000 of the aid authorization was justified.A 
subcommittee of Chairman Taber's committee^ with Taber also serving as 
chairman of the subcommittee, subjected th Greek-Turkish aid proposal 
to a rigorous examination on June 27 and 30 and July 1 and 2. Testi­
mony of government witnesses and questioning by subcommittee members 
consumed 4l9 pages in the printed hearings--almost as much as was re­
quired to report the hearings on the initial authorization measure by 
both the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees. 
The Senate Committee on Appropriations, on the other hand, disposed of 
the matter at a brief session on July 19-̂  ̂ The House had passed the
appropriations bill on July l8 , surprisingly appropriating the full 
52$400,000,000. It was passed by the Senate on July 2$, with action
by both Houses being completed on July 26. It was approved by the
53President on July 30) becoming Public Law 271» . The surprising turn-
New York Times, May l8, 1947, p. 25- 
^̂ Ibld., July 17, 1947, p. 2.
^^House Subcommittee on Appropriations, Hearings on the Sup­
plemental Appropriation Bill for 1948, pp. 968-1387•
S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings on H. R. 4269, An Act Making Supplemental 
Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1948 and for Other 
Purposes^ 00th Congress, 1st Sess., 1947, PP« 1-A, 9-12, 15-24, 46-47• 
Cited hereafter as Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations, Hearings on 
H. R. 4269.
^̂ Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 15, D400-401.
^^Ibid., pp. d432, 435, 439, 441, 443.
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about by Chairman Taber and the House Appropriations Committee was
attributed to some very "plain talk" by Secretary of State Marshall
and the new Under Secretary, Robert A. Lovett, at an executive session
of the Deficiencies Subcommittee after the conclusion of its public 
3khearings.
Thus, over five months had elapsed since the Truman Adminis­
tration had been apprised of the British decision to cease it as­
sistance to Greece and Turkey and the completion of Congressional 
action on the program recommended by the Administration. Because 
of the provision in the authorization measure for a loan of $100,000,000 
from the R. F. C., the Administration had been able to.initiate action 
on its plan of assistance. Yet the Administration had been unable to 
formulate concrete plans until the Appropriations Committees of both 
Houses had placed their stamps of approval on the planned course of 
action. A noteworthy feature of the hearings before the House Ap­
propriations Subcommittee, in particular, was the insistence on examin­
ing the most minute details of the Administration's plan for aiding 
Greece and Turkey. By the time of final Congressional action on the
55proposed aid program, a serious deterioration had occurred in Greece.
Reaction to the Truman Doctrine 
The American Public 
When the Truman Administration made its decision to intervene
5^New York Times, July 17, 19̂ 7> P» 2. Under Secretary Acheson 
had left the government on June 30 to return to private law practice.
^^Testimony of Acheson before House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 
Hearings on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 19^, pp. 9&9-971,
998:
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actively with economic, technical, and military assistance in the 
Greek-Turkish crisis, it had to take into consideration the reactions 
of at least three publics: the American people. Congress, and foreigners-
particularly Europeans. It is worth noting that the Administration made 
its decision without any advance public promotion of the proposal, with 
the exception of Under Secretary Acheson's briefing of selected repre­
sentatives of the news' media a few days prior to the President's address 
to Congress. The Administration, therefore, had committed itself to a 
certain course of action before any serious effort had been made to gain 
the support of either Congress or the larger American public. After the 
commitment had been made, however, the Administration systematically pro­
ceeded to inform the public of the necessity of its course, even though 
Under Secretary Acheson denied that any extraordinary measures were being 
taken along these lines.
At no time during Congressional consideration of Greek-Turkish 
aid was the general public unfavorably disposed toward the entire pro­
gram. Although the public had not been pre-conditioned toward favorable 
reception to this specific program, the public had, since early during 
United States involvement in World War II, grown increasingly accustomed
to the idea of continued participation of this country in international
57affairs. However, due to the successful promotion of the United Nations
5^House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Assistance to 
Greece and Turkey, pp. 39-̂ 0.
57̂ 'American Institute of Public Opinion polls during the period 
January, 19^2-August, 19^7 indicated that support for active United 
States participation in world affairs 'was at no time during’'this 
period less than 60 percent of the respondents. Almond, p. 2k3,
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idea and the concept of collective security, the American public was 
quick to criticize the Truman Doctrine for its ostensible "by-passing" 
of the United Nations. Even though the United Nations was not equipped, 
to function in this particular crisis, the majority believed that the 
Truman Administration should at least have made the motion of proceed­
ing through the United Nations. Then, if the world organization could 
not act, or if its action should be blocked by the obstructionist tactics 
of the Soviet Union, the moral position of the United States as a faith­
ful proponent of the concept of collective security would be preserved.
As some in the Administration had feared, the Soviet-American aspect 
of Greek-Turkish aid became the focal point in the public debate, as it 
was in the Congressional debate. In order to quiet the alarms of the 
American public, as well as the public and officialdom of Europe, re­
garding the possibilities of a devastating confrontation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, the Administration’s plans for 
larger-scale aid were developed around the central notion that this 
country was Interested solely in promoting economic and social well­
being, as a means of insuring political stability and thus, world peace.
Public reaction to the Truman Doctrine was immediate, at home 
and abroad. Pages of the Congressional Record were filled with news­
paper editorials, radio addresses, and with the comments of Congress­
men, even before actual hearings or debates had begun. As the time for 
formal debates arrived, the matter had been quite thoroughly aired and, 
thus, much repetitious comment was encountered. Newspapers, by and large, 
quickly endorsed the Truman Doctrine. Some, of course, had reservations
^Gjones, pp. 146, 176, 199-205, 212.
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and some were more enthusiastic than others, depending on their posi­
tions on the political spectrum. Newspapers supporting the proposal 
included the following: New York Herald Tribune; Anniston (Ala.) Star;
New York Times; Boston Herald; Christian Science Monitor; Providence 
(R. I.) Journal; Philadelphia Inquirer; Philadelphia Bulletin; Pittsburgh 
Post-Gazette; Washington Post; Washington Star; Columbus (Ohio) Citizen; 
Cincinnati Times Star; Indianapolis Star; Louisville Courier Journal; 
Nashville Tennessean; Atlanta Constitution; Montgomery Advertiser; New 
Orleans Times-Picayune; Chicago Times; St. Louis Post-Dispatch; Kansas 
City Star; Houston Post; Portland Oregonian; San Francisco Chronicle;
Los Angeles News; New Hampshire Morning Union; Carroll County (N. H.) 
Independent; Buffalo (N. Y.) Courier Express; Rochester (N. Y.) Democrat 
& Chronicle; Portland (Me.) Press Herald; Omaha World Herald; St. Paul 
Pioneer Press; Memphis Commercial Appeal; Jacksonville (Fla.) Times 
Union; and the Los Angles Times. Newspapers in opposition included: 
Chicago. Tribune; Chicago Daily News; Chicago Sun; IM; Wall Street Journal;
Richmond (Va.) News Leader; Mankato (Minn.) Free Press; and the Miami 
59(71a.) Herald.
The Greek-Turkish aid proposal was supported by most newspaper 
columnists and radio commentators, according to a State Department sur-
6ovey. However, some prominent columnists either opposed the proposal 
or had reservations. These included Drew Pearson, William L. Shirer, and
^̂ Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, A865, 892-893, 902, 923,
926, 1009, 1033, 1044-1045, 1052, 1067-1068, 1072-1073, 1092, 1116-1117, 




Prominent individuals outside the Federal government as well 
as private groups and organizations, were quick to respond to the new 
American foreign policy. Prominent individuals announcing their sup­
port, either full or qualified, included: Sumner Welles (former Under
Secretary of State); the Governors of the six New England ëtates: Hor­
ace A. Hildreth (Me,), Charles M, Dale (N. H.), Ernest W. Gibson (Vt.), 
Robert F, Bradford (Mass.), James L. McConaughy (Conn.), and John 0. 
Pastore (R. I.); Alf M. Landon (former Governor of Kansas and Republican 
Presidential nominee in 193̂ ); Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt; Thomas E. 
Dewey (Governor of New York and contender for the 1948 Republican Presi­
dential nomination); Herbert H, Lehman (former Governor of New York); 
Harôld E,. Stasèen (former Governor of Minnesota and contender for the
1948 Republican Presidential nomination); and Spyros P. Skouras, movie 
62magnate. Organizations supporting the proposed policy included: 
American Legion; Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace; Common 
Cause, Inc,; American Association for the United Nations; Social Demo­
cratic Federation; National Republican Club; Americans for Democratic 
Action; Freedom House; Liberal Party; Council for Social Action of the 
Congregational Christian Churches; National Foreign Trade Council; 
National Association of Manufacturers; American Federation of Labor; 
American Farm Bureau Federation; United States Chamber of Commerce;
^̂ Congressional Record. XCIII, Part 10, A976-977, 1086, 1097- 
1098, 1302; Ibid., Part 3. 3289.
'"Ibid., XCIII, Part 10, A972, 1110, 133̂ ; 1365; New York Times, 
March 15, 19^7> P» Ibid., March l6, 1947, pp. 3, 13; Ibid., March 
23, 1947; p, 3; Ibid,, April 10, 1947; p, 6; Ibid,, Msy "b, 1947, p, 7 =
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National Economic Councilj Federal Council of the Churches of Christ 
in America; and the National Council of Catholic Women.
Prominent private citizens announcing their opposition to the 
Truman Doctrine included; Henry A. Wallace (former Vice President and 
Secretary of Commerce, then editor of the "New Republic"); Fiorello H. 
LaGuardia (former mayor of New York City and Director-General of UNRRA); 
Harold Ickes (former Secretary of the Interior); Elliott Roosevelt 
(son of the late President); Hamilton'Fish (former New York Congressman); 
James P. Warburg (banker, author, and former Deputy Director of the Of­
fice of War Information); William Z. Foster (national chairman, U. S. 
Communist Party); Alvanley Johnston (Grand Chief Engineer, Brotherhood 
of Locomotive Engineers); and A. F. Whitney (President, Brotherhood of
, 6kRailroad Trainmen).
Organizations opposed, either in whole or in part, included:
League of Women Voters; Methodist Federation for Social Action; American 
Slav Congress; Progressive Citizens of America; American Council for a 
Democratic Greece; Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade; American
^^Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, A5; Almond, pp. l6l-l6s, 
165, 169, 179-160, 203; New York Times, March 13, 19̂ 7, 3; Ibid.,
March li)-, 1947, p. Ibid., March lë, 1947, p. 3j Ibid., March 2 6, 19̂ 7, 
p. 4; Ibid., March 28, 1947, p. 12; Ibid., March 30, 1947, p. 46; Ibid., 
March 31, 1947, PP-* 1, 11; Ibid., April 2, 1947, P« 4; Ibid.,. April 4,
1947, p. 8; Ibid., April 13, 1947, p. 40; Ibid., April 22, 1947, p. 21; 
Ibid., April 27, 1947, P* 50; Ibid., May 4, 1947, P* 33; U. S.,•Congress, 
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, on 5.938, A Bill To 
Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 6oth Cong., 1st Sees., 1947, 
pp. 3-4, I5I-I52, 213-214. Cited hereafter as Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Hearings on Assistance to Greece and Turkey; House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, pp. 333-334.
^^Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, A1057, 1064-1065, 1328- 
1329, 1347; New York Times, March l4, 1947, P« 7; Ibid., March 17, 1947, 
p. 10; Ibid., March 22, 1947, P. 6; Ibid., March 23, 1947, p. 4; Ibid.,
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Association of Scientific Workers; National Council of American- 
Soviet Friendship; Congress of American Women; American Veterans Com­
mittee; American Labor Party; Council for Democracy; National Peace 
Conference; Postwar World Council; Fellowship of Reconciliation;
Women's International League for Peace and. Freedom; Socialist Party; 
National Council for Prevention of War; Peoples Mandate Committee 
for Inter-American Peace and Cooperation; Nation Associates; National 
Lawyers' Guild; National Farmers' Union; Council on Christian Social 
Progress, Northern Baptist Convention; Macedonian American People's 
League; Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Church; Inter­
national Reform Federation; American Friends Service Committee; War 
Resisters League; and the C. I. 0. Maritime Committee.Represen­
tatives of many of these organizations appeared before either the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Foreign Affairs Com­
mittee, or both, during the hearings conducted on Greek-Turkish aid. 
Several individuals, representing only themselves, appeared before 
the committees. The predominant sentiment expressed by non-Adminis- 
tration witnesses at the hearings was in opposition to the proposal 
as advanced by the Administration.^^
April 1, 19̂ 7, p. 9; Ibid.. April 26, 194?, p. 28; House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs , Hearings, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, pp. 195-213•
^^This list includes groups who supported some form of economic 
aid to Greece but objected to the Truman proposal on various grounds, 
such as its military aid features, the "by-passing" of the UN, the link­
ing of aid to Greece with aid.to Turkey, or the undemocratic character 
of the Greek and Turkish regimes.
Nineteen non-Administrâtion witnesses appeared before the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Six individuals or groups submitted state­
ments for the official record. In the shorter hearings conducted by the
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The first complete national survey on aid to Greece and 
Turkey, released by the Gallup Poll on March 27; showed $6 percent 
in favor of and 32 percent opposed to aid to Greece. Regarding aid 
to Turkey, U9 percent were in favor while 36 percent were opposed. An 
overwhelming majority thought the United States should supervise any 
aid given to Greece and Turkey. However, a majority disapproved send­
ing American military advisers to train either the Greek or Turkish 
armies. The respondents gave as their primary reasons for favoring 
aid to Greece and Turkey the following: check Communism and stop
Russia; provide food and other assistance to starving Greece; strengthen 
America's position and keep peace. On the issue of whether extending 
economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey was likely to lead to 
war between the United States and the Soviet Union, 5̂  percent of the 
respondents thought this result "not likely", while 30 percent con­
sidered war as a "likely" consequence. Although $6 percent favored 
turning the problem over to the United Nations and 25 percent opposed 
this solution, when asked their reasons why this matter was not re­
ferred to the United Nations the respondents answered:
(a) The UN is too slow, speed is needed here; (b) 
the UN is not equipped to handle the problem, has 
no money to spend and no police force; (c) Russia 
would use her veto to prevent any action . . .
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thirty-two non-Administration witnesses 
presented testimony and three statements were submitted for the record.
The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 2 (Summer, 19̂ 7), 
285-286. Results of this poll would seem to indicate that United States 
possession of an atomic monopoly most definitely did not contribute to 
any air of truculence or belligerence on the part of the American people 
toward the Soviet Union.
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A Gallup Poll released on April 13 showed 63 percent in favor of turn­
ing the problem over to the United Nations, with 23 percent opposed.
A Roper survey in April, 19̂ 1, conducted in eleven towns and 
cities over the nation, indicated that yO percent of those who were 
familiar with the Greek-Turkish aid proposal supported it. However,
6951 percent of those supporting the measure had reservations.
The New York Times conducted a survey of popular reaction to 
the Truman proposal in ten areas of the nation: Boston, Chicago, Detroit,
Omaha, Richmond, Atlanta, Dallas, Denver, Portland (Ore.), and Los Angeles. 
It concluded that support of the measure was general throughout the coun­
try, although there were reservations. This support was based on a wide­
spread fear of Russian expansionism and antipathy toward Communism as a 
system. The survey indicated that isolationism was "nearly dead— or at 
least latent", even in the traditionally isolationist Midwest end Moun­
tain States areas. Americans generally wanted the United Nations to be 
a success and were a "little uneasy" that the Truman Doctrine may have
70"by-passed" the world organization. ^
There seems little question that the great majority of the popu­
lation supporting the Truman Doctrine did so on the grounds that Communism 
was a growing danger to the peace of the world and to the security of the 
United States. The leading exponent of Comm'unism--the Soviet Union--was 
in most cases identified as the primary source of the difficulty. It
^^Ibid., p. 286.
Ĝ Roper, pp. 177-179.
^^New York Times, March 23, 1947, E5<
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now made little difference whether Soviet actions were motivated by 
desires for security, traditional Russian expansionist ambitions, or 
the desire to enlarge the sphere of world Communism. This was the 
negative approach to the problem and the basis of distinction between 
those who supported the Truman Doctrine because, finally, the United 
States intended to cease its appeasement of the Russians, and those 
who viewed the move as a final interment of the traditional isolation­
ist foreign policy which had seen the United States pulled into two
72world wars and a ruinous depression. Some viewed the situation in 
Greece and Turkey, and that emerging in Western Europe, as a challenge 
to America to assume the position and responsibilities of leadership 
to which it was entitled by its power and wealth. If it did not assume 
these responsibilities, the leadership gap would be filled by the Soviet 
Union. War would result ultimately between the two countries because 
of their antagonistic systems. War might eventuate under any circum­
stances, of course, but by assuming its leadership responsibilities
73the United States would be more able to control those circumstances.
The more positive aspects of the Truman Doctrine, i.e., the pro­
posal to assist in the economic reconstruction of Greece, were viewed
7 T̂he St. Louis Post-Dispatch interpreted Truman's message as 
"putting the Soviet Union on notice" and as bringing "completely into 
the open" the "struggle for world power between the United States and 
Soviet Russia." Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, A1044,
7̂ The New York Herald Tribune viewed the issue as whether the 
United States i i is to shape its own world or allow it to be shaped 
by others . . . ." Ibid., p. A926. Also, see comment by Hanson W. Bald­
win, New York Times, March 2, 1947, quoted in Ibid., p. A8i4.
73Sumner Welles, writing in the Washington Post, quoted in Ibid.,
pp. A972-973.
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hopefully by many as implying that the United States would offer as­
sistance on an even wider scale, particularly in Europe, for economic
'jhreconstruction without ideological motivations.' Others supported
the proposal simply on humanitarian grounds, as a continuation of the
relief assistance provided by the United States through UURRA. and other
75devices to many nations in the postwar period, '
Opposition to the Truman Doctrine ranged from the extreme 
left to the extreme right. Henry A. Wallace, perhaps, was the most 
prominent (and voluble) critic on the. left. Wallace, and the left in 
general, opposed the policy on the grounds that it was an undue pro­
vocation of the Soviet Union; it was completely negative and meant the 
end of the Roosevelt policy of peaceful cooperation, particularly through 
the United Nations. The unilateral Truman policy, which would divide 
the world into two antagonistic camps, was a return to "power polities" 
and was nothing but outright imperialism, promoted by American mili­
tarists and capitalists who were primarily interested in keeping the 
Soviet Union away from the oil of the Near and Middle East. It was 
rank hypocrisy to describe the governments of Greece and Turkey as 
democratic. Rather than a declaration against all forms of totali-
^Former Kansas Governor Alf M. London urged that the United 
States get to the "heart" of the situation and help Europe rebuild. 
Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 10, AlllO. Mark Sullivan, writing 
in the New York Herald Tribune, March 21, 19^7j believed the Truman 
policy ultimately would end the drain on the U. S. Treasury for for­
eign relief by helping to re-establish the normal conditions of inter­
national trade . Ibid. , p. AII97. Mrs. Anne O'Hare McCormick urged that 
the Truman plan be expanded into a ". . . master plan for the resur­
rection of Europe . . . ." Ibid. , XCIII, Part 11, A1525-
75This was the second most frequent reason given for approving 
aid to Greece and Turkey in a Gallup Poll released on March 27, 19^7*
Ibid. , XCIII, Part 2, 2827-2028.
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tarianism, the Trman Doctrine meant that the United States had cast 
its lot vith reactionary regimes the world over in an alliance against 
Communism. Instead of stopping Communism, this policy would promote 
its spread throughout the world, especially in those areas striving to 
free themselves of foreign domination. If Greece needed aid in re­
constructing its economy, then any American assistance should be chan­
nelled through the United Nations, with guarantees that such aid would 
be used only by the people and not by the regime for political purposes. 
If Greece needed assistance in restoring order, this was a problem 
solely for the United Nations. In fact, a United Nations commission 
was in Greece investigating the northern border incidents. It was 
argued. Instead of awaiting the report of this commission, however, 
the United States had intervened unilaterally. Few liberals conceded 
that Turkey needed assistance of any nature. If its national integrity 
was being imperiled, then the matter should be brought before the 
United Nations. Liberals could see no distinction between the pre­
sent "crisid" and the previous crises in Iran and Indonesia, which 
had been dealt with by the United Nations.A few liberals conceded 
the necessity for assistance to Greece and Turkey and agreed with the 
Administration's contention that the United Nations and its affiliated 
agencies were unequipped to act in the emergency. They urged, however, 
that the United States consult closely with the world body in all aspects
7^See speeches and articles of Henry A. Wallace, cited in Ibid., 
XCIII, Part 10, Â1064, I329, and in New York Times. March l4, 194?, p.
7j Ibid., April 1, 19̂ 7, p. 9; Ibid., May 1, 19̂ 7, p. 9* Most of the 
groups appearing before Congressional committees holding hearings on 
the aid bill reflected varying aspects of the liberal opposition.
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of its program of assistance and be prepared to step aside if the 
United Nations eventually should be able to intercede. Unless the 
United States demonstrated a willingness to act through or in coopera­
tion with the United Nations, it would be open to justifiable criticism
77at home and abroad.
Many opponents on the right also utilized the argument that 
Gredî-Turkish aid was a problem for the United Nations and thus criti­
cized the Truman policy for "by-passing" that organization.Again, 
with the liberal opposition, they argued that the United States was 
being asked to "pull British chestnuts from the fire" and that such a
79policy could only lead to war with the Soviet Union. Die-hard iso­
lationists contended that United States security would be unaffected by
80anything that occurred in Greece or Turkey, That Communism was a 
"danger" was conceded, but United States interests could best be served 
by eliminating Communism from within the United States itself before
^^Without classifying him as either "liberal" or "conservative", 
Walter Lippmannargued this point. Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 
10, A1086. Lippmann also objected that the Truman Doctrine " . . .  com­
mits us to an alliance with the most reactionary forces in the world 
and alienates the moderate and democratic forces . . . . "Ibid., Part
3, 3289.
78The right-wing argument that the Truman program "by-passed" 
the United Nations was a facade for more deeply-held objections, such 
as to the prospective ultimate costs of foreign aid and to any involve­
ment in affairs outside the Western Hemisphere. E.g., see remarks of 
Drew Pearson in Ibid., Part 10, A9T6-977j editorial in Detroit Free 
Press, March 9, 19̂ 7, îi Ibid., p. A923; remarks of Dr. Douglas S. Free­
man, editor of Richmond (Va.) News-Leader, in Ibid., pp. AIOI7-IOI8.
7^Chicago Daily Tribune, March I3 , 19̂ 7; cited in Ibid., p.
A10Y2,
®*̂ Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, cited in Ibid., p. A863.
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becoming embroiled in such distant places as Greece and Turkey.
Many conservatives were convinced that the policy of providing aid to
foreign countries, if continued, soon would bankrupt the United States.
The United States could neither purchase European friendship nor stop
Communism with dollars. To attempt to do so would simply play into
82Stalin s well-laid trap. Not to be forgotten were those tradition­
alists who, quoting from Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe 
Doctrine, viewed the Truman Doctrine as a "dangerous departure from 
our traditional foreign policy . . . . Opponents on both left and 
right maintained that the United States, by intervening in Greece
and Turkey, was perpetrating the identical sin for which righteous in-
8Udignation had been hurled upon the Soviet Union.
The Response Abroad 
Reactions to the Truman Doctrine were not slow in coming from 
Europe and other parts of the world. In Greece, the measure was hailed 
by all except Communist circles. The latter described it as open in­
tervention on behalf of the "present Fascist regime" and said it could
Q-i
Testimony of Hamilton Fish, isolationist former N« Y= Con­
gressman, before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Assis­
tance to Greece and Turkey, pp. 195-213*
®^Editorials, Enid (Okla.) News, March 2, 19̂ 7, and Detroit 
Free Press, March 9> 19̂ 7, in Congres'sTonal Record, XCIII, Part 10, A847-848, 923.
^^Statements of Hamilton Fish, and Dr. Samuel Guy Inman, Guest 
Professor of International Relations at Ohio Wesleyan University, before 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Assistance to Greece and 
Turkey, pp. 195-213, 215-223*
84Statements of Fish, and Martin Popper, Executive Secretary, 
National Lawyers Guild, in Dp id., pp. 19o, 260-264.
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only result in Intensifying the civil war. The pronouncement likewise 
was warmly received in Turkey, where there were very few Communists
Qc
to voice opposition. In Wanking, China, Nationalist Chinese officials
expressed hope that the Truman proposal meant an end to America's
China policy of attempting to get the Nationalists and Communists to-
86gether in a coalition government. The Yugoslav Communist news­
paper "Borba" denounced the Truman proposal and described the United 
States as a " , . . force that menaces the independence of nations
87. . . . In France, the National Congress of the Popular Republican 
Movement endorsed the Truman proposal but expressed apprehension that 
it would divide the world into ideological blocs. Feeling was parti­
cularly strong in France that the new United States policy would com­
pel a showdown between the Soviet Union and the Western world, com­
pelling France to make a choice it was most reluctant to make. Some 
described it as an imperialistic move connected with activities of 
United States "big business men" in the Wear East. Many were appre­
hensive that the United States would offer aid to France on the same 
terms as the Greek offer. France was unstable politically and finan­
cially hard-pressed. The Truman proposal tended to bring to a climax 
the continuing crisis between the extremes of left and right. Reactions 
by Communist members of the Assembly provoked a governmental crisis 
on March 19; causing Premier Paul Ramadier to demand a vote of confi-
^^New York Times, March 1 3, 194?; P* 6.
Q^Ibid., March l4, 1947, p. 5.
^ '^ Ib id ., March 17, 1947, P- 3-
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dence. Support for the Truman policy came from the extreme right, 
who thought it meant the United States would intervene to prevent the 
Communists from coming to power in France, and by the Radicals and the 
Democratic Socialist Resistance Union (largely DeGaullist). Both the 
Socialists and Popular Republicans agreed in private that Truman had 
accurately pinpointed the menace to peace but they feared it would 
hasten the time France had to choose between East and West. France's 
dilemma seemed to be that the United States had the financial assis­
tance that France needed, whereas Moscow controlled the French party
that spoke for the bulk of the working class and the trade unions.
88There was a definite possibility of a civil clash in France.
Generally, in Europe outside the Iron Curtain, the reaction 
to the Truman Doctrine seemed to be that the new United States policy
89would bring either real peace or atomic annihilation. In Britain, 
the Labor Government officially welcomed the Truman proposal, yet 
many members of the Labor Party were highly critical. Many Britons on 
both left and right feared that the blunt policy would lead to war and 
to British annihilation. Many Britons simply resented that Great 
Britain was being supplanted as a world leader by the United States. 
There was criticism in both Britain and France that the new United 
States policy had "by-passed" the United Nations. A majority of Britons 
seemed to welcome the Truman Doctrine, however, as proof that the United 
States at last had matured politically and diplomatically and had ended
^^Ibid., March 17, 19̂ 7, PP- 5,23; Ibid., March 10, 19 7̂, P- 6; 
Ibid., March 21, 19̂ 7, p. 1; Ibid., March 30, 19̂ +7, E5.
Q^ibid., March 30, 19^7, E5»
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its long affair with isolationism. Both the Conservative and Liberal
90parties endorsed the proposal.
Reaction was divided in Italy along ideological lines. Com­
munists , Socialists, and left-wingers strongly opposed the Truman pro­
posal as a threat to Soviet Russia, Conservatives, and a large part of
the middle class, regarded it as an efficient means of checking Com­
munism. Many Italians hoped it would lead to a revision of the Italian
peace treaty - more in Italy's favor. Many feared it would lead to 
91war.
In the Low Countries and Scandinavia, the Truman proposal was
92received with apparent misgivings. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, the Truman Doctrine was viewed as a "direct threat to Greek free­
dom and independence ..." and "frankly directed against the demo­
cratic elements in Greece.The United States statement of aims in 
Greece was compared with the tactics of Hitler, who "also referred 
to the Bolsheviks when he wanted to open the road to conquests.
The United States was soundly castigated for disavowing its obligations
to the United Nations. If it could not dominate the United Nations, 
it would ruin the world body. The so-called threat to Turkish integ­




^^ Ib id . , March l4 ,  19^7» P-
9^ Ib id . , March 15, 19^7, p. 4.
95ibid.
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America was charged with an "imperialism" of the same order as that 
lately pursued by Gemiany, Italy, and Japan. The Communists also 
charged that an economic crisis confronted the United States, thus 
prompting it to seek new markets for its "swollen" wartime indus% 
trial capacity. In addition, it was alleged, the United States covt- 
eted oil and naval bases in the Near and Middle East.9^ At the United 
Nations Security Council on April 7; Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister 
Andrei A. Gromyko asked that the Council create a commission to ad­
minister United States assistance to Greece, in order to insure that 
such assistance would be used only for the benefit of the Greek peo­
ple. Turkey, in the Soviet view, was not entitled to any assistance.
The reason the United States had not presented the Turkish case to 
the Security Council, Gromyko charged, was that it could not prove 
the existence of a threat to Turkey's integrity from any source.^7
Congress and the Truman Doctrine 
The most critical test of the Truman Doctrine was in the 
Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress, The reactions of the Ameri­
can and European publics naturally were reflected in Congress and played 
no small part in the decision reached by that body.
The time required by Congress to consider and act upon the 
Greek-Turkish aid proposal has been detailed above. Initial Congres­
sional reaction to President Truman's message of March 12 indicated 
eventual approval of the aid proposal. There were never any serious
^^Ibid., March 22, 1947, p. 6. 
^7roid., April 3, 19̂ 7, pp. 1, 4.
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doubts that the measure would receive ultimate Congressional approval, 
yet the Administration continued to stress the urgency of the situ= 
ation and press for quick action. As time wore on, opponents pointed 
out that neither Greece nor Turkey had collapsed under Communist 
pressures. They accused the Administration of attempting to create an 
unwarranted crisis atmosphere in order to prevent unhurried Congress- 
sional examination of a radical departure in American foreign policy.
The Greek-Turkish aid program was managed in the Senate by 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
and in the House by Representative Charles Eaton, Chairman of the For­
eign Affairs Committee. Although a Republican, Senator Vandenberg was 
the firmest supporter of the proposal in Congress and the Administration's 
hope for rapid and uneventful passage. Senator Vandenberg began hear­
ings on the aid bill several days after hearings had commenced in Repre­
sentative Eaton's committee, yet the Foreign Relations Committed had 
concluded its hearings, made a favorable report, and the Senate had ap­
proved the bill before Eaton's committee had made its report to the 
House. Vandenberg did not appear to rush the proceedings before his
committee unduly, and all witnesses who asked to be heard were given
98an opportunity to appear. Obviously committed to the proposal from 
the beginning, Vandenberg conducted the hearings so as to permit thor­
ough consideration of the proposal and the alternatives. Yet the chair­
man succeeded in instilling a sense of urgency in the proceedings
^®There were complaints from some of the opponents, however, 
that insufficient time had been given to opposition witnesses. There 
were also charges of attempts to smother the opposition. See statement 
of Sen. Taylor (D,, Idaho), in Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 2,
2619=2620.
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before the Senate committee, a feeling not equally reflected in the 
proceedings before its House counterpart. Senator Vandenberg was master 
of the situation at all times, whereas Representative Eaton was less 
aggressive— often leaving the hearings in charge of another member of 
the committee. Senator Vandenberg was an active interrogator of wit­
nesses, whereas Representative Eaton rarely, if ever, asked a question. 
Administration witnesses who appeared before the Foreign Relations 
Committee were treated with the greatest civility. Only on one occasion 
was an Administration official subjected to barbed questioning, and
this was by a non-member of the committee. Senator Claude Pepper (D.,
. goFla.), an outspoken liberal- critic of the proposal.Although Sena­
tor Vandenberg believed that the Administration had erred in failing 
to coordinate its action with the United Nations, and submitted an 
amendment to correct this situation,his most pointed criticism 
of the Administration arose from its failure to apprise Congressional 
leaders of the critical situation in Greece and Turkey at an earlier 
date.̂ *̂  ̂ Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Administration 
spokesmen received, at times, much less gentle treatment than in the 
Senate committee. Interestingly, however, the same House members who 
subjected Administration witnesses to the most antagonistic questions 
frequently came to the defense of the proposal when it was under at­
tack by non-governmental witnesses. The non-governmental witnesses
^^Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Assistance 
to Greece and Turkey, pp. 36-4%.
^QQ lbid . , pp. 16-18, 198.
101C ongressional Record, XCIII, P a rt 2 , 2167.
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overwhelmingly were in opposition to the Truman proposal before both
committees. However, as Chairman Vandenberg pointed out, most lead-
102ing groups did not ask to be heard on the proposal. Many of the . 
same witnesses appeared before both committees.
The major change recommended in the legislation by either 
committee was the so-called Vandenberg amendment. Proposed by Senator 
Vandenberg and adopted by both his committee and the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, the amendment attempted to rectify what was generally con­
ceded to be a mistake in tactics by the Administration, in that it 
had not consulted first with the United Nations before initiating its 
unilateral action in the Greek-Turkish crisis. With the acquiescence 
of the Administration, the Vandenberg amendment was incorporated into 
the final legislation. Under this provision, the United States agreed 
to withdraw its aid to Greece and Turkey should either government so 
request or should the United Nations so recommend, on the finding that 
United Nations aid made the continuance of United States assistance
unnecessary. The United States voluntarily waived its right to veto 
103such action.
In general, the same arguments for and against the Truman 
Doctrine were heard in the Congressional hearings and debates as were 
expressed by the general public and in the communications media. Both 
sides relied on their own interpretations of public opinion. The at­
tack against the Truman Doctrine in the Senate was led by a band of
^^%enate Committee on Foreign Relations, Report No. 90, 
Assistance to Greece and Turkey, p. 7.
-̂ •'Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Assis­
tance to Greece and Turkey, p. 1$8.
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Democrats, including Senators Pepger (Fla.), Taylor (Idaho), and 
Johnson (Colo.). Both Pepper and Taylor were liberals. Johnson was 
considered a conservative, although in the Seventy-ninth Congress he 
had supported the Administration on most controversial issues. Op­
position based on isolationist sentiment was more vocal in the House 
than in the Senate, although the liberal opposition ms represented.
The Administration's case for the Greek-Turkish aid program ms 
eloquently and comprehensively presented by Senator Vandenberg. The 
Truman Doctrine ms not a radical departure in American foreign policy.
It ms, instead, a plan for peace, for strengthening the United Nations 
by supporting its objectives until the organization ms capable of
 ̂ 104For an exposition of the various points made in opposition 
to the Truman Doctrine in Congress, see remarks of Rep. Sabath (ill.), 
in Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 2, 2210; Rep. Schmbe (Okla.), in 
Ibid., Part 10, A10ë9; Sen. Johnson (Colo.), in Ibid., p. A1117, and in 
Ibid.. Part 3, 3290-3293, 3398-3399, 3504-3509, 3752; Sen. Taylor 
(Idaho), in Ibid., pp. 2866, 3345-3346, 3387-3388; Rep. Bender (Ohio), 
in Ibid., Part 2, 2$87; Sen. Pepper (Fla.), in Ibid., Part 3, 3279-3288, 
3607; Sen. Buck (Del.), in Ibid., p. 3783; Sen. Byrd (Va.), in Ibid., 
pp. 3773-3774; Sen. Thomas (Okla.), in Ibid., Part 10, A97I; Sen. McKellar 
(Tenn.), in Ibid., Part 3, 3787-3788; Sen. Williams (Del.), in Ibid., 
pp. 3758-3759; Sen. Brooks (111.), in Ibid., p. 3468; Sen. Butler (Neb.), 
in Ibid., p. 3239; Rep. Hoffman (Mich.), in Dpid., Part 10, ÂIO5O; Rep. 
Smith (Ohio), in D)id., p. AIIO6; Rep. Rich (Pa.), in Ibid., Part 3, 2993; 
Rep. Smith (Wise.), in Ibid.. Part 4, 46ll, 4620; Rep. Vursell (ill.), 
in Ibid., pp. 4626-4628; Rep Knutson (Minn.), in Ibid., pp. 4640-464l;
Sen O'Daniel (Tex.), in Ibid., Part 3, 3770=3771; Sen. VTherry (Neb.), 
in Ibid., p. 3739; Sen. Martin (Pa.), in Ibid., pp. 3223=3225; Sen,
Thomas (Utah), in Ibid.. p. 3328; Sen. Lodge (Mass.) and Sen. Saltonstall 
(Mass.), in laid.. pp. 3338-3337; Sen. Flanders (Vt.), in Dsid., p. 3338; 
Sen. Murray (Mont.), in Ibid. > pp. 3491-3492; Sen. Hawkes (N. J.), in 
Ibid., p. 3809; Sen, Revercomb (W. Va.), in Ibid., pp. 3470, 3882, 3889; 
Sen Brewster (Me.), in Ibid., p. 3692; Sen. Malone (Nev.), in Ibid., p. 
3729; Sen. McClellan (Ark. ), in Ibid., pp. 315O-3156; Sen. Eastland 
(Miss.), in Ibid., p. 3328; Sen. Bridges (N. H. ) and Sen Dworshak (Idaho), 
In Ibid., p. 347O; Ben. Robertson (Wyo=), in Ibid., p. 3789; and Rep. 
Chenoweth (Colo.), in Ibid., Part 4, 4615. ' See also House Subcommittee 
on Appropriations, Hearings on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 
1948. pp. 983, 1055-1056, 1149, 1151, I25Ô, 1382.
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taking .over in the situation. He denied that the United States vas 
emharking on an imperialistic course. Our -proposed action was only "in­
telligent self-interest". The United States did not propose to "under­
write the earth"; yet, he varned, there would be further needs for aid. 
The senator hoped, in the future, however, that we had enough foresight 
that it would not be necessary to react continually on a crisis basis. 
Senator Vandenberg called for "honorable" efforts to remove the friction 
between the United States and the Soviet Union and the "closest possible 
integration" of our plans with the United Nations. He did not defend 
the excesses of the Greek Government but pointed out that it had been 
chosen in a free election and that the Food and Agriculture Organi­
zation of the United Nations had recommended that the Greek Government 
seek United States aid. The United States had a right to expect im­
provements, however, in the character and efficiency of the Greek 
regime, once our aid and advice had been extended. American mili­
tary assistance was intended only to " . . . help Greece help herself 
to be self-reliant . . . ." He denied that we were plotting any offense 
against the Soviet Union, yet " . . . what we deny to ourselves as a 
matter of morality we also must deny to others as a matter of conquest," 
Senator Vandenberg demanded that the Soviet Union demonstrate "in deeds'.' 
that it was not "plotting to encircle us in a Communist-dominated 
world . . . If Congress should refuse to back the President when 
he has so clearly enunciated America's intentions, we could never again 
except to convince anybody that we are serious when we say we shall not 
compromise basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. Senator Vanden­
berg urged that the United Nations "be used to the maximum of practical
lU3
possibilities . . . But we would "ruin it by assigning to it func­
tions which it does not possess . . . He expressed his "regret" 
that President Truman had not, in his March 12 address, simultaneously 
advised the Secretary General of our intentions instead of waiting six­
teen days to do this indirectly through our Security Council represent­
ative. The senator also expressed regret that there had been so little 
time for consideration of such a program. He explained that he had not 
been advised until February 2?. Then, in closing. Senator Vandenberg 
candidly pointed out the distinction between the roles of President 
and Congress in American foreign policy. Simultaneously, he very con­
cisely presented the case for bipartisanship in foreign policy:
... we confront a condition and not a theory . , . Con­
gress does not have an unprejudiced chance to exercise 
truly independent and objective judgments in such cir­
cumstances as we here confront . . , Congress does not 
enjoy original jurisdiction in foreign relations. That 
is the prerogative of the Chief Executive. We come in, 
usually, only at the eleventh hour, when our choice is 
the lesser of two evils ... I do not for an instant 
mean to say we cannot act on our own independent judg­
ments ... I do not mean to say that we can either shift
or dodge our share of responsibility . . . But I do mean 
to say that among the paramoimt factors to which we dare 
not deny due weight is this; To repudiate the President 
of the United States at such an hour could display a 
divisive weakness which might Involve far greater jeopardy 
than a sturdy display of united strength. We are not free 
to ignore the price of noneoraplianee . . . ,-05
Debate was to continue on the aid measure for several weeks.
Even after Congressional approval of the authorization bill, proponents
would have to repeat the process and justify the program to the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees--little Congresses in themselves. Yet
lO^Congressional Record, XCIII, P art 3, 3195-3198.
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while husily engaged in shepherding the Greek-Turkish aid program 
through Congress, the Administration had begun initial planning on an 
expansion of this program to a wider and even more crucial area. It 
had become apparent that Europe was not experiencing as rapid a re­
covery from the effects of the war as had been hoped. Circumstances 
seemed to be conspiring against recovery. Administration leaders 
became convinced that American assistance would be required to pre­
vent an economic and political catastrophe in Europe that would have 
world-wide ramifications. The Truman Doctrine had not been advanced 
entirely as a reaction to Soviet pressures in the eastern Mediterranean 
although certainly those pressures acted as a catalyst for the new 
American policy. Some figures within the Administration had foreseen 
at an early date that foreign aid demands on the United States would 
increase, rather than decrease, if the dislocations caused by the war 
were ever to be corrected. Congress was growing restive under the 
heavy postwar aid requirements, however, and with the Republicans in 
control it was doubtful if more than emergency or stop-gap relief and 
rehabilitation measures could continue to gain its approval. There­
fore, careful preparations would have to be made if aid on the scale 
required in Europe could be expected to gain the affirmation of Con­




In late April, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall returned to 
the United States after nearly two months in Moscow at a session of 
the Council of Foreign Ministers. The meeting, devoted primarily to 
Germany, had ended in abysmal failure. A peace treaty, and an end to 
the debilitating partition, appeared even further from reality than 
prior to the meeting. At this juncture, the only apparent course for 
the United States was to proceed with the plan for merger of its oc­
cupation zone with that of the British and to attempt to persuade a 
reluctant France to Join in this plan. Among American officials it 
was the consensus of thinking that Germany would be a continuing finan­
cial dfaih on̂  the United States so long as it remained compartment­
alized. Moreover, unless the German economy were rehabilitated and 
restored to its central position in the European economy, there ap­
peared to be no hope of effecting more than a superficial economic 
recovery in Europe. America had contributed billions of dollars to­
ward the relief and rehabilitation of postwar Europe. Yet, nearly 
two years after the war's end, economic and perhaps political, disaster 
confronted Europe. Returning from Moscow, Secretary Marshall and his 
aides concluded that an even greater effort would be required of both
11+5
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the United States and Europe in order to avert the impending col­
lapse.^
This perhaps was the origin of what soon was to become known
2universally as the "Marshall Plan". Yet there are other antecedents. 
Among these was the Truman Doctrine, which was being debated in Con­
gress and among the American public at the time of Marshall’s return 
from Moscow. It had become identified, however, as primarily an anti­
communist reaction— and an overly-militant reaction, at that, although 
it did contain economic reconstruction features. Previously mentioned 
were the billions of American dollars in loans, credits, food,and equip­
ment for the relief and rehabilitation of war-torn areas. The failure
of this piecemeal approach to economic recovery was becoming increasingly
3apparent to American policy-makers and other close observers. It was
^Ward, pp. l43-lWk; Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its 
Meaning (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1955), PP* 3, 21; Jones, 
FP. 2lS, 221-224.
^Price, p. 3* The evidence indicates that the "Marshall Plan"
was from conception to Implementation a joint venture, receiving con­
tributions from many sources. Aji attempt is made herein to indicate 
the major sources. Former President Truman gives Marshall " . . .  full 
credit for his brilliant contributions to the measure which he helped 
formulate. And it was Marshall who had envisioned the full scope of
this approach. He had perceived the Inspirational as well as the eco­
nomic value of the proposal ... I believe the fact that a man of Mar­
shall's world standing made the proposal of this policy helped greatly 
in its eventual adoption . . , Truman, II, 115» The late Senator 
Tom Connally (D., Tex.) states flatly that Dean Acheson deserves "full 
credit" for originating the concept and the formula of the "Marshall 
Plan". Connally, p. 323»
3Former President Trjman writes that by 19^7 " . . .  it was 
apparent that an even larger and more comprehensive program was needed 
to achieve the rebuilding of the economy of Europe ... I was looking 
for some method that would encourage the peoples of Europe to embark 
upon some joint undertaking that would eventually lead to effective self- 
help. " Truman adds that in the fall of 1946 "the State-War-Navy Coordi-» 
nating Committee was asked to join in this study and to submit recom­
mendations for action . . . ." Truman, II, 111, 113.
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becoming apparent, also, that the United States Congress was growing 
increasingly reluctant to vote funds for emergency assistance, with 
decreasing prospects for tangible returns on such assistance or for ■ 
a foreseeable end to the series of emergencies.
In examining the lineage of the Marshall Plan, it is worth­
while to observe the activities of two important officials who pre­
ceded Mr. Marshall in State Department service; Under Secretary Dean 
G. Acheson and Assistant Secretary (later Under Secretary) for Economic 
Affairs William L. Clayton. In April, 19^; Acheson and Clayton jointly 
proposed to then Secretary Byrnes a plan whereby the United States would 
undertake a "general initiative" in regard to the wide range of polit- 
ibal problems remaining unresolved in Europe. Without going into the 
details of the proposal, it is important to note that its purpose was 
to secure a reversal of the process whereby Europe was being divided 
into rival power blocs. Even should the plan prove unsuccessful, the 
onus for Europe's division could not then be placed upon the United 
States. One feature of the Acheson-Clayton proposal is important in 
the development of the thinking which culminated in the Marshall Plan. 
This looked specifically to’Æird developing a solution to Europe's prob­
lem of lagging reconstruction. It was proposed that an all-European 
economic organization be created for the purposes of accelerating Euro­
pean reconstruction and achieving greater economic unity in Europe.
It was further proposed that a specific commitment be made by the United 
States to contribute "substantial economic aid" to the organization. 
Secretary Byrnes rejected the Acheson-Clayton proposal, It has been 
speculated that the proposal did not fit Secretary Byrnes' style of
lU8 ■ •
"treaty-by-treaty piecemeal negotiation" with Soviet Russia and that
he preferred instead to test the Russians with his plan for a long-
i;range German demilitarization treaty.
In the preceding chapter it was explained that Under Secretary 
Acheson took the lead in fashioning the American response to the Greek- 
Turkish crisis. Before President Truman submitted the Greek-Turkish 
assistance proposal to Congress, Acheson, on March. 5> initiated a 
study to determine the extent of similar assistance requests which 
might be made of the United States during the coming months. General 
Eisenhower, Army Chief-of-Staff, had urged such a study and a general 
appropriation consolidating all aid requests, including that for Greece 
and Turkey. Acheson and Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson, however, 
felt that the Greek-Turkish assistance request could not be delayed for 
the period such a study would require. Likewise, they were of the opin­
ion that such a request would not be approved by Congress at that time. 
Each agreed that the study should be made, however.^ President Truman 
and his advisers, after studying the implications of the situation pre­
sented in the Greek-Turkish crisis, apparently proceeded on the assumption 
that their course in seeking Congressional approval of economic, mili­
tary, and technical assistance for those beleaguered states constituted 
in effect a long-term American commitment to the development of a world 
security system, ultimately involving a much greater expenditure of 
American resources than was reflected in the Greek-Turkish program.
kW. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in 
Recent History (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, I960), pp. IÔ5-I87.
^Jones, pp. 137-138, 159.
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This commitment, however, could not be enunciated explicitly without 
the firm support of Congress and the American people. This support 
could be gained only through careful preparations.^
On March 11, a Special Committee of three members, one each from 
the departments of State, Wax, and Navy, was created by the State-War- 
Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). Members of the Special Committee 
were William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for 
Research and Intelligence; Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, War 
Department; and Rear Admiral E. T. Wooldrfdge, Navy Department. The 
committee was given three weeks in which to complete a study on the 
countries that might need emergency aid from the United States in the 
coming months. The study then was to be expanded to cover all countries 
that might require long-range assistance from the United States. Seven 
subsidiary committees were established to study various aspects of the 
problem and a Committee on Extension of Aid to Foreign Countries was 
created to formulate the position of the State Department on the inter­
departmental committees. The committee members consisted, generally, 
of lower-ranking officials in the three departments, since at this time 
the top-ranking officials of these departments were occupied with 
other important matters. The committee’s preliminary report, completed 
on April 21, surveyed the economic, financial, political, and social 
conditions in twelve "critical" countries, mostly in Europe. The studies 
recognised the critical situation of the world economy but that the task 
of its reconstruction could not be undertaken by the United States alone.
^James Reston, in the New York Times, March 11, 19̂ 7* Reproduced
in  C ongressional Record, XCIII, F a r t  10, A9Ô3.
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Any general recovery program, to be successful, would require close 
coordination among participating countries. The importance of a revival 
of German production and trade to European recovery was emphasized. Al­
though it was agreed that preference in assistance should be given to 
democratically oriented countries, the interdependence of all European 
countries was recognized. Trade between Western and Eastern Europe 
should be encouraged, the report recommended. Even financial and com­
modity assistance to the Soviet satellites was not to be ruled out, if
this would produce a secondary advantage to Western Europe while mini-
7mizing its benefit to the satellites.
Shortly after assuming office, Secretary Marshall, on February 
22, speaking at Princeton University's bicentennial celebration, cau­
tioned his listeners that Americans were not awake to the seriousness 
of the postwar world situation
... If the world is to get on its feet, if the pro­
ductive facilities of the world are to be restored, 
if democratic processes in many countries are to re­
sume their functioning, a strong lead and definite g 
assistance from the United States will be necessary.
In his public utterances. Secretary Marshall repeatedly urged Americans 
to awaken to their world responsibilities.
While in Moscow, Secretary Marshall had recognised the con­
nection between the German problem and general European recovery. He 
pointed out to Marshal Stalin the interest of the United States in pro­
moting European economic recovery and that this country had no ulterior
Tjones, pp. 199-205.
^Congressional Record, XCIII, P a rt 10, A792.
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motives in seeking such an objective. After returning to America, 
the Secretary of State told the American people in a radio address 
that Europe was disintegrating too rapidly for any further delay in 
seeking a solution. The next day, April 29, Secretary Marshall in­
structed George Kennan, head of the department's recently created 
Policy Planning Staff (PPS), to develop ideas and suggestions for a 
program of United States assistance to European reconstruction. Kennan 
was told to "avoid trivia." It is interesting to note that the pace 
of the Administration's planning was accelerated at this point, be­
cause the subject of Europe's plight was now a matter of wide public 
and Congressional discussion. The Secretary feared that Congress might
act precipitately and force an unsatisfactory plan upon the Adminis-
9tration.
The Policy Planning Staff issued its memorandum on aid to 
Europe on May 23» In the meantime, Under Secretary Acheson, substituting 
for President Truman, delivered an important address on "The Require­
ments of Reconstruction" before the Delta Council at Cleveland, Missis­
sippi, on Hay 8, The speech had two purposes: first, to emphasize the 
positive (economic) aspects of the Truman Doctrine, and in so doing, re­
turn the level of public discussion of this policy to a less militant 
plane; and second, lay the groundwork for an even greater undertaking 
by the United States to stabilize the world's economy.Although
9Jones, pp. 169, 222-224; Robert Ellsworth Elder, The Policy 
Machine: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy (Syra­
cuse: Syracuse University Press, 1960), p. ÔU.
°̂U. S., Dept, of State, Bulletin. Vol. XVI, No. 4ll (194?); 
991-994; Truman, II, II3. Truman refers to Acheson's speech as the
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Acheson denied later that the speech was a "trial balloon" for the
Marshall Plan^it ^s undisputed that the Under Secretary, prior
to delivering the speech, indicated its importance in relation to
12American foreign policy to three British newsmen. In fact, the 
Administration was disappointed in the coverage given Acheson’s speech 
by the domestic news media. It was not until reports of the speech, 
along with British and European reaction, began filtering back across 
the Atlantic that its significance began to be appreciated by the news 
media in this country.
On May 9, a memorandum on European reconstruction was sub­
mitted to the Policy Planning Staff by three members of the staff of 
Under Secretary of State Clayton. It proposed a coordinated European 
recovery program assisted by the United States and directed notuonly 
at solving immediate problems but also at the ultimate integration of 
the European economy. Although the proposal recommended the inclusion
"prologue" to the proposal given "full development and expression a month 
later by Marshall." According to Jonathan Daniels, when it developed 
that Truman could not fill the speaking engagement he "called Acheson 
to the White House and outlined what he hoped ha would say," Daniels, 
p. 321.
‘"̂ Price, p. 2k*
1 g-‘Jones, p. 212,
l^Truman, II, 113; Daniels, pp. 321-323; Jones, p, 213, State 
Department representatives of domestic news services were briefed also 
as to the "official importance" of Acheson*s speech, Within a few 
weeks, however, the speech achieved the intended result and most press 
commentary and speculation directed toward the problem of European 
reconstruction. Some commentators considered the Acheson speech an 
"extension" of the Truman Doctrine, whereas others considered it an "im­
provement" because it omitted reference to military aid and de-emphasised 
the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, 
Jones, pp, 232-233» See also Daniel S, Cheever and H, Field Haviland, Jr,, 
American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1952), pp. 108-109,
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of all European states in the recovery program, including the Soviet 
Union and its satellites, its ultimate purpose uas to create the eco­
nomic conditions necessary for the maintenance of stable center and 
left-of-center governments in Europe, The Economic Commission for
Europe, an agency of the United Nations, was viewed as the most ap-
1 kpropriété organ for handling the reconstruction program.
Under Secretary Clayton returned to Washington on May 19 from 
six weeks in Europe. In a short memorandum to the Secretary, he 
graphically presented the alarming conditions he had observed there, 
emphasizing that the destruction of the European economy by the war 
and the steady deterioration thereafter had been grossly underesti­
mated.
Without further prompt and substantial aid from 
the United States, economic, social, and political dis­
integration would overwhelm Europe, with awful Impli­
cations for the future peace and security of the world 
and immediate, disastrous effects upon our domestic 
economy . . . .
Clayton believed that the resources of the United States wore ample to 
meet Europe’s needs. He suggested that it was only a matter of organ?, 
izing our fiscal policy and consumption in order to make available 
surpluses out of our production. These should be financed through 
taxation rather than by adding to the national debt, he thought, Clayton 
envisioned the necessity of United States assistance in the vicinity of 
$21 billion over a period of at least three years. This should be an 
outright grant. The grant would be predicated upon a plan developed 




In developing their recommendations to the Secretary, Kennan
and the Policy Planning Staff utilized the SWNCC studies, Kennan * s own
analysis of Soviet conduct. Under Secretary Clayton’s memorandum as well
as that of his staff, and the knowledge of experts such as Charles E.
"Chip" Bohlen, departmental Counselor.The ideas of columnist Walter
17Lippmann contributed significantly to Kennan's thinking.. Presented
to Secretary Marshall on May 23, the TFS memorandum then was circulated
l8among the Secretary’s top assistants. In a series of conferences 
within the department, most of the PPS recommendations were adopted. 
Certain provisions of the memorandum were incorporated almost literally 
into Secretary Marshall’s speech at Harvard University on June 5; In 
which he enunciated the basic principles of the "Marshall Plan".
The Policy Planning Staff viewed the European crisis as re­
sulting largely from the disruptive effects of the war on its economic,
^^Ibid.. pp. 247-249.
^̂ Ibid., p. 241; Goldman, p. 71*
17Jones, pp. 226-232. Jones, serving at the time in the Public 
Affairs Office of the State Department, writes that Lippmann̂ 'suggested 
in an article on May 1 that the United States ask European countries 
to join in drawing up a common recovery program and present this coun­
try with a "consolidated deficit". So far as Jones knew, this was an 
"original idea" and, in general, this is what the Europeans eventually 
did. Jones also states that by mid-May, 194%, it was apparent that the 
"public" expected the United States to aid in Europe’s reconstruction. 
There was "no question" to Jones that the Marshall proposal " . . .  was 
to an important degree the consequence of public pressure built up and 
suggestions advanced, . , ,, in an interplay of ideas between the 
nation's leaders and the public . . . ." Many of the nation’s leading 
nê TSpapers and journals increasingly expressed concern about the "larg­
er picture" of European reconstruction in the weeks after the announce­
ment of the Truman Doctrine.
18Acheson, Clayton, Bohlen, and Benjamin V. Cohen, Price, p. 24.
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political, and social structure and . . from a profound exhaus­
tion of physical plant and of spiritual vigor . . . It was agreed 
that the situation was being exploited by Communists and that "fur­
ther communist successes would create serious danger to American 
security . . . The "root of the present difficulties", however, 
did not lie in Communist activities. The PPS stressed that American 
aid to Europe should not be directed toward combatting Communism but 
toward correcting " . . .the economic maladjustment which makes 
European society vulnerable to exploitation by any and all totali­
tarian movements . , . Great emphasis was placed on the necessity 
for making abundantly clear that the United States would be helping 
Europe to help Itself. Explicitly, the PPS stated that the formal 
initiative for the aid program must come from Europe itself. Like­
wise, the program must evolve in Europe and Europeans must bear the
basic responsibility for it. " The role of this country should
consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and 
of the later support of such a program." The European countries should 
seek American support jointly, not in a " . . . series of isolated and 
individual appeals." The program, finally, "must give reasonable as­
surance that if we support it, this will be the last such program we 
shall be asked to support in the foreseeable future." Kennan and the 
PPS urged that efforts be made to correct what they considered the 
principal public misconceptions about the Truman Doctrine. One such 
misconception was that the United States merely was reacting to Com­
munist pressures and was interested primarily in stopping Communism 
and only secondarily in restoring sound world economic conditions. It
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should be made clear, they emphasized, that the Truman, Doctrine was 
not a "blank check" to any country where Communists "show signs of 
being successful.
Both Acheson and Kennan advised Secretary Marshall that the 
offer of American assistance should be extended to all of Europe, in­
cluding the Soviet Union. Acheson did not want the United States to 
be accused of dividing Europe. Kennan felt that if Russia agreed to 
participate, she could make a substantial contribution to the success 
of the program. If she refused to participate, it then would appear 
that Russia was opposed to a revival of Europe's economy. It was 
agreed that the Soviets probably would reject the offer, since if they
agreed to cooperate it would be necessary to disclose the economic
20and financial condition of the Soviet Union. Traditionally, at 
least, the Soviets had been reluctant to reveal freely any such in­
formation.
These activities, guided by the State Department, had been
proceeding with the full approval of President Truman who, within the
span of a few weeks in early 1947, had become convinced of the failure
21of the piecemeal approach to reconstruction of the European economy,
The next step for the State Department, after reaching general agreement 
on the PPS recommendations, was the problem of the timing and character
^̂ Price, pp. 22-23; Jones, pp. 249-250; Goldman, pp. 71-74.
^ P̂rice, p. 24; Jones, pp. 252-253; Goldman, p. 74.
^^In his budget for the 1Q48 fiscal year, submitted to Congress 
on January 10, 1947, President Truman had anticipated the need only for 
a "modest relief program for a few countries which are still in desperate 
straits . . . ." Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 1, 24l.
157
of a public statement of America's willingness to assist in European
reconstruction. Secretary Marshall felt that Congress was in an un=
favorable mood to receive further aid requests, especially one of the
magnitude envisioned in the European Recovery Program. Therefore, the
Secretary wanted the proposal to break with "explosive force" upon the
American public. The planners were in agreement in believing that a
favorable response would be forthcoming from Europe, Precautions were
taken to prevent premature leaks of the proposal in this country. No
advance notice was given to European governments of the forthcoming
22United States initiative. Under Secretary Acheson, however, did
take steps designed to facilitate and accelerate the European response,
by insuring that British Foreign Secretary Bevin would be delivered a
copy of the statement wherever he might be, as soon as it had been
released. In addition, certain Washington newsmen had been kept
informed of the general tenor of Administration thinking on the sub-
21).ject of Europe's growing plight.
Secretary Marshall had accepted an invitation to speak at the 
Amherst commencement exercises on June l6.-5 At that time he would 
concentrate on the approaching crisis in Europe and extend the American 
offer of assistance. Because the European situation appeared to be
22
23,
Price, pp. 2k-2^. 
'Jones, p. 256.
oilAcheson, Kennan, and Bohlen apparently considered this expe». 
dient an essential ingredient of foreign policy formulation. James 
Reston, of the New York Times, was a favored recipient of advance infor­
mation. Jones, p. 237*
25Goldman, p. 75.
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deteriorating so rapidly, however, the Amherst appearance was canceled 
and the Secretary accepted instead an invitation to receive an honorary 
degree from Harvard University on June 5* Charles E. Bohlen was as- 
signed the task of preparing Marshall's speech. Bohlen relied pri­
marily on the PPS and Clayton memoranda in drafting the speech, which
was reviewed by Acheson and Kennan and revised only slightly by Secre­
cytary Marshall. '
pQSecretary Marshall, in his June $, 19̂ 7 speech at Harvard,^ 
sought to clarify for the American people the meaning of the mass of 
data being presented in the news media regarding the "very serious" 
world situation. In his estimation, the heart of the world crisis was 
the breakdown of Europe. The requirements for rehabilitation of Europe's 
economy had been grossly underestimated: the task would require "a
much longer time and effort than had been foreseen." Europe " . . .  
must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and 
political deterioration of a very grave character." If such a situation 
were permitted to develop, it would not only be demoralizing to the 
world at large and contribute to "disturbances" arising from sheer 
desperation, but also the "consequences to the economy of the United 
States should be apparent to all."
Ibid.; Jones, p. 25$. Acheson objected to the Harvard selec­
tion because he felt that the news coverage given such events was inade­
quate .
^̂ jones, p. 255.
S. Senate, The European Recovery Program: Basic Documents 
and Background Information, pp. 73-75* References to and quotations 
from the Secretary's speech on the following pages are from this source 
unless otherwise noted.
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It is logical that the United States should do 
whatever it is able to do to assist in the re­
turn of normal economic health in the world; 
without which there can be no political stability, 
and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not 
against any country or doctrine but against hunger, 
poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose 
should be the revival of a working economy in the 
world so as to permit the emergence of political 
and social conditions in which free institutions 
can exist.
Secretary Marshall indicated that the United States was convinced of 
the futility of the piecemeal approach to achieving postwar rehabili­
tation. Further United States assistance " . . .  should provide a cure 
rather than a mere palliative . . . ." The "full cooperation" of the 
United States Government would be given to any government " . . .  
willing to assist in the task of recovery . . . ." No American help 
could be expected for those who deliberately attempted to thwart the 
recovery of others. Instead, they could expect the opposition of the 
United States.
Marshall then informed the European countries that the next 
step in their rehabilitation depended on them. The United States had 
taken the first step by'signifying its willingness to assist them in 
achieving economic recovery. However, they must agree among them­
selves as to the requirements of the situation as well as to the steps 
they would take in order to give effect to "whatever action might be 
undertaken by this Government."
It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this 
Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a pro­
gram designed to place Europe on its feet economical­
ly. This is the business of Europeans. The initiative 
. . . must come from Europe. The role of this coun­
try should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of 
a European program and of later support of such a program
i6o
so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The 
program should be a joint one, agreed to by a num­
ber, if not all, European nations.
As he had done previously and would do again. Secretary Marshall closed 
by imploring the American people to "face up to the vast responsibili­
ties which history has clearly placed upon our country . . . ."
Europe's Reaction: The Committee of European
Economic Cooperation 
Secretary Marshall's address almost immediately set in motion 
activities which were to occupy the energies of scores of persons on 
both sides of the Atlantic for the ensuing year.
Marshall further clarified his Harvard address on June 12, ex­
plaining that his proposal was directed to all of Europe west of Asia,
29including the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. British Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin and French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault re­
acted almost simultaneously in acclaiming the Marshall statement as a 
positive attempt to create a "healthy world." They began discussions 
on June 13 relative to a European reply to the Marshall proposal. Both 
recognized the desirability of participation in this effort by the Rus­
sians. Thus, an invitation was extended to the Soviet Union and, on 
June 27, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov Joined his colleagues in
31Paris. The Soviet press, however, attacked the Marshall proposal on
29u. S., Department of State, Committee of European Economic Co­
operation, General Report, I, Publication 2930; European Series 28 (Wash- 
ington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 19̂ 7), P* 9* Cited hereafter 
as CEEC: General Report.
3%. S. Senate, The European Recovery Program; Basic Documents 
and Background Information, p. 3*
3ICEEC: General Report, p. 9-
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the ground it would lead to unwarranted foreign intervention in the 
internal affairs of states. It was also suggested, with little suh? 
tlety, that the underlying purpose of the proposal was to secure ex­
ternal markets for American goods in order to avert an "approaching
32crisis" in America's capitalistic economy.
Attempts to include Soviet Russia in the Marshall Plan dis­
cussions were futile. Bevin and Bidault immediately proposed the 
creation of a steering committee to coordinate the work of subcom­
mittees charged with surveying European resources and developing the 
outlines of a European recovery program. 3̂ Molotov offered objections 
to this proposal on several grounds. He objected that a "special 
organization" to assess European needs and resources would constitute 
interference In the internal affairs of European states "... down 
to determining the line of development to be followed by the main branches 
of industry in these countries . . . ." He charged that Britain and 
France were laying the groundwork for a "predominant position" in the 
proposed organization. Nothing would remain of the economic or polit­
ical sovereignty of European states should such an organization come 
into being: Molotov charged that under the proposal the "decisive hold"
on the economic life of Europe would belong to the United States. The 
internal efforts of individual countries should be given a "decisive im­
portance" in any reconstruction effort. Molotov vehemently objected 
to the contemplated use of German resources in the recovery program
32U. S. Senate, The European Recovery Program; Basic Documents 
and Background Information, pp. 3, 151-154.
^^Ibid., p. 4.
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at the expense of those countries "which had made the greatest sacrifices 
during the war . . . ." The Anglo-French plan, if implemented, could 
only lead to the division of Europe into "two groups of States and 
creating new difficulties in the relations between them." Molotov felt 
it "necessary to caution" Britain and France "against the consequences 
of such action . . . A Soviet counterproposal, rejected by the British 
and French, would ha.ve the European nations draw up a list of their re­
quirements from the United States, determine the possibilities of get­
ting such aid, and then facilitate its distribution.^^
On July 2, the Soviet Union withdrew from the discussions. The 
next day Bevin and Bidault issued invitations to twenty-two European 
governments to meet in Paris on July 12 to consider a European recovery 
plan. Sixteen nations accepted: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Re­
fusing to attend were the Soviet Union and the governments of Eastern 
Europe dominated or decisively Influenced by the Soviets: Finland, Po­
land, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Po­
land, on June 24, had indicated its intention to participate in the 
Paris discussions, only to withdraw its acceptance later. Czechoslo­
vakian Premier Klement Gottwalk and Foreign Secretary Jan Masaryk Jour­
neyed to Moscow to be told to reconsider their acceptance of the in-
3^Bevin reacted militantly in denying Molotov’s allegations.
He expressed "regret" that "Mr. Molotov has threatened that if we con­
tinue this beneficent work we must face grave consequences." He bluntly 
informed the Russian that such threats did not constitute " . . .  the 
sort of prospect which will deter us from doing our duty." Bidault was 
equally forceful in his rejoinder. Ibid., pp. 155-1&1"
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vitation. This was sufficient policy guidance for the subservient
35Eastern European governments.
At Paris, the sixteen nations in a four-day conference created 
the Committee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC), a general com­
mittee to oversee the functioning of four technical committees on food 
and agriculture, iron and steel, transport, and fuel and power. Later, 
additional committees on timber, manpower, balance of payments, trade 
and customs union, and financial obstacles to intra-European trade were 
added. Basically, the objective of the CEEC was to analyze the economic 
resources and capabilities of the sixteen countries and Western Ger­
many, develop the outlines of a European recovery program, and agree 
on what each country required in the form of external assistance and 
what each could do for itself. A deadline of September 1 was set for 
submission of a proposed program for the years 1948-1951 to the United 
States Government. Most of the information had been collected by 
early August.Providing assistance to the CEEC and its committees 
in drafting its report were Under Secretary of State Clayton, Henry 
Labouisse, and Colonel C. H. Bonesteel III, of the Department of State.
The CEEC report was signed by representatives of the sixteen 
nations on September 22, 19̂ 7 and transmitted to President Truman on 
September 24 by Secretary Marshall. In the report, the economic and 
financial problems confronting the sixteen nations and Western Germany 
were defined. Reviewed were (l) the production targets set for them-
^^Ibid., pp. 4-5; CEEC: General Report, p. 9*
3^CEEC: General Report, p. 10.
3'̂ Price, pp. 36-37.
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selves; (2 ) the steps being taken and to be taken to achieve internal sta­
bilization; (3) the measures to be taken by the participating countries 
through combined or coordinated action to solve production problems, pro­
vide for the free and efficient flow of goods and labor, and insure the 
full utilization of their resources; and (k) the problem presented by the
balance of payments deficit of the participating countries with the
,38
Explicit recognition was given in the report to the interrelation­
ship of the economies of the participating countries and "that the pros­
perity of each of them depends upon the restoration of the prosperity of 
all . . . Such an objective could not be attained, however, without
sustained common efforts, directed specifically towards 
the production of scarce commodities, the full use of 
available resources and the achievement of internal 
financial and economic stability.39
Pledges were made by the participating countries to use all their ef­
forts to achieve the production targets set out in the report and to 
carry out "vigorously" the measures necessary to achieve internal fi­
nancial stability in each coun.try and confidence in its currency and 
credit. The establishment of a joint organization to review the prog­
ress of the recovery prograra was recognized as a necessity.
3̂ CEEC: General Report, p. 1.
39ibid., p. 2.
^Qlbid. On September 12, the CEEC had accepted six basic condi­
tions on the extension of U. S. aid which were submitted by Under Secre­
tary Clayton: (l) take immediate steps toward financial and monetary sta­
bility; (2 ) each country to guarantee its production program; (3) reduce 
trade barriers; (1+) provide for World Bank financing of some of the aid 
requirements; (5 ) form a continuing organization; and (6 ) recognize com­
mon objectives and responsibilities. U. S. Senate, The European Recovery 
Program: Basic Documents and Background Information, p. 8 . Clayton*s ac-
tion brought reminders from the Russians that this ms an example of the 
"interference" against which they had been urging caution. Ward, p. l48.
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The report was declared to he no "shopping list" of the goods 
which the sixteen nations and Western Germany hoped to receive from 
the United States. It was designed instead as an analysis of the Euro­
pean maladjustment and "an examination of what the participating coun­
tries can do for themselves and for each other to work towards a lasting 
solution." The size of the problem was illustrated by showing the 
expected deficit of the participating countries and Western Germany in 
their trading relations with the American continent and the non-partic­
ipating countries during the years 19̂ 8-1951• It was neither asked 
nor expected, however, that the United States provide the full amount 
of the deficit. Part of the deficit was expected to be filled through 
private financing and investments, the International Bank for Recon­
struction and Development, and any suitable assets still available to
lt-1the participating countries.
The recovery program, formulated in the CEEC report was based 
upon four points:
(i) A strong production effort by each of the
participating countries, especially in agri­
culture, fuel and power, transport, and the 
modernization of equipment.
(ii) The creation and maintenance of internal
financial stability as an essential condition 
for securing the full use of Europe's pro­
ductive and financial resources.
(iil) The development of economic co-operation be­
tween the participating countries.
(iv) A solution of the problem of the participating 
countries deficit with the American continent 
particularly by exports.
^^CEEC: General Report, pp. 2-3*
^^Ibid., p. 11.
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The report looked to a restoration, by 1951> of agricultural 
production to the pre-war level and a "significant expansion" of min­
ing and manufacturing production beyond the 1938 levels. To achieve 
the production targets, the participating countries would require 
food, raw materials, fuel and capital equipment from overseas. It 
was not expected that pre-war standards of food consumption could be 
reached even by 1951• The CEEC report looked to 19̂ 8 as the critical
year.in determining the overall success of the recovery p r o g r a m .
To insure the success .of the recovery program, the partici­
pating countries "pledge themselves to join together, and invite other 
European countries to join with them, in working to this end . . , ."
Each country pledged " . . .  to use all its efforts
(i) to develop its production to reach the targets, 
especially for food and coal;
(ii) to make the fullest and most effective use of
its existing productive capacity and all available 
manpower;
(iii) to modernise its equipment and transport, so that 
labour becomes more productive, conditions of work 
are improved, and standards of living of all peo­
ples of Europe are raised;
(iv) to apply all necessary measures leading to the
rapid achievement of internal financial monetary 
and economic stability while maintaining in each 
country a high level of employment;
(v) to co-operate with one another and with like-
minded countries in all possible steps to reduce 
the tariffs and other barriers to the expansion 
of trade both between themselves and with the 
rest of the world, in accordance with the princi­




(vi) to remove progressively the obstacles to the 
free movement of persons within Europe;
(vii) to organise together the means by which common 
resources can be developed in partnership. ^
During 19^-1951; it was estimated that the participating
countries would require imports from all countries valued at $57-3
billion, of which $35*2 billion represented imports from the American
continent.The net trade deficit with the American continent for
the four year period was estimated at $22.it- billion ($l6 billion with
the U. S.), a part of which it was assumed could be financed through
the International Bank and sources other than special assistance ($3*13 
, k6billion). It was contemplated that the participating countries still
would be running a trade deficit with the American continent in 1951.
However, the CEEC report assumed, given favorable world conditions
which would enable the participating countries to earn dollars in non-
American countries, that a near balance would be achieved by the end
of 1951. After 1951, it was assumed, the deficit would be of dimensions
klmanageable without special external aid.
Following submission of the CEEC report to the President, it 
was subjected to a rigorous analysis by Government officials. The 
analysis was coordinated by an interdepartmental steering committee, 
chaired by a representative of the State Department and including 
representatives from Treasury, Commerce, Interior, Army, Navy, and 
^^Ibid., p. 13. See also n. 40, supra.
^^Ibid., p. 42.
^̂ Ibid. , p. 54.
47Ibid., pp. 59-^0.
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other interested agencies. As technical analyses progressed, the 
steering committee assisted in putting together an overall picture.
The National Advisory Council, chaired by the Secretary of the Treas­
ury, was made responsible for analyzing the financial and fiscal parts 
of the CEEC report. The Executive Committee on Economic Foreign 
Policy, chaired by the Secretary of State, analyzed the broad eco­
nomic policy questions raised by the report. Aspects pertaining to 
food were analyzed by a subcommittee of the President’s Cabinet Com­
mittee on World Food Problems, chaired by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
Other parts of the report were assigned to working groups chaired by 
officials of the Department of Commerce. After completion of the analy­
sis, the State Department conducted a series of conferences in Washings 
ton between the commodity committees established to review the CEEC 
report and the European technicians who had assisted in its prepara­
tion. The object of the so-called "Washington conversations", which 
began on October 9, was to clarify the CEEC report and to secure sup- 
plementary data. Invited to participate as observers were the
staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign
k9Affairs Committee, and the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid.
After its refusal to participate in the endeavors of the CEEC, 
Soviet Russia further reacted to the Marshall proposal by concluding 
a number of trade agreements with the nations of Eastern Europe and
Dept, of State, Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 431 (1947), 687-688.
^^Kenneth Kofmehl, Professional Staffs of Congress (West Lafa­
yette, Inc.; Purdue University Studies, Humanities Series, I962), p.
258.
169
by encouraging the conclusion of bilateral pacts between members of 
the Soviet bloc. Severally, these trade and barter arrangements con­
stituted the "Molotov Plan", or the Soviet answer to the Marshall
50Plan. In effect, these arrangements increased Russian control over 
the economies of the nations of Eastern Europe. Trade which had flowed 
previously to Western Europe was directed toward the east, handicapping 
even further the outlook for a successful European reconstruction ef­
fort. The final wedge between East and West was driven, apparently, in 
October, with the announcement of the formation of the Communist Infor­
mation Bureau (Cominform), with its headquarters to be located in Bel­
grade, Yugoslavia. Representing the Communist parties of the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia, France, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hun­
gary, and Rumania, the Cominform charged that the Marshall Plan was the 
instrument of the United States for achieving world domination. It 
called on Communists everywhere to do their utmost to "wreck" the Mar­
shall Plan.^^
Exploration of American Capabilities To Finance 
European Reconstruction 
While the CEEC endeavored to collect the data upon which to 
formulate an economic recovery program, the Truman Administration set
^̂ U. S. Senate, The European Recovery Program: Basic Documents
and Background Information, pp. 5-6. Such a plan had been under way 
since the end of the war. The attractions of U. S. aid under the Mar­
shall Plan, however, confronted the Soviets with the necessity of in­
tensifying the process of creating a buffer zone of small states depend­
ent upon the powerful Soviet Union for both political and economic 
sustenance.
^^Ibld., pp. 6, kS.
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about determining how extensive a program could be supported by the 
United States without endangering its own economy. At the same time, 
Congress proceeded to determine for itself the extent of the European 
crisis and the ability of the United States to respond, if the facts 
so warranted. There were elements of cooperation, as well as rivalry, 
between the two branches as interest mounted in regard to the course 
to be followed by the United States. In the end, perhaps no policy 
ever adopted by the United States, either previously or subsequently, 
received the attention, study, and deliberation given to the Marshall 
Plan.
52After conferring with Senator Vandenberg and other members 
of the Senate, President Truman, on June 22, announced the creation 
of three committees to study the limits and capabilities of the United 
States to provide assistance to a European recovery program and the 
impact such assistance would have on the domestic economy. One com­
mittee, composed of Government specialists, was placed under the chair­
manship of Julius A. Krug, Secretary of the Interior. It was directed 
to survey the nation's resources with a view toward determining the 
ability of the United States to support the proposed recovery program. 
The second committee was the President's Council of Economic Advisers, 
consisting of Dr. Edwin G. Nourse, chairman; Leon Keyserling and John
D. Clark, members. Its assignment was to study the impact on the 
domestic economy of the proposed foreign aid program. The third com-
52Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (ed., with the collaboration of Joe 
Alex Morris), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 376-377.
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mittee was a nineteen-member nonpartisan advisory group known as the 
President’s Committee on Foreign Aid, which consisted of business, 
labor, financial, agricultural, and academic leaders under the chair­
manship of Secretary of Commerce Harriman. It was charged with 
studying the broad aspects of the aid program, i.e., the principles 
and policies which should guide the operation of the aid program, the 
needs and capacities of the European countries, the volume of as­
sistance required, its relation to the domestic economy, and problems 
of finance and administration. In general, the Krug and Wourse com­
mittees were to supply the Harriman Committee the data necessary for 
it to carry out its responsibilities. Reports were submitted to the 
President by the Krug Committee on October 7j the Council of Economic 
Advisers on October 28; and the Harriman Committee on November 6. As
53Dept, of State, Bulletin, Vol. XVI, No. 417 (l94?), 1297, 1315; 
U. S. Senate, The European Recovery Program: Basic Documents and Back­
ground Information, pp. 3-4; House Subcommittee on Appropriations, Hear­
ings on the Supplemental Appropriation Bill for 1948, pp. 976-977- Mem­
bers of the Harriman Committee were: Hiland Batcheller, president, Al- 
legheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.; Robert E. Buchanan, dean. Graduate College, 
Iowa State College; W. Randolph Burgess, vice chairman. National City 
Bank of New York; James B. Carey, secretary-treasurer. Congress of In­
dustrial Organizations; Granville Conway, president, Cosmopolitan 
Shipping Co., Inc.; Melville F. Coolbaugh, Golden, Colo.; Chester C. 
Davia, president. Federal Reserve Bank, St. Louis, Mo.; R. R. Deupree, 
president, Procter and Gamble Co.; Paul G. Hoffman, president, Stude- 
baker Corp.; Calvin B. Hoover, dean,Graduate School, Duke University; 
Robert Koenig, president, Ayrshire Collieries Co.; Edward S. Mason, dean. 
School of Public Administration, Harvard University; George Meany, 
secretary-treasurer, American Federation of.Labor; Harold G. Moulton, 
president, Brookings Institution; William I. Myers, dean. College of 
Agriculture, Cornell University; Robert G. Sproul, president. Univer­
sity of California, Berkeley; Owen D. Young, Van Hornesville, N. Y.; 
Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., Washington, D. C.; and John L. Collyer, 
president, B. F. Goodrich Co. The President's Committee on Foreign 
Aid, European Recovery and American Aid (Washington: U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1947), pp. iv, v, vii, 3- Cited hereafter as European 
Recovery and American Aid. In 1952, Mr. Harriman stated that the
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their studies had progressed, they were supplied advance data from 
the CEEC study being pursued in Europe.
Simultaneously with the work of the three special committees, 
the State Department proceeded to convert the broad concepts of the 
Marshall Plan into a legislative program. An interdepartmental "Ad­
visory Steering Committee", under the chairmanship of Under Secretary 
of State Robert A. Lovett (appointed to succeed Acheson, who resigned 
on June 30); vas created to prepare the necessary legislation. An 
interdepartmental "Correlation Committee", chaired by the State De­
partment's Col. C. H. Bonesteel III, reported directly to Lovett's 
committee. An "Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy" 
studied the relation of the aid program to the United Nations. Also 
assisting in the planning was a departmental "Committee for European 
Recovery". At times, as many as 35O State Department employees worked 
from half to full time in developing the Marshall Plan program. Lead­
ing State Department participants in these activities, in addition to 
Under Secretary Lovett, included Willard Thorp, C. Tyler Wood, Paul 
Nitze (who, according to one source, provided much of the "intellectual 
and organizing drive"), Lincoln Gordon, Colonel Bonesteel, Charles 
Kindleberger, and Ernest Gross. Lewis Douglas, Ambassador to Great
initiative in setting up the Harriman Committee was actually taken by 
Dean Acheson, although " . . .  Marshall had a hand in it . . . In­
terview with Harry Bayard Price, October 1, 1952. See Price, p. h2. 
William C. Foster, then Under Secretary of Commerce, took a leading 
role in nominating the members of the committee. Senator Vandenberg 
was consulted closely in the committee's work. Ibid.
54European Recovery and American Aid, p. viiij Dept, of State, 
Bulletin. Vol. XVII, No. 431 (1947), 588.
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Britain, was extremely effective in Congressional liaison activities. 
High-level personnel in other executive departments cooperated ex­
tensively with these members of the State Department. Support was 
given by this group to the Krug, Nourse, and Harriman committees. In 
fact, the substance of the Harriman Committee's report was supplied 
by the group under Lovett. Additionally, the group established a 
temporary unit for handling initial planning and shipments which went 
into operation immediately after final approval of European recovery 
legislation.
The Krug report on the impact of foreign aid on the natural 
resources of the United States, submitted to the President on October 
7, was the product of a Government-wide effort. Experts and technicians 
were made available from the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, In­
terior, Labor, State, and War; the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System; the Export-Import Bank; the Federal Trade Commission; 
the Federal Power Commission; the Interstate Commerce Commission; the 
Maritime Commission; the National Housing Agency; the Office of De­
fense Transportation; the Tennessee Valley Authority; the U. S. Tariff 
Commission: and the Executive Office of the President. As many as 
300 people worked on the report at various stages of its preparation. 
From representatives of these agencies, a liaison committee was created 
to guide and oversee the preparation of basic commodity studies by com­
modity committees composed of experts in the various agencies. The
^̂ Price, pp. h6-h7;, Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State;
A History of Its Organization, Procedure and Personnel ( N. Y.: The " 
Macmillan Co., 19̂ 9); P- ^58; Cheever and Haviland, pp. 113-11̂ .
17̂4-
report itself was drafted by a small editorial committee.
The Krug report did not concern itself with either the fiscal 
or administrative aspects of foreign aid. In essence, it concluded 
that the United States possessed the natural resources to undertake 
the proposed European aid program. Although exports constituted a 
relatively small part of our total economic output, foreign aid de­
mands "would aggravate in some measure the strains on our economy at 
its highest peacetime level . . . ." Even though the United States 
is wealthy in natural resources, it " . . . cannot long underwrite the 
material deficits of other nations without serious impact on its econ­
omy and its resources , . , ." However, the foreign aid program 
looked to the revival of world production and trade and the intelli­
gent and balanced use of world resources. This was . essential
to our own continued well-being and security . . . ." A large foreign 
aid program would intensify certain shortages resulting from current 
high levels of consumption. The most immediate problems of supply 
and consequent economic repercussions would be presented in regard 
to wheat, steel, coal, nitrogen fertilizers, and certain items of 
industrial equipment. However, "sound administration" of the foreign 
aid program would reduce most of these supply impacts. It would also 
be essential to organize foreign aid purchase procedures so as to create 
a minimum impact on the domestic economy and assure proper channeling 
of commodities in short supply to their most effective uses in achieving
^̂ U- S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on 
Interim Aid to Europe, 80th Cong., 1st Sees., 19̂ 7, pp. 178-179» Cited 
hereafter as Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Interim 
Aid to Europe.
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European reconstruction. It would be necessary to make cooperative 
arrangements with countries receiving assistance in order to insure 
that foreign aid purchases did not compete with one another and thus 
aggravate the domestic economy. Finally, cooperation between govern­
ment and industry would be necessary in order to break domestic pro­
duction and supply bottlenecks and to assure proper channeling of
57exports.
The report of the Council of Economic Advisers was centered 
upon the effect of exports, financed in part with Government funds, 
on domestic production, consumption, and prices. It pointed out that 
past aid programs had not prevented Americans from enjoying a living 
standard much higher than any pre-war level, because of the vast in­
crease in productive capacity during and since the war. Although past 
aid programs had contributed to inflationary pressures on prices, the 
C. E. A. asserted that the current inflation had been caused primarily 
by domestic factors. Unless some kind of foreign aid program were 
continued, the United States could look to a "rapid reduction in ex­
ports" which would cause substantial readjustment problems although 
probably no "serious short-run damage" to the economy. However, we 
could expect industrial paralysis in some countries and " . . .  reper­
cussions of major proportions upon our own economy and upon world sta­
bility." Using aid figures cited in the CEEC report, the C. E. A. es­
timated that the export surplus of the United States actually would not 
be as large under the proposed Marshall Plan as it had been, especially
57lbid., pp. I79-I8O; U. S. Senate, The European Recovery Program:
Basic Documents and Background Information, pp. 89-90»
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during the second quarter of 19̂ 7* Thus it was logical to conclude 
that the burden of the proposed recovery program could be assumed "be­
cause a larger impact has already been sustained . . . ." If this 
optimistic picture were not to be overturned, however, problems raised 
by specific commodities in short supply would have to be dealt with 
effectively. These items were food, steel, industrial and agricultural 
machinery, coal, and fertilizers. Regarding the financing of the pro­
posed new foreign aid program, the C. E. A. recommended that it be 
financed as had past aid programs, i.e., through taxation rather than 
through increasing the national debt. The C. E. A. saw no need for 
any new taxes either to finance the program or to reduce inflationary 
pressures, since the program's impact would be less than that of re­
cent programs. The long-range implications of the contemplated foreign 
aid program were viewed as being extremely beneficial to the domestic 
economy. To prevent serious inflationary consequences to the domestic 
economy resulting from possible mismanagement of the administration of 
foreign aid, the C. E. A. recommended, in regard to the specific com­
modities in relatively short supply, the use of export controls, al­
locations for domestic use, discouragement of misuse or excessive use, 
efficient transportation and distribution, and the curbing of speculation 
and hoarding of goods. To combat the threat of inflation, the Council 
recommended the continuance of taxes at present rates, stimulation of
CÛ
saving, and control of "dangerous" expansions of credit.
The recommendations of the Harriman Committee perhaps were most
S. Senate, The European Recovery Program; Basic Documents
and Background Information, pp. 97“T01>
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significant to the ultimate success of the proposed Marshall Plan, 
coming as they did from a membership reflecting leaders in several 
aspects of the national life. Both the Krug and Nourse reports re;- 
flected the conclusions of public servants. While it was true that 
much of the data supplied the Harriman Committee came from govern­
mental sources, the Committee's conclusions concerning whether or not 
the United States "could safely and wisely extend aid to western
59Europe" were its own. The committee emphasized that Europe's sal­
vation "lies very much in its own hands . . . ." United States aid 
could only serve as a "spark" to start the European "engine". While 
the United States had much at stake in European recovery, it should be 
recognized that this country is no "limitless cornucopia". Substantial 
burdens would be placed on American citizens by the aid program and the 
shipment of scarce goods abroad would add to inflationary pressures.
The committee advised that American aid should be conditioned upon 
the participating countries' taking "all practicable steps to achieve
^ Ĥarriman, in 1952, stated that disagreements in the com­
mittee, while not too serious, largely concerned what the American 
economy could afford. Price, p. 42. Price states that there were 
"vigorous" debates on a number of issues. At the beginning there 
was disagreement as to whether the Marshall program should be es» 
sentially a charity program or a cooperative effort to effect eco­
nomic recovery. Ibid. One observer wrote that the committee's de­
liberations were an "almost comic rebuttal" of the Soviet-Communist 
criticisms of the Marshall Plan, pointing out that the "chief support" 
for the program came from Harriman and the non-business members, The 
business members were fearful, according to this source, that the con­
templated program would create serious dangers to the American economy. 
They were adamant on the point that the United States could not meet 
European requests for crude steel or scrap without endangering domestic 
production. Ward, p. 171. Paul G. Hoffman, a member of the committee 
and first Administrator of the European recovery program, gave a large 
share of the credit for the committee's report to Richard M. Bissell, 
Jr., its Executive Secretary. Interview with Price, January 28, 1953, 
cited in Price, p, 46.
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the production and monetary goals" set out in the CEEC report. The 
methods or forms of economic organization used to achieve these goals 
should he of no concern to the United States, " . . .  so long as they 
are consistent with basic democratic principles . . . ." The CEEC 
report was praised for recognizing " . . .  that European production 
can expand only as currencies and exchange rates are stabilized, as 
budgets are balanced, and as trade barriers are reduced . . . . " The 
committee was critical of the CEEC report in that it believed that 
European plans for expansion of capital equipment, if carried through, 
would increase inflationary pressures. The size of a "prudent" aid 
program would be determined, ultimately, by the availability of com­
modities within the United States. Many European requirements could 
not be met in full, e.g., steel and steel-making materials, coal 
(transportation difficulties), petroleum, farm and mining machinery, 
and heavy electrical equipment. The committee estimated that the 
proposed aid program would cost the United States Government approxi­
mately $5*75 billion in 19^  and between $12 billion and $17 billion 
overall. It revised downward the CEEC import figures because of the 
unavailability of goods. Likewise, export figures were revised down­
ward. Thus, its figure for the overall cost of the program was ap­
proximately $5 billion lower than that of the CEEC. The committee 
emphasized that aid should be extended on a yearly basis and " . . .  
must be subject to constant, vigilant review of the Congress." The 
committee recommended that the aid program be financed through taxation, 
not by borrowing. Means to insure the availability of goods in short 
supply would have to be developed, although voluntary methods should
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be used wherever possible. To insure "unity of administration" of the 
program, the committee recommended the creation of an independent agency, 
its head to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
The head of this agency would be the chairman of a.board of directors, 
composed of the Secretary of State and persons representing other de­
partments concerned with the program. The board should be empowered only 
to establish and adjust general policies within lines set by Congress, 
whereas operating decisions should be made by the head of the agency, 
who should be required to cooperate with the Secretary of State. The 
committee suggested that Congress create a special joint committee to 
maintain the "closest possible relations"with the proposed agency. To 
deal with the continuing committee of the participating countries and 
to coordinate the activities of representatives of the agency in individ­
ual countries, it was recommended that a "chief representative" of the 
agency be provided for Europe. Representatives of the agency in individ­
ual countries would be responsible to the head of the agency but they 
should keep the United States ambassadors to those countries informed 
of their communications. To insure that there would be only one dip­
lomatic representative in these countries, only the Ambassador would 
be authorized to take up "important matters" with governments.^^
Congressional Reaction
Congressional hearings and debates on the Truman Doctrine had 
focused the thinking of most members on the subject of foreign aid. The 
deteriorating situation in Europe became a topic of wide discussion in
*̂̂European Recovery and American Aid, pp. 3-iS.
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the news media even before enactment of the Greek-Turklsh aid program.
The relationship of the United States to the developing crisis naturally- 
found its way into the deliberations on this program, for the Truman 
Doctrine was sufficiently ambiguous to make its provisions applicable 
apparently to all of Europe (or to the world). Activities within the 
Government concerning European reconstruction went unobserved by neither 
the news media nor by Congress, These activities were welcomed by some, 
but brought visions of tragedy to others.
While the Greek-Turkish aid bill was under consideration, a 
resolution was introduced in the House to create a Select Committee on 
Foreign Aid for the purpose of studying in depth the actual and long- 
range requirements of foreign countries for outside economic assistance; 
the resources available to meet these requirements, in the United States 
and elsewhere; the agencies which are or might be available to assist 
in meeting these needs; the controls required to maintain prices of 
commodities in short supply at reasonable levels; and measures which 
might assist in correlating any United States assistance without weaken­
ing its domestic economy.A subcommittee of the House Foreign Af­
fairs Committee issued a report in June in which it predicted an emer-
62gency in Europe. On July 22, the House adopted H. Res. 296, introduced
^̂ H. Res. 173. Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 3, 309O-
^^Holbert N. Carroll, The House of Representatives and Foreign 
Affairs (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 19$8), p. llëT^
In 19̂ 5, the House Special Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and 
Planning (Colmer Committee), although concentrating on the domestic econ­
omy, emphasized the importance of German recovery to general European 
economic recovery and predicted that the U. S. would have "to act more 
positively to encourage that recovery . . . ." Ibid., p. 212.
l8l
by Representative Christian A. Herter (R., Mass.), authorizing the 
creation of a Select Committee on Foreign Aid to make a broad stud}'' 
of the problems of European reconstruction.^^ On July 29, a nineteen- 
member committee was appointed. Its members were selected from the 
major standing committees of the House which would be concerned with 
various aspects of the foreign aid problem. Representative Eaton, 
chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, was named the Select Com­
mittee's chairman, although Representative Herter, vice chairman and 
"executive director", was its driving force. Ultimately, the com­
mittee became known as the Herter Committee. Professor W. Y. Elliott, 
of Harvard University and the Legislative Reference Service of the 
Library of Congress, headed an impressive staff of some fifty persons.
Earlier, Professor Elliott had been selected as director of the pro-
gkfessional staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
The Herter Committee was divided into subcommittees on Great 
Britain; Austria and Germany; France, Belgium, Holland, and Luxem­
bourg; Italy, Greece, and Trieste; and a subcommittee on Agriculture 
(covering most of Europe). The committee left for Europe on August 
28 and returned on October 10. Summaries of the data accumulated and 
principles to form the basis of a report began appearing in the press
^^Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 15, DU17*
^^House Select Committee on Foreign Aid, Final Report on Foreign 
Aid) pp. II, I-3. Republicans on the committee included: Thomas A.
Jenkins, Ohio; Charles A. Wolverton, N. J.; August H. Andresen, Minn.; 
Francis Case, S. D.; John 0. Kunkel, Pa.; John M. Vorys, Ohio; Charles 
V. Vursell, 111.; W. Kingsland Macy, N. Y.; Richard M. Nixon, Calif. 
Democrats were: E. E. Cox, Ga.; James P. Richards, 8. C.; Francis E. 
Walter, Pa.; Harold D. Cooley, N. C.; George H. Mahon, Tex.; Overton 
Brooks, La.; Eugene J. Keogh, N. Y.; A. S. Mike Monroney, Okla.
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on November 7 . Although its final report was not issued until May, 
19 8̂ , the committee issued preliminary reports from time to time. 
Reports one through eight had been issued by November 22--in time to 
be of assistance to Congress in considering emergency interim aid 
for Italy, France, and Austria.
Meanwhile, conditions in Europe were being viewed firsthand 
by other members of Congress. In addition to the Herter Committee, 
subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman John 
Taber and a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, the 
Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, and various 
other groups visited Europe during the summer and fall of 19^7*^^
The Herter Committee assembled an impressive and comprehensive 
collection of data on the economic and political situation in Europe.
Its reports and recommendations were credited with being an important 
factor in eventual acceptance of the massive European reconstruction 
program.Its staff was quite active also in promoting cooperation 
among some of the agencies participating in the various aspects of 
planning for the recovery program. Meetings were held with the staffs 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Krug, Nourse, and 
Harriman Committees. For several months, these groups held weekly 
luncheon-conferences, where information was exchanged and each was kept
^^Ibid., pp. 1-3.
S. Senate, The European Recovery Program: Basic Documents
and Background Information, p. 9; Congressional Quarterly, Vol. Ill, No. 
3 (July-Sept., 19̂ 7)> xvii-xviii.
^^Paul G. Hoffman, in an interview with Harry Bayard Price, 
cited in Price, p. 55*
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apprised of the progress of the others.During the early stages of 
the planning of the recovery program, there was also at times col­
laboration between the staffs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
under the direction of Dr. Francis 0. Wilcox, and the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee.  ̂ The initiative taken by the staff of the Herter 
Committee created some resentment, both in the Executive branch and 
in the House. The Foreign Affairs Committee, envious of the publicity 
received by the Select Committee, reportedly paid little attention to 
the latter's studies. A foreign aid bill introduced by Representative 
Herter also reportedly was ignored by Chairman Eaton and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee. Critics of the Herter Committee felt that its 
staff was over-zealous, i.e., it performed like a "rival bureaucracy" 
rather than as a "skeptical collaborator" in working out a foreign aid 
program. Some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee felt that the
loyalty of that committee's staff had been compromised through its
70serving the Herter Committee.
^^Kofmehl, pp. 155-156.
°9carroll, pp. 101-102.
'̂‘̂rpid., pp. 106, 217-218. The House Republican leadership had 
felt that the Foreign Affairs Committee was inadequate to perform the 
role of the House in a broad study of the foreign aid problem. Ibid,, 
p. 215* This was bound to create resentment, and did. Also, in creat­
ing the Select Committee, the House Republican leaders may have been 
expressing a desire on the part of the House to assert its equality with 
the Senate and the Executive in making foreign policy. Since the Con­
stitution requires that revenue measures be Initiated in the House, 
and since this has been interpreted to include appropriation measures 
as well, the use of foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy presented 
the House with a golden opportunity to enhance its prestige. The rel­
ative inferiority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in relation to 
other House committees, as opposed to the exalted status of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee in relation to the other Senate commit­
tees, usually meant extra effort for the Administration in securing
Although it made no recommendation as to the amount of aid 
required, the Herter Committee agreed that the situation in Europe was 
more than a temporary emergency. A long-range program of assistance, 
based upon American support, would be necessary to solve Europe's prob­
lem. . The Herter group recommended that a corporate authority be 
created to administer any new foreign aid program. Congress would 
maintain control through a regular review of the authority's funds and 
operations. The authority would have a bipartisan board of directors 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Its programs 
and policies would be coordinated through a Foreign Aid Council pre­
sided over by the Secretary of State and including top officials of 
Government agencies concerned with foreign aid matters. The proposed 
authority would be capitalized in an amount to be determined after a 
more careful study of commodities in short supply in the United States 
and the world. As contemplated by the Herter Committee, the authority 
would be concerned only with requests for assistance in the form of 
foodstuffs, fuel, and fertilizers. Remaining "genuine requirements for 
foreign aid in capital goods, equipment, and raw materials ..." could 
be met through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
House approval of foreign policies requiring Congressional consent. Ordi­
narily, the position of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee became the 
position of the entire Senate. This could not be said of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee. It seldom spoke with the unanimity of its Senate 
counterpart and it constantly was confronted with the possibility of 
repudiation by a parent body traditionally much more parochial and di­
visive than the urbane Senate. Ibid., pp. 8 , 33-37; 40-48, 91-93; 143- 
147, 255-256, 267, 284-285, 289, 325; 328-329; Malcolm E. Jewell, 
Senatorial Politics and Foreign Policy (Lexington: University of Ken- 
tucky Press, 1962), pp. 110, 128, 134ll35; 137; David N. Farnsworth,
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press', 1961), pp. 7-8, 158.
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and the Export-Import Bank. It was recommended that the latter he given
71additional resources to carry out these functions.'
The Public Response 
' Even before Secretary Marshall's Harvard address, the news 
media had been giving the deteriorating European situation wide-spread 
dissemination. Speculation was rife as to the next move by the United 
States Government. Pronouncement of the Truman Dbctrine and approval 
of Greek-Turkish aid had contributed to an atmosphere conducive to the 
acceptance of a larger aid program, although this was by no means a 
certainty. Beginning with Under Secretary Acheson's Cleveland, Missis­
sippi address on May 8, Administration spokesmen, in selected forums 
throughout the nation, increasingly reiterated the theme of America's 
responsibility for helping to create--and its stake in the maintenance 
of— stable world economic conditions.
71U. S. Senate, The European Recovery Program: Basic Documents
and Background Information, pp. 132-135*
72President Truman spoke frequently, as did Secretary Marshall. 
Other State Department officials utilised in this public relations cam­
paign included Under Secretaries Acheson, Clayton, and Lovett; George 
C. McGhee, Benjamin V. Cohen, Willard L. Thorp, William Benton, Charles
E. Saltzman, Norman Azmour, John A. Loftus, Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen, 
Norman Burns, Winthrop G. Brown, George V. Allen, and Ernest A. Gross.
See Dept, of State, Bullet in. Vol. XVI, No. J|15 (l947),1159-ll60; Ibid., 
Vol. XVI, No. 4l6 (1947), 1193-1197, 1221-1224, 1230-1240; Ibid.. Vol.
XVI, No. 417 (1947), 1294-1297; Ibid., Vol. XVII, No. 4l9 (I^), 80-84; 
Ibid. . Vol. XVII, No. 421 (1947)1334-185; Ibid., Vol. XVII, No. 428 (1947), 
1^ 501, 522-526; Ibid., Vol XVII, No. 429T Ï 9 47),595-599; Ibid., Vol.
XVII, No. 434 (i947TT826-828; Ibid., Vol. XVII, No. 435 (19W), 856-866; 
Ibid. , Vol XVII, No. 436 (1947), 903-908; Ibid., Vol XVII, No. 439 (19̂ 7), 
10^ - 1028; Ibid., Vol. XVII, No. 44l (1947TTÏ186-1187; Ibid., Vol. XVIII, 
No. 446 (19W7 78-82; Ibid. , Vol. X'.̂ III, No. 447 (1948), 108-III; Ibid., 
Vol. XVIII, No. 451 (19W7 231-232; pid. , Vol. XVIII, No. 452 (191577 
278; Ibid., Vol. XVIII, No. 454 (1948), 349; Ibid., Vol. XVIII, No. 455 
(194877^74-375; Ibid. , Vol. XVIII, No. 456 (I^), 401; Ipid. . Vol. XVIII, 
No. 458 (1948), 476-478; To id., Vol. XVIII, No. 46l (1948773^4-567, 585*
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By mid-July; an American Institute of Public Opinion poll in­
dicated that only percent of the respondents had heard of the Mar­
shall Plan for aiding Europe. A majority of this group (57'̂ ) approved, 
however, even when told the plan might cost the United States around 
$5 billion per year. They were not willing to assume new tax burdens 
for this purpose, however. An overwhelming 82 percent thought the plan 
should not be stopped because of Russia's refusal to c o o p e r a t e . A  
Roper poll, also in July, 19^7; indicated that 65.5 percent of the 
respondents considered Soviet Russia as an "aggressive" nation. By 
November, 19''-7, 6l percent of the respondents in an AIPO poll had heard 
of the î'iarshall Plan. Of those who had heard of it, k'J percent approved, 
only 15 percent disapproved, while 38 percent had no o p i n i o n . These 
polls indicated to the Administration that an important segment of the 
public had yet to be convinced of the necessity or desirability of the 
United States lending massive assistance to European reconstruction.
To mobilize public support, late in 19^7  ̂citizen's "Commit­
tee for. the Marshall Plan" was c^rganized. Serving as National Chairman 
was fox'tner Secretary of State and war Heni-y L. Stimson. Chairman of its 
Executive Committee w s  former Secretu.ry of War Robert, P. Patterson, 
while Mrs. Wendell L. Wlllkie headed a Wofùcn's Division. John H. Fergu­
son was made Executive Director. Included on the Executive Committee 
were former Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Winthrop W. Aldrich,
^̂ The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. II, No. 3 (Fall, 19^7), ^95* 
Armstrong, p. A3.
7^The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. II, No. A (Winter, I9A7),
675.
i8t
Frank Altschul, James B. Carey, David Dubinsky, Allen W, Dulles, Her­
bert H. Lehman, Clark M. Eichelberger, William Emerson, Herbert Feis, 
Alger Hiss, Philip Reed, Frederick C. McKee, Arthur W. Page, Herbert 
Bayard Swope, and Mrs. Willkie. Over 3OO prominent citizens were in­
cluded in its National Council. Regional committees were organized 
throughout the country. The cooperation of national organizations was 
enlisted and wide currency given to appropriate publications. Other 
techniques utilized by the committee included the promotion of news 
and editorial coverage in metropolitan papers; a special mat service 
for small papers; creation of a speakers' bureau; engagement of a news 
agency to disseminate press releases; and national and local radio broad­
casts. Appeals for funds through newspaper advertisements brought con­
tributions from practically every state in the nation. The committee and 
its principal staff members registered under the Regulation of Lobby­
ing Act. Nearly every member of Congress was the recipient of petitions 
circulated throughout Congressional districts and forwarded to Washing­
ton. Harold Stein, a political scientist, was in charge of the Wash­
ington office. A close contact was maintained with Executive depart­
ments and Congressional committees. This office also prepared materials 
for the use of witnesses before Congressional committees, issued analyses 
of the various legislative proposals, and directed special efforts against 
the inclusion of hai-mful restrictions and amendments in the European re­
covery bill.^^
S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on 
United States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, 80th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 19W, Part 2, pp. jkj-'jjj. Cited hereafter as Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United States Assistance to European 
Economic Recovery.
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By the time Congress had reconvened in special session in Novem­
ber, to consider interim aid for certain European countries, support for 
the Marshall Plan had been announced by the following organizations: 
American Legion, AMVETS, American Veterans Committee, Jewish War Veterans, 
American Farm Bureau Federation, National Grange, National Council of 
Farmer Cooperatives, American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, International Association of Machinists, International 
Ladies GarmentWorkers Union, Council for Social Action of the Congre­
gational Church, Friends Committee on National Legislation, Federal 
Council of Churches of Christ, Catholic Association for International 
Peace, Americans for Democratic Action, League of Women Voters, Women's 
Action Committee for Lasting Peace, YWCA, National Council of Jewish 
Women, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Business and Professional 
Women's Clubs, American Association of University Women, and the Na? 
tional Planning Association. Organizations which had announced their 
opposition to European aid included: Progressive Citizens of America,
American Tariff League, Communist Party, and the Methodist Federation
77for Social Action.
The situation in Europe, meanwhile, becoming even more 
critical, especially in Italy, France, and Austria. The attendant 
publicity gave further credence to the importunings of Administration 
spokesmen. Lending weight to their dire predictions were the voices of 
many Congressmen who had viewed the European scene in person. On Sep­
tember 2 5, President Truman proclaimed a national campaign against the
^^Congressional Quarterly, Vol. Ill, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 19^7);
636.
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•waste of food products affecting grain supplies. A Citizens' Food Com­
mittee, under the chairaianship of Charles Luckman, -was appointed to 
direct a campaign of public participation. The President declared that 
resolution of the current economic emergency in Europe could not a'wait 
the detailed studies being undertaken in relation to the long-range 
Marshall Plan. Again, seeking to build support for the aid program, 
the President, on October 27, invited one hundred leaders of industry, 
labor, agriculture, and the general public to confer with him at the
78White House.
Secretary of Commerce Harriman, Secretary of State Marshall,
and the President issued warnings of the prospects of widespread
starvation in Europe during the coming winter unless immediate aid were
79forthcoming from the United States. In order to alleviate immediate
distress in Europe, certain steps were taken by the Administration 
earlier in the summer of 19̂ 7* On August l4, the United States canceled 
•war claims against Italy in the amount of $1 billion; released $60 
million in war assets; returned to Italy twenty-eight ships seized dur­
ing the war; redeemed several millions of dollars in script issued to 
Italien prisoners of war; reduced American claims against Italy to $5 
million; and agreed to sign a friendship pact with Italy later in the 
year. At a conference in London, the United States, Britain, and France 
agreed to restore Cezman production to the 193^ levels. Plans were
78CEEC: General Report, pp. 8, 10; U. S. Senate, The European
Recovery Program: Basic Documents and Background Information, p. 9»
^̂ Dept. of State, Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 3̂1 (19̂ 7), 688-689; 
Ibid., Vol. XVII, No. k-32 , 736-739-
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announced on September 12 for studies to begin on the formation of a 
European customs union, to include the nations of Eastern as veil as
80Western Europe.
Interim Aid
It had become apparent by September that France, Italy, and 
Austria would need even further assistance to survive the winter of 
19^7-19^ without widespread suffering and starvation. Austria, for 
months,had survived solely through foreign relief. These funds would 
be exhausted shortly after January 1, 1948. France had dollar resources 
sufficient to allow the procurement of food and fuel from abroad only 
to the end of December. At the end of August, France had restricted 
practically all imports except food and fuel. In Italy, funds were 
available for the procurement of food and coa.l only to the end of
November. In June, Italy had been forced to eliminate the overseas
purchase of most of the raw materials needed for the operation of its 
economy. Food and coal requirements had been met through the American 
foreign relief program, but these funds would be exhausted by December
An effort was made to discover if the crisis could be met
through funds already appropriated to the Administration. It was con­
sidered undesirable to call Congress into special session at the time, 
since upon convening in the next regular session it would be confronted
S. Senate, The European Recovery Pi'ogram: Basic Documents
and Background Information, pp. "J-è,
0-1 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Interim 
Aid for Europe, p. 8.
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with the Administration's long-range European Recovery Program. The 
President was advised that at least '$580 million were necessary for 
emergency aid to Italy, France, and Austria. When it became obvious 
that this amount was not available, the President and Secretary Marshall 
met with Congressional leaders on September 29 and asked that the Ap­
propriations Committees and Foreign Relations Committees of both Houses 
meet at the earliest date to consider the European food crisis. Con­
gressional figures attending the meeting included Senators Bridges, 
Connally, Lucas, Vandenberg, and White; Representatives Arends, Bloom, 
Eaton, Halleck, Rayburn, and Wolcott. Truman emphasized that it would be 
futile to consider a long-range European Recovery Program if France, 
Italy, and Austria were unable to survive the winter. In addition, he 
pointed out, it would be useless to call a special session cf Congress 
unless the crucial Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees ap­
proved interim aid. On September 30, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee announced a joint 
session on November 10 to begin hearings on the interim aid program.
The Senate Appropriations Committee scheduled hearings to begin on
82November 18.
State Department officials, during September and October, had 
kept trie urgency of the Eurcpean situation constantly before the Presi­
dent. At the same time, departmental officials were meeting in the 
evenings with membei'S of Congress. These meetings, arranged by Con-
8?Truman, II, 117: Dept, of State, Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No.
431 (19^7 ), 688-689; Ibid., Vol. XVII, No! k32 (19^7), 735-736; U. S. 
Senate, The European Recovery Program: Basic Documents and Background 
Information, p. 9»
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gressional staff members, did much to bring about a meeting of minds on 
the urgent nature of the European situation. Secretary Marshall met 
frequently with Senator Vandenberg during the summer and the Foreign 
Relations Committee received regular briefings from State Department 
officials. Although agreeing that emergency aid was a necessity if the 
long-range aid program were to have any possibility of success, V'anden- 
berg left to the President the responsibility for calling Congress 
into special session.
The President met again with Congressional leaders on October 
23 at the White House. Afterward, he issued a proclamation calling 
the Congress into special session on November 17* In a public state­
ment is,sued simultaneously, the President announced as his reasons for 
calling the special session " . . .  the alarming and continuing increase 
in prices in this country and the situation regarding the need for 
emergency foreign aid . . . .' He announced, in addition, that this 
expedient would enable Congress to " . . .  speed up its consideration 
of the part to be played by the United States in the long-range European 
recovery prograia. " On tiie next evening, the President addressed the 
nation on all major networks as to the necessity for convening Congress
. 84in special session.
Addressing the joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Commit'tce and the Houc.e Foreign Affe, 1rs Committee on November 10, Secre­
tary Marshall asked for enactment of legislation authorising the ap­
propriation of $397 million in interim foreign aid. Of this amount 
®3cheever and Haviland, pp. 110-111; Price, p.I50.
® '̂Dept. of State, Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 435 (l9^7)> 852-855 =
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Austria would receive $42 million, France $328 million, and Italy $227 
million. These funds would suffice until March 31, 1948, "before which 
time we hope that some decision may have been taken by the Congress re­
garding a broad recovery program . . . ." The Secretary emphasized that 
this was " . . .  not a recovery program. It is designed to help provide 
the essentials of existence to the people of these three countries."
Congress required a month to pass a stop-gap interim aid measure
providing for a grant of $522 million to France, Italy, and Austria. The
total interim aid figure was increased to $577 million with the additional
appropriation on March 31, 1948 of $55 million. Although the interim
aid bill passed with relative ease, conflict was indicated for the long-
86range recovery program.
The interim aid bill (S. 1774), sponsored jointly by Senators 
Vandenberg and Connally and reported unanimously by the Foreign Relations 
Committee on November 19, authorized the full $597 million requested by 
the Administration. The committee report emphasized that support for 
the interim measure carried no obligation to support any long-range aid
®^Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Interim 
Aid for Europe, pp. 8-9«
86Senators Vandenberg and Hickenlooper had acquired information 
in mid- 1947 that an agreement existed between the U. S. and Great 
Britain which provided that the U. S. could not use the atomic bomb 
against any country without British consent. Later agreements, provid­
ing for sharing of information and cooperation in atomic development, 
were revealed on November 16 by Secretary Forrestal and Under Secre­
tary Lovett. Both senators warned that unless the agreements were re­
vised, the Administration could not expect approval of the Marshall Plan. 
Accordingly, in January, 1948, the agreements were revised. Final deci­
sion for use of the bomb wa,s placed in the hands of the U. S. President, 
the U. S. was assured of more adequate ore supplies from the Belgian 
Congo, and the area in which information could be exchanged was clari­
fied. Vandenberg, p. 3̂ 1•
19^
87 ' -program. Senate debate on the measure lasted from November 2h until
December 1. Senator Vandenberg led the forces in support of the mea­
sure. Although approval seemed apparent, there was some vigorous dis­
sent. Senator Taft said the situation creating the necessity for aid had 
been caused by the Administration’s past policies of appeasing the
Russians in Europe and by the Europeans themselves, who had adopted "the
88principles of socialism". Taft :%s joined in this line of dissent by 
others, including Senators Knowland (R., Calif.) and McClellan (D., Ark.), 
who charged the Administration with inconsistency in its policies vis-a- 
vis the Soviet Union. Senator Brooks (R., 111.) criticized the "short­
sighted" decision to "annihilate" Germany during the war. Senator
Malone (R., Nev.) attributed the European crisis to the "Socialist-
8qinclined governments" of Europe.
Although the aid bill passed by an overwhelming majority of 83 
to 6, this vote did not mean that the Marshall Plan legislation, when 
introduced, would emerge unscathed. Many senators announced their 
reluctant support of the interim measure and made explicit that this 
did not mean their endorsement of the î-îarshall program. An amendment 
offered by Senator Ball (R., Minn.), which was adopted by voice vote, 
struck out language in the bill referring to a "general European
S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, European Interim 
Aid Act of 19̂ 7; 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 19̂ 7; Report No. 771 to accompany 
S. 177 ;̂ pp. I-16, in Senate Miscellaneous Reports,IV (Washington: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1947). Cited hereafter as Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, European Interim Aid Act of 19^7.
88( 
ĜIbid.
Congressional Quarterly, Vol. Ill, No. 4 (Oct.-Dec., 1947),
610.
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90economic recovery program". Objections heard in the Senate centered 
primarily on the amount of appropriations authorized; the mechanics of 
the revolving funds of local currencies to be established with the pro­
ceeds of the sale of goods furnished under the bill, arrangements for 
publicizing the aid program in the recipient countries, and the relation­
ship of the aid program to the United Nations. Amendments were offered 
to accomplish the purposes of the objectors, but were defeated. Senators 
Taylor (D,, Idaho) and Pepper (D., Fla.) again raised the issue of "by­
passing" the United Nations, as they had done in connection with Greek- 
91Turkish aid. Other objections were raised concerning whether the
aid should be a loan rather than a gift; distribution of the relief
supplies; shipping (the bill contained no provision requiring a specific
amount of the supplies be shipped in American bottoms); administration
(should not be entrusted to the State Department); and the "neglect" of
92LatinTAmerica and Asia in the foreign aid program,
On December 2, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reported 
H. R. 46ok, which was similar to S. 177^ except that it included a pro­
vision for aid to China and provided for an appropriation of only $590 
93million. House debate began on December ij- and continued through six 
legislative days. There was more opposition to the aid bill in general
^^Ibid., p. 6ll; The six senators voting against the bill were: 
Langer (R., N. D,), McKellar (D., Tenn.), Moore (R., Okla), O'Daniel (D., 
Tex.), Robertson (R., Wyo,), and Taylor (D., Idaho), Ibid,, p, 6l4.
^^Ibid., pp. 612-613,
^^Ibid., pp. 613-614.
^ ^ r o id . . p. 616.
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in the House and its supporters stressed the "anti-Communist" aspects 
of the program more than did aid supporters in the Senate, Forty-seven 
substantive amendments were offered to the bill in the House, whereas 
only twenty were offered in the Senate. Opponents argued that the bi­
partisan foreign policy of the "internationalists" would "lower our 
standard of living" and "destroy our individual freedom.Others 
objected that foreign aid would bankrupt the united States; that ap­
proval of the interim bill was tantamount to approval of the Marshall 
Plan; that the aid might eventually be used against the United States; 
that previous aid had not accomplished its purpose; that we were pay­
ing "blackmail" to European countries against their "threats" to go 
95Communist. It also was argued that the Europeans could solve their
96problems by returning to free enterprise economies.^ Amendments were 
offered to include protections in the bill against procuring goods in 
short supply in the United States (rejected), to lower the amount of 
aid recommended by the Foreign Affairs Committee (rejected), and to 
put several conditions on the export of wheat (adopted),^7 The House 
bill was passed by voice vote. House and Senate conferees quickly 
compromised the differences between the two Houses and the conference 
report was accepted in both Houses on December 15 with little debate. 
The conferees had restored the amount of funds authorized to be ap-
^^Ibid.. p. 617.
^^Representatives Allen (R., 111,), Mason (R., 111.), and 
McGregor (R., Ohio), Ibid,, pp. 617-618.
^^Representative Coudert (R., N. Y.), Ibid,, p. 619.
^7ibid., pp. 619-623.
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propriated to the $597 million requested by the Administration. Senate
adoption •'.•re.s by voice vote, while in the House the report was adopted
on a roll call vote of 313-82. Voting against the report were seventy
Republicans, eleven Democrats, and one member of the American Labor 
98Party,
Generally, the comment from Washington lobbyists and the press
was favorable toward the interim aid bill. However, these quarters
were displaying more concern for the long-range European Recovery Pro- 
99gram.
The stage now was set for introduction of the legislation to 
implement the proposal announced by Secretary Marshall in June. Since 
that date, scores of persons in the Executive branch had labored at a 
fever pitch to develop plans which would meet the requirements of the 
European crisis and simultaneously be acceptable to the Congress and 
the people. There was cooperation from Congress in this endeavor and, 
at the same time, Congress sought to gain insight into the European 
situation by its own devices. Europe had responded quickly to the 
American proposal and, generally, in the cooperative manner which had 
been a condition of American aid. The refusal of Soviet Russia and its 
satellites to join in the concerted effort to rehabilitate all of 
Europe with American assistance was a disappointment to many. It meant 
not only that the problem of European reconstruction would be more dif­
ficult to resolve but also that the disparity of interests between the
^̂ Ibid., pp. 628-629. Congress was not quite as generous, however; 
in regard to the funds actually appropriated. See page 193,supra.
^^Ibid., pp. 629-630.
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United States and the Soviet Union had become greater than ever. It 
became increasingly apparent that this disparity ŵ s vorldwide in 
scope and effect. The influence of the threatening deterioration of 
relations between the world's two super-powers would weigh heavily 
in determining the legislative success or failure of the Marshall Plan.
The problem of foreign aid had been highlighted in the ,eyes 
of the nation for nine months. Instead of improving through generous 
infusions of American aid, economic and political conditions in Europe 
were a source of despondency. In order not to lose the momemtum and 
effect gained through the calling of Congress into special session, 
the Administration, on the last day of that session, unveiled its new 
approach to the reconstruction of Europe through self-help, mutual co­
operation, and more generous American assistance.
CHAPTER V
THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM IN CONGRESS
The Setting and the Forces
On December 19, 19^1, the last day of the special session, 
President Truman forwarded to the Congress his message on the Euro­
pean Recovery Program.^ Simultaneously, the State Department sub­
mitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee draft legislation and
obackground materials for its use in considering the recovery program. 
The House Foreign Affairs Committee had commenced hearings on foreign 
aid legislation on December 1?.
Thus, the climactic stage had been reached in the planning for 
a positive postwar United States foreign policy and for a possible 
solution to the impasse in the development of a peaceful and prosperous 
postwar world. The plans had been formulated. Now, under the rules 
of the American system of government, Congress was to have its day.
The weeks and months ahead were to be filled with frustrations for 
the planners of the Executive branch as the Congress--with due de- 
liberateness--exercised its function of law-making. For the President
^Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 9, 117̂ 9-11753•
2U. S., Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Outline of Euro­
pean Recovery Program: Draft Legislation and Background Information,
80th Cong., 1st Sees., 19̂ 7• Cited hereafter as Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, Outline of European Recovery Program.
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may propose, but it is the unquestioned prerogative of the Congress
to dispose. The Truman Administration was pressing for completion
of Congressional action on the recovery program by April 1 in order
to maintain the flow of supplies generated under the interim aid
legislation, which was scheduled to expire by that date. If the aid
"pipelines" were not kept open, the prospects for European recovery
would be even further diminished. Disastrous consequences were 
3predicted.
The fate of the Marshall Plan, therefore, was now at the 
disposal of the Republican-dominated Eightieth Congress. With few 
exceptions, that Congress was led by men who not only had been con­
stantly at swords' points with the Truman Administration but also were 
possessed of deep-seated isolationist attitudes. Their voting habits 
comported with their attitudes. In addition, these men were for the 
most part economic conservatives and took great pride in their ef­
forts to develop an "economy program" for the Federal Government. 
Despite the urgency attached by the Administration to its speedy en­
actment, a foreign aid program calculated conservatively to entail 
$17 billion in United States expenditures over a four-year period could 
be expected to encounter serious obstacles in such an environment. Not
^Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 9, 11751.
4In an analysis of Congressional voting behavior on questions 
of foreign aid, loans and grants, during the 1933-19^3 period, Robert A. 
Dahl found that in the House 89 percent of the Democrats favored such 
legislation whereas only $6 percent of the Republicans did so. In the 
Senate, 83 percent of the Democrats favored such legislation while only 
55 percent of the Republicans reacted favorably, Dahl, p. I89.
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to be dismissed from consideration during this critical period ms the 
forthcoming Presidential campaign. Certain important contenders were 
directly involved, including President Truman and Senators Taft and 
Vandenberg. The recovery program could well have been lost amidst the 
intricate involvements of a Presidential campaign. Not only did Presi­
dent Truman have less them, firm control of his party in Congress at 
this time, there also was serious doubt that he would be renominated.
The President did not strengthen his position by sometimes being less 
than tactful in his relationships with important Congressional figures.^
Probably no legislative program in the history of the nation' 
had received such an extensive effort in its preparatory stages as had 
the European Recovery Program. A large and convincing body of evidence 
had been accumulated as Justification for its enactment. Yet Adminis­
tration officials were to be besieged for seven months with demands 
for more and better Justifications. Although there were many points 
of contention, the main controversies throughout revolved around two 
issues: the scope and duration of the program and the plan for its
administration. In general, the Administration, in order to win on the 
first of these issues found it necessary to compromise on the second. 
Many compromises were made by the Administration, none of which, how­
ever, did serious damage to the basic policy involved. Not until the 
actual appropriation measure was signed more than six months from the 
time of introduction of the enabling legislation, however, could it be
5one writer observed that by the end of his first year in office 
President Truman no longer held regular strategy conferences with the 
leaders of his party in Congress. " . . .  Relations between President 
Truman and individual Senators and Representatives are purely social." 
Coffin, pp. 22-23.
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said with certainty that control of United States foreign policy was 
exercised by the President rather than by the Congress.
Despite the care given to the development of the recovery pro­
gram and to its exposition to the Congress and the public, there is 
some doubt that it would have emerged from the Congressional arena 
substantially in accordance with Administration desires had there not 
been a steady deterioration of the international situation during this 
period. Initially, the recovery program was presented with only oblique 
references to its important bearing on the United States-Soviet Russian 
relations. Before completion of Congressional action on the program, 
however, fewer efforts were being made to conceal the Importance at­
tached by the United States Government to a rejuvenated Western Europe
6aligned in some manner with this nation.
Although the GreehÆurkish aid program ostensibly had been 
directed against all forms of totalitarianââm, there was little doubt 
that the Truman Doctrine had been enunciated primarily as a warning to 
the Soviet Union and to the Communist ideology which it espoused. The 
Marshall Plan, in part, had been conceived as a response to the threat 
posed by Soviet Communism while at the same time it contained the 
promise of reducing the tensions and threats of war inherent in the 
intensification of the Soviet-American struggle. The Russians, however,
^During presentation of the program to Senate and House committees, 
emphasis was placed on its economic aspects, both as to cause and effect. 
Before final Congressional action had been taken on the measure, the 
Administration was urging expeditious action not only on ERF but also 
on Universal Military Training and revival of Selective Service. In ad­
dition, veiled promises were made of United States support of a de­
fensive Western European military arrangement. New York Times, March
18, 19 8̂ , pp. 1, 3.
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proved to be as suspicious of this American initiative as they had 
been of others during and after the war. Their open declaration of 
hostility toward the European Recovery Program thus frustrated ef­
forts by the Truman Administration to effect some form of under­
standing with Soviet Russia.
In achieving reality for the European Recovery.Program the 
Administration confronted the task of winning the adherence of an 
increasingly reluctant Congress and the support of a larger public 
which frequently evinces little knowledge of or enthusiasm for
7foreign undertakings. Important officials of the Administration 
worked diligently to explain the necessity for the undertaking to 
the general public. Such initiative was exercised by the Adminis­
tration in taking its message to the public that Congressional critics 
frequently centered their opposition around charges that the people
7In October, 19̂ 7; when the European crisis was mounting, an 
American Institute of Public Opinion Poll showed more Americans con­
cerned with high prices, inflation, and the high cost of living than 
with foreign policy, Russia, or the danger of war. The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol. II, No.  ̂(Winter, 19 7̂); 658. An indication of the 
vagaries of public opinion is seen, however, in an earlier AIPO poll 
released in August, 19̂ 7, in which 73 percent of the respondents thought 
that the United States would be involved in another war within twenty- 
five years. Ibid., Vol. II, No. 3 (Fall, 19̂ 7), 490. In February,
1948, amidst the ERP hearings and the attendant publicity, only 33 
percent of the respondents in an AIPO poll considered foreign policy 
issues as the most important problems facing America. However, in 
April, at the height of the Italian electoral crisis, the Comparable 
figure became 73 percent. Almond, p. 73* As late as January, 1948, 
when the Marshall Plan had been before the public for months, the New 
York Times found in a survey made in eleven cities across the nation 
that " . T , a large segment of the public neither fully understands 
nor is vitally interested . . ." in ERP. Among those indicating an 
interest, however, the consensus was favorable toward ERP. Most of 
the opposition was concentrated in the Middle West. New York Times, 
January 4, 1948, e6.
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were being "brainwashed" and "propagandized". Probably as much as 
any governmental program in American history— if Congressional reaction 
is any guide, the Marshall Plan captured the attention of the American
9public and, more importantly, the various interest groups. As the 
opinion polls continued to demonstrate, no program can ever distract 
the public completely from day-to-day pursuits. The interest of many 
citizens is seldom captured for long and then only with varying degrees 
of intensity. Yet the evidence is ample that many special interest
g
Such charges were heard most frequently in the House. In general. 
House debate on ERP was much more emotional than was the Senate debate.
An explanation for this may lie in the less-harried atmosphere prevailing 
in the Senate, where few restraints on debate exist. In the House, where 
debate is limited carefully, a member must make his points quickly and 
concisely. Thus, members may feel a compulsion to be less diplomatic 
and more candid. Usually, those who charged that the public was being 
"propagandized" also alleged that the public was "confused" thereby; 
therefore, "further study" was warranted. For examples, see U. S.,Con­
gressional Record, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1$48, XCIV, Part 3; 3313; 3321. 
Some criticism of the Administration's publicity efforts came from 
friendly sources. James Reston charged State Department public re­
lations specialists with ineptitude for releasing simultaneously on 
December 19 the ERP bill, the department's explanation thereof and 
the President's message on the program, with no further information 
releases prior to the re-convening of Congress. The department also 
was scored for poor timing by its release of a summary of commodities 
available for ERP on a day when it had to compete for press coverage 
with the President's State of the Union message. New York Times, Janu­
ary 7, 1948, p. 12.
9
There was no great "upsurge" of sentiment on the part of the 
general public demanding immediate enactment of ERP, yet there undoubt­
edly was a general consensus in support of the program. The support 
of special interest groups appeared to be overwhelming. There were 
many decidedly reluctant votes cast in support of ERP in Congress. Un­
doubtedly, they resulted from convictions that to vote otherwise might 
lead to recriminations at the polls. Opposition among conservative 
House Republicans was so strong as to threaten disunity at the forth­
coming Republican National Convention. To prevent a disastrous party 
split in a year in which it appeared inevitable that the Republicans 
would capture the Presidency, economic and other considerations were, 
in the end, overcome by purely political factors. See Vandenberg, p. 428, 
concerning the intensity of the ill-feeling between the "isolationist" 
and "internationalist" wings of the Republican Party generated by the 
recovery legislation.
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groups went to great lengths to elicit support for the European Re­
covery Program. In the majority of cases, the interest group support 
appeared to he motivated not hy expectations of the fulfillment of 
selfish interests but by apparent conviction that in the achievement ' 
of the program's objectives lay the world's best hopes for peace. To 
be sure, there were those groups whose support quite obviously was 
grounded upon hopes of material benefit from the largesse ensuing from 
the operations of the program.The support of other groups was based
*̂̂ For a description of the activities of the Committee for the 
Marshall Plan, see supra,Chapter TV, pp. 186=187. This committee un­
doubtedly deserved a large measure of the credit for making the European 
Recovery Program a general topic of discussion throughout the country.
The Senate and House hearings indicated that several of the interest 
groups and individuals appearing before the committees were conducting 
organized campaigns designed to stimulate public interest in and support 
of the recovery program. Mr. Charles R. Hook, President of the American 
Rolling Mills Co., Middletown, Ohio, described town meetings being held 
in his city, with representatives of the State Department present to 
answer questions on ERP. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) Hear­
ings on United States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part'2, 
p. 639* Local affiliates of the League of Women Voters of the United 
States conducted "literally hundreds" of meetings throughout the coun­
try in support of ERP. Ibid., p. 659. James F. O'Neil, National Com­
mander of the American Legion, undertook a 50,000=mile tour of the nation 
to discuss ERP. Ibid., p. 67O. Voluntarily, the National Planning As­
sociation undertook a study regarding the administrative aspects of ERP. 
Ibid., pp. 723-7^0. Ralph McGill, editor of the Atlanta (Ga.) Constltu- 
t ion. maintained a steady flow of editorials in support of ERP and spôke 
on the subject throughout Georgia and the South. Ibid., pp. 7^L“T̂ 3* The 
Committee for Economic Development worked for "months" on the preparation 
of a formal statement in support of ERP, Ibid., pp. 847-852. Upon the 
request of Senator Vandenberg for a study of the administrative aspects 
of ERP, the Brookings Institution diverted its entire staff to the in­
quiry which ultimately became the basis for the compromise between the 
Administration and Congress in respect to this aspect of ERP. Ibid., 
pp. 855-859. The National Council of Jewish Women sent to its more than 
200 sections throughout the country voluminous literature on the Mar­
shall Plan and asked for the reactions of the various sections. Without 
exception, the replies were in the affirmative. Ibid., p. 955* T̂i 
the fall of 1947, the Council for Social Action of the Congregational 
Christian Churches of the United States .issued an appeal to Christian 
churches to support the Marshall Plan as well as the domestic measures
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primarily on their anti-Communist and anti-Russian biases and their 
analysis of the program as a major strategic move in the conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Most groups were well 
aware of the national security aspects of the program; however, some 
emphasized this more than others.
necessary to insure its success. Ibid., Part 3, pp. 1323-I326. The 
National Intercollegiate Christian Council, composed of student YMCA's 
and YWCA's on 750 campuses, polled the various campus organizations and 
asked each to have its membership discuss ERP. Its poll indicated a 
"great majority" in support of ERP. Ibid., pp. 13̂ 9-1352' The inter­
national relations chairmen of the 2,000 local affiliates of the Na­
tional Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs took the 
lead in securing signatures to petitions addressed to Congress urging 
the adoption of ERP. Ibid., pp. 1^20-1421, The American Federation 
of Labor called a conference in Brussels, Belgium, in March, 1948, for 
the purpose of explaining to the representatives of labor in the CEEC 
countries the aims and purposes of the Marshall Plan and that American 
labor was "standing united" behind the plan. U. S., House, Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a Post- 
War Recovery Program, The First Step Being Consideration of Proposals 
for a European Recovery Program, Including H. R. 454o, H. R. 4$79, and 
Similar Measures (2 Parts),80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 19w, Part 2, pp. 
1308-1318. Cited hereafter as House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a fost-War Recovery 
Program. For the groups with less altruistic motives in supporting 
ERP, the following serve as examples: Dr. George F. Zook, President,
American Council on Education, asked that the ERP legislation include 
provisions for making available to the recipient countries vocational 
teachers and leaders from the United States to assist in developing 
vocational training programs. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Hearings on United States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 
2, p. 649. In a statement inserted in the record by Senator George 
(D., Ga,), the president of the American Turpentine Farmers' Association 
expressed concern " . . .  over the prospects of the progressively de­
clining export market for gum naval stores . . . ." Because the ERP 
nations, in the pre-war period, had accounted for more than half of 
the industry's exports, it was "only fair" that Marshall Plan funds be 
used to help the industry regain these markets. Ibid., Part 3; P* 1220. 
The National Retail Farm Equipment Association, pleading that farm 
machinery requirements for the ERP countries were unrealistic in view 
of the relatively backward state of European agriculture, its emphasis 
on small plots, and the great need among American farmers to acquire 
replacements for equipment either worn-out or ill-suited to modern, 
highly mechanized and commercialized farming, offered to mount a cam­
paign to meet the needs of Europe. Ibid.. pp. 1326-1331* like the
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During the war and in the immediate postwar period, great emphar- 
sis had been placed on the concept of "bipartisanship" in the conduct 
of American foreign policy. Senator Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, was the leading Congressional exponent of 
the theory. Chairman Eaton, of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
also enthusiastically endorsed the concept, although his effectiveness 
was not to be compared with that of Vandenberg.The Truman Adminis­
tration owed much to the former isolationist from Michigan for his 
political sacrifices on behalf of the recovery program. Vandenberg en­
countered the strongest, the most vocâl, and the most obstinate opposition
to his theory of bipartisanship and to the recovery program from among
12the leaders of his own party in the Congress. For reasons known only
representative of the gum naval stores industry, the fresh and dried 
fruit Industries asked for assistance in re-establishing European markets 
for their products. If this were not done, they maintained, an increase 
in support prices would be necessitated. Ibid., pp. 1435-1437' The 
Kentucky General Assembly petitioned Congress to provide that tobacco 
supplied under ERf " . . . be on a basis that will remove United States 
surplus supplies of each type of tobacco . . . ." Ibid., p. l444. The 
National Machine Tool Builders' Association was critical because the 
CEEC Report contained no requirement for machine tools. The machine 
tool industr}' was operating at "one-half its potential" due to Govern­
ment- disposal of surplus machine tools for war purposes. Therefore, 
to maintain a "strong American machine-tool industry", it was urged 
that this surplus be utilized in the recovery program. House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a Post- 
War Recovery Program, Part 2, pp, 1419-1423. The National Society of 
Professional Engineers urged that the services of its members be utilized 
in the recovery program " . . .  to assure the full and effective use of
our technical assistance, . . . ." Ibid., pp. 1728-1729*
^^Dean Acheson, A Democrat Looks At His Party (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1955)> pp. 104-105j Jewell, pp. 119-126; Vandenberg, pp.
1-125; Congressional Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 1 (Jan,-Mar,, 1945), 43-44;
Carroll,.pp. 96-97.
^^Vandenberg, p. 466; Connally, p. 311*
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to Vandenberg, he placed ERP above all political considerations, in­
cluding his Own ambitions for the Presidency.The Congressional de­
bate of the Marshall Plan demonstrated that bipartisanship is extremely 
difficult to maintain in a Presidential election year. Both the hear­
ings and debates demonstrated that the phenomenon of isolationism was 
far from dead in the America of 1948. The recent war had compelled 
a degree of internationalist thinking in Congress, Internationalism 
was a difficult concept for some members to accept willingly but, with 
few exceptions, winning the war took precedence over partisan politics.
Two and one-half years after the war's end, there was no such obvious
l4compulsion about matters requiring Congressional approval. In the 
view of many, both liberals and conservatives, the United States was 
confronted with problems enough within its own boundaries without en­
deavoring to shoulder the burdens of the world. It was the extreme 
in irony that the Marshall Plan depended for its ultimate success up­
on the enthusiasm and skills of such contrasting Republican leaders 
as Vandenberg, Martin, and Halleck, and a Congress dominated by a 
party almost unalterably opposed to any program, whether domestic or 
foreign, proposed by the Democratic Truman Administration, From the 
outset, Vandenberg was in sympathy with the objectives of the European 
Recovery Program. Being human, he was unable to divest himself of all
13Vandenberg, p. 384.
^^Democratic Senator Tom Connally, not one to praise Republicans 
unduly, concedes their support of the bipartisan foreign policy during 
World War II and the peace treaties following that war. With the adop­
tion of the Truman Doctrine, Connally observed, " . . .  several Repub3- 
licans began to veer back toward isolationism . . . ." Connally, p. 350.
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prejudices and he therefore endeavored to identify ERP as a bipartisan 
undertaking (and thus as much Republican as Democratic),The obstruc­
tionism of some of his Republican colleagues, however, and the wide 
currency given thereto by the news media, almost overshadowed the posi­
tive contributions of Vandenberg.
The ultimate character of the European Recovery Program thus 
was determined by the interaction of the many powerful contending forces 
in the American political arena. No public policy is ever determined 
without the participation of and contributions from these forces. The 
degree of participation is variable, yet it is ever present. Although 
some members of Congress complain that the President has merely to 
speak in the area of foreign policy and thus commit the nation to a 
given course, leaving no effective role to Congress, the story of the 
Marshall Plan demonstrated otherwise. The initiative, then as now, 
remains largely a Presidential prerogative, yet in a government built 
upon compromise, the ultimate content of public policy is determined 
in large measure by those most skilled in the art of the possible.
The final setting in the Marshall Plan story was in the committee
■̂ T̂he position of Senator Vandenberg as much more than an im­
partis. 'oderator was evident from the beginning of the hearings before 
his committee. Repeatedly, he emphasized the necessity of writing a 
bill that would have the confidence of the American people and, ad­
ministratively, accomplish the desired objectives, Senate Foreign Re­
lations Committee, Hearings on United States Assistance to European 
Economic Recovery, Part 1% pp. 149-150)' 302i
l6 'For examples, see New York Times, June 6,'19̂ 8, pp. 1, 13j 
Ibid. , June 8, 19 8̂, pp. 1, 5, 6; Ibid., June 10, 1948, pp. 1, 5j Ibid., 
June 11, 1948, p..13; Ibid., June 15, 1948, pp. 1, l4; Ibid., June lé, 
1948, pp. 1, 4; Ibid., June l8, 1948, p. 9i Ibid., June 19, 1948, pp.
1, 13; Ibid., June 20, 1948, pp. 1, 40.
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hearing rooms and the chambers of Congress, As the story had developed
there had been elements of collaboration with certain of the actors on
the Congressional scene; yet, as the latter would concede, the prime
impetus had not come from Capitol Hill. Now, however, the spotlight
focused on other participants in this drama of American government.
The leading actors in this final act included Senator Vandenberg, highly
17influential chairman of the eminent Senate Foreign Relations Committee;
18certain members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; the chairmen
17Membership on the committee, in addition to Vandenberg, included 
Arthur Capper (R., Kan.), Wallace H. White, Jr. (R. Me.), Alexander Wiley 
(R,, Wis,), H. Alexander Smith (R., N. J.), Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R., 
Iowa), Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R., Mass.), Tom Connally (D,, Tex.),
Walter P. George (D,, Ga.), Robert F. Wagner (D., N. Y.), Elbert D.
Thomas (D., Utah), Alben W. Barkley (D., Ken.), and Carl A. Hatch (D.,
N. M,) Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 15, D12. Among the Republicans, 
Vandenberg had served on the committee eighteen years; Capper, eleven 
years; Wiley, two years. Smith, Hickenlooper, and Lodge were "freshmen".
On the Democratic side, Connally had served sixteen years; George, nin- 
teen years; Wagner, eighteen years; Thoma§, fourteen years; Barkley, ten 
years; and Hatch, two years. Among the entire membership, there were 
overlapping memberships on ten of the other fourteen Senate standing 
committees. Capper, White,and Wiley were chairmen of standing committees, 
while Wagner, George, Thomas, and Hatch ware ranking minority members 
of standing committees (and had been chairmen in Damocratic-controlled 
Congresses). Farnsworth, pp. 24-2$. During the hearings, Vandenberg, 
Wiley, Smith, Hickenlooper, Lodge, Connally, George, Thomas, and Barkley 
were most active in questioning witnesses. Only Wiley and Hickenlooper 
indicated skepticism toward ERP, During Senate debate, Vandenberg, Lodge, 
Smith, Connally, and Barkley were most active in defending the proposal,
18Republican members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, ranked in 
descending order of seniority, included Charles A, Eaton (N. J,), Chairman; 
Robert B. Chiperfield (ill,), John M. Vorys (Ohio), iferl E, Mundt (S,D,), 
Bartel J, Jonkman (Mich.), Frances P. Bolton (Ohio), Charles L, Gerlach 
(%,, ), Lawrence H, Smith (Wis.), Chester H. Merrow (N, H, ), Walter H,
Judd (Minn.), James G. Fulton (Pa.), Jacob J. Javits (N. Y.), John Davis 
Lodge (Conn,), and Donald L, Jackson (Calif,), Democratic members, in 
descending order of seniority, were: Sol Bloom (N, Y,), John Kee (W, Va.),
James P, Richards (S. C.), Joseph L. Pfeifer (N, Y.)) Pete Jazman (Ala.), 
Wirt Courtney (Tenn.), Thomas S. Gordon (ill.), Helen Gahagan Douglas 
(Calif,), Mike Mansfield (Mont,), Thomas E, Morgan (Pa,), and William 
F. Colmer (Miss.). Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 15, D22. Committee
c;xx
19and certain members of the Appropriations Committees; and the Re-
20publican leadership of Senate and House. Functioning behind the 
scenes were the Administration officials who had guided the European 
Recovery Program to its present status. Participating both publicly 
and privately were the interest groups, some focusing upon specific 
objectives in connection with the legislation and others directing
Republicans most active during the hearings were Vorys, Judd, Lodge,
Mundt, Bolton, Jonkman, Chiperfield, Smith, Fulton, Merrow, Javits, 
and Jackson, generally in the foregoing order. This same group led 
the defense of the bill in floor debate. Vorys was chairman in fact 
if not in name. Democratic members most active during the hearings, 
as well as the House debate, included Bloom, Kee, Richards, Jarman, 
Courtney, Douglas, Mansfield, and Colmer.
^^The House Appropriations Committee consisted of forty-three 
members (25 Republicans; l8 Democrats). The chairman was ultra- 
conservative John Taber (R., N. Y.). Ranking Democrat was Clarence 
Cannon (D,, Mb.). In respect to ERP, the most important members of 
this committee, by far, were Taber, Richard B, Wiggleworth (R., Mass.), 
Albert J, Engel (R., Mich.), Karl Stefan (R., Neb.), Francis base 
(R. , S. D. ), Frank B. Keefe (R., Wis.), Cannon, John H. Kerr (D., N.
C.), and George H. Mahon (D., Tex.), who composed the Subcommittee on 
Deficiencies. The recommendations of this subcommittee, ultimately, 
became the recommendations of the parent committee and the House as 
well. The Senate Appropriations Committee which, traditionally, sits 
as a reviewing authority for the House committee, consisted of twenty- 
one members (12 Republicans, 9 Democrats). Republican members included 
Styles Bridges (N. H. ), Chairman; Chan Gurney (S. D.). C. Wayland Brooks 
(111,). Clyde M. Reed (Kan,), Joseph H. Ball (Minn.), Homer Ferguson 
(Mich.), Kenneth S. Wherry (Neb. ), Gvy Cordon.'(Ore, ), Leverett Salton- 
stall (Mass.), Milton R. Young (N. D. ), William F. Khowland (Calif.), 
and Henry C. Dworshak (Idaho). Democratic members were Kenneth McKellar 
(Tenn.), Carl Hayden (Ariz.), Elmer Thomas (Okla.), Millard E. Tydings 
(Md.), Richard B. Russell (Ga.), Pat McCarran (Nev.), John H. Overton 
(La.), Joseph 0. O'Mahoney (Wyo.), and Theodore Francis Green (R. I.),
A high incidence of Midwesterners was noted among the Republican member­
ship of both committees. Eifeht of the twelve Republicans on the Senate 
committee were members of the so-called "revisionists", whose aim was 
to defeat or weaken ERP. Ironically, at least a part of this group con­
tributed later to the "reconstruction" of the ERP appropriation measure 
after its near-emasculation by the House of Representatives. Ibid., p. D9*
^^Supra, Chapter II, n. 30, pp. 85-86.
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their efforts toward achieving either acceptance or rejection of the 
policy goals reflected in the proposed program.
The Administration Bill
Although the House Foreign'Affairs Committee conducted one
meeting on proposed foreign aid legislation on December 17, ISk-J, while
Congress was in special session, hearings on the Administration's bill
for the European Recovery Program did not actually begin until the
opening of the Second Session of the Eightieth Congress in January,
I9W. At that time, the bill was introduced in the Senate by Senators
Vandenberg and Ponnally and in the House by Representative Eaton, in
order to provide their committees with legislative vehicles,on which
21to commence their hearings and studies.
22"The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948" authorized appropria­
tions of $6.8 billion for European recovery purposes during the first 
fifteen months of the program and a total of $17 billion for the period 
April 1, 1948-June 30, 1952. Provision was made for an advance of 
$500 million from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation pending en­
actment of the appropriations legislation, and the President was 
authorized to transfer any unobligated and unexpended funds remaining
21The Administration measure was introduced initially in the 
House (H. R. 4840). In the Senate the bill was designated S.2202. Be­
cause the Senate passed S.2202 before hearings had been completed in 
the House on foreign aid proposals, the Senate measure moved to the 
House, was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee and emerged, with 
amendments, as the vehicle embodying that committee's foreign aid recom­
mendations. The House committee also considered H. R. 4579; authored 
by Representative Herter.
22Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Outline of European 
Recovery Program.
213
from interim aid appropriations to the recovery program.
The bill recognized the ''interdependence" of the United States 
and Europe. Europe's crisis was viewed as flowing from the "economic 
disruption remaining in the wake of war." It was declared to be United 
States policy to assist those European countries " . . .  participating 
in a joint European-recovery program based on self-help and mutual co-
2koperation." It was contemplated that the participating countries 
could become independent of "abnormal outside economic assistance" by 
the end of the program through
(1) promoting industrial and agricultural production in 
the participating countries;
(2 ) furthering the restoration or maintenance of the 
soundness of European currencies, budgets, and 
finances;
(3) facilitating and stimulating the growth of inter­
national trade of participating countries with one 
another and with other countries by appropriate 
measures including reduction of barriers which 
may hamper such trade, 5̂
Any country, either "wholly or partly in Europe, including its 
colonies or dependencies", could participate in the program so long as 
it "remains an adherent to a joint program for European recovery designed 
to accomplish the purposes of this Act."^°
To administer the act, there was established an Economic Co­
operation Administration in the Executive branch. The agency was to be
^^Section 9* Ibid., pp. 8-9 .




headed by an Administrator, to be appointed by the President and con­
firmed by the Senate. Although heralded as being "independent", it 
•was provided that "all" of the Administrator's functions " . . .  which 
affect the conduct of the foreign policy of the United States shall be 
formed subject to the direction and control of the Secretary of State. 
This provision generated great controversy. Only after resolution of 
the controversy could passage of the act be viewed with any assurance, 
Since the Economic Cooperation Administration would be vitally concerned 
with United States foreign policy, the State Department argued, it must 
be administered accordingly. Since the President is responsible for 
foreign policy, then the Department, as his agent, should
, . . participate actively in the formulation and execution 
of the program. The authority of the President, through 
the Secretary of State, to give direction to the adminis­
tration of American assistance where it affects the foreign « 
policy of the United States must remain clear and unimpaired,
Provision was made for a Depüÿy Administrator, also to be ap­
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and for interim 
administration by other agencies of the Government, as directed by the
President, pending the appointment and qualification of the first Ad-
29minlstrator or Deputy Administrator.
It was contemplated that "to the greatest extent practicable" 
the services and facilities of already-existing Federal agencies would 
be utilized in the administration of the program. The Administrator
27Section 4(a). Ibid., pp. 3-4.
^^Ibid.. p. 56,
Bisection 4(b)(c). Ibid., p. 4.
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would be empowered sufficiently, however, to provide " . . .  central 
administrative direction by a-relatively small organization of the 
highest competence . . . . Provision was made for employing per­
sonnel for jduty within the United States without limit as to number. 
Limits as to number and salary were placed on the category regarded 
to be the core of the Administrator's top staff,
To be. the "chief United States representative to any European 
organization of participating countries which may be established , , , 
to further a joint program for European recovery ..." and to carry 
out any other duties " . . .  assigned , , . with the approval of the 
President . . the position of United States Special Representative 
in Europe was created,
For carrying out overseas functions under the act, the Secre­
tary of State was authorized to appoint or assign, "in consultation with 
the Administrator", persons to the Foreign Service Reserve, Foreign 
Service staff officers and employees, and alien clerks and employees.
The Administrator was authorized to appoint a representative on the 
Foreign Service Board, Such personnel who were citizens of the United 
States were to be appointed "subject to investigation by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation," except that they could begin work after 
preliminary investigation and clearance by the State Department.
The act specified the functions which could be performed by
30lbid.. p, 56,
3^Section 4(d), Ibid,, p, 4.
^^Section 5, Ibid., pp. 4-5,
^^Section 6, Ibid,, p, p*
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the Administrator in providing the assistance required by the partic­
ipating countries. Such functions included procurement, processing, 
the storage and shipment of commodities, and providing technical in­
formation. These functions were to be performed through other exist­
ing governmental agencies " . . .  with the consent of the head of such 
department, agency or establishment, , . , Assistance programs, 
however, would require the approval of the Administrator. In order 
to facilitate private investments in fui-therance of European recovery, 
the Administrator was authorized to guarantee the convertibility of 
foreign currency received by a United States firm which established 
a business, plant, factory,etc., abroad in furtherance of the purposes 
of the act. Any such projects would require the consent of the Adminis­
trator and the participating country concerned. The amount of any 
guarantee was to be limited to the amount of the investment and could 
not insure against ordinary business risks. Total guarantees were to 
be limited to 5 percent of all appropriations made under the act and
were to be limited to a period of fourteen years from the date of
, 3k enactment.
Assistance to participating countries could be provided in the 
form of grants or in the form of loans or other credit terms. In de­
ciding whether assistance should be through grants or on payment terms 
and in determining the terras of payment, the Administrator was required 
to consult with the National Advisory Council on International Mone­
tary and Financial Problems (NAC), a Cabinet agency. The decision as
34.Section 7(a)(b). Ibid., pp. 5-7.
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to whether repayment for assistance should he required, and the terms 
of repayment; if required, were to depend upon the capacity of the 
participating country to make repayment " . . .without jeopardizing 
the accomplishment of the purposes of this Act." Whenever assistance 
was to he extended on credit terms, the Administrator was directed 
to allocate the funds to the Export-Import Bank which would administer 
the credit as directed, and on the terms specified, hy the Administrator 
in consultation with the NAC.
The Administrator was authorized to utilize commodities owned 
hy government agencies and determined hy the owning agency to he avail­
able for procurement. Reimbursement, of course, was required. The Ad­
ministrator also was authorized to conclude agreements with partici­
pating countries to promote increased production in such countries of 
materials required hy the United States "as a result of deficiencies 
or potential deficiencies" in the natural resources of the United States. 
It was not contemplated that any such increased production was to he used 
as direct repayment for United States assistance. Many members of Con­
gress, however, conceived this as an excellent mechanism for securing 
at least partial repayment for American assistance. Secretary Marshall 
and other Administration officials testifying at the hearings argued 
that the goal of American assistance was to aid the participating coun­
tries in reestablishing their export markets and their productive facil­
ities. If the United States should begin immediately to drain off
35section 7(c). Ibid., p. 7. 
3^Section 8(a)(c). Ibid., pp. J~d.
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their potential exports as repayment for assistance, they would continue 
running deficits in their balances of payments. Therefore, it was urged, 
strategic stockpiling materials should be purchased with dollars other 
than those appropriated for ERP.3?
Authority was granted to the Administrator to charter or sell 
Government-owned merchant vessels to participating countries, if he
38deemed such actions necessary.
Agreements between the United States and the participating coun­
tries were to be concluded by the Secretary of State "after consultation 
with the Administrator, . . . As a condition precedent to receiving 
assistance, each participating country was required to signify its ad­
herence to the purposes of the act through the conclusion of an agree­
ment with the United States. "Where applicable", each such agreement 
would provide for:
(1 ) Promoting industrial and agricultural production in 
order to . . . become independent of abnormal outside 
economic assistance;
(2 ) Taking financial and monetary measures necessary to
. . , restore or maintain confidence in its monetary 
system;
(3) Cooperating ... in facilitating ... en increasing 
interchange of goods and services , , . and cooperating 
to reduce barriers to trade , .
(4) Making efficient use, within the framework of a joint 
program for European recovery, of the resources of such 
participating country, including any conanodities, 
facilities, or services furnished under this Act;
37senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United 
States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 1% pp. 6, 290,
390,
3%ection 7(a)(5), Section 8(d), Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Outline of European Recovery Program, pp. 6, 8,
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(5) Facilitating the sale to the United States for 
stock-piling purposes, . • . of materials . , . 
required by the United States , , , which may be 
available in such participating country after due 
regard for reasonable requirements for domestic 
use and commercial export of such country;
(6 ) Placing in a special account a deposit in the cur­
rency of such country, in commensurate amounts and 
under such terms and conditions as may be agreed
to between such country and . . . the United States, 
when any commodity or service is made available 
. . . and is not furnished ... on terms of pay­
ment. Such special account, . . . shall be held 
or used only for such purposes as may be agreed to
between such country and . . . the United States;
(7 ) Publishing • . . and transmitting to the United States,
. . . full statements of operations under the agree­
ment , . . . ;
(8 ) Furnishing . . . any relevant information which
would be of assistance . . .  in determining the nature 
and scope of future operations under this Act.
Provision was made for the Administrator to furnish assistance during a
period of three months immediately following enactment of the legislation, 
providing the participating country signified its adherence to the pur­
poses of the act and its intention to conclude the required agreement.39
The President was authorized to request the cooperation of the 
United Nations and its agencies, or other international organizations,, 
in ceurrying out the recovery program. He was directed to transmit to 
the Secretary General copies of reports to Congress on operations under 
the act and to register agreements concluded under the act with the 
United Nations, if required to do so by the Charter.
The terminal date of the recovery legislation was specified as
39s6ction 10. Ibid., pp. 9=10*
^4section 11. Ibid., p. 10.
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June 30; 1952, unless its provisions were terminated sooner by the
klpassage of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses of Congress,
The Hearings
Despite the unprecedented effort expended in the preparation 
of the recovery program legislation and supporting data, the Adminis­
tration bill encountered difficulties before both the Vandenberg and 
Eaton committees. Both were exhaustive in their consideration of the 
proposal. Both reported major amendments to the original proposal.
Public hearings were begun by the House Foreign Affairs Com­
mittee on December 17; 19̂ 7; resumed on January 12, 1948, and con­
cluded on March 12, A total of twenty-nine public sessions were con­
ducted. The committee issued its report to the House on March 20, 
after more than a week of closed sessions for preparation of the re­
port, The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began public hearings 
on January 8 and concluded on February 5* A total of twenty-four public 
sessions was held, Its report was submitted to the Senate on February
2 7.
Before the, hearings began, there had been an unsuccessful ef­
fort made to conduct Joint hearings, on the grounds that this would pro­
vide a better opportunity for a thorough review of United States for­
eign policy, conserve the valuable time of Cabinet officers and other 
officials, and eliminate duplications of effort. To this argument it 
was objected that the large size of such a joint committee would make 
the questioning of witnesses tedious and difficult and that repetition
4lSection 13= Ibid,, p, 11=
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of testimony vas not necessarily objectionable, i.e., it vould give 
emphasis to certain ideas and thus be educational. Most of the op­
position to joint hearings arose in the House, where there was more op­
position in general to foreign aid. Furthermore, certain Republican 
leaders feared the beneficial results which might accrue to Senator 
Vandenberg in presiding over Joint hearings. Reportedly, there was
competition behind the scenes by the two committees for prominent 
42witnesses.
Ninety-eight witnesses appeared before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee during the course of its hearings on the recovery 
bill. Appearing for the Administration were Secretary of State Mar­
shall, 'Ambassador to Great Britain Lewis W. Douglàs,, Secretary of 
Commerce Harriman, Secretary of Agriculture Anderson, Secretary of 
Interior Krug, Secretary of Treasury Snyder, Secretary of Defense 
Forrestal, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall, and William Mc- 
Chesney Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export- 
Import Bank. Although not a part of the Administration, John J. Mc- 
Cloy, President, and Eugene Slack, Executive Director, of the Inter­
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, proved to be valuable 
witnesses for the Administration bill. In addition to the witnesses ap­
pearing in person, nineteen individuals or groups submitted statements
43for insertion in the record of the hearing.
One hundred witnesses testified before the House Foreign Affairs
lipNew York Times, January $, 1948, p. 4.
^^Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United States 
Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Parts 1 and 2.
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Committee during its hearings on foreign aid legislation. Included 
were thirteen representatives of the Administration who appeared on be­
half of particular aspects of the recovery legislation. A matter of 
controversy surrounding the House committee hearings was the determina­
tion by the House Republican leadership and the Republican majority on 
the Foreign Affairs Committee to conduct hearings on all aspects of 
foreign aid, including, in addition to ERP, aid to Greece, Turkey, and 
China. This move was opposed unsuccessfully by the Administration and 
by committee Democrats, who maintained that such a procedure might 
result in failure to meet the April 1 deadline for enactment of ERP.
Not only did the Administration wish to prevent an interruption of 
the flow of recovery materials to Europe, it also urged enactment of 
the recovery program by April 1 in order to give psychological support 
to the Italian Government, which faced a critical challenge from the 
Communists in elections to be held on April l8 . At the same time, it 
was the desire of the Administration to keep ERP free of any relation­
ship to military assistance. The Greek-Turkish program included both 
military and economic aid. The China aid program, initiated reluctantly 
in consequence of Republican pressures, initially included only eco­
nomic features. Before emerging from the committee, however, it also 
contained provisions for military assistance.
Administration officials appearing before the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in the course of its prolonged hearings included Secretary of 
State Marshall; Assistant Secretary of State Willard L. Thorp; State 
Department Legal Adviser Ernest Gross; Ambassador to Great Britain 
Douglas; Secretary of Defense Forrestal; William L. Clayton, Adviser to
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the Secretary of State; Secretary of the Arm}' Royall; Secretary of 
Treasury Snyder; Secretary of Commerce Harriman; Secretary of Agricul­
ture Anderson; and Secretary of Interior Krug. In addition to the 
witnesses appearing personally before the committee, some forty-five 
individuals or groups submitted statements for insertion in the printed 
record of the hearings.
Administration witnesses appeared first before both committees 
and were then followed by the private individuals and groups. No ap­
parent effort was made by either committee to prevent a full expression 
of the various points of view on foreign aid. Proceedings before the 
Senate committee were conducted more systematically than were the 
hearings before the House committee, where proceedings often were mired 
by the enthusiasts of China aid and other detractors of the Adminis­
tration and the State Department in a bog of partisan controversy. A 
greater evidence of bipartisanship was displayed by members of the 
Senate committee; indeed, one would almost conclude that the term was 
not in the lexicon of the House committee membership. Further, there 
clearly was a greater compatibility with "internationalism" among mem­
bers of the Senate committee than among the House group. A much closer 
affinity with the State Department and understanding of its problems 
was demonstrated by members of the Foreign Relations Committee. Ironi­
cally, a more detailed and searching examination of the proposed legis­
lation was conducted by the Foreign Affairs Committee than by the 
Senate group, perhaps because it was enjoying the novel experience of
^^House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on United States 
Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program, Parts 1 and 2.
being cast in a role as an equal to its traditionally more powerful 
Senate counterpart.
Senator Vandenberg exercised full control of the proceedings 
before his committee, as was his custom. He was a frequent interrogator 
of witnesses sued did not permit proceedings to falter or wsinder afield. 
Although committed to the basic policy embodied in ERP, Vandenberg 
possessed fixed beliefs in respect to its administration and was re­
sponsible for the eventual plan of administration included in the 
legislation.
Chairman Eaton, on the other hand, quite frequently delegated 
the charge of proceedings to one or the other of his lieutenants and 
departed the hearings. At one point he commented about his plan of a 
"rotating chairmanship" for the committee, whereby his younger colleagues 
could gain experience in presiding.Mr. Eaton seldom questioned a 
witness and, in fact, only infrequently commented, except in a Jocular 
vein. His feelings could be made quite explicit, however, as in the 
case of an exchange with Representative Herter (R., Mass.) on the 
first day of hearings, regarding Herter's proposed bill for European 
reconstruction.^^ The elderly chairman obviously did not appreciate 
the notoriety gained by Herter through the mechanism of the Select
Ilk
Ibid., Part 1, p. 659.
^^Eaton told Herter that after reading Herter’s proposed bill he 
concluded that it "abolishes the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House 
. . . and the executive department and establishes a super=duper organi­
zation of Government such as has never existed before . . . ." He won­
dered " . . .  what constitutional powers are still left to control it 
or govern it?" Further needling Herter, Chairman Eaton inquired if 
Herter’8 plan for a corporation to administer ERP would work "Just as 
well if the President was a Republican?" Ibid., pp. 13-1̂ ; 19*
225
Committee on Foreign Aid.
Proceedings before the House committee were undisciplined in 
comparison to the conduct of business before Senator Vandenberg's com­
mittee. Throughout the hearings, members of the House committee were 
in and out of the hearing room answering roll calls on the floor of the 
House. Often there would be only one or two members present to inter­
rogate important witnesses. On at least one occasion, the questioning
was delegated to Dr, W. Y. Elliott, chief of the committee professional 
k7staff. There was no question of Dr. Elliott's competence; yet staff 
personnel do not elicit responses from administrators similar to the 
reactions generated by questions or requests directly from legislators 
themselves. As was the case with régàfd to Greek-Turkish aid legis­
lation, a greater sense of urgency and of American responsibility was 
exhibited by the Senate committee than by the House committee.
The decision of the House Republican leadership and the Repub­
lican majority on the Foreign Affairs Committee to conduct an all- 
inclusive hearing on foreign aid was justified on the ground that Con­
gress had been confronted with a, series of foreign aid crises with no
kSopportunity to view the overall aid requirements. There was merit to
1|.7
Ibid., pp. 556-561.
Ibid., Part 2, pp. 1555-15̂ 7. The emphasis on a "comprehensive" 
approach to postwar American foreign policy was calculated to impress 
upon the public in an election year the capabilities for leadership of 
the Republican Party. Advocates of China aid argued that it was incon­
sistent to oppose Communism in Europe while seemingly encouraging it in 
China. Arguments of the Administration that the two situations were 
quite different were unimpressive to a public which based its judgments 
primarily on moral grounds. To avoid embarrassment and to prevent undue 
delays in passage of ERP, the Administration reluctantly agreed to a 
measure containing provisions for China aid. New York Times, February 8 , 
19I&8 , E3.
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this argument, yet the insertion of the Chinese emhroglio into the 
European aid hearings could serve only to further confuse the aid 
picture. With regard to China, the Administration obviously vas in 
a dilemma, yet to attempt a solution of this problem while meeting 
the European crisis possibly could lead to a weakening of the total 
American effort in both areas. It was suspected that there was more 
than mere coincidence in the injection of the China aid problem into 
the consideration of European recovery legislation. With the 19̂ 8 
Presidential campaign beginning to gather momentum, the Republicans
I
could expect only to gain through an expose'of United States policy in 
China, because as each day passed the ability of the United States to 
influence events in that country decreased, however much this may 
have been contrary to the wishes of the Administration.
The Administration witnesses appearing before the committees, 
of course, supported the ERP. Each, in general, appeared for the 
purpose of presenting and elaborating upon a particular aspect of the 
program. Secretary Marshall presented the program in its broad out­
line and scope. Ambassador Lewis W. Douglas served the Administration 
admirably with his knowledgeable presentation of the program in its 
most minute details. Mr. Douglas had been recalled from London specif­
ically to perform the role of State Department liaison with Congress 
during consideration of the ERP legislation. A highly successful busi­
nessman and former member of Congress, he made a significant contri­
bution to the acceptance of ERP by Congress. Not infrequently did he 
receive the praise of committee members for his comprehensive grasp
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kg
Of the program, from broad principles to specific details, ^
As the hearings got under way, it began to appear highly prob­
able that a European Recovery Program in some form would be reported 
favorably to the respective Houses. This was evident from the tenor 
of questions addressed to witnesses and from the overwhelming support 
given to the proposal from non-Government witnesses appearing before 
the committees. This is not to say, however, that the legislation 
would be reported in the same form as introduced, since its support 
derived from varied sources. It was to be expected that there would 
be efforts to incorporate certain features into the legislation as 
manifestations of this variegated support. It was just as certain 
that there would be efforts to kill or .cripple the recovery legis­
lation. It was the task of the Administration and its Congressional 
allies to protect the measure against crippling amendments, whether 
proposed by friends or by enemies. Senator Vandenberg undeniably proved 
to be the Administration's greatest friend in Congress, in respect to 
this task.
Every shade of opinion on the political spectrum was represented 
among the private witnesses appearing before the committees. If these
kgĤouse Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on United States 
Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program. Part 1, pp. 190-191.
In his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secre­
tary Marshall indicated that Ambassador Douglas had been his closest 
and most valuable adviser on ERP. As evidenced by his fielding of 
questions asked by members of both committees, Douglas had acquired an 
unusually thorough knowledge on the subject in a very brief time. During 
much of this time, the Ambassador "commuted" from his London post. At 
one point. Senator Lodge referred to Ambassador Douglas as the "general 
manager of the enterprise" of steering ERP through Congress. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United States Assistance 
to European Economic Recovery, Part 1, pp. 55; 68.
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persons and the groups whom they represented could he assumed as being 
representative of the American public, there was little question as to 
the broad general support of ERP. The detailed knowledge exhibited by 
many of these witnesses in regard to the proposal was gratifying. Not 
so gratifying was the obvious effort of some to benefit materially from 
the recovery program while professing genuine, unselfish support.
On review, there appears to have been scarcely any aspect of 
the proposed recovery bill which escaped close scrutiny during the 
course of the hearings. A multitude of inquiries were propounded. Al­
though many of such queries were in the nature of rhetoric, it was in 
their resolution that Congress was to make its imprint not only on 
the final character of the recovery program but also on the course of 
postwar American foreign policy.
The basic question to be resolved was that of the course of
Amercian foreign policy in the coming years. The United States could
assume either an active, responsible role in world affairs or it could
retreat once again into the assumedly protective shell Of isolation.
The hearings and debates on ERP demonstrated that isolationism was not
defunct, although in some respects its outward manifestations had
altered. Many of the postwar isolationists hurled insults at all things
strange or foreign, urged that the United States remain aloof from
"entangling alliances", that it not destroy its abundance by extravagant
"give-aways" to undeserving and ungrateful foreigners, and that it build
up an armed force so powerful as to intimidate any pretender to world 
50power.
^^Those who opposed the economic aid program yet strongly urged 
the strengthening of American armed forces might more properly be
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Subsidiary issues raised concerned the contents of the legis­
lative vehicle utilized hopefully by the Administration in giving sub­
stance to the principles of the nation's postwar foreign policy. Basic 
in this regard were questions directed toward the necessity for the 
recovery program, the amount of such aid to be rendered, and the duration 
of American assistance. Those who disagreed with the necessity for as­
sisting Europe in its recovery efforts attempted either to achieve a 
decrease in the amount of aid or to limit the United States commitment, 
or both, after the failure of more overt efforts to defeat the proposal 
in its entirety. Proponents of the Administration bill urged that at 
least four years would be required for Europe to regain the economic 
ground lost because of the war and the natural calamities following in 
its wake. Their contention that at least $17 billion in aid would be 
needed during this period, with a minimum of $6.8 billion needed during 
the first fifteen months, was never refuted successfully by the op­
position. Of course, the opposition did not possess the technical 
capability for amassing data in support of its position comparable to 
that of the proponents of the recovery program. Frequent allusions 
were made to the overwhelming nature of the Administration's supporting 
data, not all of which were complimentary.^^ Isolated efforts to refute
described as "militant nationalists". Even while maintaining that ERP 
and similar programs would bankrupt the United States, they called for 
the spending of similar magnitudes on the re-building of America's mili­
tary might. Although in most cases they took umbrage at being termed 
"isolationist", they were in effect advocating a "go it alone" policy. 
Scattered among this opposition group was a minority element composed of 
liberals who sincerely protested that the money could "best be spent at 
home". Congressional Record, XGIV, Part 3; 3312, 3321, 3̂ 19, 3̂ 23, 3̂ 37, 
3439, 3443, 3451, 3513.
51Secrstary Marshall was apprehensive that so much data had been 
accumulated and disseminated that it might actually prove more confusing
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this data, however,’sometimes were the objects of ridicule.This
is not to say that the Administration's positions on various questions
were irrefutable or that they escaped serious scrutiny. But, in the
end, the almost year-long study and preparation devoted to the problem
53of European aid produced the intended results.^
The political wisdom of including in the ERP bill a definite 
overall aid commitment in money terms was challenged by Senator Vanden­
berg even before the legislation was presented to the Congress. He in­
sisted that the Congress would never approve the bill so long as this
than informative. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on 
United States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 1, p. 71. 
Senator Vandenberg, although highly laudatory regarding the Adminis­
tration's documentation of its case for ERP, recognized the physical 
impossibility of the assimilation or substantiation of this data by his 
committee or by an individual member of Congress. The knowledge that 
the Administration's data and recommendations had been studied and ap­
proved in general by the Harriman Committee was quite reassuring to 
Senator Vandenberg and to other members of Congress. Ibid., p. SG.
^^Senator Taft's recognized intellectual abilities and his 
position of leadership among Senate Republicans did not deter a scathing 
description by fellow Republican Senator Morse (Ore.) of Taft's recom-,.. 
mendation for a drastic cut in the ERP authorization as mere "guess­
work". Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 2, 265^-2655*
53ln its report to the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee 
declared that it " . . . was greatly impressed with the thorough docu­
mentation which was available during its examination of the European 
recovery program. It is probable that no legislative proposal coming 
before the Congress has ever been accompanied by such thoroughly pre­
pared documentary materials . . . ." U. S.,Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, A Bill To Promote the General Welfare, National Interest, 
and Foreign Policy of the United States through Necessary Economic and 
Financial Assistance to Foreign Countries Which Undertake To Cooperate 
with Each Other in the Establishment and Maintenance of Economic Con­
ditions Essential to a Peaceful and Prosperous World, 80th Cong., 2nd 
Sess., 19̂ 8, Report No. 935, to accompany S.2202, p. 4, in Senate Miscel­
laneous Reports, I (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948). 
Cited hereafter as Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report No. 935,
. . . on the European Recovery Program.
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specific sura ($17 billion) was retained. Vandenberg urged, instead, 
general language committing the United States to a four year program 
so long as the participating countries adhered to the pledges they 
had voluntarily undertaken. He maintained that one Congress could not 
'bind a succeeding one, except in a moral sense, and that it would be 
disastrous to the program and to American foreign policy to extend a 
promise to the European countries that might not be fulfilled. Al­
though viewing the sum of $17 billion as completely necessary and 
realistic, he thought the Administration's objective could be secured 
more easily by first obtaining Congressional acceptance of the neces­
sity for United States assistance to European recovery, which would in 
itself constitute a recognition of an implied obligation to continue 
assistance for at least the four years generally considered essential 
for the achievement of a successful recovery program.
Senator Vandenberg also was concerned that the economy-minded 
Eightieth Congress might not accept the requested $6.8 billion ap­
propriation for the initial fifteen months of the recovery program. 
When it appeared that sentiment for decreasing the requested sum was 
gaining adherents, Vandenberg devised a plan providing for an appro­
priation of $5 .3 billion during the initial twelve months of the pro­
gram. To gain acceptance of this scheme, which involved no real
5^Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United States 
Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 1, pp. Due to the
absence from Washington of Secretary Marshall, the decision to eliminate 
the request for a specific $17 billion authorization was made by Under 
Secretary Lovett, after consultation with the President and the affected 
Executive branch agencies. Attempting to prevent possible embarrassment 
to the Administration, Lovett initially had attempted to dissuade the 
President from including the $17 billion sum in the ERP authorization 
meas'ure, but had been unsuccessful. New York Times, January 7; 1948, p. 4.
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reduction in the requested appropriation, he emphasized that by making 
the appropriation for only twelve months, Congress thereby would have 
an opportunity to review the program at an earlier date.
Those who questioned the necessity for assistance to European 
recovery posited, in their expressions of doubt, possible alternatives 
for United States action (or inaction). Did Europe's current crisis 
result directly from the war or did it reflect a malaise that had it's 
beginning even prior to the outbreak of that devastating holocaust?
Did the resolution of this crisis require vast outpourings of America's 
treasure or could the Europeans do more for themselves? Should capital­
istic, free-enterprise America endanger its own economy to buttress the 
crumbling socialistic edifices in Europe? Would not these countries 
ultimately become Communist despite United States assistance? Was not 
Europe's problem largely a result of the machinations of the Soviet 
Union? Should not the United States face the main threat directly and 
devote these vast funds to the strengthening of its armed forces? Why 
fatten the golden calf for the Soviet bear, which could move at will
56in Europe?
From the inception of the planning for the European Recovery 
Program the Administration insisted that the United States would assist 
Europe only in helping itself. It was urged, however, that this govern-
55wew York Times, January 28, 1948, p. 1; Ibid., February 15,
1948, pp. 1, 29.
5^Such questions represented the isolationist viewpoint as ex­
pressed by former New York Congressman Hamilton Pish. Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United States Assistance to European 
Economic Recovery, Part 3, 1396-1400.
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ment should not attempt to dictate the exact procedures by which the 
common goal of European recovery was to be attained in each of the 
participating countries. Instead, it should be sufficient to set forth 
certain broad goals in the enabling legislation, the attainment of 
which should make the participating countries independent of "abnormal" 
outside economic assistance at the end of the program. Bilateral agree­
ments between the United States and each participant would contain 
more specific pledges on the part of the participant, as a condition 
precedent to the receipt of assistance, to signify its adherence to the 
purposes of the program. These broad goals and the specific pledges, 
as set forth in the Administration bill, generally embodied the pledges 
previously adhered to by the participants in the CEEC Report, issued 
the previous year. Opponents of the ERP focused their attacks upon 
these provisions of the bill. The Administration and its supporters 
appealed against the legislation of humiliating, unrealistic, or
- impolitic conditions upon American aid which might nullify the ob-
57Jectives of the program.
57secretary Marshall, in his opening testimony to the Foreign 
Relations Committee, told the group that " . . .  We must always have 
in mind that we are dealing with democratic governments of sovereign 
nations . . . He urged that there could not be conditions placed 
on American aid " . . .  which would, in effect, destroy the whole moral 
justification for our cooperative assistance toward European partner­
ship," Ibid., Part 1, p. 6. Many suggestions were advanced as con­
ditions of American assistance. There were many demands for strict 
accounting and supervision of aid rendered as well as for a foolproof 
system for publicizing the source of the aid. An effort was ;nade to 
require the participating countries to demonstrate progress toward 
political or economic union as a condition of aid. The State Depart­
ment was pressed for reasons why the United States should not secure 
foreign military bases in return for economic assistance. Many Con­
gressmen did not accept the argument that to demand immediate repayment 
of United States assistance would negate the recovery effoit. As
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The question of who should he eligible for assistance under 
the recovery program was a matter of extreme delicacy for the Adminis­
tration, because of the growing American-Soviet dichotomy. If the aid 
legislation were to include any "anti-Soviet" overtones, it would be 
extremely vulnerable to Soviet propaganda in Western European countries, 
the theme of which was that the United States through its aggressive 
and unilateral policies was leading the world relentlessly toward an 
inevitable World War III. A war-devastated Europe was highly suscep­
tible to such propaganda. On the other hand, Congress and the American 
public increasingly were becoming militantly more "anti-Soviet" and
C Q
"anti-Communist". It was no easy task to devise arguments for
anti-Russian sentiment increased in the United States, there were ef­
forts to require that participating countries cease trading with the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European satellites. Repayment of Ameri­
can assistance with critical raw materials was demanded by many--both 
supporters and opponents. If the efforts of several Congressmen had 
been successful, the recipient governments would have been required to 
pledge the cessation of further nationalization and socialization 
measures. Ibid., Part 1 , pp. 36, 62-63, 203, 228, 290, 330, 368, 393, 
483; Ibid., Part 2 , pp. 57O-580, 617-618. House Foreign Affairs Com­
mittee, Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Re­
covery P'rogramT Part 1, pp. 174, 167, 228, 232,238, 260-262, 339, 343, 
443, 48o, 403-484, 487-489.
cQ
An April, 19̂ +8 Roper poll in England, Sweden, Switzerland, 
France, and Italy, on European attitudes regarding the underlying moti­
vations of the Marshall Plan, showed a majority of the respondents in 
each of these countries, with the exception of England, expressing the 
view that an American desire to prevent Europe's going Communist was 
the basic reason for the plan. A large group in each country thought 
the plan was motivated by an American desire to build friendships in 
case of war with the Soviet Union, Roper, pp. I82-I83. A February, 
1948 Gallup survey found 77 percent of its American respondents think­
ing the Soviet Union was attempting "to build herself up to be the 
ruling power of the world." Almond, p. 95» In June, 1948, a Fortune 
survey found small majorities favorable to the dispatching of American 
armed forces to France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, if this should be 
necessary to prevent absorption of these countries into the Soviet 
orbit0 Ibid., p. 99» On returning from a European tour in February,
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keeping ERP open to all European countries, including the Soviet 
Union and its satellites, and for maintaining at least a semblance 
of normal economic and political relations with a government openly 
antagonistic toward the recovery program and the United States. It 
was equally difficult for the Administration to urge that the re­
covery program be left open to any European country adhering to the 
objectives of the program and simultaneously oppose a concerted effort, 
led largely by Republicans, to include Spain as a participating country. 
As anti-Russian and anti-Communist fervor mounted, particularly after 
the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948, Administration 
efforts to preclude the injection of this bias into the ERP legislation 
evoked charges against it ranging from mere stupidity or appeasement 
to unqualified treason. The Yalta and Potsdam Agreements generated 
partisan strife during the Foreign Affairs Committee hearings as well 
as in the House debate. Neither subject was mentioned in the Senate 
committee hearings.
1948, United Nations' Secretary General Trygve Lie said he had found a 
"general fear of war" in Europe. New York Times, February 12, 1948, p. 
l8 . For European Communist efforts to keep fears of war aroused among 
the working population, see Ibid., March 31, 1948, p. 4.
59'^Although Secretary Marshall, early in the Senate hearings, 
accused the Soviet Union and European Communist parties of employing 
economic distress to further selfish political ends, he would not be 
led into the advocacy of other than economic solutions for Europe's 
problems. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United 
States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 1, pp. 3-4, Mar- 
8hall told Congressman Karl Mundt, who was pressing for an explanation 
of continued trading with the Soviet Union, that " . . .  our position 
... is that we have to be very careful that we do not upset ordinary 
trade relations which we desire, in order to stabilize the general 
situation. These are very pertinent considerations, whereas some of 
the proposals for termination of dealings with the Soviet Union would 
accomplish almost nothing except a profound irritation," As Secretary
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Another issue during the hearings was the form of the proffered 
American assistance. Should the main burden be shouldered by the Ameri­
can taxpayer, or should the European countries be assisted primarily 
through loans and other credits? The Administration contended that 
European credit was,exhausted, hence the necessity for the recovery 
program. Assistance would be extended on terms of repayment whenever 
possible, but hopes that a large part of the costs of the recoveiy pro­
gram would be repaid eventually were discouraged. American repayment 
would be manifested, if the program proved successful, in trade with a 
revitalized Europe and w o r l d - T h i s  aspect of the problem also in­
volved the total amount of funds to be authorized and appropriated by
of State, Marshall said he had "... endeavored to develop a basis of 
negotiation toward some reasonable settlement in all these matters. It 
is a very simple matter to break off negotiations, but it is a very 
serious thing to do it." House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings 
on United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program, Part 2 
pp. 1559; 1561. When the Yalta and Potsdam accords were brought into 
the discussions, Marshall defended the agreements, maintaining that the 
primary difficulty being encountered currently was that " . . .  of 
having people act in what we think is good faith with relation to those 
agreements." Ibid,, p. 1567. Congressman Walter Judd had precipitated 
this response with the declaration that the Yalta agreements were the 
source of the "mess" in which the United States found itself. Ibid, 
Following the delivery of a message by President Truman to a joint 
session of Congress on March 17; in which he again urged speedy Con­
gressional action on ERP, the Chicago Tribune denounced Truman as the 
"most inept and incompetent President this ,country has known . . . ." 
Secretary Marshall was described as " . . . the worst blunderer ever 
to occupy the office of Secretary of State . . . ." Senator Vandenberg 
was termed " . . .  that other monument of unfitness." New York Times, 
March I8 , 1948, p. 4. Similar sentiments were echoed in the ERP debates.
^OSenate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United 
States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 1, pp. 65-éê. See 
Ibid., Part 2, p. 547, for support of the Administration's position by 
John J. McCloy, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development.
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'Congress. This vas not determined finally until Congress had acted on 
the appropriation measure by which ERP would be implemented. There 
were many alternate schemes propounded, each of which was designed to 
reduce the amount of money required to be appropriated. Proponents of 
these plans argued that the original estimates had been inflated by 
either the Europeans or the State Department, or both; that fhe Europeans 
were not in as dire need as had been advocated; that private financial 
sources were not being given an opportunity to participate; that exist­
ing international agencies, such as the International Bank for Recon­
struction and Development, could extend more assistance in the situation; 
that other Western Hemisphere countries could contribute more to Euro­
pean recovery than was being contemplated; that the European countries 
possessed billions of dollars in hoarded gold and dollars and that their 
citizens possessed billions of dollars in investments in the United States 
which could be utilized in the recovery program.
With regard to the administration of United States assistance to 
European recovery, the Administration urged that;
... an effective organization must, as its paramount 
requirement, be granted flexibility both in its pro­
gramming operations and in the use of the funds placed 
at its disposal. The organization must operate in har­
mony with United States foreign policy. It must func­
tion during the life of the program with the continuity 
of policy essential to orderly progression toward recovery 
in Europe. It must command the respect and confidence of 
the American p e o p l e .
Gllbid., Part 1, pp. 30, 223-224, 291-293, 390-396, 516-518, 
52O-52I; Ibid.Part 2, pp. 5̂ 9, 712. House Committee on Foreign Af­
fairs, Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Re­
covery Program, Part 1, pp. 135-136, 182, 416-417'
62Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Outline of European 
Recovery Program, p. 55=
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Only through flexibility could United States support be kept responsive 
to changing conditions in Europe and to variable supply situations. At 
the same time, flexibility in operations would permit encouragement 
of maximum self-help and mutual help in Europe, insure the most ef­
fective use of American assistance and minimize its impact on the United 
econoiay. The Administration intended that normal trade channels would 
be used to the greatest extent practicable, but if Government procure­
ment were necessary the facilities of already-existing agencies would • 
be used. In fact, existing agencies would be used wherever possible 
throughout the program. The Administration insisted that foreign 
policy aspects of the program must be controlled and directed by the 
State Department. Since the program was very deeply involved in for­
eign policy, this meant that the State Department would "participate
actively" with the Economic Cooperation Administration in the formu-
6klation and execution of the program. In making loans or grants,
^^Ibid., pp. 55-56.
^^Ibid., p. 56. Early in the Senate hearings, Marshall pointed 
out that there "cannot be two Secretaries of State : , , ," He told the 
committee that he had argued against the contention of some persons 
within the Administration that EGA should be made a section of the State 
Department; however, he had concluded after considerable study that the 
Secretary of State should have both the direction and control of foreign 
policy under the EGA bill. He insisted that the State Department had 
neither the desire nor the capability to operate the recovery program. 
Senator Vandenberg did not disagree that the Secretary of State should 
have complete control of foreign policy; however, he insisted that the 
"economic side of the enterprise" should be in the hands of the Adminis­
trator. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United 
States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 1, pp. 9, I6-I7 , 
155-156, 166-192. The basic question involved in this controversy was 
who would determine which functions "affect" foreign policy--the Secre­
tary or the Administrator. Marshall thought that as much as 00 percent 
of the Administrator's activities would have no bearing on foreign 
policy, yet the Secretary of State must, in his opinion, be free to
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and in determining whether in a given situation aid should be in the 
form of a loan or a grant, the Administrator would be required to con­
sult with the National Advisory Council, composed of top Cabinet of­
ficials.^^ Although the ECA Administrator would exercise "management 
control" of the program, the actual procurement, transportation, and 
related operations would be performed by existing Government agencies. 
It was intended that the operating policies of ECA and the European 
Recovery Program be coordinated with the related activities of certain 
other Government agencies. For example, European requirements would 
have to be appraised in relation to United States and world resources, 
to the competing demands on these resources, and to the impact on 
domestic policies and programs. Sharing responsibilities in these 
areas were the Treasury Department, Agriculture, Commerce, Interior,
determine those instances where he must either take the initiative or 
disapprove a contemplated act of the Administrator. Under the bill as 
written, the Administrator still would be authorized to carry disputes 
to the President. This was not satisfactory to those who maintained 
that there should be a clear delineation between the "business" and 
"foreign policy" sides of the enterprise. House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Re­
covery Program, Part: 1, pp. 45-51. That most of the pressure for an 
administration of the recovery program "independent" of the State De­
partment came from Republican sources led to speculation that this was 
an attempt by the Republican Party to become identified with the pro--- 
gram in a constructive sense even though remaining free to be critical. 
New York Times, January 6, 1948, pp. 1,13; To id., January 11, 1948, B3« 
The original plan of administration was drafted by an interdepartmental 
committee and revised by the Bureau of the Budget. Reportedly, the 
final plan was unsatisfactory to several State Department officials, 
including Under Secretary Lovett, but received the President's approval. 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on United States Foreign 
Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program, Part 1, p. 52; New York Times, 
February 12, 1948, p. 22.
°5senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Outline of European 
Recovery Program, p. 56.
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Army, Labor, and others. Exports would continue to be controlled by 
the Commerce and Agriculture Departments, The Administration viewed 
functions in Europe under the program as of both a technical nature 
and a broader, political, nature. As such, these activities would be 
"essentially an extension of the conduct of the relationship of the 
United States to the participating country concerned . . . ." There­
fore, and in order to maintain a
single channel of responsibility for United States 
negotiations with other governments, all operations 
in individual countries . . . should be placed 
within the embassies, and subject to the general 
supervision of the ambassadors.
In each major participating country, there would be a "chief economic 
cooperation officer", under the ambassador. They would report to the 
ECA through State Department communications channels, with cop'ies sent 
to the ambassador. State, and other agencies as appropriate. Like­
wise, Instructions to these officers would come from ECA through State 
Department communications channels. On all matters affecting foreign 
policy. State Department views would be expressed. The Special United 
States Representative for the ERP would report jointly to the ECA and
the State Department and receive his instructions jointly from these. 66 agencies.
The essence of the opposition to the plan for administering ERP
^^Ibid., pp. 56-57* The original plan of administration was ob­
jectionable to the Republicans (and to some Democrats) also on the 
grounds that the European representatives of ECA would be subservient 
to the State Department. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hear­
ings on United States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 
1, pp. 150-100,173-104. See also New York Times, January 6, 1940,
pp. 1,13.
2hi
lay simply in the fact that it was "tied" too closely to the State 
Department. At this time, State was being subjected to increasingly 
severe attacks from many sources: from the isolationists who wanted
no part of foreign aid, from the China "lobby" for State's alleged 
desertion of Nationalist China, from the anti-Communists for its al­
leged appeasement of Soviet Russia, and from the Communists and their 
sympathizers for an alleged undeviating antagonism toward the Soviet 
U n i o n . I n  addition, ERP did possess certain characteristics of a 
business operation,., even though it had been designed primarily as a 
tool of United States foreign policy. Thus, conservatives in general 
and business or business-oriented groups challenged the ability of 
the State Department to execute effectively a "business" program such 
as ERP. These groups charged most frequently that with State Depart­
ment direction of the program all "sound" principles of business and 
economics would be disregarded in any conflict with State's estimation 
of the proper course of United States foreign policy. Previous aid 
programs, involving billions of dollars, were described as evidence 
of the State Department's inability to direct and control an enter­
prise as massive and potentially dangerous to the domestic economy, 
as ERP.^®
The Administration concurred that ERP did possess certain
"̂̂ House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on United States 
Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program, Part 1, pp. 6̂ 2, 682-683, 
1075; Ibid. . Part 2. p p . 1411-1419, 1581-1625. 1678-I68O, I697-I702,
1796, 1898.
Â—,— a.g., see testimony of Henry J. Taylor, author ana journaixeu, 
before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on United States 
Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 2, pp. 779-800•
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"business" characteristics. Senator Vandenberg agreed that there could 
not be "two Secretaries of State". He argued, however, that for there 
to be any hope of a successful outcome to this foreign aid venture the 
Administrator could not be hamstrung as provided in the Administration 
bill. Not at all satisfied, he engaged the Brookings Institution to 
perform an independent study of the administrative aspects of the re­
covery program, with instructions that it make its own recommendations 
as to the most appropriate administrative mechanism for EBP. 9̂
Because of the so-called "business" characteristics of ERP, 
a considerable amount of sentiment developed for organizing the aid 
program under a corporate form of administration, obviously because 
of the association of this type of management with the successes of 
the American free-enterprise system. During the hearings, several 
variants of the corporate form were proposed. The plan receiving 
the most Congressional support was advanced by Congressman Christian
A. Herter (R., Mass.), who had been the active head of the House 
Select Committee on Foreign Aid. Possibly because of the rivalry be­
tween Chairman Eaton, of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and Herter, 
the latter’s plan did not receive serious consideration as an alter­
native. Herter's plan suffered, also, because it would have removed 
ECA from the direct control of both the President and State Depart­
ment and placed it under a bipartisan board, with coordination by a 
Cabinet group. Another obvious failure of the Herter plan was its 
reliance on assistance primarily through loans from sources other than
69 ,Ibid., Part 1, p. 74.
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appropriations. In short, it was "relief-oriented" rather than
70"recovery-oriented". Congress could not consistently approve another
relief program while maintaining its desire to bring such programs to
an eventual end through better planning, organization, and utilization
71of United States foreign assistance. Unfortunately for the Herter 
plan, also, was Mr. Herter's association with an effort to create a 
special joint Congressional committee to oversee the administration of 
United States assistance. Powerful interests in the House were of­
fended by this proposal inspired by the Harriman Committee and sup­
ported by Senator Vandenberg who, for tactical reasons, suggested
72Herter as its logical head.
In such an undertaking as the prospective recovery program,
a basic issue to be resolved related to the effect of the program on
the domestic economy and natural resources of the United States. Much
70u. S. Senate, The European Recovery Program; Basic Documents 
and Background Information, pp. 132-I35.
7̂ This was one of the declared reasons for the decision by the 
House majority leadership to have its Foreign Affairs Committee embark 
on a comprehensive study of the foreign aid problem rather than con­
fine its inquiry to ERP. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings 
on United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War Recovery Program, Part 
1, p. 90j ^ d . ,  Part 2, pp. 1555-1559.
"̂ Ĥerter had created a certain following for his position in 
the House. Although his plan was less generous than that of the Ad­
ministration, Herter was committed to the aid principle. Reportedly, 
he worked closely with Senators Vandenberg and Lodge during the forma­
tive stages of the ERP bill. Several of Herter’s ideas were incor­
porated into the Senate version of ERP, at the urging of Lodge. To 
curtail Herter's opposition to the recommended ERP appropriation, Van­
denberg urged Herter's appointment as chairman of the aid "watchdog" 
committee. Although Speaker Martin was agreeable to this proposal, 
Chairman Taber of the House Appropriations Committee and Chairman Eaton 
of Foreign Affairs scathingly denounced the proposed intrusion into the 
preserves of their standing committees. New York Times, February 16, 
1948, pp. 1,3; Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 3; 3051-3852=
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of the data accumulated by the Administration was intended to buttress 
its contention that the 'recovery program might have some minor ill- 
effectc on the domestic economy but that the program was absolutely 
essential if this country were to enjoy a healthy economy in the years' 
ahead. If Europe were to be left in economic desperation then ulti­
mately this deleterious situation would engulf the United States and 
the world. Economic chaos in Europe would eventuate in political 
chaos and totalitarian solutions. In such a world, the economic and 
political freedoms enjoyed in the United States might of necessity 
have to give way to some form of regimentation.Opponents argued, 
on the other hand, that even in the short-term period the program 
would lead to economic and ultimately to political controls. Doubts 
were expressed that American resources were sufficient to fulfill the
requirements of European recovery without causing the American people
ik-to undergo extreme sacrifices. In general, organized American labor 
expressed a more optimistic outlook regarding America's ability to 
undertake the aid program than did American business and industrial 
interests appearing before the Senate and House committees. This is 
especially interesting, in view of Communist charges that the program 
was a Wall Street conspiracy to colonialize the participating European 
countries. In fairness to American business, however, it should be
73•̂ Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United 
States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 1% pp. 4-5, 10, 
36, 56-67, 245-249, 256, 275-276, 354-357, 0̂9; kkk.
'̂^Ibid.. pp. 56-57* Although not opposed to the principle of 
European aid, former President Hoover expressed several reservations, 
among which was the fear that the program would accelerate inflation 
and drain America's natural resources. Ibid., Part 2, p. 708.
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pointed out that the vast majority of their representatives endorsed 
the recovery program; in varying degrees of enthusiasm and vith vary- 
ing recommendations for conditions to he placed on American aid.
It was not unexpected that certain interests would view the re­
covery program as a means for the enhancement of their own situations. 
Thus the committees were subjected to the entreaties of the shipping 
interests, the seamen and their friends in organized labor generally, 
and the freight handling organizations, to eliminate the provisions 
from the bill authorizing the charter or sale of Government-owned mer­
chant vessels to the participating nations. The Administration main­
tained that since the United States had an excess of such vessels to 
its needs, a large savings could be realized by transferring a number 
of these vessels to the participating nations for transporting aid 
materials. The shipping interests and organized labor stoutly objected 
to this reasoning, maintaining that this would not only give the Euro­
peans a preference in the lucrative hauling of aid materials, but also
^̂ Also, labor representatives tended generally to place less 
emphasis on the conditions to be placed on American aid, to urge prompt 
enactment of the ERP legislation in at least the amount requested, and 
to stress the economic aspects of the problem confronting Europe. The 
American Federation of Labor expressed a more nationalistic view than 
did the Congress of Industrial Organizations and its affiliated unions. 
Although the Communist Party (USA) was not represented personally before 
either committee, it submitted a statement in which it denounced the 
program. Former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, who appeared before 
the House committee in a very hostile setting, expressed views at little 
variance from the Communist position. See statements of Harvey W. Brown 
(international Association of Machinists), William Green (AFL), James
B..Carey and Phillip Murray (CIO), Walter Reuther (United Automobile 
Workers-CIO), in Ibid., Part 2, pp. 724-727, 833-836; Ibid., Part 3, PP- 
1297-1304, 1386-1395. For statement of Wallace, see House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for a Post-War 
Recovery Program, Part 2, pp. 1581-1625.
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would release European vessels for an intensification of the competition 
with American shipping in other areas of the world. The meager savings 
resulting from the proposed action could not justify the destruction of 
the American merchant marine and loss of employment for thousands of 
Americans. It was not denied that the American merchant marine existed 
in large part through Government subsidies because of its higher operating 
costs in relation to the merchant fleets of other countries and its re­
sultant inability to compete successfully. The United States Maritime 
Commission, an agency of the Executive branch, intervened openly and 
vehemently in denouncing the charter and sale provisions of the Adminis­
tration bill. It is testimony to the strength of the maritime industry 
to note that not only was this provision defeated but also the industry 
was given a preferred position in the. transportation of recovery program 
supplies and materials.
Since food was of critical importance in the initial stages of 
the recovery program, the committees heard explanations of how European 
recovery and the food producing and processing industries simultaneously 
could be benefitted by the program's enactment. American agriculture 
had undergone a tremendous expansion during the war in meeting the re­
quirements of America and its allies. Even in the postwar period pro­
duction remained higher than normal because of world-wide food shortages. 
By 1$48, however, the world-wide dollar shortage was causing surplus
'̂^Ibid., Part 1, pp. 912-919, IO96-IO9 8, II63-IITO; Ibid., Part 
2, pp. 1391-1^00, 1821, 2004, 2265-2281; Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Outline of European Recover:, Program, pp. 91-93; Senate Com­
mittee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United States Assistance to 
European Economic Recovery, Part 2, p. 836; Ibid., Part 3, PP. 1034-
1038, 1211-1213, 1282-1287, 1302-1304.
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problems in American agriculture. The European Recovery Program,
/
therefore, offered a solution to the problems of surplus and con­
tinued high production. Appearing before the committees were rep­
resentatives of the major agricultural organizations as well as re­
lated interests such as wool, tobacco, naval stores, fruit, and farm
77machinery. Their missionary efforts were, for the most part, suc­
cessful. It was interesting to note that less sympathy toward the 
problems of agriculture, food processing, the merchant marine, and 
other special interests was manifested by the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee than by its Senate counterpart. Nevertheless, the House 
friends of these special interests were much more influential than
78were their critics on the Foreign Affairs Committee.
It would be unfair to single out the agriculture and food 
processing industries and the merchant marine as being the only
77Agriculture Secretary Clinton P. Anderson candidly outlined 
the benefits to be realized from ERP by American agriculture, empha­
sizing the general importance of the European market to American farm 
products. He also frankly recognized that ERP was a blessing for certain 
areas of agriculture plagued with problems of surplus, such as tobacco 
and fruit, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United 
States Assistance to European Economic Recovery, Part 1, pp. 303-32̂ .
H. J. Heinz II, president of the H. J. Heinz Co., urged "prompt enact­
ment" of ERP. Ibid., p. 908. See also Ibid. . pp. 928-933, 1115-1127, 
for support of the National Farmers Union, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation, and the National Grange.
78Although a supporter of ERP, Congressman John Vorys, of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, displayed little sympathy toward the 
importunings of the special pleaders appearing before that committee, 
usually bluntly informing such representatives of his sentiments. House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearings on United States Foreign Policy for 
a Post-War Recovery Program, Part 1 , p. 88I. Another influential member 
of the committee, Minnesotan Walter Judd, was equally as candid. Al­
though the sentiments of Vorys and Judd dominated in the committee re­
port, they were overruled in the House itself. Ibid., p. 919*
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interest groups who came before the committees with missions other 
than expressions of endorsement of or opposition to the recovery 
program. There were others, whose messages perhaps were more subtle. 
For example, if Congress had followed the recommendations of the 
National Association of Manufacturers the recipients of American aid 
would have been required to make "internal reforms" of an economic and 
political nature, as conditions of aid, which might have been inter­
preted as a renunciation of sovereignty. On the other extreme, any 
conditions in regard to the use of American aid were regarded by 
Henry'Wallace, the Communists,and a few labor and ultra-liberal groups
as patent attempts to dominate the economic and political lives of the
79recipient nations.
^^Although professing support for ERP and espousing "political 
and economic freedoms for the various peoples of the world", the NAM 
advocated that the ERP be administered by a corporation, composed of 
representatives from the major segments of the American economy, which 
would " . . .  operate in a businesslike manner and with careful busi­
ness safeguards . . . ." As conditions of American aid, the NAM would 
demand equal treatment for American businesses operating in the 
recipient countries, prohibit aid where "confiscatory" taxes were 
levied on United States exports or on the assets of United States 
nationals, require that aid recipients make all aid-related purchases 
in the United States or within the recipient countries, deny aid to 
countries where the property of United States nationals had been 
confiscated without "prompt" and "effective" compensation, prohibit 
the undertaking of further nationalization programs or projects which 
"destroy" or "impair" private competitive enterprise, guarantee exist­
ing enterprises autonomy from "detailed political control", extend aid 
to private enterprise rather than to governments, prohibit cartel ar­
rangements, and eliminate all internal economic controls. Republican 
Senator Smith (N. J.) considered the NAM proposals an'effort to impose 
the American economic system on the participating nations. Senator 
Tom Connally (D., Tex.) reacted indignantly to the NAM's emphasis on 
the "business" aspects of ERP and the necessity for conducting the re­
covery program on a "businesslike" basis "by businessmen", stating ". . . 
I don’t like the idea of their segregating themselves off into a higher 
group with higher preferences and higher sense and more knowledge about 
all these public questions than the rest of us . . . ." Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Hearings on United States Assistance to European 
Economic Recovery, Part 2, pp, 805-827.
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The role to be played by Germany in the reconstruction pro­
gram aroused much concern throughout the hearings and debates. The 
Administration contemplated an important role for Germany in the pro­
gram. In fact, the disastrous effect upon European postwar recon­
struction of the sick, truncated Germany had contributed significantly 
to the initial formulation of the Marshall Plan for European recovery.
In the growing anti-Communist atmosphere of 19k8, there were insistent 
demands from Congress, in particular from the House, that the Adminis­
tration re-evaluate its German policies. There were demands for a 
cessation of the dismantling and reparations programs as being incon­
sistent with the overall objectives of European reconstruction. A 
planned transfer of occupation administration functions from the Army 
to the State Department was delayed because of Congressional opposition. 
The Administration had to balance its objectives of European recon­
struction with other political considerations. Most importantly, it 
had to respect the general fears among Germany's neighbors of the 
possible threats inherent in German revival. Thus the Administration 
strongly maintained that its agreements regarding German dismantling
and reparations not only would not hinder German or European recovery
80but instead would promote such recovery. Any efforts by the United 
States to revive the German economy were expected to and did provoke 
bitter criticisms not only from the Communists but also from the
80A State Department memorandum was prepared on the subject of 
German dismantling and reparations in response to H. Res. 3̂ 5, adopted 
by the House of Representatives on December I8 , 19̂ 7* The lengthy 
memorandum was dispatched to Speaker Martin, Senators Vandenberg and 
Bridges, and Representatives Eaton and Taber, on January 2k, 19^.
Ibid., Part 1, pp. k97-503.
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minority groups who had suffered most from Hitler’s Germany. Among 
other charges arising from such quarters was that the Marshall Plan 
was merely an "extension" of the Truman Doctrine, a reference con-
O'!noting the utmost opprobrium. The Administration had recognized the 
negative aspects of the Truman Doctrine and had endeavored to make 
compensations in the Marshall Plan. Its effort was not made easier by 
those supporters of the Marshall Plan who viewed it as a continuation 
of the policy announced in the Truman Doctrine. The Administration 
endeavored to dispel any impressions that the European Recovery Pro­
gram was directed against the Soviet Union. The Administration’s 
position was difficult to sustain, however, in view of the mounting 
pressures in Congress for increased arms expenditures, cessation of 
trade between the prospective beneficiaries of ERP and the satellite 
states of Eastern Europe and even between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, or for some form of military alliance between the United 
States and the recipient Western European nations. Even when expressed 
in the most sophisticated terms, the Soviet Union could not view with 
equanimity such manifestations of American sentiment.
Of the many groups represented before the two Congressional
ftlHenry Wallace described ERP as a "new version of the thoroughly 
discredited Truman Doctrine . . . .  It will not fight hunger but per­
petuate it. ERP will not promote recovery but indefinitely postpone it. 
ERP sets European living standards below prewar standards, while it seeks 
to revive Germany as the great industrial center of a European military 
bloc, and would restore the power of the European monopolists and land­
owners over the people of Europe. ERP would open western Europe to the 
control of Wall Street. It sidesteps and will destroy the United Nations. 
It would increase, not diminish international friction . . . ." House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on United States Foreign Policy 
for a Post-War Recovery Program, Part 2, pp. 1581-I582.
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committees, and the numerous individuals representing only themselves, 
only a small minority expressed outright opposition to the recovery 
program. Even some of this opposition ostensibly could have been re­
versed by acceptance of certain conditions. For example, the groups 
appearing on behalf of Irish-Americans (and Irish unity) voiced their 
unalterable opposition to the program so long as Great Britain was a
82beneficiary. Even the American Communists profferred support for 
an aid program administered in its entirety by the United Nations. 
During the hearings the following groups and individuals expressed 
opposition to ERP: Irish-Americans (several groups); George Weller,
foreign correspondent, Chicago Daily News; William E, Knox, president, 
Westinghouse International Electric Corporation; George H. Earle, 
former Governor of Pennsylvania; Owen J. Roberts, former Justice of the 
United States Supreme Court; the Communist Party (USA); the National
Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards (CIO); Henry A. Wallace, former
Vice President of the United States; Ernest T. Weir, National Steel 
Corporation; William Glazier, International Longshoremen's and Ware­
housemen's Union; John B. Trevor, American Coalition of Patriotic 
Societies; the National Lawyers Guild; the Illinois Manufacturers' 
Association; the Committee for Constitutional Government, Inc.; and 
the American Labor Party. A few Congressmen also appeared in op­
position to the program.®^ Although the opposition expressed by these
^^Ibid., Part 1, p. 98 .̂
^3ibid., Part 2, p. 1̂ +39*
^^Ibid., Part 1, pp. 98k, 1075-1077; 1111-1117, 1223-1226;
Ibid., Part 2, pp. 1354-1355, 1433-14-38, 1538-1543, 158I-1582, 1678- 
1703, 2003-2004, 2105-2110, 2112-2123. Senate Foreign Relations
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individuals and groups was based upon varied philosophical grounds, 
the most important point to be noted in connection with these op­
ponents was. the fact of their insignificant number— fifteen, as com­
pared to the ninety-eight individuals speaking for themselves or for 
various organizations in overwhelming support of the European Recovery 
Program. In addition, several members of the House appeared before
O'—
the Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the program.
Committee, Hearings on United States Assistance to European Economic 
Recovery, Part 2, pp. 933-935; Ibid.. Fart 3; PP* 1023-1026, 1106-ÎÏÔ^
®^Expressing support of ERP were John J. McCloy, President, 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Bernard Baruch; 
John Foster Dulles; Eugene Meyer, Chairman of the Board, The Washing­
ton Post; Charles R. Hook, President, American Rolling Mills Co., 
Middleton, Ohio; Dr. George F. Zook, President, American Council on 
Education; Mrs. Kathryn F. Stone, League of Women Voters of the United 
States; James P. O'Neill, National Commander, the American Legion; Ray
H. Brannaman, Commander-In-Chief, Veterans of Foreign Wars; Ray Sawyer, 
American Veterans of World War II; Owen Root and Chet Patterson, Ameri­
can Veterans Committee; General William J. Donovan; Harvey W. Brown, 
International Association of Machinists; Mrs. Margaret F, Stone, Na­
tional Women's Trade Union League of America; Luther Gulick, National 
Planning Association; Ralph McGill, The Atlanta Constitution; Robert 
P. Patterson, former Secretary of War; William Green, President, Ameri­
can Federation of Labor; Dr. Calvin B. Hoover, Dean, Graduate School, 
Duke University; Paul G, Hoffman and Wayne 0. Taylor, Committee for 
Economic Development; Professor Mildred B. Northrop, Women's Action 
Committee for Lasting Peace; Mrs. Donald R. Burgess and Professor Mabel 
Newcomer, American Association of University Women; Mrs. J. L. Blair 
Buck, General Federation of Women's Clubs; Herbert H. Lehman, American 
Jewish Committee; Paul A. Porter and David D. Lloyd, Americans for 
Democratic Action; H. J. Heinz II, H. J. Heinz Co.; R. W. Gifford, 
Chairman of the Board, Borg-Warner International Corporation; James 
G. Fktton, National Farmers Union; Clark M. Eichelberger, American 
Association for the UN; George C. Tenney, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co. 
of California; Norman Thomas, Socialist Party; Mrs. Joseph Willen, 
National Oounc il of Jewish Women; Bernard We it zer, Jewish War Veterans 
of the USA; Railway Labor Executives Association; Robert M. LaFollette, 
former U. S. Senator; Catholic Association for International Peace;
John Ben Shepperd, President, U. S. Junior Chamber of Commerce; William 
P. Brooks, North American Export Grain Association; Marvin J. Coles and 
William D. Davies, Foreign Freight Forwarders and Brokers Association
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So as to dispel any Impression that the support tendered the 
recovery program blind, unquestioning, or completely altruistic, 
it should be pointed out that in the majority of cases each supporter 
had very definite views in respect to such important questions as: why 
the aid was needed; the amount and duration of the assistance; how the 
aid should be administered; the conditions, if any, to be attached to 
American aid; the quid pro quo, if any, the United States should receive 
in exchange for its aid; whether aid should be primarily in the form 
of loans or grants; the proper degree of American supervision over the 
aid; the urgency, or lack thereof, in connection with the aid request; 
whether the United States should commit itself to the life of the program
of New York; James H, Sheldon and Edgar Ansel Mowrer, Socielyfor Pre­
vention of World War III; Frazer A. Bailey, National Federation of 
American Shipping, Inc.; Allan B. Kline, American Farm Bureau Fed­
eration; J, T. Sanders, National Grange; James D. Zellerbach, Crown 
Zellerbach Corp.; James M. Reed, American Friends Committee; Chatles P. 
Taft, The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America; Lewis H. 
Brown, Johns Manville Co,; J, R, Gorraley, Pacific Coast Marine, Fire­
men, Oilers, Water Tenders and Wipers Association; American Turpentine 
Farmers’ Association Cooperative, Valdosta, Ga.; Russell E. Brown, In­
dependent Petroleum Association of America; Ely Culbertson, Citizens 
Committee for United Nations Reform, Inc.; Harry Lundeberg, Seafarers 
International Union of North America, and Sailors Union of the Pacific 
(AFL); James B. Carey and Phillip Murray, Congress of Industrial Organi­
zations; Joseph Curran, National Maritime Union; Dr. Ronald Bridges, 
Council for Social Action of the Congregational Christian Churches of 
the United States; Paul M. Mulliken, National Retail Farm Equipment 
Association; David A, Bunn, National Intercollegiate Christian Council; 
Walter Reuther, United Automobile Workers (CIO); The People's Lobby; 
Benjamin A, Javits, attorney. New York City; New York State Bar As­
sociation; National Federation of Business and Professional Women's 
Clubs; Veterans Political Committee, Inc.; Export Managers Club, New 
York City; National Board of the YMCA's, USA; Northwest Horticultural 
Council, Wenatchee, Washington; Dried Fruit Association, San Francisco, 
and California Fruit Growers Exchange, Los Angeles; General Assembly 
of Kentucky; Walter White, National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People; Mrs, Kathryn Lee Marshall, Women's International League 
for Peace and Freedom; William Batt, industrialist, Philadelphia (Pa.)
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as proposed by the Administrâtionj the relationship of the recovery 
program to the United Nations and to the concept of collective security; 
whether the program should be open to all countries agreeing to cooperate 
in achieving the overall objectives; the possible effects of the pro­
gram on the American domestic economy and its natural resources; the 
position of Germany in the recovery program; and the ultimate goals 
of the European Recovery Program, i.e., whether positive, in the sense 
of creating a more prosperous and peaceful world, or negative, in the 
sense of emphasizing the Soviet-American dichotomy an^the national
Chamber of Commerce; Philip D. Reed, Chairman of the Board, General 
Electric Co.; Dean Acheson, former Under Secretary of State; Elliott 
Wadsworth, International Chamber of Commerce; Capt. W. C. Ash, Na­
tional Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots of America; Robert 
P, Koenig, Ayrshire Collieries Corp., Indianapolis; Ruth E. Manning, 
Catholic War Veterans of the USA; Florida Citrus Commission; Dr. Win­
field W. Riefler, Institute of Advanced International Studies, Prince­
ton; Hoyt S. Haddock, CIO Maritime Committee; George Baldanzi, Textile 
Workers Union of America (CIO); A, G. Bryant, National Machine Tool 
Builders’ Association; New Jersey State Federation of Women's Clubsj 
Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Executive Secretary, The President's Com­
mittee on Foreign Aid; Allen W, Dulles; National Association of Wool 
Manufacturers; National Society of Professional Engineers; Edwin B. 
George, economist. Dun and Bradstreet; Alumni Association of Merchant 
Marine Cadet Corps; and Professor John H. Williams, Harvard University. 
In regard to the following persons, support was so conditioned 6s to 
change the effect of the program from "recovery" to "relief", to em­
phasize loans or repayment,to the extent of nullifying the purposes 
of the program, to require internal political or economic reforms in 
the recipient nations which might have been unacceptable to sovereign 
states, or otherwise to indicate support so lukewarm as to constitute 
opposition to the Administration's proposal: Henry Hazlitt, Newsweek 
Magazine; former President Herbert Hoover (who later altered his posi- 
tion); Henry J. Taylor, journalist and author; Curtis E. Calder and 
Herbert H. Schell, National Association of Manufacturers; Robert F. 
Loree, National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.; Earl 0. Schreve, Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States; True D. Morse, Doane Agricultural 
Service, Inc.; Hamilton Fish, former Congressman, New York; 0. K. Arm­
strong, writer; Long Beach, Calif., Chamber of Commerce; Carl B. 
Fritsche, Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.) Tuscaloosa, Ala. and Detroit,
Mich.; Clarence K. Streit, Washington, D. C.; Foreign Traders Assn. 
of Philadelphia; and Merwin K. Hart, National Economic Council, Inc.
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security aspects of the program.
The Committee Versions of E:RP 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously reported 
its version of the "Economic Cooperation Act of 19̂ +8" to the Senate 
on February 2J. It was not until March 20 that the House Foreign Af­
fairs Committee submitted to the House the "Foreign Assistance Act of 
19̂ 8". The latter contained provisions not only for the European 
Recovery Program (Title I) but also for the International Children's 
Emergency Fund (Title II); military aid to Greece, Turkey and China 
(Title III); and economic aid to China (Title IV).
The Foreign Relations Committee placed major emphasis on the 
economic basis of Europe's problems, although recognizing that recon­
struction was being impeded by "subversive elements". However, it 
urged that all European countries, including the Soviet Union and its 
Eastern European satellites, be encouraged to participate in the re­
covery program,^? The Foreign Affairs Committee, on the other hand,
viewed the "Communist menace" as the underlying reason for continuing
88and expanding American foreign aid programs. Given these contrary
 — -  -  -̂--------------------------------------------
S., Congress,House, committee on Foreign Affairs, A Bill To
Promote the General Welfare, National Interest, and Foreign Policy of the 
United States Through Necessary Economic and Financial Assistance to For­
eign Countries Which Undertake To Cooperate with Each Other in the Estab­
lishment and Maintenance of Economic Conditions Essential to a Peaceful 
and Prosperous World, 80th Cong., 2nd Sees., 1948, House Report No. 1585 
on 8.2202, p. 1, in House Miscellaneous Reports, II (Washington: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1948). Cited hereafter as House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 1585 on 3. 2202.
GTSenate Foreign Relations Committee, Report No. 935, ... on 
ths_ î^o2ean _̂Rscovê r_Progrwu, pp. 1, 4-8, 8, 13-1"t.
ÛÛ
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 1585 on
8.2202, pp. 1-5.
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views of the basic cause of the European crisis,it might have been 
expected that the t-'ro committees would arrive at different solutions 
to the problem. The major difference between the two, however, was 
the insistence of the House group upon placing military aid provisions 
in an omnibus aid measure. In regard to the European Recovery Program, 
the House committee reflected a more pessimistic overall view of the 
proposal than did the Senate committee, although it basically accepted 
the Administration plan as altered by the Foreign Relations Committee 
and then by the Senate itself,
The most significant difference between the original European 
recovery proposal submitted by the Administration and the bills reported 
by the Congressional committees was in the area of administering the aid 
progtam. The pattern was set by Vandenberg's committee and accepted by 
the House committee. Arguments for the creation of an independent cor­
poration to administer the aid program were rejected by the Senate com­
mittee on grounds that the program was too Important and its impact on 
other agencies of government would be too great for it to be administered 
by other than an "integral part" of the Executive branch on a par with 
Cabinet departments.^^ The Administrator was given direct access to the 
President and was made independent of the Secretary of State in respect 
to the formulation and execution of the plans under the program. It was 
required that these two officials should consult one another in regard
®%enate passage of S.2202 came on March 13•
^^he Foreign Affairs Committee inserted a provision authorizing 
the Administrator to create a corporation to conduct the "business 
operations" of the program, if he determined the need. House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. I585 on S.2202, pp. 42=̂ 3.
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to foreign policy matters. Any conflicts which could not be resolved 
between them would be referred to the President for ultimate decision. 
Personnel were to be selected by the Administrator and responsible to 
him. Within the participating countries, the chiefs of the recovery 
program missions were to be second-in-rank to the chiefs of the regular 
diplomatic missions. They were to be appointed by the Administrator 
and responsible to him. The Special Representative in Europe was given 
the primary responsibility of representing the United States before the 
permanent organization to be created by the participating countries.
In addition, he would be a "roving ambassador", performing duties as­
signed by the Administrator. He would be required to keep the Secre­
tary of State, the Administrator, the chiefs of the special missions,
91and the chiefs of the diplomatic missions informed of his activities. 
Both committees agreed that the head of EGA " . . .  must be an able ad­
ministrator, a dynamic leader, and cooperative in his approach to other 
agencies.Whereas the Administration bill had made assistance to 
the EGA by other Government agencies contingent upon the consent of 
the heads of those agencies, the Senate committee provided that the 
President could "direct" other agencies to provide EGA with needed
personnel, facilities, etc. The House committee endorsed this amend- 
93ment.
^^Senate Foreign Relations Gommittee, Report No. 935, > • • 
on the European Recovery Program, pp. l4-l8.
9 ]̂H3id., p. 15.
^^House Gommittee on Foreign Affairs, Report No. 1585 on S.2202, 
pp. 44-47.
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Both committees recommended a total of $5*3 hillion for the
initial tvelve months of the recoveî '- program. The Senate committee
recommended that the entire amount be provided through appropriations,
whereas the House group provided that $1 billion of the total would
come from the Export-Import Bank, whose lending authority would be mn-
Ol|.creased to that extent. Under the Senate committee’s version of the
recovery legislation, only one authorization measure would be necessary
for the life of the program. Annual reviews of the program would be
95held in conjunction with the appropriation requests.The Foreign 
Affairs Committee rejected this approach, requiring instead annual 
Congressional authorizations as well as appropriations,^^
Provision for a bipartisan Joint Committee on Foreign Economic 
Cooperation, to conduct a continuing study of United States foreign 
aid programs, was made by the Senate committee.Jealous of its pre­
rogatives, the Foreign Affairs Committee unceremoniously deleted this 
98provision.
Of the two committees, the Senate group was much more charitable
^^At least one-half of the $1 billion was to be used for loans 
to the participants. This ms viewed as a concession to Congressman 
Herter, who believed that loans should be used rather than grants wherever 
possible. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
95senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report No. 935, • • • on the 
European Recovery Program, pp. 49-50.
9^House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 1585 on
5.2202, pp. 40, 42.
9?Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report Ho. 935, . . . on 
European Recovery Program, p. 19.
^®House Committee on Foreign Affairs, House Report No. 1585 on
8.2202, p. 42.
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toward the specific program and requirements advanced by the Adminis­
tration. Although the House committee made few major changes in the 
legislation it received from the Senate, it availed itself of the op­
portunity presented in submitting its report to criticize the Adminis­
tration for its operation of past foreign aid programs and for their 
piecemeal presentation to Congress, Similarly, the Administration was 
criticized for its management of German recovery. It considered that 
the Administration had been too conservative with regard to its estimates 
of assistance which could be provided from sources other than the 
American taxpaying public. Frequent allusions to the utter futility 
of determining the "exact size" of the program, and thus its exact
impact on the United States economy, no doubt bolstered to some extent
99the Congressional opposition to the recovery program. The Senate com­
mittee, on the other hand, commended the Administration for the thor­
oughness of its effort in preparing the recovery program for submission 
to Congress and its committees. Similarly, the committee endorsed the 
methods used by the Executive branch in determining the requirements 
of the CEEC nations. The funds requested by the Administration to finance 
the European requirements were considered an extremely "tight fit".
Little apprehension was evidenced of the nation's ability to sustain
100the recovery program.
Slightly different positions were taken'by the two committees 
with regard to the right of the United States to receive some repayment
^^Ibid., pp. 5-7 , 19-22.
^^^Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report No. 935i = . = on 
the European Recovery Program, pp. 1, 4-6, 21, 32.
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for its assistance to the European nations. The Foreign Relations 
Committee agreed with the Administration that the United States should 
not demand or expect to receive "strategic" stockpiling materials in 
return for its assistance.The Foreign Affairs Committee, on the 
other hand, inserted provisions designed to guarantee that the United 
States at least would be assured its "equitable share" of strategic 
materials "at world market prices".
Both committees agreed with the Administration, despite evidence
of overwhelming Congressional disapproval of the position taken, that
savings could be realized in the recovery program through a provision
for chartering or selling surplus Government-owned merchant vessels
to the participating countries for the transportation of recovery pro-
10'̂gram materials and goods.
Both committees rejected arguments for placing extreme conditions 
on the assistance provided by the United States to the participating 
nations. The Foreign Relations Committee, at Senator Vandenberg’s in­
sistence, included a provision cautioning that the continuance of 
United States aid would depend upon the continued efforts of the par­
ticipating countries to achieve the objectives of a joint recovery 
program as pledged by them at Paris in 19^7-^^^ A provision Inserted
^O^Ibld., pp. 35-36.
^O^Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 3, 3891*
^03genate Foreign Relations Committee, Report No. 935, ... on 
the European Recovery Progr^, pp. 36-37; House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee, House Report No. 1565 on S.2202, p. 35*
lO^Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report No. 935, ... on 
the European Recovery Program, pp= 3̂-̂ =̂
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by the House committee, which was designed to prevent Soviet Russia 
or its Eastern European satellites from benefitting even indirectly 
through the program, prohibited the re-export to those countries of goods 
manufactured from commodities received by the participants through the 
recovery program. The House committee also inserted provisions designed 
to protect American investments in the participating nations.
Finally, the House committee was more insistent than either the 
Foreign Relations Committee or the Administration that only personnel 
of "unquestioned" loyalty be employed in the agency administering the
106recovery program.
The Debates 
Prospects for Adoption of the 
Recovery Program
Senate debate began on S.2202 on March 1 and concluded on March 
13; when the "Economic Cooperation Act of 1948" was passed by a vote of 
69-17* Debate had been accelerated, as much as possible, in order to 
get the bill before the House Foreign Affairs Committee before it closed 
its hearings and began the process of "marking up" its version of the 
foreign aid bill. The House began debating 9.2202, as amended by the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, on March 23. Debate was concluded on March 
3 1, when the bill passed by a vote of 329-74, with two members answering
*̂̂ Ĥouse Foreign Affairs Committee, House Report No. 1505 on
S.2202, pp. 26-2 8, 38-39, 100.
^‘̂ ^Ibid., p. 48.
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"present" and twenty-six not voting.
As preparations were made to begin Senate debate, there was no 
assurance that the Administration's April 1 deadline for enactment of 
ERP would be met. Public hearings were still in progress before the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Republican leadership ap­
peared unmovedly pleas from the Administration and from Senator Vanden­
berg to speed up the Congressional timetable for final action on the 
recovery program. Despite the obstacles, there was general agreement 
by this time that ERP would eventually be enacted in some form. The 
major question, at this point, was whether the opposition possessed the 
strength to attach crippling amendments to the legislation. There was 
Republican-led opposition to ERP in both Houses. Opposition in the 
Senate, however, was more cohesive than that in the House. A group of 
Senate Republican "revisionists" had initiated a series of meetings 
while the hearings were in progress for the purpose of developing 
strategy in opposition to ERP. This group, normally numbering eighteen 
or twenty and consisting largely of Midwesterners, formulated specific 
proposals for changing ERP, some of which were presented to the Foreign 
Relations Committee during its hearings, with others being submitted 
in the form of amendments or substitutes during the Senate debate. Not 
all of the "revisionists" were unalterably opposed to ERP; however, a 
majority of the amendments proposed during Senate debate originated
within this g r o u p . ^̂ 8
'̂̂'̂ Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 2, 1915, 2793J Ibid., Part 
3; 3322, 3874-3875.•
^^®Members of the "revisionists" included Senators Joseph H. 
.Ball (Minn.), Clyde M. Reed (Kan.),, Kenneth S. Wherry (Neb.), Henry C.
2o3
Although House opposition to ERP was disorganized, many nega­
tive votes were expected to come from Midwestern Congressmen, as had 
been true with regard to the interim aid bill passed in December.
Speaker Martin and Majority Leader Halleck, both of whom were conserva­
tive and fiercely partisan Republicans, were critical of many aspects 
of the Administration's past, present, and prospective foreign policies^^^ 
Obviously, ERP was not popular among the House Republican leadership. 
Cognizant, however, of the program's general popular approval, they 
designed a strategy by which, hopefully, their party could reap some 
of the election year benefits expected to accrue from the enactment 
of the program. Conversely, it was their aim to minimize any gains to 
the Democrats from the program's enactment.
Dworshak (Idaho), James P. Kern (Mo.), William E. Jenner (Ind.), George 
W. Malone (Nev.), Arthur V. Watkins (Utah), C. Wayland Brooks (111,),
Zales N. Ecton (Mont.), E. H. Moore (Okla. ),Guy Cordon (Ore.), William 
F. Khowland (Calif.), Owen Brewster (Me.), Homer E. Capehart (Ind.),
Joseph R. McCarthy (Wis.), Chapman Revercomb (W, Va.), Harry P. Cain- 
(Wash.), and Edward V. Robertson (Wyo.). New York Times, January 31;
19U8 , pp. 1,6; Ibid., February 7, 19^, pp. 1,5; Ibid., February 8 ,
19 8̂ , p. 31' Frequently, this group was Joined by Republican Senators 
Hugh Butler (Neb.), Albert W. Hawkes (N. J.), John J. Williams (Del.), 
Milton R. Young (N. D.), and Democrat W. Lee 0'Daniel (Texas). Al­
though not a member of the "revisionists". Senator Taft, the Republican 
Policy Committee Chairman, basically opposed ERP. New York Times, Jan­
uary 19 8̂ , E3; Ibid., January 6 , 19 8̂ , p. 18; Ibid., January' 11,
1948, E3; Ibid., January 19; 1948, p. 1.
^^Of eighty-two votes cast against interim aid in the House, 
fifty-five represented Midwestern Republicans. Forty of the latter 
were concentrated among the states of Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, 
and Missouri. New York Times, January 4, 1948, E3*
^^^Ibid., January 6 , 1948, p. I8 . _
llllbid., February 8 , 1948, E3. Despite the opposition to ERP 
manifested by many Congressional Republicans, leading spokesmen of the 
party outside Congress were in virtual unanimity in supporting the pro­
gram. These included Governor Dewey of New York, Governor Warren of
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The Congressional opponents of the recovery program, thus, 
held little hope of defeating the legislation. They could hope, how­
ever, to reduce the size and scope Of the program. Furthermore, they 
could hope to capitalize on the valid doubts relative to the exact 
needs of the participating countries and legitimate questions as to 
how these nations could better help themselves. In brief, the strat­
egy of the opposition was to probe from every angle, hoping to find 
weak places and to make inroads at such positions.
Although it had expressed general satisfaction with the ERP 
bill approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Adminis­
tration was fully aware that major battles lay ahead, the outcome of
which could be determined only as the issues were voted upon in the 
112Senate and House. As the debates began, the objective of the Ad­
ministration was not simply the enactment of a European Recovery Pro­
gram, but the passage of legislation which would secure the general 
goals embodied in the recovery program and preserve the important 
prerogatives of the President in the area of foreign policy formu­
lation against encroachments from within the legislative branch.
Senate Consideration of ERP
When S.2202 became the "unfinished business" of the Senate on 
Monday, March 1, 1948, it could not be inferred that the measure was
California, Harold E. Stassen, and John Foster Dulles. Ibid,, January 
3, 1948, p. 9; Ibid., January 11, 1948, E3j Ibid., January l6 , 1948, 
p. 12; Ibid., January l8 , 1948, p. 33; Ibid., January 28, 1948, p. 12;
Ibid., February 13, 19̂ 8, pp. 1, 6.
^^^Ibid., January 6 , 1948, pp. 1,13; Ibid., January 29, 1948,
p, l8; Ibid., January 30, 1948, pp. 1,3,
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debated without interruption until a decision was reached. There were
many interruptions, to the dismay of the bill’s proponents. Debate
lagged for several days. Several members, including Minority Leader
Barkley, voiced criticisms of their colleagues for poor attendance
during the debate of such a critical issue. Vandenberg pleaded with his
colleagues to submit their amendments for consideration as quickly as 
113possible. Senator Wherry, Acting Majority Leader, led the opposition
against S.2202. As Floor Leader, he was in a position to erect ob-
114stades against, if not to defeat, the recovery measure. Early in 
the debate. Wherry's fellow Republican, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (Mass.), 
a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and ardent supporter of 
ERP, bluntly accused Wherry of "nitpicking" while Europe was disinte­
grating. At other points. Lodge charged Wherry with "dragging red 
herrings" into the debate and "saber-rattling".Although Vandenberg 
led the debate for the proponents of S.2202, he was assisted by Lodge. 
While at most times completely self-possessed. Senator Vandenberg on 
occasion was provoked to sharp retaliation, as when the authenticity 
of his conversion to internationalism ■'.•re.s questioned by his Republican
colleagues Ball and Brewster. Also, when exasperated, he could pointedly
ll6recognize a delaying tactic as such.
443congres5ional Record, XCIV, Part 2, 1921, 19&1, 19̂ 4.
ll^Although endeavoring to create the impression that he was at­
tempting to facilitate the ERP debate, Wherry early took the lead in 
raising points designed to impede the debate's progress. Despite the 
alleged urgency of the situation, he argued, the subject should be dis­
cussed "from A to Z and back again." Ibid., p. 1966.
^^'îcid., pp. 2327, 2637.
1 1 Ibid*, pp* 2027-2029* During the debate ; Vandenberg received 
frequent support from Senators Lodge, Barkley (D., Ken.), Connally (D.,
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During the debate, the membership of the Foreign Relations Com­
mittee presented a united front. There vas no breaking of ranks at 
any time. Only three members sponsored or joined in sponsoring amend­
ments to the bill (Vandenberg, Wallace H. White, Jr., and Walter F. 
George). Their amendments, all accepted, obviously had the support of 
the full committee and the Administration. No committee member voted 
against the position taken by Senator Vandenberg on any roll call vote 
(of vhich there were seven, including the vote on final passage). No
amendments were adopted which did not have the approval of Vandenberg
and the committee.
Most of the debate centered upon 8.2202 itself rather than upon 
American foreign policy in general, although the conduct of foreign policy 
by the Democratic Administration was subjected to occasional censure.
The sponsors, of course, hoped to prevent a general foreign policy de­
bate because of the urgency attached to the European situation. Some 
sixty-nine senators participated in the debate. Some delivered lengthy 
speeches, while others merely raised questions concerning particular 
aspects of the bill. The device of "extension of remarks" was used, 
although not as much as. in connection with the House debate.
Tex.), Thye (R., Minn.), Rosy (D., N. C.), Lucas (D., 111.), Smith (R.,
N.J.), McKellar (D., Tenn.), Hill (D., Ala.), Eastland (D., Miss.),
McMahon (D., Conn.), Saltonstall (R., Mass.), Flanders (R., Vt.), Bald­
win (R., Conn.), Morse (R., Ore.), Cooper (R., Ken.), Pepper (D., Fla.), 
Myers (R., Pa.), Holland (D., Fla.), Maybsnk (D., S. C.), Hickenlooper 
(R., Iowa), O'Conor (D., Md.), and Sparkman (D., Ala.). Of members of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, the most frequent participants in the 
debate were Vandenberg, Lodge, Smith, Connally, and Barkley. Hicken­
looper was less active than he had been during the hearings, where he 
frequently displayed serious reservations toward the bill.
26?
It was not until March 8 that the Senate began voting on 
amendments to 8.2202. During the previous week the bill had. been de­
bated in general terms. Very few amendments were presented during 
the first week; despite the urging of Senator Vandenberg. Because of 
the delays, it later became necessary to hold night sessions in order 
to terminate the debate and bring the measure to a vote by the end of 
the second week, in accordance with Vandenberg's schedule. As these 
delays occurred, and with no definite date set for debate to begin in 
the House, supporters of ERP became alarmed at"the possible consequences 
in Europe of failure to meet the April 1 deadline for enactment of 
ERp/^'^
Although many eloquent words were spoken in support of the
recovery program during the debate, the major arguments favoring its
11.8passage were as follows:
1. It will promote peace, stability, and freedom.
2. It is in furtherance of intelligent American 
self-interest: America cannot enjoy prosperity
if the rest of the world is destitute. America 
cannot live in peace if the remainder of the world 
is in chaos,
^̂ '̂ Ibid. , pp. 2024-2025.
■j 1  Û
For arguments in support of ERP, see remarks of Senators Van­
denberg, Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 2, 1915-1920; Thye (R,, Minn.), 
in Ibid., p. 1979; Hoey (P., N.C.), in Ibid., p. 2021; Smith (R., W. J.), 
in Ibid., pp. 2107-2108; McKellar (D., Tenn.), in Ibid., p. 2205; Hill 
(D., Ala.), in Ibid., pp. 2379-2380; Eastland (D., Miss.), in Ibid., pp. 
2379-238I; Saltonstall (R., Mass.), in Ibid., p. 2384; Flanders (R., Vt.), 
in Ibid., pp. 2304-2305; Baldwin (R., Conn.), in Ibid., pp. 2531-2533; 
Morse (R., Ore.), in Ibid., pp. 2650-2004; Lucas (D., 111.), in Ibid., 
p. 2655; Connally (D., Tex.), in Ibid., pp. 2600-2097; Pepper (D., Fla.), 
in Ibid., pp. 2724-2738; MacMahon“T^, Conn.), in Ibid., pp. 2751-2752; 
Holland (D., Fla.), in Ibid., pp. 2752-2753; Hickenlooper (R., Iowa), in 
Ibid., pp. 2779-278O; Sparkman (D., Ala.), in Ibid., p. 2705; Barkley 
(d., Ken.), in Ibid., pp. 2790-2792.
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3. It will help to stem the advance of Communism
in Europe, most hopefully by inducing cooperation 
between East and West.
h. It will be much less costly than preparing for 
or fighting a war.
5. It hopefully will eventuate in economic and 
political unity among the participating European 
nat ions.
6. It is America's responsibility to use its wealth 
and power in the interests of peace; it cannot 
withdraw into isolationism and remain either 
free or prosperous.
7. In restoring Europe, it will at the same time 
preserve Ajnerican markets and thus the American 
free-enterprise system.
8. It has been studied in great detail by experts 
from within and without the Government and has 
the overwhelming approval of many respected in­
dividuals in all walks of the national life, in­
cluding the members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, who are among the leaders of the 
Senate.
9* It manifests a bipartisan foreign policy.
10. It gives America an opportunity to demonstrate the 
spiritual values of democracy. America cannot be 
false to its ideals and purposes.
11. Only America is capable of meeting the requirements 
of Europe.
12. The plan of administration adopted by the Foreign 
Relations Committee insures that the economic 
aspects of the aid program will be conducted in
an efficient manner, free of State Department con­
trols but coordinated with overall foreign policy.
13. Previous American aid has had beneficial results: 
already there is evidence of greater cooperation 
among Western European countries.
The arguments against the recovery program were many and varied. 
They ranged from the broadside attacks of the conservatives upon the
2b9
very concept of foreign aid to the criticisms by the liberals of the 
underlying motivations of the aid program. They included recommen­
dations by both the right and the left opposition of alternatives to 
the proposed course of action or of ways in which to "improve" upon 
the specific proposal. With criticisms ranging from the general to 
the particular, from both sides also came predictions of fateful con­
sequences for the nation if it chose to continue along its apparent 
course.
Some of the major arguments heard against the recovery pro-
119gram during the Senate debate were:
1. The proposed four-year commitment is against all 
American traditions of "no entangling alliances".
2. The State Department has made an utter failure 
in postwar foreign policy. It cannot be trusted 
with this plan.
3. It is the height of inconsistency for the Adminis­
tration to urge the adoption of this plan while 
continuing to "do business" with the Soviet Union, 
to encourage trade between the participating na­
tions and Eastern Europe, and to deny Spain the 
opportunity to participate.
1 1 Q
See remarks of Senators Wherry, Congressional Record. XCIV, 
Part 2, 1962-1963, 1970-1971, 1979-1980, 2327, 2637-2638, 2720; Khow­
land (R. , Calif.), in loid. . pp. 1963-196 ;̂ Ball (R., Minn.), in Ibid.., 
pp. 1974, 1983-1985, 2199, 2776-2778; Kem (R., Mo.), in Ibid.. pp.
1982, 2190, 2618-26^1; Malone (R,, Nev.), in Ibid.. pp, 2123-212^, 
2130-2131, 2188-2216, 2316-2321, 2624, 2633-2634; Johnson (D., Colo.), 
in Ib_id. . pp. 2131-2135; Butler (R., Neb.), in Ibid. . pp. 2190, 2763; 
Ecton (R., Mont.), in Ibid.. p. 2191; Revercomb (R., W. Va.), in Ibid.. 
pp. 2192-2193, 2788-2789; Jenner (R., Ind.), in Ibid.. pp. 2208-2209; 
Hawkes (R., N. J.), in Ibid.. pp. 2215-2216, 2634, 2756-2758; Langer 
(R., N. D.), in Ibid.. pp. 2316-2321, 2367-2377; Taylor (D., Idaho), 
in Ibid., pp. 2385-2400, 2448-2458; 0'Daniel (D., Tex.), in Ibid., pp. 
2462-2466; Chavez (D., N. M.), in Ibid., pp. 2466-2469; Capehart (R., 
Ind.), in Ibid., pp. 2517-2520, 2622; Dworshak (R., Idaho), in Ibid., 
p. 2623; Cain (R., Wash.), in Ibid., p. 2625; Taft (R., Ohio), in 
Ibid., pp. 2641-265O; and Brooks (R., 111.), in Ibid., pp. 2759-2763*
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4. The basic problem in Europe is the fact of Soviet 
aggression, which can be stopped only by superior 
force.
5. The recovery program is likely to result in in­
calculable damage to the domestic economy.
6. Servicing the Federal debt, balancing the budget, 
providing a superior military establishment, and 
fulfilling other domestic needs should have priority 
over EBP.
7. There are no assurances that the program will succeed.
8. Much of Europe's "crisis" results from mistakes in 
American foreign policy, socialistic experiments by 
European governments, and the threat from Soviet 
power. Solutions must be devised for these problems 
before economic recovery is possible.
9 . America will never be repaid for any of its assistance.
10. Many of the participating countries do not need aid: 
the Europeans can do much more for themselves. Some 
of these countries want American dollars merely to 
develop their own empires or industries.
11. , The program will lead to World War III, to inflation,
controls, and militarism in America.
12. Unless the participating nations undertake internal 
reforms, they will be forever dependent upon American 
aid.
13. The burden imposed upon the American taxpayer by this 
program is disproportionate. Private sources can pro­
vide much of the required assistance.
14. ERP is designed to achieve American dominance in Europe,
15. ERP has been deliberately "baited" in order to garner 
the support of various selfish interests.
16. American assistance will be used to promote socialism 
in Europe. How can this stop Communism?
17. Only those countries directly threatened by Communist 
force should be aided,
18. American assistance will tend to lower the American 
standard of living to that of the recipient countries.
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19. There should be repayment for all aid materials 
not essential to the sustenance of life.
20. ERP is a blatant attempt to "buy" the western 
European nations as allies against the Soviet Union.
21. ERP is a Wall Street conspiracy to dominate Europe.
22. American assistance should be channelled through 
the United Nations.
23- The "anti-Communist hysteria" is being fueled de­
liberately by the industrialists, militarists, politi­
cians, and press, each for selfish reasons detrimental 
to peace.
2h, ERP is designed to provide markets for surplus American 
production and to avoid a depression.
25. ERP is merely an extension of the Truman Doctrine,
which is blind to totalitarianism of the Right.
2 6. There is no constitutional authority for a foreign
aid program.
2 7. America should first concentrate upon the elimination 
of internal Communism.
28. Any American assistance should be afforded only to 
private European industries, not to governments.
29. ERP is not an evidence of bipartisan foreign policy.
It is merely another Truman policy being forced upon 
Congress.
30. All -reparations and dismantling programs in Germany
should be stopped.
3 1. The legislation as drafted is too broad: it gives 
the Administrator excessive control over the domestic 
economy and is a "blank check" to the Administration.
32. There has been insufficient time given to the debate 
of this program.
Twenty-six amendments were offered to S.2202. In addition, two 
substitute measures were proposed. Of the amendments, fourteen were 
submitted by one or more of the 'irevisionists ". Seven of these were
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adopted, after initial acceptance ty Vandenberg and the Foreign Re­
lations Committee. Both substitute measures and eleven proposed 
amendments were rejected. Two amendments were withdrawn.
Possibly involving the most controversy were amendments 
proposed by Senators Ball and Taft and substitute measures offered by 
Senators Taylor and Capehart. Rejected on a roll call vote of 19 to 
53 on March 8 was the Ball amendment, which would have required the 
participating countries to establish exchange rates for their curren­
cies which would "reflect with reasonable accuracy the actual pur­
chasing power" of such currencies. The committee bill required only 
that the participating countries establish "valid" rates of exchange. 
Involved was the extent to which conditions should be placed upon 
American aid as well as the definition of "valid" as used in the com­
mittee bill. Ball argued that the word "valid" was no condition at 
all, i.e., that any rate of exchange considered "legal" by the partici­
pating country would be "valid". Therefore, the current situation of 
inflated rates of exchange would be continued. Vandenberg argued that 
it would be a "dangerous thing" for the Senate to "put down in black 
and white a rule of international exchange which we are going to propose 
to have enforced as the result of this legislation." Rather than at­
tempt to define the word- "valid" it would be better to rely on the Ad­
ministrator's Judgment of the evidence as to whether a participating 
country was endeavoring to stabilize its currency. In the 19-53 vote, 
the Ball amendment was supported by seventeen Republicans and two Demo­
crats. The Republican support consisted almost solely of "revisionists". 
The coalition defeating the amendment consisted of twenty-two Republicans
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and thirty-one Democrats. Of the Republicans voting on the amendment,
5̂  percent voted "naywhereas 9^ percent of the Democrats voting 
cast negative votes.
On March 10 the Senate rejected on a roll call vote of 3 to 
jk a substitute proposed by Senator Taylor. Taylor’s measure embodied 
the position of Henry A. Wallace, former Vice President and Presidential 
contender of the Progressive Citizens of America. Taylor had announced 
as the running-mate of Wallace. His proposal was supported by the 
American Communists and certain other left-wing groups. It specifically 
repudiated the Truman Doctrine and advocated universal disarmament. 
Entitled the "Peace and Reconstruction Act of 19̂ 8", it proposed the 
creation of a European Reconstruction and Economic Development Adminis­
tration within the United Nations to which the United States would 
contribute $5 billion annually over a five-year period, in addition 
to an immediate contribution of $$00 million for emergency aid. As 
indicated by the vote, this was less than a popular alternative to
the committee bill. Voting for the substitute, in addition to Taylor.
121were Senators Pepper and Langer.
The crucial test for ERP came on the night of March 12, when 
the Senate rejected on a roll call vote of 31 to $6 an amendment pro­
posed by Senator Robert A. Taft to reduce the EGA authorization from 
$$.3 billion to $4.3 billion. Taft argued that ERP could not be Justi­




battle against communism." He favored giving aid only for specific 
projects and objected to the balance of payments method by which aid 
requirements had been calculated. He deprecated the latter as at 
best mere "guess-work". Taft objected to any commitment by the United 
States to the recovery program involving more than one year at a 
time. He expressed apprehension in regard to the domestic economic 
consequences of the proposed aid program and urged that the European 
countries do more for themselves. On the basis of "general principles 
of economy", Taft argued that some reduction in the $5*3 billion re­
quest was warranted. The senator insisted that his method for deter­
mining the amount of aid required by Europe was as logical and sound 
as that used by the sponsors of the recovery program. Senator Morse, 
ridiculing Taft's proposal as "penny-pinching", attacked it on the 
ground that the studies of one senator could not compare in credibility 
with the exhaustive investigations underlying the recommendations of 
the Administration and the Foreign Relations Committee. Morse reasoned 
further that the fact of Europe's present need was proof the previous 
postwar aid provided by the United States had been inadequate, There­
fore, the evidence was conclusive of the need for a greater infusion 
of foreign assistance. Senator Connally entered the debate at this 
point with a major speech. He defended the proposed recovery program 
on the basis of its potential for insuring world peace. Only the United 
States had sufficient resources to respond adequately to the European 
crisis. Unless timely and adequate measures were taken to alleviate the 
European situation, the chaotic situation existing there ultimately 
would engulf the world. The Taft amendment led to a shart division
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among Senate Republicans: twenty-three supported the amendment while
twenty-four voted against it. The twenty-three Republicans, consist­
ing primarily of "revisionists", were joined by eight Democrats, divided 
equally between Southerners and Westerners. However, as had been the 
pattern throughout the voting, Senate Democrats overwhelmingly followed 
the Vandenberg leadership. Although the Taft amendment was defeated, 
the debate emphasized the serious reservations of a large Senate mihor-
ity toward the recovery measure and forecast further difficulties for
122the actual appropriations bill.
A substitute measure, entitled the "international Relief and 
Reconstruction Act of 19̂ 8", was advanced by Indiana’s Senator Cape­
hart. Rejected on a roll call vote, 22 to 6 8, on March 13, it represented 
the last major effort by Senate opponents to defeat S.2202. Capehart's 
measure would have separated the recovery program into two distinct 
phases; relief and recovery. Relief aspects would have been placed 
under an International Relief Administrator, with $2 billion author­
ized for this purpose. The recovery aspect would have been placed 
under the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, with that agency’s lend­
ing capacity increased by $3 billion and the participating countries 
required to establish their own versions of the RFC. If the partici­
pating countries held any serious hopes of recovery, Capehart argued, 
they must emulate the successful private enterprise system of the 
United States. Members of the Foreign Relations Committee successfully 
argued that Capehart’s measure had been given entirely too little study to
^^^Ibid., pp. 2641-2708.
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justify its substitution for S.2202 at this late hour. Three Demo­
crats joined nineteen Republicans in support of the Capehart substitute.
Sixty percent of the Republicans voting opposed the proposal, whereas
12393 percent of the Democratic senators voted "nay".
There were, of course, other important amendments proposed to
S.2202. An amendment by Senator Knowland, adopted by voice vote on 
March 8, prohibited exports from the United States to non-participating 
European countries if such exports interfered with fulfilling the re­
quirements of participating countries, unless the Secretary of Commerce 
declared that the exports to non-participating countries were in the 
national interest of the United States. Another Knowland proposal, 
adopted by voice vote on March 8 , required that $0 percent of the gross 
tonnage of ERP commodities procured in the United States be shipped in
"LpjiAmerican vessels, "so far as practicable." Another amendment, sponsored 
by the shipping interests and advanced by Senator Brewster and other, 
"revisionists", eliminated the authority contained in the committee bill 
to charter American vessels to the participating countries. An amend­
ment sponsored by Senator George, a member of the Foreign Relations 
Committee, directed the Administrator to use private channels of trade 
"to the maximum extent consistent with the accomplishment of the pur­
poses of this act."^^^ In accordance with an amendment authored by
^23capehart seemed unperturbed by the inconsistency of his com­
parison of an agency such as RFC with unadulterated free enterprise.
Ibid. , pp. 2766-2772, 2775.
^Z^ibid., pp. 2297-2298.
^^^Ibid., pp. 2k60-2k62.
^2& ibid ., pp. 2470-2^71.
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Senator Cooper, the President was directed to encourage other Western 
Hemisphere countries to furnish assistance to E u r o p e. T he  Adminis­
trator was authorized (rather than directed, as its "revisionist" spon­
sors preferred) to furnish assistance to specific approved projects,
under an amendment proposed by Senators Ball and Wherry and accepted by
1 Pfivoice vote on March 11. In an example of the conciliatory tactics 
utilized so successfully with the opposition. Senator Vandenberg spon­
sored an amendment, accepted by voice vote on March 11, which provided 
specifically that the Special Representative in Europe would represent 
the Administrator as well as the United States. The Senate, under Van­
denberg 's leadership, previously had rejected a "revisionist" proposal 
which not only would have changed the relationship between the Special 
Representative and the Secretary of State but also would have changed 
the title of the Special Representative to "Agent General for Economic 
Cooperation". The object, of course, was to sever as completely as 
possible all connections between the recovery program and the State 
Department. In another gesture of conciliation, Vandenberg sponsored 
and the Senate accepted a companion measure providing that the Special 
Representative would receive his instructions from the Administrator, 
prepared and transmitted in accordance with procedures agreed upon 
between the Administrator and the Secretary of State. The amendment
provided also that the Special Representative would coordinate the
129various EGA missions in the participating countries.
127Ibid., p. 2U7I.
125ibid., p. 2535- 
129ibid., pp. 2536-25 2̂ .
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A proposal by Senator Cooper that disputes between the Adminis­
trator and export control authorities be referred to the President for
1 sndisposition was accepted by voice vote on March 11.^^^ On March 12, the 
Senate accepted by voice vote an amendment by Senator Brooks authorizing 
the Administrator to pay ocean freight charges on private relief ship-
131ments from the United States to participating countries receiving grants.
On March 13, the Senate accepted by voice vote a proposal by Senator 
Aiken (R., Vt.) and other senators from agricultural states to revise a 
section of the bill relating to the use of agricultural products in the 
recovery program. Pursuant to the revision the Administrator was di­
rected "insofar as practicable", in buying surplus farm products, to make 
such purchases only in the United States except when the commodity was 
available in one of the participating countries or when a scarcity ex­
isted in the United States; to procure each class or type of surplus 
farm commodity in the approximate proportion of each to the total United 
States surplus; and to purchase surplus farm products from the Commodity 
Credit Corporation whenever practicable, paying the CCC only its cost 
but not more than the market price. "Revisionist" Senator Reed (R,,
Kan.) secured Senate approval of an amendment on March 13 requiring that 
wheat used to produce wheat flour for participating countries amount to 
at least 25 percent of the total unprocessed wheat and wheat in the 
form of flour transferred by grant to the participating countries. Also 




Taft authorizing the Administrator to guarantee credits extended to 
participating countries by persons or governments of other Western Hemi­
sphere nations, with a limit of 70 percent on governmental credits. 
Senator McCarthy (R., Wis.) offered, and the Senate accepted by voice 
vote on March 13, an amendment expressing the "understanding" of the
Senate that prisoners of war remaining in participating countries would
132be repatriated by January 1, 19̂ 9*
At the request of Vandenberg, Senator Fulbright (D., Ark.) 
reluctantly withdrew a proposed amendment adding "political unification" 
to the stated objectives of the recovery legislation. Although eventual 
European union was envisioned by many of the proponents of the recovery 
program, Vandenberg and other leaders were reluctant to make their hopes 
so obvious and thus subject the United States to charges of "political 
interference" in the recipient nations.^̂ 3
An effort by the "revisionists" to separate the recovery program 
into relief and recovery aspects, by leaving to the Appropriations Com­
mittees the determination of the amounts to be devoted to relief and by
limiting other assistance to specific projects approved by the Adminis-
13ktrator, was rejected by voice vote on March 11.
A last-minute obstructionist tactic was offered by Senator 
O’Daniel (D., Tex.) who, on March 13, demanded a roll call vote on his 
amendment to authorize an appropriation of $600 million to increase
^32Ibid., pp. 2713-2720, 2753, 2766.
-33ibid., p. 2286. 
is^ibid., pp. 2533-2535.
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old-age pensions by $6o monthly. The amendment was defeated, 13 
to 73.^35
The Senate approved the "Economic Cooperation Act of 1948" by 
a vote of 69 to I7 , at midnight, March I3, 1948. Although the decisive 
vote had been cast on the Taft amendment the previous evening, the 
Senate galleries remained packed as the last vote was recorded. Thirty- 
one Republicans joined thirty-eight Democrats in providing the over­
whelming victory. Ninety percent of the Democrats voting supported the 
measure on final passage, whereas 70 percent of the Republicans cast 
affirmative votes. Thirteen Republicans and four Democrats combined 
in opposition to passage of the measure. The Democrats voting in op­
position consisted of three Southerners and one Westerner, while the 
Republican group was composed of diehard "revisionists".
The Senate thus had met Vandenberg's deadline of March I5, set 
on February 28 by the Senate leader when he declared that the Czechoslo­
vakian coup and increased Soviet pressure on Finland made imperative 
prompt Congressional action on the recovery program.
Efforts To Expedite Passage of ERP
Vandenberg,'s committee, even before final Senate action on ERP, 
had begun closed hearings on bills providing assistance to Greece, Tur­
key, and China, in order to prevent the occurrence of any parliamentary 
delays in consequence of the decision of the House Republican leadership 
to combine all aid legislation into an omnibus p a c k a g e . 3̂7 it still
435i b l d . , pp. 2 7 2 1 - 2 7 2 3 .
^ 3̂ I b i d . , p. 2793; New York Times, March l4, 1948, pp. 1,53*
^3?New York Times, February 29, 1948, p. 1.
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appeared doubtful that final Congressional action on the recovery legis­
lation could be obtained by the April 1 deadline, although State Depart­
ment officials expressed hope that at least Congress vould act before 
the crucial April l8 Italian elections. However, on March 8 , Secretary 
Marshall, Ambassador Douglas, and Under Secretary Lovett appealed per­
sonally to Speaker Martin to expedite House action on ERP. Martin would 
not commit the House to final action before April 10. The Speaker did, 
however, call a meeting of House and Senate leaders for March 9 for the 
purpose of synchronizing the disposition of foreign aid legislation by 
the two Houses. At the meeting, Martin and Halleck refused to grant 
priority to ERP and insisted on omnibus treatment of foreign aid leg­
islation. Eaton disagreed, arguing that ERP should have priority and 
that the measure should be largely in the form of the Senate bill. 3̂̂
Administration forces and Congressional supporters at this time 
increased the tempo of their demands for prompt Congressional action. 
President Truman, Secretary Marshall, other Cabinet officials, and Con­
gressional leaders participated in a meeting at the Washington Cathedral 
on March 11, on the subject of "The Churches and ERP". Truinan, Marshall, 
and John Foster Dulles urged Immediate action on the recovery program, 
while calling for calmness in a "tense world situation",Simultaneously, 
President Truman dispatched a request to Speaker Martin for $55 million 
in additional interim aid for Italy, France, and Austria. The President, 
in his letter, emphasized the "extreme urgency" of the European situation.
^̂ ^Ibid., March 9, 19^, pp. 1, 13; Ibid., March 10, 1948, p. 8; 
Ibid., March 15, 1948, p. 3.
^39ibid., March 12, 1948, pp. 1, 4.
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Despite the opposition, House leaders on March 11 decided on the omnibus 
approach to foreign aid legislation. The Senate Republican Policy Com­
mittee reluctantly accepted this approach the following day.̂ *̂̂
On March 15, with ERP still confronting House delays, the White 
House surprised Congressional leaders with an announcement that President 
Truman would address a joint session of Congress March 17 on the "for­
eign situation". At the same time, the State Department served informal
notice on Italy that the election of a Communist Government on April l8
1^1would result in the termination of further United States assistance.
In a surprise about-face, the House Republican Steering Com­
mittee, on March l6 , agreed to advance the House timetable for ERP and 
other foreign aid legislation, as well as legislation relating to the 
defense establishment. Speaker Martin warned the group of a "grave 
crisis in our international relations." Under the new timetable, final 
House action was contemplated on foreign aid approximately two weeks 
hence— during Easter week. A scheduled recess over the Good Friday
lit?weekend was not disrupted, despite the objections of House Democrats.
Belatedly, President Tr’jman invited Congressional leaders to 
the White House on March l6 for a preview of his scheduled March IT
speech to the joint session. The conference was cancelled, however,
when Senators Vandenberg and Barkley announced that they could not be.
4̂̂ Ibid., pp. 1,2; Ibid., March 13, 19^, p. 1.
^^^Ibid., March l6 , 19̂ 8, pp. 1, 5-6.
^^^Ibid., March 17, 19̂ 8, PP- 1,2. Representative Howard Smith
(D., Va.) angrily charged House Republican leaders with deliberate stall­
ing tactics. Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 3, 3320.
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absent from a previously scheduled meeting of the Foreign Relations 
Committee. At the same time, the White House announced that Secre­
tary Marshall would give three foreign policy speeches in the immediate
f u t u r e . ^ ^ 3
Diplomacy was abandoned by the President in his March 17 speech 
as he bluntly accused Soviet Russia of plotting the subjugation of 
Europe. Truman demanded enactment of Universal Military Training, to 
be buttressed by a temporary draft to halt "threatened Communist con­
trol and police-state rule" of the remaining free nations in Europe.
He again urged immediate adoption of ERP and pledged full United States 
support of the Western European Union agreement on economic cooperation 
and mutual defense signed at Brussels on March 17« Without directly
so stating, the President clearly implied that his offer • included
ikkfull economic and military support.
On the same date as the President addressed Congress and the 
nation, the Foreign Affairs Committee completed action of the ERP phase 
of its foreign aid bill. The omnibus measure was reported to the House 
on March 19, with the committee Democrats publicly objecting to the 
Joining of ERP and other aid programs in the same measure. Simulta­
neously, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was completing it® 
hurried consideration of aid for Greece, Turkey, and China.
While Secretary Marshall was pointing to the "grave" world
^^%ew York Times, March 17, 19^, pp. 1, 3»
^^^Ibld., March l8 , 19k8, pp. 1,3.
"̂/Ibld. , March 20, 19W, pp. 1,4.
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situation in public addresses in California, the House Appropriations 
Committee prepared to act expeditiously on the President's request for 
$55 million additional interim aid for Italy, France, and Austria. Only 
one day was required to complete House action on this measure, for which 
authorization had been granted the previous December.
One explanation for the crisis atmosphere enveloping Washington 
at this juncture was found in reports emanating from that city con-
r
earning the Government's official estimate of the status of Soviet-United 
States relations. Prior to the Czechoslovakian coup, the United States 
Government had assumed that the Soviet Union did not want war with this 
country. After that sobering event, however, this estimate was revised 
to include the possibility that the Soviet Union, acting in desperate 
haste to complete its subjugation of continental Europe before the Mar­
shall Plan could be implemented, might proceed with, its aggressive 
actions beyond the point of "no return".
House Consideration of ERP
On March 22, as the House passed the interim aid measure virtu­
ally without debate and without a record vote, the House Rules Committee, 
after hearing three Congressional witnesses, deliberate! less than 
fifteen minutes in determining the procedure to govern House consider­
ation of the omnibus aid bill. Over the objections of Congressman Eaton, 
who pressed for more expeditious action, the Rules Committee, by pre­
arrangement with Speaker Martin and Majority Leader Halleck, ordered
^40ibid.; Ibid., March 21, 1948, p. 1.
^^7lbid., March 21, 1948, ElO.
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fifteen hours' (approximately three days) general debate for the bill, 
after which it was to be read for amendments. Despite the mounting 
pressure for a cessation of the already protracted debate on ERP, 
there was little optimism, that this action marked an end to obstruc­
tionist tactics by the opponents of the recovery program.
As debate opened in the House on March 23, Congressman Vorys, 
who guided the foreign aid measure through the House for Chairman 
Eaton and the Foreign Affairs Committee, read a letter from former 
President Herbert Hoover, who urged prompt approval of the foreign 
aid bill in the amount requested and restoration of many provisions 
contained in the Senate version of S.2 2 0 2 . With the conversion of - 
Hoover, who initially had opposed many aspects of the Administration 
and Senate bills, and with the anti-Communist tide mounting, the ef­
forts to organize the House opposition to ERP were in a state of 
virtual collapse. This did not mean, however, that there would be no
attempts made to emasculate ERP through crippling amendments.
After brief debate, the House adopted, by a roll call vote of
316 to 21, H. Res, 505, the rule governing debate on S.2202 as amended.
The debate focused on the recovery bill itself, except for partisan
^^^Ibld., March 23, 1948, pp. 1, 9. Representative Allen (R., 
111.), Rules Committee chairman, angrily denied the charges of Repre­
sentative Smith (D., Va.), ranking Democrat on the Rules Committee, 
that the Republican leadership was delaying consideration of S.2202.
He was bitter toward those who " . . .  want to rush things through with­
out debate or understanding." Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 3; 3321-
^^°Ibid., pp. 3435-3436.
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charges and countercharges in regard to the time allowed for debate. 
Chairman Eaton opened the debate in the Committee of the Whole with a 
brief plea for quick passage of the bill. Fellow members of the For­
eign Affairs Committee, including Representatives Vorys (R., Ohio), 
Courtney (D., Tenn.), Judd (R., Minn.), Jackson (R., Calif.), and 
Fulton (R., Pa.), explained the bill in detail.
Arguments for and against the measure differed little from 
those heard in the Senate. Although the Foreign Affairs Committee ver­
sion of S.2202 contained three additional titles providing aid to 
Greece, Turkey, and China, most of the debate centered upon ERP. The 
debate on the China aid feature was conducted on a fiercely partisan 
level, with the Republicans defending China aid provisions in the bill 
against Democratic attacks.The primary difference between Senate 
and House debate was a matter of emphasis. In the House, the anti- 
Communist and national security aspects of the foreign aid program, . 
the question of trade with Soviet Russia and the Eastern European 
satellites, and the loyalty of personnel who would be charged with 
administering the aid program, were the focus of debate. The advis­
ability of placing all foreign aid in one piece of legislation was
l^Olbid., pp. 3311-3321.
^51lbld., .pp. 3322-33 1̂.
^^^In explaining these provisions of the bill, Judd charged the 
Administration with "appeasing" Soviet Russia since the war's end. He 
argued that ERP would be a futile effort unless the United States simul­
taneously acted to "save" Asia from Communist domination. Ibid., pp. 
3328-3329. Representative Richards (D,, S. C.), also a member of Foreign 
Affairs, charged that the committee had "only about 1 week of half-baked 
testimony on the subject of economic aid to China . . . ."He strongly 
defended the Administration's China policy against attacks by Judd, Mundt, 
and others. Ibid., pp. 3̂ 30-3̂ 31.
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argued intermittently throughout the debate, and the question of 
Germany's place in the reconstruction program was a prominent issue.
The question as to Spain's inclusion in the recovery program aroused 
intense and heated debate. In general, the House consideration of 
the aid bill was more strident, more acrimonious, and noticeably 
more partisan than was the Senate debate of the recovery program.
Although the Foreign Affairs Committee reported the foreign 
aid bill unanimously to the House, this unanimity was not reflected 
during the House debate. Democratic members objected vigorously to 
the omnibus character of the measure and made attempts to separate 
the various titles by floor amendments. Republican members Just as 
strenuously defended their workmanship and successfully resisted the 
efforts to separate ERP from other provisions of the bill. The con­
duct of foreign policy by the Administration was the subject of fre­
quent criticism by Republican members of the committee, who presented 
the committee version of S.2202 as the sole effort to develop a com­
prehensive foreign policy during the postwar era. Democratic members, 
in most instances, arose to the defense of American foreign policy 
as conducted by Democratic P r e s i d e n t s . ^̂ 3 of the forty-seven sub-
^^^Representative Sol Bloom (D., N. Y.), ranking Democrat on
Foreign Affairs, directed his opening remarks to criticism of the com­
mittee's Republican majority for consolidating aid in one package. 
Representative Vorys argued that the committee majority and the House 
leadership adopted the omnibus approach in an effort to develop a 
"world-wide foreign policy." Ibid., pp. 3323-332̂ ' Representative 
Courtney charged that if the committee majority had not delayed con­
sideration of ERP by its adoption of the omnibus approach, Czechoslo­
vakia would not have fallen "behind the Iron Curtain". Ibid., p. 3325. 
Representative Mundt, another member of the committee, announced' In his 
opening remarks several conditions which would have to be implemented 
simultaneously with ERP in order to render the latter effective. His 
conditions included implementation of the Voice of America program, 
renunciation of the Morgenthau Plan for Germany, elimination of Communists
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stantive amendments proposed to 3.2202, sixteen were submitted by 
various members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Quits frequently, 
members found themselves on opposing sides of the various issues.
This division at least contributed to the adoption of certain amend­
ments considered objectionable to committee-'Spokesmen. Representative 
Vorys, who handled the bill for Chairman Eaton, frequently was over­
ruled by the Committee of the Whole in his efforts to limit debate 
or bring dilatory tactics to an end. He received little assistance, 
in this regard, from the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, 
Representative Francis Case (R., S. D.). Attendance during the debate, 
as indicated by votes within the Committee of the Whole, was poor.
Of the forty-seven substantive amendments offered to S.2202 
in the Committee of the Whole, twenty-two were accepted. Of the amend­
ments accepted, sixteen were presented either by or on behalf of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee or were acceptable to it. Of the twenty-five 
amendments rejected, the spokesmen of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
made specific objections to twenty-three. Of the total amendments 
proposed, committee spokesmen expressed opposition to twenty=nina.
Their arguments prevailed in twenty-three instances.
Of all the amendments proposed, possibly the most controversy 
wa.3 generated by: (l) a substitute proposed by Ralph W. Gwinn (R., N. Y.);
(2) an amendment by Alvin E. O'Konski (R., Wis.) to include Spain in the 
countries eligible to participate in BRPj (3) a group of amendments
from the Federal Government, development of a "consistent" foreign pol­
icy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and restructuring of the United Nations 
to exclude Communist nations. Ibid., p. 3̂ 15*
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offered by Walter H. Judd (R., Minn.), Christian A. Herter (R., Mass.), 
and James C. Davis (D. , G-a.), relating to loyalty investigations of 
persons employed by the Economic Cooperation Administration; (̂+) an 
amendment by William M. Colmer (D., Miss.) to eliminate the provision 
of the committee bill authorizing the charter of 200 dry-cargo ships 
to participating countries, and an amendment by Willis W. Bradley 
(R., Calif.) requiring at least 50 percent of the materials acquired 
in the United States for ERP to be shipped in American vessels; (5) 
an amendment by Colmer and a substitute offered by Karl E. Mundt (R.,
S. D.), relating to the question of exports to the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe; (6 ) an amendment by Charles W. Vursell (R., 111.) to 
decrease appropriations authorized for EGA during the first year of 
the program from $U.3 billion to $3 billion; (7 ) amendments by Lawrence 
H. Smith (R., Wis.) and John Phillips (R., Calif.) to limit the term 
of the United States commitment to participating countries; and (8 ) 
amendments by Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.) and Jsimes P. Richards (D.,
S. C.) to eliminate those provisions of the bill relating to economic' 
and military aid to Greece, Turkey, and China (Titles III and IV).
The Gwinn substitute, initially ruled not germane and sub­
sequently rejected on a division, 60 to 103, would have established
a corporation with a revolving fund of $500 million for the purpose
15!).of performing foreign relief operations. Those accepting this 
approach obviously rejected the studied conclusions of the many per­
sons who contended that further relief measures could not solve the
^ ^ ^ Ib id . , pp. 3627-3628, 3641.
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European problem. Nevertheless, the proposal received a large measure 
of support from the isolationist element.
The O'Konski amendment making Spain eligible to participate 
in ERP provoked the most heated controversy of the debate. Adopted 
on a division, IU9 to 52, and subsequently reaffirmed by the whole House 
'on a division, I88 to lOk, the proposal split the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs along partisan lines and caused a sharp reaction by the Adminis­
tration. President Truman warned that this provision would destroy the 
entire program and that it must be deleted in conference. Debate on 
the amendment was limited to five minutes by the House leadership, 
which also prevented a record vote on the issue. This was but one of 
many miscalculations of the Congressional and public sentiment by the 
House Republican leadership during the protracted consideration of the 
recovery program. In support of Spanish inclusion in the recovery 
program, it was advanced that the primary intent of the program was 
to halt the spread of Communism in Europe. Since Spain was the most 
fervently anti-Communist nation in Europe, it was illogical and in­
consistent to exclude her from the program. In the course of the re­
curring debate on this issue, the Administration was denounced as a 
"haven " for Communists and Communist-sympathizers, for an alleged
155"softness" toward Communism, and for "appeasement" of the Soviet Union,
^55%n offering the amendment, O'Konski charged that to eliminate 
Spain from participation in ERP " . . .  is nothing but shameful and 
stupid appeasement of the pinkos in our State Department and Department 
of Commerce." Ibid. , pp. 3̂ 28-3i|29. Representative Smith (R,, Wis.) 
bitterly attacked the State Department, charged Secretary Marshall with 
"taking sides" with the Chinese Communists, and wondered if the Ad­
ministration was " . . .  actually interested in stopping communism."
Ibid., pp. 3kki-3kk2 . The motion to limit debate on the O'Konski
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s.2202, as reported by the Foreign Affairs Committee, provided 
that no United States citizens or residents could be employed by EGA 
until an investigation had been made by the Federal Bureau of Investi­
gation and a report made to the Administrator or Secretary of State. 
Employees already in Government service could be utilized temporarily 
pending the FBI investigation. Throughout the entire House debate, 
any discussion of the administrative aspects of the foreign aid pro­
gram focused largely upon the alleged problem of "Communists-in- 
Government" rather than upon any general principles of sound public 
administration. The debate on this provision of the bill indicated 
a strong sentiment in support of requiring a favorable FBI report 
prior to employment of EGA personnel, until it was pointed out that 
the FBI could not be made the appointing authority. A compromise 
finally was reached among the contending forces which required the 
Administrator or the Secretary of State to certify his belief, on the 
basis of the FBI report, in the "unquestioned loyalty" of the employee 
and that such employee "is not now and never has been a member of any 
organization advocating contrary views" to the American system of govern= 
ment. Copies of the certification were to be filed with the Senate
amendment was made by Vorys, with the explanation that a majority of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee had agreed "not to object." In the 
short time allotted him, Bloom scathingly denounced the amendment and 
Vorys' action in limiting debate. Ibid., p, 3706. Throughout the re­
mainder of the debate there were several unsuccessful efforts made to 
remove the O'Konski amendment. Ibid., p. 387̂ * In addition to Presi­
dent Truman's "unalterable" opposition to the amendment, the State 
Department urged that it be stricken lest it damage the American posi­
tion that ERP was designed to promote democracy and peace. Defense 
Department officials, however, observed that Spain would be a valuable 
ally in the event of war with Soviet Russia. New York Times, March 31, 
I9U8, p. hi Ibid., April 2, 1948, pp. 1, 19. '
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Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 
Further amendments were adopted which suspended this requirement for 
a period of three months at the beginning of the program and permitted 
present employees of the Federal government to be assigned to ECA for 
three months without the prior FBI investigation.
On behalf of the shipping interests and the coastal states, 
Representative Colmer (D., Miss,) offered an amendment to delete the 
provision of the committee bill authorizing the charter of 200 merchant 
ships to participating countries; and Representative Bradley (R., Calif.) 
proposed to reinsert the provision adopted by the Senate requiring at 
least 50 percent of the materials acquired in the United States for ERP
^^^Representative Klein (D., N. Y.) demanded an investigation of 
the "administrative inefficiency and unbalance in the structure" of the 
State Department and charged that large American oil companies exerted 
an undue influence in the State Department. Ibid,, pp. 3319-3320. Rep­
resentative Jensen (R., Iowa) thought the bill should have some provision 
for "stopping Communism" in America since the Communists were " . . .  
running rampant all over this country." Ibid.. p. 3423. Representative 
Hoffman (R., Mich.) demanded a thorough "fumigation" of "Reds", "near- 
Reds" and "red sympathizers and fellow travelers" in the Federal adminis­
trative agencies. Consuming over an hour on personal privilege, the can­
tankerous Hoffman gleefully conceded he was only "getting even" with the 
Foreign Affairs Committee "for all the things they ever did to me." Ibid., 
pp. 3513-3514. Representatives Eberharter (D., Pa.) and McDowell (R.,
Pa.) engaged in heated argument after McDowell questioned the loyalty of 
a fellow Pennsylvanian employed by the Commerce Department. Ibid., pp. 
3641-3642. Representative Cox (D., Ga.) advocated the employment only 
of those personnel who "believe in and support our American system of 
society and Government. ..." Cox charged that certain of the persons 
who participated in the conception and planning of ERP " . . .  either 
are or were Soviet sympathizers, while others were affiliated with Com­
munist front organizations. Some are or were Socialists . ..." He 
did not produce evidence to substantiate his charges. Ibid., p. 3624.
In regard to the Judd-Mundt amendment, requiring certification of "un­
questioned loyalty". Representative Eberharter unsuccessfully argued that 
the language "and has never been a member of any organization advocating 
contrary views" would bar from Government employment many people of com­
plete loyalty. The authors suggested the language could be improved in 
conference. Ibid., pp. 3726-373O.
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to be carried in American bottoms if such were available at market 
rates. Although opposed vigorously by members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, both amendments were adopted,
During the general debate, much emphasis was placed upon the 
subject of trade with Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe, both by the 
United States and by the participating nations. Both proponents and 
opponents of S.2202 voiced objections to continued trading with Soviet 
Russia. The Administration was criticized severely for sanctioning 
such trading.Representative Colmer proposed to prohibit the export 
of commodities or technical data to any country which had " . . .  an­
nounced its intention to prevent the success of the European recovery 
program." Representative Mundt proposed a substitute amendment which, 
although unacceptable to Colmer, was adopted by the Committee of the 
Whole. Under the Mundt amendment exports both from the United States 
and participating countries were to be controlled by (l) prohibiting 
exports to nonparticipating European countries when determined by the 
Administrator that such would not be in the national interest and (2)
^^^Ibid., pp. 3733-3750. The example of Colmer, a member of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, bringing this issue before the House sub­
sequent to the adoption of a policy by the committee characterized the 
disunity of the committee. Not only were the House managers for the 
bill unable to muster sufficient votes to defeat the amendments, but 
they also were unsuccessful in limiting debate. Representative Judd 
argued that the subsidization of the American merchant marine should 
not be the burden of ERP. Mundt charged the shipping industry with 
"raiding" the ERP bill. Vorys ridiculed the "special interest flag- 
waving plea" and chastised the House for wanting to conduct a "WPA 
program for American shipping interests, at the expense of the tax­
payers . . . . "
1 fT O
■̂ '̂̂ Among others, criticisms were expressed by Representatives 
Smith (R., Wis.), McGregor (R., Ohio), Colmer (D., Miss.), Rizley 
(R., Okla.). Ibid., pp. 3443, 3518, 3538, 3851.
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by prohibiting exports to participating countries of commodities which 
were to be used in producing goods for export to nonparticipating coun­
tries, if the end product could not be exported from the United States 
under its export control laws and regulations. Colmer was not convinced 
that the Mundt amendment was strong enough, while supporters of S.2202 
pleaded that it was " . . .  next to a declaration of war .....
The isolationist opposition to S.2202 was marshalled in sup­
port of the Vursell amendment to reduce the ERP authorization from $̂ -3 
billion to $3 billion. , Whereas Vursell argued that even $3 billion was 
more than adequate to meet Europe's legitimate requirements, opponents 
of the amendment insisted that the $5*3 billion sum recommended by the 
Foreign Affairs Committee was at best a minimal amount to achieve genuine 
European recovery. After vigorous and lengthy debate, the Vursell amend­
ment was rejected on a division, 6l to 112.̂ ^̂
^^^Representative Folger (D., N.C.) charged that the committee 
(Mundt) substitute amendment was "next to a declaration of war against 
Russia, a thing that is premature, is not helpful, and would put us in 
a bad light in our protestations that we are trying to bring about a 
peaceful . . . world, . . . ." Ibid., pp. 375̂ -37̂ 0.
^^^Debate on the Vursell amendment was more intense than on
any other portion of the bill. Thirty members took the floor to speak
on the amendment, which involved the heart of ERP, The bitter attacks
of the amendment's supporters moved Minority Leader Sam Rayburn (D.,
Tex,) to say he had heard "some very familiar talk here today > , , ,"
He then chastised those present who had opposed appropriations for de­
fense preparations in the late 1930's, charging that had they voted dif­
ferently the United States might never have been attacked. Representative 
Dirksen (R., 111.) scolded his fellow Republicans, saying that if the 
amendment were adopted the Marshall Plan would become the "partial plan'.'. 
He considered it strange that "men will come into the well of this House 
and talk about billions for aircraft in preparation for the next war 
and yet resolutely take a stand against this proposal which might spare 
the world another bloody struggle . . . .  To you on my side let me say 
to you that we have our responsibility, because we are in charge of this 
body at the present time. If the program fails because we are too nig­
gardly, it will be ow failure." Ibid., pp. 3810-3828.
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As S.2202 had emerged from the Foreign Affairs Committee, it
had required both an annual authorization and appropriation for EBP.
Appropriations were to be made available until 1952, however. During
the general debate there was much discussion concerning whether a moral
commitment was being made for United States participation beyond the
first year of the program. Some argued that despite the language of
the committee bill the United States was being committed to a four-year
program.- Some supporters felt that their vote would commit them to
support the continuation of the program. Opponents, as well, expressed
the view that once the program was initiated, they would be obligated
morally to vote for its continuance. A proposal by Representative
Smith (R., Wis.), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, to declare
specifically that there was no "legal or moral obligation upon any
succeeding Congress to continue the present aid program beyond 12
months" was defeated by the narrow margin of 117 to 127 on a teller
vote. Two similar proposals, advanced by Representative Phillips (R.,
Calif.), were defeated: one on a voice vote, the other on a division,
h-7 to 7°. Throughout the debate, the House leadership had displayed
sympathy toward the use of delaying tactics by the opponents of S.2202.
An example was seen at this point in the overruling of protests by the
managers of the bill that the objective of the Phillips amendments had
xôi.been rejected clearly in the defeat of the Smith amendment.
êL 61As debate concluded on the Smith amendment, Representative 
Vorys angrily addressed his fellow Republicans: " . . .  Brethren, this 
is it. For years we have thundered against the piecemeal, stopgap 
foreign policy of the New Deal. We have demanded a long-range, world­
wide policy, and we have got it, here, now formally set down, carefully 
framed and limited, and largely written by Republicans; and what happens? 
We find Republicans on this floor who want to go back to the New Deal
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Throughout the debate, Democrats had attacked the motives of 
the Republicans in combining other aid programs with the ERP legis­
lation. Although certain to be rejected, at the appropriate time the 
Democrats offered amendments to delete from the bill those portions 
relating to Greek, Turkish, and Chinese aid. Representative Mansfield 
(D., Mont.) offered an amendment to delete Title III, providing military 
aid to Greece, Turkey, and China, while Representative Richards (D,,
S.C) proposed to delete economic aid to China (Title IV). There was 
little debate on either amendment. As a matter of fact, the Committee 
of the Whole dispensed with the reading of Titles II, III, and IV. This 
fact, in addition to the brief debate on the three titles, lent credence 
to Democratic allegations that insufficient study and consideration had 
been given to the measures. Both amendments were rejected overwhelming­
ly: the Mansfield amendment on a division, l8 to 152, and the Richards
proposal on a division, 31 to 113-̂ ^̂
following the abortive attempts to delete Titles III and IV, 
the debate came to a close on March 31• The question was put on the 
committee substitute for the Senate bill, as amended in the Committee 
of the Whole. Agreement was given to the committee substitute and the 
Committee of the Whole then reported to the House. After third reading,
emergency stopgap year-to-year relief plan . . . .  We are suffering from 
congressional foot and mouth trouble here, members who drag their feet 
and foam at the mouth day after day against anything we are trying to 
do here, while we try to get ahead with this gigantic and pressing task 
. . . ." Ibid., pp. 3828-383%.
162Ibid., pp. 3757-3872. Representative Mansfield charged that 
the Foreign Affairs Committee had consumed only two hours and fifty 
minutes in its consideration of Titles II, III, and IV.
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a motion "by Representative Johnson (D., Okla.) to recommit was re­
jected. On the question of passage of the bill, S.2202 passed, 329 
to 7̂ ; with two members answering "present" and twenty-six not voting. 
Voting with the majority were I7I Republicans and 158 Democrats. Eleven 
Democrats joined sixty-one Republicans and two American Labor Party 
members in opposition to passage. The Democrats in opposition repre­
sented constituencies in Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi,
New York, Worth Carolina, Oklahoma,'South Carolina, and Virginia. The 
Republican opposition to the passage of 8.2202 was concentrated in 
traditionally conservative Midwestern states : fifty-one of the sixty- 
one negative Republican votes were cast by Representatives from Il­
linois (1 2), Indiana (5), Iowa (2), Kansas (2), Michigan (7), Minnesota
(3), Missouri (6 ), Nebraska (h), North Dakota (l), Ohio (6 ), South 
Dakota (l), and Wisconsin (2). The remaining ten Republican opposition 
votes were distributed among the following states: California (l), 
Colorado (l), Idaho (l). New Jersey (l), New York (2), Oklahoma (l), 
Pennsylvania (l), and West Virginia (2).
Among the state delegations in the House, the favorable vote 
on S.2202 ranged from 100 percent (twenty-two states) of those voting 
to k-3 percent (Michigan) of those voting. ERP received its poorest 
support in Idaho (50 )̂, Illinois ̂ 8 )̂, Indiana ($0̂ ), Michigan (̂ 3̂ ), 
Missouri (5̂ /0; North Dakota ()0^), Oklahoma (57$), and South Dakota 
(30 )̂. The four-member Republican Nebraska delegation voted solidly 
against ERP. Support among the voting members of the Colorado, Iowa, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Ohio, and West Virginia delegations ranged from 62 
percent (Minnesota) to 75 percent (Colorado, Iowa). In the remaining
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thirty-three state delegations, support for ERF among those voting 
ranged from 78 percent (Wisconsin) to 100 percent (twenty-two dele­
gations).
The House next proceeded to insist on its amendments and ask 
for a conference with the Senate. Speaker Martin appointed as con­
ferees Representatives Eaton, Vorys, Mundt, Bloom, and Keefe. With 
the exception of Keefe, all were members of the Foreign Affairs Com­
mittee. Keefe, a conservative Wisconsin Republican, was a member of 
the Appropriations Committee and had demonstrated no great fondness for
ERP.^̂ 3
Acting expeditiously, the Senate agreed to the request for a 
conference. Appointed as Senate conferees were Senators Vandenberg, 
Capper, Wiley, Connally, and George. The Senate conferees used as 
their conference vehicle the version of S.2202 adopted by the Senate 
on March 13, in addition to subsequently adopted measures largely
16ksimilar to Titles II, III, and IV of the House bill.
Beginning early in the morning of April I, the conferees labored 
continuously until midnight in reaching a compromise.On the next 
day, the conference report was accepted by both Houses with little de­
bate. The House adopted the report on a vote of 318 to 75, with two 
members answering "present" and thirty-six not voting. The report was 
accepted by the Senate on a voice vote. On April 3, 19^, President
^^^Ibid., pp. 3874-3875.
^^4bid., pp. 3894-3900, 3972.
^^^New York Times, April 2, 1948, pp. 1, 19•
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Truman signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act of 19̂ -8.̂ ^̂  The 
President magnanimously expressed his appreciation to Congress for 
its assistance in a cooperative venture.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 19^
In form; the Foreign Assistance Act of 19^8 more nearly re­
sembled the House version of foreign aid legislation.The Senate 
previously had accepted the omnibus approach and thus there was no 
major area of disagreement confronting the conferees in this matter.
There were some adjustments to be made as.to the amounts of aid for 
Greece, Turkey, and China.
In content, the House receded from an amendment designed to 
effect closer political relationships among the participating nations.
The Senate, as well as the Administration, had maintained consistently 
that ERP was an economic undertaking and that the United States must 
not attempt to dictate to the participants in political matters. The 
major accomplishment of the Senate conferees was to secure the agree­
ment of their House counterparts to delete the specific inclusion of 
Spain as a participating country. President Truman had insisted that 
this matter should be left to the determination of the participants 
themselves.
In respect to the membership of the Public Advisory Board (to
^^^Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 3, 403^-^03&, 0̂53-̂ 070.
^^?New York Times, April k, 19̂ 8, pp. 1, U.
1^^^References to the Foreign Assistance Act of 19^, unless other­
wise cited, are from the Conference Report, in Congressional Record, XCIV, 
Part 3, 4061- 0̂63,
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advise the Administrator), the House accepted the position of the 
Senate and the Administration that qualifications of members should 
relate to their broad and varied experience in matters affecting the 
public interest without reference to economic interest groups. The 
Senate accepted the more stringent House provisions regarding loyalty 
of EGA personnel. House amendments relating to accounting procedures 
to be followed by the Administrator were accepted by the Senate. The 
Senate agreed to House amendments authorizing guarantees of investments 
in information media. The House receded from'amendments specifically 
naming certain commodities.to be included within the definition of 
"surplus agricultural commodities". The Senate accepted the House 
demand for annual authorizations as well as appropriations and the 
House formula authorizing a first-year appropriation of $4.3 billion 
in addition to a "public debt transaction" of $1 billion. The total, 
$5 .3 billion, involved no disagreement between the two Houses. In 
regard to the United States assets and earnings of citizens of the 
participating countries, the Senate accepted the House amendment re­
quiring that such assets and earnings be put into "appropriate" use 
in support of ERP. This subject had received much attention through­
out the hearings and debates, with much pressure being brought to bear 
upon the Administration to assist the participating countries in lo­
cating, identifying, and controlling such assets and earnings.
The subject of repayment of American assistance had proved to 
be one of the most contentious features of the hearings and debates.
The Administration and Senate, in general, had cautioned against over­
stating the possibilities of repayment. Both the Senate and House,
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however, exhibited a greater,sense of expectancy in this matter than 
did the Administration. The Senate had adopted a provision for in­
clusion in the bilateral agreements, if applicable, under which a partici­
pating country
would undertake within reasonable limits to facilitate 
the transfer to the United States, for stock-piling pur­
poses, of materials required by the United States as a 
result of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its 
own resources . . . .
A House amendment to include "other purposes" than stock-piling was 
accepted by the Senate, so that scrap iron and similar materials needed 
immediately would not have to be stockpiled.
The House also added a provision,to be included in the bilateral 
agreements where applicable, requiring the participating countries to 
undertake to provide future schedules of minimum availabilities to the 
United States for future purchase and delivery, and also to provide an 
agreed schedule of increased production of such materials in repayment 
on a long-term basis of grants or loans made by the Administrator to 
the participating countries. A compromise agreement, reached by the 
conferees, provided that the bilateral agre'ement would bind the partici­
pating country only to agree to negotiate, and that a portion of the in­
creased production of such materials would be transferred to the United 
States on a long-term basis in consideration of general assistance rather 
than in repayment of specific grants or loans.
The Senate accepted a House amendment authorizing the Adminis­
trator to refuse delivery to participating countries of commodities or 
products going into the production of products for delivery to nonpartici­
pating European countries, if such products would be refused export
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licenses to those countries by the United States in the interest of 
its national security. The House managers agreed to a provision ad- 
vocated by the Senate conferees that if the Administrator believed that 
the export of a commodity to a nonparticipating countiy was not in the 
best interests of national security, he was to so advise the export- 
control authority (Department of Commerce). If the export-control 
authority did not act, the matter then would be referred to the Presi­
dent. The original House (Mundt) amendment had given the Administrator 
the authority to make this decision.
The House retreated from its adamant position in regard to the 
Joint Committee on Foreign Economic Cooperation, after the Senate con­
ferees agreed to change the composition of the proposed committee to a 
total of ten members, rather than fourteen, with five members from each 
House to be selected by the chairmen of the Appropriations and foreign 
relations committees from among the membership of those committees.
The feature of the House bill authorizing the Administrator to 
create a corporation, if he deemed it necessary, to assist him in 
administering the act, was retained in the conference report.
The House managers of S.2202 were elated over the results of 
the conference. They -felt that they clearly had out-maneuvered the 
Senate conferees, pointing out that they had retreated only in the 
matters of Spain and the joint "watchdog" committee. Adoption of the 
conference report by the House brought declarations that this event 
" . . .  totally and finally marks the end of the era of appeasement which 
'this country has followed since the conference at Teheran, . . .
^^9lbid., pp. 4o64-4o6$,
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Senator Vandenberg casually compared the conference report with 8,2202 
as it originally had passed the Senate, noting few major changes and 
displaying satisfaction with the final r e s u l t . ^^0
Implementation of the Recovery Program
S.2202, as signed by the President, contained a provision autho­
rizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to advance the Economic 
Cooperation Administration up to $1 billion for immediate implementation 
of the recovery program, pending action by Congress on the actual ap­
propriation measure.
As early as February, when the final form of ERP— and even the 
question of its passage were much in doubt, a group of Government experts 
began work on the-operational problems expected to be associated with 
EGA. The product of their efforts was a so-called "primer" of funda­
mentals on EGA, its objectives, and an outline of suggested procedures,
A skeleton staff, under Paul H. Nitze, Deputy Director of the State De­
partment’s Office of International Trade, was established to put the
recovery program into motion until the Administrator had been appointed
1 71by President Truman and approved by the Senate.
The question of the Administrator of the recovery program 
figured prominently in the movement of S.2202 through Congress. Through­
out the hearings and debates, it was continually emphasized that the 
success of the program would depend ultimately on the President's
^TOlbld., pp. 4̂ 34-4036.
^fÎNew York Times, April 3> 19̂ 8, pp. 1,6; Ibid., April 11,1948, E9.
304
selection of the Administrator= Speculation abounded as to the ultimate 
selection. Those mentioned in the speculation included Paul G. Hoffman, 
President of the Studebaker Corporation; Philip D. Reed, Chairman of 
the Board, General Electric Co.; former Under Secretaries of State Will 
Clayton and Dean Acheson; Charles E. Wilson, President, General Elec­
tric Co.; Ambassador Levis Douglas; Bernard Baruch; former President 
Herbert Hoover; and Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman.^^^
On April President Truman named Hofflnan, a Republican, to be 
the Administrator of ECA. -Although Hoffman vas an ardent and eloquent 
advocate of ERP, having served on the Harriman Committee, it is probable 
that he vas not the President’s first choice as Administrator. Report­
edly, the President gave serious consideration to the appointment of 
Acheson and Wilson. Acheson vas tied too closely to the Democratic 
Administration and to the State Department, hovever, as vas Will Clayton, 
Secretary Marshall's choice for the appointment. The same stigma at­
tached to Ambassador Douglas, despite his close relationships vith in­
fluential members of Congress. Wilson, unfortunately, had signed the 
civil liberties report, which had been the basis of Mr. Truman’s civil 
rights recommendations to Congress. In viev of the discord and dismay 
accompanying the submission of these recommendations to Congress, Wilson 
obviously would have been an unpopular selection. Hoffman, on the 
other hand, was being supported actively for the appointment by Senator 
Vandenberg, who was in a commanding position to effect a compromise. 
Hoffman, in addition, had the support of the chairmen of the powerful
^^^Ibld., January 29, 1948, p. l8; Ibid., April 5, 1948, pp.
1,6.
305
Senate and House Appropriations Committees, Senator Styles Bridges
(R., N.H.) and Representative John Taber (R., N.Y.), as well as that
of Secretary of Commerce Harriman. In the end, Hoffman received the
173appointment, which was confirmed quickly by the Senate.
The Appropriations Struggle 
Full implementation of ERP depended upon the outcome of the 
forthcoming deliberations of the powerful Appropriations Committees. 
Apprehension prevailed, particularly in regard to the prospective rec­
ommendations of the House Appropriations Committee, led by the ultra­
conservative John Taber. Taber had been vitriolic in his denunciation 
of the recovery program during the House debate, promising that his
committee would study the program in every detail before making any
17keffort to implement the authorization. Bridges, also a conservative
and lukewarm toward ERP, had insisted in Senate debate on assurances
from Vandenberg that no undue pressures would be applied against his
175committee in regard to its recommended appropriation. Further cause 
for apprehension among ERP supporters derived from the knowledge that 
S.2202 had received many votes cast with the often-explicit hopes that 
the Appropriations Committees would be less than generous in their
176recommendations for appropriations.
^73Ibid., April 6 , 19̂ 3? pp. 1,9,10; Vandenberg, p. 39%''
7̂%Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 3, 3852.
^^^Ibid. , Part 2, pp. 2707-2708.
^7^For example, Representative Case (R.,8,D.) stated early in 
the debate that he would feel free to vote for 8.2202 only with the 
understanding that its approval would constitute no commitment to make an 
appropriation in any specified amount. Ibid., Part 3, P* 3319*
306
Taber was unperturbed by the mounting pressures to commence
hearings on the foreign aid appropriation measure. In an unusual move.
Bridges announced on April ^ that his committee would not await final
House action, as was customary on appropriations measures, prior to
177beginning its hearings. The reasons underlying the diametrically 
opposite responses to the same pressures probably could be discovered 
in the attitudes motivating action in the Senate and in the House. Al­
though conservative leadership prevailed in both Houses, there was no 
Senator Vandenberg in the House of Representatives nor was the influence 
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs comparable to that of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Vandenberg was a part of the Sen­
ate leadership. In addition, the membership of his committee consisted 
for the most part of leaders of both parties in the Senate. Once 
action had been completed on the ERP authorization measure, the role 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and its members had been completed.
Exercising predominant influence now was the powerful Appropriations 
178Committee.
Pressures continued to mount for Congress to complete its action
^^^Taber was attacked editorially by the New York Times for his 
insistence that ERP required further study. The Times thought ” ... 
that the country can well dispense with his particular brand of states­
manship . . . . ' New York Times, April 2, 19̂ 8, p. 22', Ibid., April $,
19I+8, pp. 1, 6.
. . . Upon no group has the House devolved so much power 
as it has upon the Committee on Appropriations. Its bills are rarely 
seriously challenged on the floor. The protests arising there usually 
concern domestic projects which some Congressmen feel have been treated 
unfairly. In the case of foreign policy appropriations the House rebels 
only occasionally when it feels the committee has not cut deeply enough 
Carroll, pp. l42-l43.I f
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on the European Recovery Program. President Truman demanded quick 
action and appropriation of the full $k.2U5 .000,000 authorization for 
ECA. Although House leaders had promised on April 12 to give first 
priority to the ERP funding measure, such was not to he the case.^79 
In Europe, the sixteen nations scheduled to participate in ERP were 
completing action toward the creation of a permanent central organi­
zation to oversee the operation of the recovery program.Repre- • 
sentative Taber scheduled hearings on the foreign aid appropriation 
to begin before his committee on April 20. He warned that the hear­
ings might continue for weeks because, in his view, the legislative 
committees which had passed upon the enabling legislation did not 
have adequate data upon which to base their recommendations for ap­
propriations .
House Reduction of ERP Appropriation 
Hearings on the Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill of 19̂ 9 began
before the Deficiencies Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Com­
mittee on April 20 and continued through May 21. Sixteen days of 
hearings were devoted to ECA while twelve days were reserved for other 
aspects of the foreign aid appropriation. Testimony of the witnesses 
was contained in two printed.volumes totaling I586 pages. Sixty-eight 
Government witnesses testified on highly technical aspects of the aid
179New York Times, April 13, 1948, p. 1; Ibid., April 15, 1948,
p. 19.
iGOlbid., April 15, 1948, p. 19-
^^^Ibid., April 16, 1948, p. 9.
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i8pprogram. The committee staggered the supporters of ERP and created 
an immediate furor vith its report, which was submitted to the House on 
June 3* Although recommending an appropriation for ECA of $5,055,000,000, 
an ostensible reduction of only $245,000,000 from the authorization, the 
committee in reality reduced the ECA appropriation by $2,001,000,000 
through the stratagem of changing the basis of the appropriation from 
twelve to fifteen months. The committee reasoned that it had provided 
the maximum amount which could be expended intelligently during the 
fifteen month period. If a necessity for additional funds should arise, 
it reasoned further, Congress would be in session and could then consider 
the "emergency". The committee pointed to past expenditures for foreign 
aid and criticized their "wasteful" administration. It further justified 
its action on the basis of the "dwindling assets and domestic economy" 
of the United States. In attempting to justify its protracted hearings, 
the committee assailed the " . . .  complete instability in the estimates 
and other data ..." presented in justification of the $6,533;710,228 
requested for all aspects of foreign aid. The Administration was criti­
cized for the "absence of definite policy" in the execution of the pro­
gram which only recently had been authorized. Despite its faith in its 
own judgment as opposed to that of the hundreds of experts who had sup­
ported the requested ERP authorization, the committee declared the im­
possibility of ascertaining the actual needs of the participating coun­
tries within a billion dollars. The committee also substituted its
l8?U. S., Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on 
Deficiencies of the Committee on Appropriations , 'Hearings on the Foreign 
Aid Appropriation Bill for 1948, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, 2 parts.
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judgment for that of the experts in its estimate of the prospects for 
the 19 8̂=19^9 crop year in Europe, concluding that "substantial savings" 
could be realized because of this "fact". The committee looked askance 
at the amount of the authorization measure contemplated for the incentive 
item of tobacco, terming this a "luxury". It directed that surplus 
United States wool be utilized in the program. It was critical of con­
templated exports of coal from the United States. It did not believe 
that European farms could be mechanized to the extent contemplated in 
the authorization measure. The committee expressed the view that grants 
should be held to a minimum. Authorized funds for aid to Greece, Turkey, 
and China also were decreased by the committee. The policies of the 
Administration in regard to the occupation of Germany were censured. 
Legislative riders -were attached in connection with the-use of "counter­
part" currencies and the administration of ECA funds in occupied areas.
By other riders the Jurisdiction of the Joint "watchdog" committee was 
extended and the Administrator was directed to utilize in ERP certain 
commodities which had been contracted for export but which had been 
denied licenses under the new Government export-control program ini­
tiated on March 1.^^^
Chairman Taber issued a statement apart from the report in which
he charged that the "real aims" of foreign aid had been "grossly mis-
18^represented" to the American public. The House Rules Committee
^̂ Û. S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Foreign 
Aid Appropriation Bill, 1949, Soth Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, Report No. 
2173, to accompany H. R. 6001, pp. 1-10, in House Miscellaneous Reports, 
IV (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 194w/,
^®^ew York Times, June 4, 1948, pp. 1, 8,
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quickly granted a rule governing debate on H. R. 6801, the "Foreign 
Aid Appropriation Bill of 1949", The rule allowed four hours of general 
debate and forbade points of order against legislative provisions in 
the bill.^®^ Despite the efforts of a "restorationist" coalition led 
by Representatives Everett Dirksen (R., 111.) and Clarence Cannon (D.,
Mo.) the House, under the firm control of Taber, Martin, and Halleck, 
passed the "Taberized" foreign aid appropriation on June 4. Only two 
minor amendments not to the liking of the leadership had been adopted. 
There were no record votes. The issue was largely one of party regu­
larity, with Republican members waiting restlessly about the House 
chamber for the opportunity to vote. Also involved was the rivalry 
between the Appropriations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Com­
mittee, with members of the latter assisting in the vain effort to
l86stem the isolationist tide.
Res. 633, Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 6, 7163-7168. 
The’rule was accepted by a vote of 329-22.
^^^Ibid., pp. 7168-7213; New York Times, June 5; 1948, pp. 1,5.
In his opening remarks, Taber told the House that " . . .  the architects 
of this world-wide relief program have no definite plan and no definite 
program. There is no Marshall plan . . . .The budget estimates . . . 
appeared to be the result of a series of after-dinner conversations in 
which administration economists and planners let their imaginations run 
riot." Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 6, JlSB, He charged that the 
hearings had revealed a ... complete lack of substantiating evidence 
on the proposed needs and requirements of the participating countries 
. . . ." Ibid., p. 7169. Representative Cannon charged that no evidence 
had been adduced which warranted the reduction adopted by the Appropria­
tions Committee. He contended that enactment of the recovery program 
legislation already had accomplished beneficial results in Europe, not 
the least of which was restoration of hope in the participating countries. 
Ibidc, p. 7171, Representative Stefan (R., Neb.) defended the actions 
of the Appropriations Committee, praising its endeavor " . . .  to put 
Americanism at the head of the priority list . . . ." Ibid., p. 7176. 
Representative Vorys charged the Appropriations Committee with "tamper­
ing" with legislative policy. Ibid,, p, 7195' Tempers grew extremely
311
Response to House Action 
The House action brought dismay in Europe as well as in the 
United States. Supporters of ERP charged that the "irresponsible" 
action had shaken world confidence in American leadership and could 
only benefit the cause of the Soviet Union and world Communism. Members 
of both major parties viewed the move as damaging to the progress that 
had been made in the postwar period toward establishing a bipartisan 
foreign policy, i.e., a foreign policy which was consistent, reliable, 
and would both reassure the friends and confound the enemies of the 
United States. European Communists capitalized upon the House action, 
pointing to it as an example of United States insincerity and insta­
b i l i t y .  ^ ^ 7
Undoubtedly because of the proximity of the approaching Presi­
dential campaign, a move developed within the Republican party to prevent 
the dominance of the Taber-Martin-Halleck views on foreign policy. A 
serious question as to the leadership abilities of the party had arisen 
as a consequence of the House action. Senator Vandenberg took the lead 
to restore the ERP funds in the Senate, informing reporters on June 6 
that he was taking the unusual step of requesting an audience before
short during the debate, as when Representative Case (R., S. D,) charged 
that Representative Cooley (D., N. C«j was opposed to the reduced ap­
propriation only because he feared that tobacco purchases under the pro­
gram would be decreased from the amount originally planned. Ibid., p.
7181.
^^?New York Times, June 5; 19^; PP* 1, Ibid., June 6, 1948, 
p. 9' Secretary Marshall feared serious political repercussions" in 
Europe. The Committee for the Marshall Plan issued a statement de­
claring that the House action in decreasing the ERP appropriation would 
defeat the purposes of the recovery program.
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the Senate Appropriations Committee to plead the case for a restoration 
of the funds slashed by the House. Associates described the senator 
as "fighting mad" and "critically concerned" about the impact of the 
House action on the ERP countries and in the diplomatic and ideological
188conflict with the Soviet Union. Republican Presidential contenders 
Harold E. Stassen and Thomas E. Dewey joined Vandenberg publicly on
189June 7 in demanding a restoration of the ERP funds. ' Several Re­
publican senators conceded that the House action had placed their party 
in an embarrassing position, with Senators Morse (R., Ore.), Saltonstall 
(R., Mass.), Baldwin (R., Conn.), and Ferguson (R., Mich.) declaring
that the Republican party would have to assume the responsibility if
190the recovery program should fail for a lack of funds.
Addressing a packed session of the Senate Appropriations Com­
mittee on June 9> Senator Vandenberg delivered a scathing attack upon 
the "meat axe" technique used by the House in decreasing the ERP ap­
propriation, describing it as an attempt "to. gut the enterprise". He 
criticized the move as a "cynical reversal" of a major Congressional 
policy decision through the "back door" of an appropriations bill.
Minority Leader Barkley joined Vandenberg in appealing the House fund 
191cut. California's Governor Earl Warren, another contender is. the
1, 13.
ISSnsv York Times, June 5> 1948, p. Ibid., June 6, 1948, pp.
^̂ ^Ibid., June 8, 1948, pp. 1, 6,
^^^Ibid., p. 5.
S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Hear­
ings on Economic Cooperation Administration, H. R, 68OI, 80th Cong., 
2nd Sess,, 1948, pp. 423-439- Cited hereafter as Senate Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings on ECA, H. R. 68OI.
313
campaign for the Republican Presidential nomination, telegraphed his
congratulations to V a n d e n b e r g . ^^2 Candidate Stassen appeared before
the Appropriations Committee the following day, making a similar ap- 
193peal. Representative Taber, meanwhile, declared that he would de­
fend the House decreases "to the end".^^^ Also entering the fray, the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee declared publicly that the Appropria­
tions Committee should be deprived of any and all responsibilities in 
connection with providing funds for the implementation of foreign 
policies.
Senate Consideration of ERP Appropriation 
In the midst of this furor, hearings before the Senate Ap­
propriations Committee on the foreign aid appropriation bill were 
concluded. The hearings had commenced on May 13 and ended on June 12. 
Thirteen public sessions were held, during which sixty-five'witnesses 
were heard. The committee submitted its report to the Senate on June 
Most significantly, it acted to restore all but $2̂ 5 million 
of the $5*3 billion authorization. It accomplished this primarily by 
restoring the appropriation to a twelve-month basis. It recommended
^^^Hew York Times, June 10, 1948, pp. 1, 5«
^93senate Committee on Appropriations, Hearings on ECA, E. R. 
6801, pp. 459-469.
^9^New York Times, June 10, 1948, pp. 1, 5-
^9^Ibid., June 11, 1948, p. 13-
8. . Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, For­
eign Aid Appropriation Act, 1949, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, Report No.
1626, to accompany H. R. 68OI, in Senate Miscellaneous Reports, IV 
(Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1948).
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a total of $5,055^000,000 for ERP for twelve months, against the
I '
requested $5*3 billion, thus the difference of $245 million. The 
committee, in effect, restored $1,175>000,000 of the actual House 
decreases in ERP funds.
Despite its generous action in restoring most of the ERP 
funds, the Senate committee was critical of the "cursory examination" 
upon which the authorization had been based and of the "total in­
adequacy" of the Executive branch estimates as a basis for a "precise 
appropriation". Apprehensively, supporters of ERF feared that such 
expressions of sentiment would bolster the Taber forces in the im­
pending conference to reconcile the divergent views of the two Houses. 
Borrowing language from the Taber committee report, the Senate group 
complained of the imprecision of the entire enterprise to the current 
date. Its own reductions were Justified, ultimately, on the same 
grounds as those relied upon by the House committee, i.e., because 
the estimates had a great element of uncertainty there could be no 
valid basis for objecting to a reduction of appropriations. Never­
theless, because of the 'obvious need' for United States aid, the 
committee was recommending a much larger appropriation than did the 
House. It admonished the Administration, however, that subsequent 
requests for appropriations for the program should be based "on a 
more business-like and stable formula . . . ." As passed by the House, 
H. R. 6801 had provided a total of $5,980,710,228 for all activities, 
with the basis of appropriations changed to fifteen months. This 
compared with a budget estimate of $6,533>700,000 for a twelve-month 
period. The total recommended by the Senate committee for a twelve-
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month period was $6,125,710,228. It recommended a much lower sum than 
did the House for the International Children's Emergency Fund; it in­
creased the amount allowed by the House for Greece and Turkey, although 
its recommendation still was below the budget request; and it increased 
the amount allowed by the House for China aid, although, again, its 
recommendation was below the budget request. Finally, the committee
recommended a greater sum than allowed by the House for government and
197relief in occupied areas.
Senate deliberation on the report of its Appropriations Com­
mittee was swift. Senator Vandenberg expressed his gratitude to Chair­
man Bridges and the committee for restoring the funds cut by the House, 
Although not in complete agreement with all of the committee amendments 
to the bill, Vandenberg voiced general satisfaction with the bill as it
emerged from the committee, He asked for a record vote on the most
>
significant committee amendment, which changed the period for avail­
ability of funds to twelve months. The amendment was accepted, 6k to
19815, with most of the negative votes being recorded by the "revisionists". 
The Senate then proceeded to accept the other committee amendments with 
little discussion. At 12:30 a. m. on June 15, the bill passed, 60 to 
9, with twenty-seven members not voting. The "nays" consisted of die­
hard isolationists, plus Idaho's Democratic Senator Taylor. The Senate 
then insisted on its amendments and requested a conference with the 
House, Appointed as conferees were Senators Bridges (R,, N, H,), Gurney
197lbid,, pp. 1-15.
^^^Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 7, 8309-83IO,
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(r., s. D.), Brooks (R., 111.), Reed (R., Kan.), McKellar (D., Tenn,),
Hayden (D., Arlz. ), and Thomas (D., Okla.).^^^ The House refused to
accept the Senate amendments and agreed to a conference. Representatives
Taber, Wigglesworth (R., Mass.), Engel (R., Mich.), Stefan (R., Neb.), - -
Case (R., 5.D.), Keefe (R., Wis.), Cannon (D., Mo.), Kerr (D., N.C.),
and Mahon (D., Tex.) were named as House conferees.
As it had become apparent that the Senate woul.d act to restore
the House reduction of ERP funds. Representative Taber publicly lashed
201out at Senator Vandenberg for his efforts in the restoration movement.
Vandenberg conceded that his efforts thus far had accomplished at least
one thing, i.e., his "final renunciation" as a Republican Presidential
contender. His primary objective now, in this regard, was to secure
202the nomination of a ticket to block the Republican isolationists.
Conference and Capitulation 
As the conferees prepared to assemble for their initial session 
on June 17, the portent for a satisfactory compromise of the differences 
between the House and Senate on H. R. 6801 appeared bleak. Representative
I99lbia., p. 8322.
ZOOlbid., p, 81+77.
20^Taber accused Vandenberg of "fraud" in securing passage of 
the ERP bill, by promising that he would not challenge the right of the 
Appropriations Committee to review European needs and suggest funds lower 
than those authorized. New York Times, June 15, 1$48, pp. I,l4.
^Q^Ibid., June 17, 19I+8 , p. 1+. Reportedly, Vandenberg hoped to 
block the isolationist wing of the Republican Party through the election 
of Dewey as President, with John Foster Dulles becoming Secretary of 
State. Vandenberg would complete this picture by remaining in a Repub­
lican Senate as the chairman of Foreign Relations.
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Taber reacted adamantly against the pressures for conciliation by
the House. As he viewed the situation, the prime issue involved the
power of the Appropriations Committee to review--and pass upon--the
legislative decisions of Congress in all matters requiring expenditures 
20 '̂of public funds.
After meeting for four hours on June 17, the conferees had made
no advances toward a compromise agreement. Taber remained adamant,
even though ECA Administrator Hoffman, in appearing before the conferees,
had warned that unless ERP funds were restored it would be impossible
to ship any industrial machinery or equipment during the first year of
20kthe recovery program.
Representative Taber's position was becoming increasingly un­
tenable. Earlier, members of his committee had intimated that the corn­
onsmittee report had been dictated by the House Republican leadership.
As the conferees labored. Republican leaders in both Houses privately 
expressed confidence that a satisfactory settlement would be achieved.
It was suggested that the Senate could easily make concessions on pro­
visions of the appropriations measure other than those relating to ERF.
The leaders expressed "grave doubts" that Taber would be sustained by
2q6the House if he persisted in his refusal to compromise. However, 
two further meetings of the conferees on June I8 proved futile. The
203lbid., June 17, 1948, pp. 1, 12.
ZO^Ibid., June 18, 1948, p. 9 .
^°^Ibid., June 5, 1948, pp. 1, 5.
^°^Ibid., June I8, 1948, p. 9.
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crucial issue was the period of availability of funds for ERP. Senate 
conferees insisted on twglye months, whereas the House conferees de­
manded retention of the fifteen month period. Each side charged the 
other with responsibility for the stalemate.
'Congress was scheduled to adjourn on the evening of June 1.9, as 
the Republican National Convention was to convene at Philadelphia on 
June 21. Members were eager to depart the Capitol. After a meeting 
of the Senate Republican Policy Committee in the evening of June l8, 
Senator Taft announced that he was prepared to postpone the scheduled 
Congressional adjournment, if necessary, in order to carry out the 
"moral commitment" to the Marshall Plan countries. In a major con­
cession, Taft stated that he was " . . .  quite prepared to stand by 
the view of Senator Vandenberg as to what is essential to carry out 
the moral commitments to Europe.Other expressions of Congressional 
sentiment indicated that Representative Taber's support had virtually 
dissipated.
Early in the afternoon of Saturday, June 19, Senators Taft, 
Wherry and Millikin, and Representatives Halleck and Arends met with 
Speaker Martin in the latter's office.Later that day, the dead­
lock between the Senate and House conferees was broken by a complete 
capitulation of the Taber forces. The primary disagreement between 
the two Houses--the "time element" in respect to the availability of
^°̂ Ibld. , June 19, 19̂ 8, pp. 1,2.
208ibid., pp. 1, 13.
^Q^Ibld., June 20, 1948, pp. 1, 7.
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ERP funds--was resolved by making the funds "available" until June 30,-
191-9; and by adding the proviso
. . that the entire amount may be appropriated for 
obligation or may be obligated and expended if the 
President, after recommendation by the Administrator, 
deems such action necessary to carry out the purposes, 
of said act during the period ending April 2, 1918.210
The language was an effort to save face for Representative Taber while
acceding to the pressures for restoring the House reductions.
The conference report was submitted to the House at ll:l2 p. m.,
June 19. In a spirit of hilarity. Representative Clarence Cannon, one
of the conferees, described the report as a "complete victory for the
Senate program . . . .  The report is highly satisfactory to the minority
. . . ." After "sabotaging" the foreign aid program, he continued, the
majority managers of the bill
. . . found themselves in an uncomfortable position 
as soon as the Senate announced its amendments. From 
that time down to tonight there has been a wild foot 
race upon the part of the House conferees, in a scurry­
ing search for a loophole through which to escape from 
the trap in which they had snared themselves.
Although the House managers had managed to save their lengthened date
of availability of funds, " . . .  they sacrificed everything else to
retain it and then find it meaningless ..." because, under the Senate
amendment, the President could ignore it. In a more serious vein. Cannon
charged that
. . . The proposal to thus delegate to the President 
. . . legislative functions of the Congress amounts
congressional Record. XCW, Part 7, 9123 =210,
^^^Ibid., p. 9296.
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to an abdication of constitutional authority . . . .
That is an appalling price to pay to extricate the 
House conferees from the consequences of their folly.
On a roll call vote, demanded by Representative McCormack (D.,
Mass.), the report vas accepted, 318 to 62, with fifty members not
4-. 213voting.
Shortly afterward, as dawn approached, a weary Senate agreed
to the conference report with little discussion and without a record
vote. Senator Bridges, explaining the report, said he thought it would
be "generally satisfactory" to the Senate. The total amount of the
foreign aid appropriation finally agreed upon was $6,030,710,228. The
total included $ij-,000,000,000 for EGA; $^00,000,000 for China; $1,300,
000,000 for government and relief in the occupied areas, as well as for
economic recovery in Japan, Korea, and the Ryukyus; $225,000,000 for
Greek-Turkish aid; $35,000,000 for the International ChildrerJs Emergency
Fund; and $70,710,228 for the International Refugee Organization, The
total appropriation was $!+08,000,000 below the amount approved earlier
on 11by the Senate and $503,000,000 below the amount authorized.
The Senate had laid the foundation for its victory through its 
many amendments of H. R, 68OI as it had emerged from the House. Its con­
ferees easily could compromise on minor issues in order to achieve the 
major goal of restoring the twelve-month basis of availability of the 





commended the Senate conferees upon their "splendid piece of con­
structive work which maintains the full spirit of this great enter­
prise . . . ." He expressed his "personal gratitude" to Senator 
Bridges for his " . . .  stalwart loyalty to a great ideal." There­
upon, the Senate agreed to the conference r e p o r t . A t  T:l4 a. m.,
Sunday, June 20, the Senate adjourned until Friday, December 3I, 19^.
2IÔThe House had adjourned previously at 6:$6 a. m.
H. R. 6801 was presented to the President on June 23 and be-
217came Public Law 793 on June 28, 19^- Mr. Truman expressed a 
"deep sense of satisfaction" in signing the measure. The law, he said, 
represented the " . . .  combined judgment and will of the Executive
and Congress . . .," having been bom "in the spirit of cooperation
218and not of partisan conflict."
^^^Ibid., p. 9123.
^^^Ibid., p. 9109'
^̂ '̂ Ibid., Part 8 , p. 9367.
PI ANew York Times, June 29, 19^8; pp. 1, 1̂ .
CHA.PTER VI
CONCLUSION
The primary purpose of this study has been to determine the 
roles of the Executive branch of the Federal Government, Congress, and 
the public in the formulation and implementation of the American foreign 
policy expressed in the historic Marshall Plan and its legislative em­
bodiment, the European Recovery Program. Special emphasis has been 
placed on determining the Congressional role in foreign policy since, 
beginning with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and subsequent 
foreign aid programs, legislative apprcspriations increasingly kave as­
sumed greater significance in the imi'lementation of American foreign 
policy. In studying the Congressional foreign policy role, the in­
fluence of special interest groups of necessity cons leered, for 
it is at the legislative level that this component of the ccmplex Ai-eri- 
can system of government makes its greatest impact on the determination 
of public policy.
The historical background underlying the development of the 
Marshall Plan was established in Chapter I of this stutiy. Therein, the 
focus was placed upon the startling deterioration in relat;ionc between 
the United States and the Soviet Union following the end of World War 
II, which necessitated a re-evaluation of the role to be played by the 
United States in world affairs. T}}c outlines of the new role emerged
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in the Truman Doctrine, a revolutionary development in American 
diplomacy during ostensible peacetime. To emphasise the inter­
relationships which are a permanent part of the American governmental 
process at every level--and their importance in respect to the Mar­
shall Plan and European Recoverŷ  -Program, the focus in Chapter II was 
upon the domestic political situation existing during the historical 
period under consideration in this study. Assuming significance, in 
terms of the foreign policy decision-making process, were the facts 
of a Democratically-controlled Executive branch, a Republican-controlled 
Congress, and a public torn between a desire to concentrate upon day-to- 
day pursuits and a growing awareness of the "menace" of world Communism 
as exemplified and directed by the Soviet Union. In Chapter III, spe­
cial consideration was given to the American response to the Communist 
challenge in Greece and Turkey, since the policy formulated in that 
situation was but one step--although a significant one--in the devel­
opment of the Marshall Rian. Included therein was an examination of 
the personalities involved in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine 
and the efforts of these Executive branch officials to guide the Con­
gressional and other forces whose sanction was a requisite for a broad 
shift of course in this nation's foreign policy. It became apparent, 
however, even as the Truman Doctrine was being formulated, that the 
crisis in Greece and Turkey was but one aspect of a wider catastrophe 
threatening to engulf Europe itself. Eastern Europe had been swallowed 
by the Soviet Union as that nation capitalized upon a fortuitous chain 
of circumstances during the period marking the end of the war and the 
return to peace. Now, Western Europe was confronted with economic and
324
political collapse, unable to recover by its ovn resources from the 
ravages of the recent ■'.■;ar and the postvar dislocation of historic trade 
and commercial patterns. The Soviet Union posed no immediate physical 
threat to Western Europe, yet an ever-present possibility existed that 
it would be the immediate beneficiary of any failure to fill the vacuum 
about to be created in Western Europe, Increasingly during this period, 
world events had come to be viewed in terms of a United States-Soviet 
dichotomy. To a world that had placed such great faith in the fledgling 
United Nations Organization and the concept of collective security, the 
rapid deterioration in the postwar international situation was dis­
heartening. In response to the mounting crisis in Europe, the United 
States announced the Marshall Plan and offered its assistance to any 
country in Europe willing to join in a cooperative endeavor to correct 
the ills of that area's general economy. Efforts were made to purge 
the broader Marshall Plan of the militantly anti-Communist implications 
of the Truman Doctrine. In this political setting, the objective in 
Chapters IV and V was to examine the Marshall Plan as it progressed 
from basic concept to concrete reality, not in respect to its efficacy 
in the conduct of the international relations of the United States, but 
in terms of the interactions between the Executive branch. Congress, and 
the public in the formulation and implementation of that policy. Specif­
ically, the objective was to determine the roles and relative importance 
of the Executive branch. Congress, and the public in the formulation and 
implementation of the Marshall Plan and European Recovery Program.
In examining the lineage of the Marshall Plan, it is virtually 
impossible to cite one particular event at a given time and place and
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involving any certain individual as being crucial to the development 
of the specific concepts employed in the plan. Secretary Marshall's 
offer of assistance to Europe vas not solely his ovn creation, nor 
did it reflect the thinking only of State Department officials. The 
original offer of assistance and the final plan evolved after months 
of effort were the products of many minds working sometimes independently 
of one another but, in the main, working cooperatively toward a generally 
shared goal. This is not to say, however, that the motives always were 
identical.
Although the Marshall Plan was a conception evolving jointly 
in many minds— in the Executive branch, in Congress, and among the 
general public, the fact remains that the policy was initiated by the 
Executive branch, which has the responsibility for conducting this 
nation's foreign policy. From the beginning, there was no question 
that the implementation of the plan would require the consent of both 
Congress and the people, since it would involve the expenditure of 
billions of dollars of public funds over an extended period of years. 
Proceeding upon this assumption, the President and his foreign policy 
advisers from the earliest stages in the development of this'policy 
worked assiduously to generate support in Congress and among the 
public. Complications were anticipated by reason of the fact that 
economy-minded Republicans controlled both Houses of the Eightieth 
Congress. They were consciously striving to gain control of the 
Executive branch as well in the approaching 1948 elections. The public, 
plagued by inflation and shortages, very well could have revolted when 
requested to finance a massive foreign aid program such as was contem­
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plated in the Marshall proposal. In the considered Judgment of the 
President and his advisers^ the proposal embodied the course of action 
deemed most adequate to meet the immediate crisis in Europe and to 
serve the long-term interests of the United States. The major question, 
in these circumstances, was whether or not the mechanisms 'for decision­
making in the American governmental process were adequate to the re­
sponsibility placed upon them.
Officials of the Executive branch who were concerned with the 
development of the recovery program consulted with Congressional leaders 
of both parties throughout the formulâtive stages as well as during 
the period of Congressional consideration of the program. The Exec­
utive branch was subjected occasionally to the criticism that it ex­
pected bipartisanship on the part of Congress yet had failed to carry 
out an important aspect of bipartisanship, i.e., advance consultations 
with Congressional leaders of both parties— particularly the opposition—  
prior to such important decisions as the Truman Doctrine and Marshall 
Plan, Advance consultations did occur, in respect to the Truman Doctrine, 
prior to the announcement of the Government's decision. Admittedly, the 
consultations came after the decision had been made. There was no evidence 
of advance consultations prior to the announcement of the Marshall Plan: 
however, the activities of the Administration had become an open secret, 
and Congress itself was expressing concern with regard to Europe's pro­
blems. If the Government should be required to consult with Congress 
in advance of every decision in regard to foreign policy, any advantages 
associated with the Presidential system would be negatived. Foreign 
policy, in effect, then would be conducted by a committee. Even though
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he reflected chagrin at the "eleventh hour" consultation afforded 
Congressional leaders in the Greek-Turkish crisis, Senator Vandenberg 
realistically recognized the Congressional limits in foreign policy 
formulation.
President Truman created the Harriman, Nourse, and Krug 
Committees, ostensibly for the general purpose of determining if the 
United States could sustain the recovery program without serious in­
jury to its own economy but also to generate and mobilize public 
support for an Executive branch commitment which in fact already had 
been made. The Harriman Committee proved to be extremely useful in 
building support for the program among members of Congress, because 
of its composition of nationally prominent and respected businessmen, 
labor leaders, academicians, and others, who had ho official con­
nections with the Truman Administration. Although the President ex­
pressed a reluctance to call Congress into special session in the 
autumn of 19^7 for the purpose of considering additional aid for 
Austria, France, and Italy, since Congress was soon to receive the 
massive European Recovery Program, there is little question that the 
special session helped to dramatize even further the serious nature 
of the European economic crisis and to generate support for the pro­
posed solution. No effort was spared by the Executive branch in making 
available to the public high-ranking representatives of the Adminis­
tration to provide explanations of the proposed recovery program. The 
publicity given the hearings on the program before the Foreign Relations 
and Foreign Affairs committees undoubtedly assisted in creating and 
solidifying public support. Few hostile witnesses appeared against
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the legislation, yet representatives of most major and many minor special 
interest groups testified before one or both of the committees. The 
hearings served a worthwhile purpose, even though it is not likely 
that the thorough examination of the recovery program afforded there­
by changed the minds of many committee members. The hearings basically 
were educational in nature and purpose. They served to emphasize the 
overwhelming support by these interest groups to the general public 
and to members of Congress who were not members of the committees.
They provided a vehicle for the appearance of interested persons and 
groups before a legislative body and thereby to identify themselves as 
participants in the law-making process. The hearings afforded the 
Administration an opportunity to publicize its position widely and to 
gauge the public and Congressional reaction.
The efforts of the Executive branch to mobilize public and Con- 
gressional support for the recovery program were directed by top of­
ficials of the State Department, although the actual participants in 
developing the program for presentation to Congress included many 
representatives from several Executive departments and agencies. It 
was the responsibility of the State Department to guide the program 
through Congress. Although the details of planning and implementation 
were delegated to his subordinates, President Truman provided responsible 
leadership for the enterprise. He early recognized the mounting Euro­
pean problem and gave his approval to the initiation of studies designed 
to develop possible solutions. Once a plan of attack had been proposed, 
the full force of his Administration was placed into the effort to de­
velop the program for presentation to Congress and the people. The
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President made frequent appeals for public support, as did key members 
of his Administration, and constantly urged Congress to expeditious 
action on the recovery program. Because Congress was controlled by 
the Republicans, Mr. Truman ultimately depended upon their support 
for enactment of the program. The close personal relationship between 
Secretary Marshall and Senator Vandenberg helped in bridging the gap 
between the Republican Congress and the Democratic President,
One of the underlying purposes of the recovery program was, 
by extending an offer of its benefits to the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern European satellites, to ease the growing tension between the 
two giants of the postwar world. Throughout the development of the 
program and during the early stages of its consideration by Congress, 
officials of the Administration attempted to minimize any consideration 
of the program as an instrument in the Cold War. By its own actions, 
however, the Soviet Union made these efforts appear to be gestures of 
appeasement. With the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia 
in February, 19̂ 8, and with increasing Soviet intransigence in respect 
to the German problem, the recovery program increasingly came to be 
perceived as an instrument in the Cold War. Although continuing to 
stress that the program should be open to all European countries will­
ing to participate on a cooperative basis, the emphasis of the Adminis­
tration, in its urgent requests for expeditious action by Congress, 
began to shift to the importance of a strong and healthy Western Europe 
in the preservation of Western democracy. Before Congressional action 
had been completed on the recovery program, there was little question 
that it had become a weapon in the Cold War.
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Congress and its relevant committees--those concerned with 
foreign relations and appropriations--performed significant fimctions 
in regard to the implementation of the recovery program, vhereas their 
roles in its formulation were minor. The Congressional role in the 
formulation of the program was limited largely to the impetus given 
the Executive branch, and particularly the State Department, to act 
more expeditiously in initiating a proposal to meet the rapidly de­
veloping European economic crisis by reason of the evident Congres­
sional disquietude in relation to recurrent Executive branch requests 
for foreign relief appropriations. Congress itself was displaying an 
interest in the European situation, as indicated by its creation of 
the Select Committee on Foreign Aid (Herter Committee), and the Ex­
ecutive branch feared that it might be forced into an unworkable or 
embarrassing position if it did not act quickly. The findings and 
conclusions of the Herter Committee were invaluable to the Adminis­
tration in that a reservoir of support for the principle of the re­
covery program was created in Congress. The Herter Committee, as well 
as individual members of Congress, traveled to Europe during the sum­
mer and fall of 19^7 in order to make firsthand observations of the 
situation. As a result, the committee advanced its o t o  proposal for 
solution of Europe's ills. That it was not accepted by Congress was 
of less importance than the fact that members of the committee sup­
ported the basic principle of the proposed recovery program.
Although one motive underlying the creation of the Herter Com­
mittee was the desire of the House Republican leadership to demonstrate 
the new influence of the House of Representatives in foreign affairs,
331
thus reflecting an element of rivalry between it and the Senate and 
Administration, there was much evidence of close cooperation between 
the Executive branch and Congress throughout the formulâtive stages 
of the recovery program. Beginning with Senator Vandenberg's proposal 
leading to the creation of the Harriman Committee, this cooperation 
included frequent and close consultations between Vandenberg and Secre­
tary of State Marshall; exchanges of information and consultations 
between Executive branch officials and personnel engaged in the plan­
ning of various aspects of the recovery program and the staffs of the 
Congressional committees concerned; and State Department briefings for 
members of the Foreign Relations Committee. There were evidences of 
rivalry, as well, between Congress and the Executive branch and between 
the two Houses of Congress and their committees. Congress jealously 
guards its prerogatives as a separate branch of the Federal Government. 
It constantly fears encroachments by the Executive upon its domain.
This was a period in which Congress, under Republican leadership, was 
attempting to regain its stature in relation to the Executive branch.
A jealous watch prevails also between the two Houses of Congrsss--and 
their committees— to insure that one does not invade the domain of 
the other. Joint hearings on the recovery program would have expedited 
Congressional consideration of the matter, yet jealousy between the 
Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs committees prevented such an oc­
currence. Historically, the House had been overshadowed by the Senate 
and its august Foreign Relations Committee in the area of foreign re­
lations, because of the constitutional role of the upper House in the 
treaty process and in the confirmation of ambassadorial appointments.
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In regard to the recovery program, however, the House considered it­
self an equal of the Senate, and it vra.s determined to assert that 
equality. If maintained within limits, rivalry or competition can 
produce some beneficial results. Thus, the Congressional stirrings 
in regard to the European situation prompted the Executive branch to 
more expeditious action. The House insistence on a comprehensive view 
of foreign aid requests gave Congress and the public an impression 
as to the demands beyond the recovery program. The determination of 
the House to assert its equality with the Senate led to the creation 
of the Herter Committee and to a better informed House of Represen­
tatives in respect to the problem at hand.
The examination of the Congressional role in the formulation 
and implementation of the recovery program demonstrated that Congress 
can force a policy upon the President, however undesirable or incon­
sistent, if it has sufficient bargaining power. In its attempts to 
include Spain in the recovery program, the House could not enforce its 
will upon the Senate and the Administration. In this effort, the 
House Republican leadership threatened the unity of the Republican 
Party in a crucial election year and, in the end, was forced to bow 
to the internationalists and more practical politicians within the 
party. The President, in addition, demonstrated that under no circum­
stances would he accept this provision in the bill. With regard to the 
omnibus treatment of foreign aid legislation, and particularly in re­
gard to the provision of economic and military aid to China, the House 
Republican leadership was in a position to force the acceptance of its 
demands. Not only was it capitalizing on the growing anti-Communist
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sentiment in Congress and the nation, but also it was willing to gamble 
that Vandenberg and the Administration would capitulate on these issues 
rather than risk time-consuming delays in implementing the recovery 
program. On the other hand, the House Republican leadership seriously 
miscalculated the temper of Congress and the nation in its attempt to 
force a drastic reduction in the recovery program appropriations measure.
There were unwarranted delays in Congressional consideration of 
the recovery legislation and the accompanying appropriations measure, 
primarily in the House and its committees. Some of these delays were 
occasioned by the mechanics of the legislative process and some by the 
sheer obstinacy of important Congressional figures. Of course, the time 
factor may not have been as critical as was expressed by the Adminis­
tration. Months were spent by the Executive branch and by elements in 
Congress in preparing the groundwork for the recovery program. Weeks 
were consumed in conducting Congressional hearings and debates on the 
legislation. Unnecessary delays were occasioned, first, by the slow­
ness in which hearings were initiated on the appropriations measure and, 
second, by the protracted proceedings before the House Appropriations 
subcommittee which conducted the hearings. Despite the length Of those 
hearings, and the depth to which the subcommittee probed into the de­
tails of the recovery program, the subcommittee's report bore little 
relationship to the testimony received from expert Government witnesses. 
With little Justification, the subcommittee recommended, and its parent 
committee and the House adopted, a drastic reduction in funds for the 
recovery program. Apparently, the House Republican leadership, in a 
last desperate bid to defeat the recovery program, hoped to capitalize
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upon the desire of House members to adjourn and return to their con­
stituencies for the coming campaign and upon its knowledge that many 
members ; in the initial voting on the authorization measure, had ex­
pressed explicit hopes or expectations that the Appropriations Com­
mittee would examine the program thoroughly before recommending the 
appropriation of the full amount authorized. Although the members of 
the appropriations committees are sometimes looked upon in awe with 
respect to government finances, the recommended reductions in the ap­
propriations for the recovery program appeared to be based as much 
upon inherent animosity toward the program as upon an unbiased inter­
pretation of the facts - presented to the subcommittee. The House re­
duction was in fact an attempted reversal of Congressional policy. Its 
action was based on no new information indicating that the need of 
Europe for assistance had lessened since the approval of the basic 
authorization measure. On the contrary,'the situation had grown more 
serious, due to an inability to plan adequately because of the lack of 
assured funds. The action indicated a lack of responsible leadership.
It also indicated irresponsibility on the part of the members who voted 
for the initial authorization on the basis of expectations that it would 
be reduced by the Appropriations Committee and that the onus for any 
such reduction could be placed on that committee. The reduction was 
based as much on guesswork as on staff-work. The subcommittee had 
neither the staff nor the time to analyze every detail of the data sub­
mitted to it--much of which already had been submitted to the committees 
concerned with the authorization measure and which they readily admitted 
was much too massive for full comprehension. Yet, after study, they--
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and Congress-overwhelmingly accepted the basic policy involved, and 
recommended the appropriations requested by the Administration.
It is debatable whether the duplications involved in the 
labyrinthine Congressional hearings are completely justified. Much 
valuable time is lost by administrators in appearing, first, before 
two legislative committees, and then before two appropriations com­
mittees. Invariably, identical ground is traversed— in quadruplicate. 
In this case, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees were 
skeptical of the examinations of the proposed recovery program by the 
relevant legislative committees and refused to accept 'their recom­
mendations without further elaborate studies. So long as there are 
two Houses of Congress, this will be a problem in the implementation 
of public policy. It appears, however, that joint hearings could 
be utilized effectively in crisis situations without doing irreparable 
harm to the checks and balances principle, so long as the Executive 
branch exercises responsibility in defining such situations.
Under the guidance of Senator Vandenberg, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee was most effective in conducting public hearings 
on the recovery legislation and in expediting its consideration by the 
Senate, despite the organized opposition of the isolationist element.
No amendments unacceptable to the committee were adopted by the Senate. 
The prestige and influence of most of its members among the Senate was 
obviously great, and this fact was an argument used by non-members in 
support of the bill during Senate debate. The hearings before Vanden­
berg 's committee were more restrained, better organized, and conducted 
more responsibly than were the hearings before the Foreign Affairs Com-
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mittee where, at times, leadership was lacking. The influence of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee in the House could almost be predicted on 
the basis of the partisan, divisive bickering that characterized its
hearings. At times the committee lost control of the bill during the
/
House debate. Several amendments were adopted over the objections of 
committee spokesmen and later had to be deleted in conference. The 
committee had no influence when the drastically reduced appropriations 
measure was forced through the House. On the other hand, the influence 
of Vandenberg and certain other members of his committee was strong 
enough to force a restoration of the reduction in the Senate.
The most significant Congressional change in the recovery legis­
lation was adopted at -the insistence of Vandenberg and the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. Vandenberg and other Republicans, as well as some 
Democrats, objected to the administrative formula for ERP advanced by 
the Administration on the grounds that the Economic Cooperation Adminis­
tration could not effectively execute its mission as a mere adjunct of 
the State Department. Although agreeing that the Secretary of State 
should at all times have direction and control of the nation's foreign 
policy, as the President's agent, Vandenberg insisted that the day-to-day 
operations of EGA should be free of the State Department bureaucracy and 
that the Administrator should be free to conduct the operations according 
to his best judgment, subject to the requirement that he consult with the 
Secretary of State and that matters of disagreement be carried to the 
President for resolution. Once this matter was resolved by the Foreign 
Relations Committee, it generated no further controversy. The Adminis­
tration accepted the decision and did not view it as a major defeat.
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Likewise, the House Foreign Affairs Committee accepted this as s. satis­
factory resolution of the problem. Although this change in the ad­
ministrative aspects of the recovery program did no violence to the 
basic soundness of the Administration's proposal, the events surround­
ing this alteration reflect the persistent Congressional effort to in­
fluence policy. The objective in this instance was to deprive the 
State Department of effective control of EGA and in effect deprive the 
President of direct control of an instrument of American foreign policy.
The Foreign Affairs Committee, perhaps inadvertently (since 
its aged Chairman Eaton strongly favored the recovery program), aided 
the conservative House Republican leadership in delaying final action 
on the recovery program by virtue of its insistence on conducting hear­
ings on all aspects of foreign aid simultaneously with consideration 
of ERP. Despite the political overtones, a useful purpose was served 
in that the Administration for the first time had to present Congress 
a comprehensive picture of expected foreign aid requests.
The Congressional leadership afforded by Senator Vandenberg 
was indispensable to the Administration. Vandenberg had made the 
valuable suggestion leading to the creation of the non-official Harriman 
Committee, arguing that it would have an important influence on Congres­
sional thinking. He gauged the temper of Congress accurately in ad­
vising the Administration not to insist upon its request for a full $17 
billion authorization for the four years of the program. He devised a 
scheme whereby the first year's appropriation ostensibly was reduced, 
although no actual reduction occurred. Without his influence among 
Senate Republicans, the story of the Marshall Plan might have ended
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differently--with all other factors remaining equal. Since Congress 
was controlled by the Republicans, their support was essential. By his 
ability to compromise on minor points without making concessions of 
principle, he was able both to hold a majority of the Senate Republicans 
to his cause and temper some of the "revisionist" opposition. Because 
of his own relatively recent conversion to internationalism, he undoubtedly 
continued to retain the respect of and a certain amount of influence 
among the diehard isolationists of his party. Although his influence 
among House Republicans was debatable, it was not negligible. The 
Republican leadership of both Houses was conservative. In the Senate, the 
Whip and Acting Majority Leader--Wherry, led the opposition against the 
recovery program. Senator Taft, Chairman of the Majority Policy Committee, 
consistently endeavored to reduce the ERP authorization and could see 
no validity for the program save as a weapon in the struggle against 
Communism. After offering every obstacle to passage of the recovery 
measure, the House Republican leadership capitulated only when con­
fronted with the possibility that the party split over foreign policy 
would be fought to a disastrous conclusion at the National Convention 
for selection of its Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. The 
prospects for winning control not only of Congress but also of the 
Presidency were too bright to risk tfieir Jeopardy by internecine party 
strife.
Even with Vandenberg's leadership of the Republicans, the re­
covery program could not have become a reality without the support given 
the President by members of his own party. There were no mass defections 
of Southern Democrats, as had been feared. There actually was no dis-
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cernible pattern'to be found among the few Democrats who opposed the 
program. The heightening concern relative to the future course of 
American relations with the Soviet Union apparently was of greater 
significance than the civil rights issue in determining the votes of 
Southern Democrats. There was no secret, furthermore, that ERP would 
be of great importance to agricultural sections of the country, as well 
as to other economic interests.
Pressure groups without question contributed to the overwhelming 
passage of the recovery legislation and helped to determine the final 
character of the program. The shipping interests were assured that they 
would be called upon to transport a guaranteed amount of the recovery 
materials sent from the United States to Europe. Surplus Government- 
owned merchant vessels would not be transferred or sold to the partici­
pating nations to offer competition in other trading areas of the world. 
Agricultural products in surplus were assured of foreign markets. A 
large proportion of the overall expenditures for food, materials, and 
equipment under the program vrould be made in the United States. There 
were expressed fears of adding to the inflationary forces already 
present in the domestic economy, yet these fears were easily overcome 
by the possibilities for expanding the economy through the proposed 
massive infusion of public spending. Support came from many groups, how­
ever, who could not expect to benefit materially from enactment of the 
recovery program. Many of them attempted to influence Congress directly 
and many indirectly through educational efforts at the grass-roots level. 
Many of these groups continued to exert pressure, particularly the pres­
tigious Committee for the Marshall Plan, until action had been completed
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on the ERP appropriations measure. Pressure group activity in op­
position to the program was minimal.
Although there were occasional evidences of public apathy in 
respect to the European crisis and the proposed recovery program, this 
was not unusual in view of the extended period during which the problem 
was under consideration. The major concern of the average citizen ap­
pears to be the ordering of his own private universe. He moves out of 
this apathetic state, ordinarily,only when prompted by an unusual event 
which is brought forcibly to his attention. His sustained interest, 
therefore, is not directed toward analysis and solution of world problems. 
In general, the Administration, its Congressional allies, and the opin­
ion leaders among the diverse groups constituting the general public 
were effective in generating and sustaining an interest in and support 
for the recovery program. The proponents of ERP were aided materially 
by the news media, which not only generally endorsed the recovery program 
but also gave it good coverage throughout the general period of its 
development and consideration.
It was not completely unexpected that isolationism would be a 
factor in the Congressional decision on the recovery program. Congress 
was controlled by the Republicans, whose voting records in the recent past 
were much less internationalist than that of the Democrats. Although the 
Truman Doctrine and the recovery program were born in an atmosphere of 
growing international crisis, the country was not engaged in actual war; 
thus the patriotism of a member of Congress could not be challenged on 
the basis of a negative vote on these measures. The fact of serious 
domestic inflation permitted legitimate questions to be raised as to
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the possible effect of the recovery program upon the domestic economy. 
Many members of Congress who initially attacked the recovery program 
largely on isolationist grounds ultimately supported it because of their 
apparent convictions that the United States was destined for inevitable 
conflict with the Soviet Union. Such isolationists became, in fact, 
aggressive internationalists who inconsistently opposed the recovery 
program because of its alleged dangers to the domestic economy yet 
stridently charged the Soviet Union with perpetrating the European 
crisis and demanded an expansion of American armed forces as the only 
sensible American response to the European challenge. The Congressional 
isolationists consisted largely of Republicans from the Midwestern, 
Plains,and Mountain regions of the United States, which was no great 
deviation from the traditional pattern. After the war, it had been 
speculated that isolationism was defunct in the United States, in view 
of the role of this nation in creating and activating the United Nations 
and the overwhelming Congressional acceptance of the organization. The 
reemergence of a strong isolationist sentiment in Congress during con­
sideration of ERP reflected a weariness with complex world problems 
and a desire to return to simple and easy solutions. It is likely that 
such an element will be present always in American politics, considering 
the nature of the governmental system and the diversities of the nation's 
economic and social life. Particularly will this sentiment be present 
during periods' of relative international stability.
As long as the American governmental system remains as presently 
constituted, the Executive branch. Congress, and the public each will 
have an area of responsibility and concern relative to the content and
3^2
direction of American foreign policy. This study has developed no 
radical departures in respect to the formulation of foreign policy.
This responsibility is a primary function of and vas exercised in 
this case by the Executive branch--by the President and the broad 
array of foreign policy advisers serving him. The broad participation 
of different elements within the Executive branch, Congress, and among 
the public in the development of the Marshall Plan and its legislative 
embodiment, reflects the general complexity of policy formulation and 
implementation in the American democracy. It well illustrates the 
necessity for cooperation and the inevitability of compromise in 
achieving a proper functioning of the system.
So long as legislation and appropriations are required to 
implement foreign policy, the consent of Congress and, by implication, 
the public obviously are indispensable. If such consent is mandatory, 
then Congress becomes a legitimate Joint participant in the implemen­
tation of policy and there can be no valid criticisms if it refuses 
to accept a proposal of the Executive branch or if it offers proposed 
alternatives--so long as Congress and its oommittses have proceeded 
to examine the proposition in a responsible manner. If Congress does 
have a legitimate function to perform in the area of foreign policy, 
it can perform that function responsibly only when it is well-informed. 
The examination of the European Recovery Program indicated that al­
though the Executive branch endeavored to keep Congress and its com­
mittees well-informed, and even though Congress acted independently in 
developing its own sources of information. Congress ultimately remains 
dependent upon the Executive branch for much of its knowledge about the
3̂ +3
world of foreign policy.
Congressional dependence upon the Executive branch for much of 
its information relative to foreign policy was not the major weakness 
in the Congressional decision-making apparatus reflected by this study.
In the final analysis, that weakness was shown to be the inordinate 
length of time required to implement a major foreign policy decision 
once general agreement upon its contents had been reached among the 
participants. Policies which are destined to have a major impact on 
the course of the nation for an Indefinite period must of necessity be 
based upon a general consensus, which requires a study of the impli­
cations and a debate of the issues. Time'for reaching this consensus 
was certainly afforded in regard to the Marshall Plan and the European 
Recovery Program. From conceptualization to reality, the Marshall Plan 
required a period of slightly more than twelve months. The early months, 
of course, were consumed in a careful planning of the program and in 
its preparation for submission to Congress. Delays began to occur, 
however, after Introduction of the necessary legislation before Congress. 
There, the legislation had to travel the tortuous route of hearings 
before the appropriate legislative committees of each House; debates 
before each House; conference committee; and consideration of the con­
ference report by each House. Then, in order for the program to be 
financed, the process of hearings and debates had to be repeated, with 
the focus now on the appropriations committees.
This criticism is directed not so much at the time-consuming and 
time-honored procedures which, to an extent, contribute to the inability 
of Congress to function more efficiently, but at those aspects of the
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system which place so much power in the hands of strategically-placed 
individuals, without accompanying responsibility. As frustrâtingly 
slow as the Congressional system is, it did permit, more than three 
months after introduction of the legislation, a decision with regard 
to the recovery program. Based on the vote, that decision was over­
whelming in its approval of the program. In the face of this approval, 
an element of the House leadership, consisting of individuals who had 
reflected consistent opposition to the program, was almost successful 
in thwarting the expressed will of Congress, This group, in addition, 
was acting in direct opposition to the sentiments of the leaders of 
its party outside Congress.
The story of the Marshall Plan is centered upon individuals—  
within the Executive branch, within Congress> and among the groups 
constituting the public--functioning within and through institutions. 
Institutions--the mechanisms for channelling the actions of individuals-- 
functioned well in the Executive branch but poorly in Congress. Polit­
ical parties, as legitimate and useful institutions within the American 
political system, had a negligible role in the story of the Marshall 
Plan. Although political parties certainly were involved in the con­
sideration of the recovery program, the emphasis throughout was on bi­
partisanship. In the Senate, the. burden was carried by Senator Vanden­
berg, acting in a bipartisan--or, as he termed it, "nonpartisan"-- 
capacity. His major opposition came from within his own party. Two of 
the major Senate Republican leaders--Taft and Wherry--opposed the pro­
gram. The Senate Democratic Policy Committee refused to take a position 
on the Marshall Plan, lest it be charged with injecting partisan con-
3^5
sidérations into the matter. Much time was consumed by partisan bick­
ering, with several Democrats availing themselves of the opportunity 
to attack the Administration and particularly the State Department.
In respect to the European Recovery Program as it was being 
considered in Congress, the political parties nominally directing the 
energies and activities of that institution failed to fun.ction as re­
sponsible parties. There were no decisions by either Congressional 
party binding upon its membership. Had such decisions been forthcoming 
early in the Congressional consideration of ERF, mechanisms were avail­
able for their enforcement. However, Speaker Martin, Majority Leader 
Halleck, Rules Committee Chairman Allen, and Appropriations Committee 
Chairman Taber, acting at times in concert but not in response to a 
decision of their Congressional party, were free to utilize their 
strategic positions in an effort to overturn the will of the entire 
Congress, They utilized their official leadership positions and the 
recovery program in an effort to wrest control of the Republican Party 
from the despised-internationalists. Foreign policy, and the well-being 
of the nation, apparently, were secondary in their considerations. This 
is in no manner intended to be a criticism of those who opposed the re­
covery program simply because they were in opposition. Opposition to 
the program was expected. Under the American democratic system, the 
right to oppose is held as sacred. However, even in opposition there 
should be responsibility.
Even when the nominal leaders of the House had conceded the 
futility of their continued obstructionism, valuable time was consumed 
in overcoming the resistance of Appropriations Committee Chairman Taber,
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Even here, there were no sanctions which dould he effectively employed 
against Taber. Implementation of the recovery program had to 8,wait 
Taber's realization of the utter hopelessness of his position. Involved 
here was the venerable institution of seniority, by which members of 
Congress attain positions of power, rather than by some rational, in­
stitutionalized process of selection— a process which by implication 
would involve as well a method of discipline and control. This factor 
of seniority also was involved in the protracted hearings on the autho­
rization measure before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Chairman Eaton, 
although a supporter of the legislation, was approaching his eightieth 
birthday and had frequent absences from the hearings. Without con­
sistent leadership, the committee thus was subjected to a variety of 
influences, resulting in an unnecessary delay of House consideration of 
the recovery program.
Congress, therefore, has a legitimate role to fulfill in the 
implementation of foreign policy. In carrying out this role it is 
capable of influencing the content and execution of foreign policy. As 
the role of the United States in world affairs continues to expand, the 
role of Congress will likewise expand. If it is to fulfill its role 
responsibly, efficiently, and expeditiously, it must examine its own 
mechanisms for action. Under the American system of government, any 
foreign policy proposals requiring expenditures of public funds will 
and should be subjected to the close scrutiny of Congress and its com­
mittees. The committee system is a rational means for expediting the 
massive Congressional workload. That workload, and fulfillment of 
Congressional responsibility, could be further expedited by e strengthen­
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ing of the decision-making institutions of Congress. No better mechanism 
could be utilized than the already-existing party structures. If Con­
gressional parties should be made responsible, then the efficiency and 
responsibility of other institutions of Congress would be increased. 
Without enforcement of party responsibility. Congress cannot continue 
to enjoy the questionable luxury of its venerable seniority system.
But if Congress is to fulfill with responsibility its increasing burden 
in the nuclear age, it must reexamine its inner structure and practices. 
It must do more than react defensively and charge the Executive branch 
with usurping its powers. It must continue to provide a forum for. a 
thorough debate and examination of the issues. It cannot, however, con­
tinue to justify indecisiveness, unnecessary delays, or irresponsible 
obstructionism as essential ingredients of the legislative process.
Although much has been spoken and written about the principle 
of separation of powers, this study has demonstrated the interrelated­
ness of the various components of the American system of government. The 
parts do not operate in a vacuum. Each is dependent to' an extent upon 
the others for a proper exercise of its own powers and responsibilities. 
Similarly, interrelationships exist between the formal institutions of 
government and the informal institutions of society. Thus, the President 
and Congress ultimately must consult the public and its many segments in 
the making of decisions. The President and his advisers must take the 
initiative in matters of foreign policy, since neither Congress nor the 
public is equipped adequately for this task. Although the public looks 
to the President for guidance in matters of foreign policy, it does not 
feel bound to accept his initiatives at face value. Elements within the
3 ^
public at large will have very definite convictions or interests in re­
gard to matters of foreign policy, based upon economic, political, or 
other grounds. Some of these elements will reflect altruistic interests, 
while others will aspire to fulfill basically selfish and material wants. 
They will endeavor to convert their convictions or interests into con­
crete realities or advantages. Theoretically, out of the resulting inter­
actions of interests will emerge the public good. Whether good or bad, 
this is a description of the American system of interrelations between 
the formal institutions of government and the society at large. The 
pattern is similar in the making of foreign policy or in matters of purely 
domestic concern. Ordinarly, foreign policy matters will not arouse so 
intense an interest among special interest groups as was the case in re­
spect to the European Recovery Program. The recovery program, however, 
was destined to have a large impact on the diverse American society. Its 
advantages and disadvantages were readily apparent to affected groups 
and individuals. So long as the United States remains basically a demo­
cratic nation, these interrelationships between Congress, the Executive 
branch, and the public will continue to be a vital part of the function­
ing of its decision-making process. Although compromise is an essential 
ingredient in the proper functioning of the American system, the President 
and the Congress must strive constantly to define and uphold the general 
interest. Continuous care and attention toward improving the mechanisms 
for foreign policy decision-making are mandatory in order to adequately 
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